Defense and Security

Adam Nossiter has published a thought-provoking article in the April 29, 2015, New York Times. He comments on the silence of African leaders regarding the deaths of scores of African boat people who were trying to cross the Mediterranean in search of a better life. While it is true that many of the Mediterranean boat people are from Syria, Afghanistan, and other parts of the world, the majority are African. Nossiter quotes the chairwoman of the African Union commission, South African Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, as expressing her “condolences.” To me, that is a trivial reaction to an African tragedy, which, one might have thought, exposes an issue that would be a central concern of the African Union. Nossiter also reports similarly weak statements from other African leaders. European civil society indignation and calls for their governments to “do something,” even if sometimes dysfunctional, lacks an echo among African political classes and elites. African governments simply seem to be disengaged from the tragedy. Part of the reason for this disengagement may be an African lack of capacity. Few African states can control the flow of people across their borders. Many, if not most, have weak bureaucratic institutions and underdeveloped civil services. Disengagement may also reflect elite detachment from their own people. The drivers for Africans to take to the boats appear to be poverty and the lack of opportunity, underpinned by poor governance. But, economic and social development as well as improvement in governance and accountability are not simple tasks and take a long time to achieve. The African boat people are a rebuke to the popular, undifferentiated narrative of “Africa Rising.” In too many parts of Africa, nominally high rates of economic growth go hand in hand with increasing poverty and desperation. So, if they can, many Africans will take to the boats, believing that life in a European camp is preferable to staying home.

The debate over cybersecurity is heating up again in Washington. Congress is considering multiple pieces of legislation intended to enhance the ability of the private sector and government to share information about digital threats. Meanwhile, the White House has put forth its own proposal, which diverges from those measures on major issues.  Keeping track of all the legislative measures can be confusing. In this video, I provide some background on three things you need to know about the debate on cybersecurity information sharing.

This is a guest post by Alex Dick-Godfrey, Assistant Director, Studies administration for the Council on Foreign Relations Studies Program. In the past five years, the Somali jihadist group al-Shabaab has lost most of its senior leadership, surrendered its control of southern Somalia, and seen its cash flow shrink. The group has certainly seen better times. But as the success of recent attacks in Kenya and Mogadishu indicate, the group is regaining some of its previous stature but as a fundamentally different group. Al-Shabaab is now more decentralized and has a larger geographic focus. Given regional dynamics, an inept Kenyan security response, refugee flows from Yemen, and a diminished United States presence, this new embodiment of al-Shabaab is becoming increasingly difficult to counter. Internal shifts began in 2013. Infighting among various factions coupled with a series of catastrophic military defeats at the hands of international forces caused the group to change its structure and priorities. Al-Shabaab evolved from an organization with clear leadership to a more decentralized, diffuse organization, in part thanks to a degradation of core leadership due to U.S. drone strikes. With the shift in leadership, the organization’s goals became more ambiguous. Instead of seeking to rule Somalia, it is principally seeking to spoil the political process in Somalia and disrupt governance in East Africa. The emergent version of al-Shabaab no longer engages in traditional warfare, instead it focuses on asymmetric warfare, showing willingness to conduct audacious and horrific attacks. As it loses ground in Somalia, it has started to look to targets in Kenya, and even Tanzania. Despite the fact that al-Shabaab’s reorganization was largely reactive and unplanned, it has positioned the group well to effectively disrupt Somali politics. Beyond the structural changes of the group, Kenyan domestic policies have helped al-Shabaab. Anemic responses to the West Gate Mall and Garissa University attacks by the authorities vividly illustrate how inept Kenya has been at responding to al-Shabaab’s updated tactics. More importantly, however, the Kenyan domestic security reaction has been counterproductive. In the wake of recent attacks, the Kenyan government announced that it plans to forcibly displace several hundred thousand Somali refugees from northern Kenya by closing the Dadaab refugee camp. They also plan to erect an Israeli style wall on the Kenya-Somalia boarder. Provocative policies like these will likely exacerbate tensions between the government and the two million ethnic Somalis living in Kenya. Al-Shabaab will, as it always has, take advantage of such a golden recruitment opportunity. The broader global context is also benefiting al-Shabaab’s cause. News on the self-proclaimed Islamic State and Boko Haram has dominated media headlines and captured the world’s focus. This not only gives al-Shabaab breathing room to continue its resurgence, but it incentivizes al-Shabaab to conduct more shocking attacks to compete with these groups for foreign recruits and airtime. Refugees fleeing renewed conflict in Yemen may also provide a boost to al-Shabaab. The influx could destabilize Somalia, potentially allowing al-Shabaab to return to previous strongholds. In a worst-case scenario, al-Shabaab could have a fresh population to terrorize and recruit. Perhaps most worryingly, the United States has probably lost the willingness to alter events in the Horn of Africa. The Islamic State and Boko Haram pose a greater geopolitical threat compared to al-Shabaab which operates in East Africa, an area where the United States has fewer vital interests. Even comparatively low cost countermeasures, such as drone strikes, will become less useful as the group becomes more decentralized, diffuse, and covers a wider geographic area. Al-Shabaab will continue its current pattern of attacks, likely undeterred by the United States. Coupled with Kenya’s inability to deter the group and a favorable global context, al-Shabaab looks like a more dangerous threat than even at the height of its power.

Last month, I did a series of posts commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the arrival of U.S. combat troops in Vietnam on March 8, 1965. Today marks another significant date in the Vietnam War: the fortieth anniversary of the Fall of Saigon. To mark that anniversary, here are forty quotes that tell the story of the Vietnam War. “All men are created equal; they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights; among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness.”—The first lines of the Vietnamese Declaration of Independence, issued on September 2, 1945, quoting the American Declaration of Independence. “You can kill ten of my men for every one I kill of yours. But even at those odds, you will lose and I will win.” —Viet Minh leader Ho Chi Minh in a warning to French colonialists in 1946. “Our long-term objectives are… to see installed a self-governing nationalist state which will be friendly to the US… We have an immediate interest in maintaining in power a friendly French Government, to assist in the furtherance of our aims in Europe. This immediate and vital interest has in consequence taken precedence over active steps looking toward the realization of our objectives in Indochina.” —Department of State, “Policy Statement on Indochina,” issued on September 27, 1948, explaining why the United States supported French policy in Vietnam even though U.S. officials believed it ran counter to their long-term objectives for the region. “You have a row of dominoes set up; you knock over the first one, and what will happen to the last one is that it will go over very quickly.” —President Dwight D. Eisenhower speaking at a press conference on April 7, 1954. “Well, Lyndon, they may be every bit as intelligent as you say, but I’d feel a whole lot better if just one of them had run for sheriff once.” —House Speaker Sam Rayburn (D-TX) speaking to Lyndon B. Johnson in January 1961 after the newly inaugurated vice president extolled the brilliance of the members of President John F. Kennedy’s new cabinet. “Now we have a problem in trying to make our power credible, and Vietnam looks like the place.” —President John Kennedy in a June 1961 interview with the New York Times reporter James Reston. “If the Buddhists wish to have another barbecue, I’ll gladly supply the gasoline and a match.” —Tran Le Xuan, better known as Madame Nhu or “the Dragon Lady,” dismissing the fact that Buddhist monks had set themselves on fire in the summer of 1963 to protest the rule of her brother-in-law, South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem, for whom she acted as an unofficial first lady. “I don’t think that unless a greater effort is made by the government to win popular support that the war can be won out there. In the final analysis, it is their war. They are the ones who have to win it or lose it. We can help them, we can give them equipment, we can send our men out there as advisors, but they have to win it, the people of Vietnam, against the communists.” —President John Kennedy in a televised interview with Walter Cronkite on September 2, 1963. “I am not going to lose Vietnam. I am not going to be the president who saw Southeast Asia go the way China went.” —Newly inaugurated President Lyndon Johnson at a White House meeting on November 24, 1963 responding to U.S. ambassador to South Vietnam Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. telling him that Vietnam “would go under any day if we don’t do something.” “There is nothing in the resolution, as I read it, that contemplates [sending American armies to Vietnam]. I agree with the Senator that that is the last thing we would want to do. However, the language of the resolution would not prevent it. It would authorize whatever the Commander in Chief feels is necessary.” —Senator William Fulbright (D-AR) during the Senate debate on August 6, 1964 over the passage of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. “I believe this resolution to be a historic mistake. I believe that within the next century, future generations will look with dismay and great disappointment upon a Congress which is now about to mistake such a historic mistake.”—Senator Wayne Morse (D-OR) on the Senate’s impending vote to adopt the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution on August 7, 1964. “We are not about to send American boys nine or ten thousand miles away from home to do what Asian boys ought to be doing for themselves.” —President Lyndon Johnson in a speech at Akron University on October 21, 1964, two weeks before the presidential election. “We do this [escalating U.S. military involvement in Vietnam] in order to slow down aggression. We do this to increase the confidence of the brave people of South Vietnam who have bravely born this brutal battle for so many years with so many casualties. And we do this to convince the leaders of North Vietnam—and all who seek to share their conquest—of a simple fact: We will not be defeated. We will not grow tired. We will not withdraw either openly or under the cloak of a meaningless agreement.”—President Lyndon Johnson, speaking to the nation on April 7, 1965 explaining his decision to send U.S. combat troops to Vietnam. “My solution to the problem would be to tell them frankly that they’ve got to draw in their horns and stop their aggression or we’re going to bomb them back into the Stone Ages.” —General Curtis E. LeMay, in his book Mission With LeMay, 1965. “I think we have all underestimated the seriousness of this situation. Like giving cobalt treatment to a terminal cancer case. I think a long protracted war will disclose our weakness, not our strength.”—Deputy Secretary of State George W. Ball answering President Lyndon Johnson’s questionat a White House meeting on July 21, 1965 about whether the United States could win a war in the “jungle rice-paddies” of Vietnam. “It’s silly talking about how many years we will have to spend in the jungles of Vietnam when we could pave the whole country and put parking stripes on it and still be home for Christmas.” —Ronald Reagan, October 10, 1965, interview with the Fresno Bee during his California gubernatorial campaign. “Declare the United States the winner and begin de-escalation.”—Senator George Aiken (R-VT) offering advice to President Lyndon Johnson on October 19, 1966 on how to handle the politics of reducing the U.S. commitment in Vietnam. “We seem bent upon saving the Vietnamese from Ho Chi Minh, even if we have to kill them and demolish their country to do it. I do not intend to remain silent in the face of what I regard as a policy of madness which, sooner or later, will envelop my son and American youth by the millions for years to come.” —Senator George McGovern (D-SD) speaking on the Senate floor on April 25, 1967. “We are fighting a war with no front lines, since the enemy hides among the people, in the jungles and mountains, and uses covertly border areas of neutral countries. One cannot measure [our] progress by lines on a map.”— General William C. Westmoreland, the commander of all U.S. military forces in Vietnam, in a speech to a joint session of Congress on April 28, 1967. “There may be a limit beyond which many Americans and much of the world will not permit the United States to go. The picture of the world’s greatest superpower killing or seriously injuring 1,000 non-combatants a week, while trying to pound a tiny, backward nation into submission on an issue whose merits are hotly disputed, is not a pretty one.” —Robert McNamara in a memo to President Lyndon Johnson on May 19, 1967. “Hey, Hey LBJ, How many kids did you kill today?” —A protest chant that first became popular in late 1967. “We have reached an important point where the end begins to come into view.” —General William C. Westmoreland speaking to the National Press Club on November 21, 1967 as part of a Johnson administration effort to shore up sagging public support for the war. “It became necessary to destroy the town to save it.” —AP correspondent Peter Arnett quoting a U.S. major on the decision to bomb and shell Ben Tre on February 7, 1968 after Viet Cong forces overran the city in the Mekong Delta forty-five miles south of Saigon during the Tet Offensive. “For it seems now more certain than ever, that the bloody experience of Vietnam is to end in a stalemate. To say that we are closer to victory today is to believe in the face of the evidence, the optimists who have been wrong in the past.” —Walter Cronkite in an editorial at the close of the CBS Evening News broadcast on February 27, 1968 reporting on what he had learned on a trip to Vietnam in the aftermath of the Tet Offensive. “Our objective in South Vietnam has never been the annihilation of the enemy. It has been to bring about a recognition in Hanoi that its objective—taking over the South by force—could not be achieved.” —President Lyndon Johnson in a nationwide address on March 31, 1968 explaining his decision to halt the bombing of North Vietnam. “I shall not seek and I will not accept the nomination of my party as your President.” —President Lyndon Johnson telling the nation on March 31, 1968 that he would not seek reelection. “The commitment of five hundred thousand Americans has settled the issue of the importance of Vietnam. For what is involved now is confidence in American promises.”—Incoming National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger writing in the January 1969 issue of Foreign Affairs. “The time has come when the United States, in our relations with all of our Asian friends, be quite emphatic on two points: One, that we will keep our treaty commitments… but, two, that as far as the problems of internal security are concerned, as far as the problems of military defense, except for the threat of a major power involving nuclear weapons, that the United States is going to encourage and has a right to expect that this problem will be increasingly handled by, and the responsibility for it taken by, the Asian nations themselves.”—President Richard M. Nixon speaking at an informal press conference on Guam on July 25, 1969 setting forth what becomes known as the Nixon Doctrine. "I refuse to believe that a little fourth-rate power like North Vietnam doesn’t have a breaking point." —National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger speaking in July 1969 to NSC aides as he charged them with developing a punitive military strategy that would coerce North Vietnam into negotiating on American terms. “And so tonight—to you, the great silent majority of my fellow Americans—I ask for your support.” —President Richard Nixon in his address to the nation on the war in Vietnam on November 3, 1969. “Let us understand: North Vietnam cannot defeat or humiliate the United States. Only Americans can do that.”—President Richard Nixon in his address to the nation on the war in Vietnam on November 3, 1969. "If, when the chips are down, the world’s most powerful nation, the United States of America, acts like a pitiful, helpless giant, the forces of totalitarianism and anarchy will threaten free nations and free institutions throughout the world.”—President Richard Nixon in a nationwide address on April 30, 1970 explaining his decision to invade Cambodia. “This war has already stretched the generation gap so wide that it threatens to pull the country apart.” —Senator Frank Church (D-ID) speaking on the Senate floor on May 13, 1970. “The United States, which brought these actions to enjoin publication in the New York Times and in the Washington Post of certain classified material, has not met the ‘heavy burden of showing justification for the enforcement of such a [prior] restraint.’" —U.S. Supreme Court ruling on June 30, 1971 overturning the injunction barring the New York Times and the Washington Post from publishing the Pentagon Papers. "The bastards have never been bombed like they’re going to be bombed this time." —President Richard Nixon to White House Chief of Staff H.R. "Bob" Haldeman and Attorney General John Mitchell on April 4, 1972 in deciding to launch what would become known as Operation Linebacker,a massive escalation in the war effort that that included mining Haiphong harbor, blockading the North Vietnamese coast, and launching a massive new bombing campaign against North Vietnam. “Come home to the affirmation that we have a dream. Come home to the conviction that we can move our country forward.”—Senator George McGovern (D-SD) in his address accepting the presidential nomination at the Democratic National Convention on July 14, 1972. “We believe that peace is at hand.” —National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger speaking at a White House press conference about the Paris Peace negotiations on October 26, 1972, two weeks before the presidential election. “I have asked for this radio and television time tonight for the purpose of announcing that we today have concluded an agreement to end the war and bring peace with honor in Vietnam and in Southeast Asia.”—Richard Nixon informing the American public in a nationwide address on January 23, 1973 that the United States had reached agreement with North Vietnam on the Paris Peace Accords. “Today, America can regain the sense of pride that existed before Vietnam. But it cannot be achieved by refighting a war that is finished as far as America is concerned. As I see it, the time has come to look forward to an agenda for the future, to unify, to bind up the Nation’s wounds, and to restore its health and its optimistic self-confidence…. We, of course, are saddened indeed by the events in Indochina. But these events, tragic as they are, portend neither the end of the world nor of America’s leadership in the world.” —President Gerald R. Ford in a speech at Tulane University on April 23, 1975. “During the day on Monday, Washington time, the airport at Saigon came under persistent rocket as well as artillery fire and was effectively closed. The military situation in the area deteriorated rapidly. I therefore ordered the evacuation of all American personnel remaining in South Vietnam.” —President Gerald Ford’s statement announcing the evacuation of United States personnel from the Republic of Vietnam on April 29, 1975. Rachael Kauss and Alex Laplaza assisted in the preparation of this post.

Coauthored with Naomi Egel, research associate in the International Institutions and Global Governance program at the Council on Foreign Relations. Although ongoing negotiations with Iran have captured global attention, they are not the only critical nuclear meeting underway. On Monday, UN member states launched the latest five-year review conference (RevCon) of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). This core legal instrument of the nonproliferation regime provides the basis for international efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation. But expectations are modest. Unlike the last RevCon in 2010, no breakthroughs are on the horizon. Still, the month-long meeting in New York offers an opportunity to develop a plan for further progress during the next five-year cycle that will strengthen the basic bargains at the core of the NPT. The NPT, which came into force in 1970, rests on three mutually reinforcing pillars. States without nuclear weapons agree not to acquire them. The five officially recognized nuclear weapons states (the United States, Russia, China, France and Great Britain) agree to move toward disarmament. And nonnuclear weapons states should be granted access to civilian nuclear technology for peaceful energy development. This essential bargain is inherently fragile, and the challenges are growing, as our newly updated Global Governance Monitor: Nuclear Proliferation, details. Four non-recognized nuclear weapons states (India, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan) are known to possess weapons, and recognized nuclear weapons states are generally perceived to be dragging their feet on disarmament. Moreover, the spread of ostensibly peaceful nuclear technology brings new proliferation dangers. Despite these underlying tensions, the last RevCon in 2010 achieved historic results. Parties approved a 64-part action plan [PDF] to advance progress in all three areas of nonproliferation, disarmament, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Particularly noteworthy was the endorsement of a conference to discuss the establishment of a weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-free zone in the Middle East. Progress in advancing these goals, alas, has been uneven. The deadline for the Middle East conference has come and gone. More significantly, the deterioration of the U.S.-Russia relationship has curtailed bilateral progress on disarmament by the two nations with (by far) the biggest nuclear arsenals. Although both countries continue to comply with the 2011 New Start treaty (which limits each country to 1,550 deployed strategic warheads by 2018), prospects for a follow-on treaty are dismal, and Russia has cancelled cooperative nonproliferation initiatives. A hostile Russian statement [PDF] on the first day of the review conference reinforced these tensions. This perceived inertia comes at an awkward time. The last five years have witnessed the rise of a vigorous humanitarian disarmament initiative, a broad movement of nonnuclear weapons states and civil society actors frustrated by the slow pace of disarmament. Many of its members call for a total ban on nuclear weapons, akin to the Chemical Weapons Convention or the Mine Ban Treaty. The United States and other P5 members adamantly oppose such a ban. The major global bright spot has been the negotiation of a framework agreement between Iran and the P5+1 (the permanent five Security Council members plus Germany). If the preliminary terms are fully implemented, this accord will grant Iran gradual relief from sanctions and access to peaceful nuclear energy in return for internationally monitored limitations on its nuclear enrichment activities and its full compliance with the NPT. Beyond reducing the specific threat posed by Iran, U.S. officials regard the framework agreement as a demonstration that noncompliance with the NPT can be addressed. Given this context, achieving a consensus outcome document will be a tall order. That should not stop U.S. negotiators from doing all they can to strengthen the three pillars of the nonproliferation regime, including by advancing the goals outlined in the 2010 action plan and securing agreement on other critical issues where progress is possible. Reinvigorate commitment to the NPT: The United States should redouble efforts to close the loophole under Article X of the NPT that enables parties to withdraw scot-free after they have violated treaty provisions, as North Korea did in 2003. Working with other permanent Security Council members, the Obama administration can ensure that there is no “get out of jail free” card in the future, by passing a resolution mandating automatic sanctions on countries that abuse Article X. The United States should also work with its partners in the Nuclear Suppliers Group to agree to cease exports of all nuclear related materials (including for peaceful purposes) to any such country. Continue to advance old, but valuable ideas: In parallel with these steps, the United States should promote steps toward disarmament that enjoy broad support, despite longstanding challenges. The Obama administration should continue to endorse universalization of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, notwithstanding continued Congressional resistance to approving U.S. ratification of this treaty. It should also continue advocating the negotiation of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT), despite the high hurdles (notably Pakistan’s opposition). Support the IAEA: The United States can also build international goodwill by enhancing the third pillar of the NPT, expanded access to peaceful nuclear energy, which benefits more parties than any other provision. On Monday, Secretary of State John Kerry made a welcome gesture in this direction, announcing that the United States will donate an additional $50 million to the IAEA’s peaceful uses initiative. The Obama administration should build on this initiative by agreeing to increase funding to advance the IAEA’s work in areas such as promoting global health and boosting agricultural yields. At the same time, the United States must continue to encourage all countries to implement the Additional Protocol, a safeguards agreement that allows IAEA inspectors enhanced access to make sure states are not developing clandestine nuclear weapons programs. Consolidate nuclear security gains: At the RevCon, the United States should take advantage of the opportunity to strengthen the relationship between the NPT regime and the biennial Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) that the Obama administration began in 2010. While there are advantages to the informal, flexible NSS format, there is a danger that momentum will slow and progress will be lost when a new U.S. administration takes office. To consolidate the gains it has spearheaded, the United States must create an enduring mechanism to advance nuclear security after the NSS summits end in 2016. The way to do so is by strengthening the IAEA’s own nuclear security mandate, giving it both the responsibility and adequate funding it needs to coordinate and implement the myriad initiatives promoted and developed by the NSS process. While expectations are modest, the overall state of the nuclear nonproliferation regime is strong. The NPT is necessarily a delicate balance between the haves and have nots, between the goals of nuclear nonproliferation, disarmament, and peaceful access. It is not perfect. But nor is it replaceable. Despite ongoing challenges, the nuclear nonproliferation regime—with the NPT at its core—has been largely effective, as our Global Governance Monitor lays out. The challenge for U.S. negotiators over the next month is to advance these conflicting goals within the limits of the possible.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from April 18, 2015 to April 24, 2015. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   April 18: Gunmen kidnapped the chairman of Rivers LGA. April 18: A soldier killed one civilian at a checkpoint in Ushongo, Benue. April 18: Sectarian violence in Agatu, Benue resulted in the deaths of sixty. April 19: Boko Haram killed two soldiers in Kukawa, Borno. April 20: Sectarian violence in Donga, Taraba resulted in fifteen casualties. April 21: Nigerian troops killed a top Boko Haram commander and a "number" of other insurgents in Kaga, Borno. April 21: Gunmen killed a campaign coordinator for Kaduna State’s governor-elect, el-Rufai, in Jema’a, Kaduna. April 22: Nigerian forces invaded the Boko Haram stronghold in Sambisa Forest, Borno. The casualty count is unknown.

Mali has been relatively quiet over the past few months, with a UN and Algerian-brokered peace process underway to address decades of ongoing conflicts between the Bamako government and Tuaregs in the north. However, on April 27, pro-government forces seized the town of Menaka from Tuareg separatists following heavy fighting. Details are scarce. The following day Tuaregs fired on UN peacekeepers near Timbuktu, apparently thinking they were Malian soldiers. The Tuaregs apologized, according to the UN mission spokesman. But, there are also sketchy reports of Tuareg attacks on government troops in the same area at about the same time. The main Tuareg separatist group is the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA). “Azawad” is the name the separatists apply to northern Mali. The MNLA had occupied Menaka in eastern Mali. In 2012, Tuaregs had separated themselves from Bamako and taken over some two-thirds of the country. Shortly thereafter, al-Qaeda militants took over land occupied by MNLA, ultimately triggering foreign interventions. A multinational, African force, largely directed and coordinated by the French, forced the jihadists out of the cities and towns that they had occupied. However, MNLA continues today as a political movement with the goal of autonomy from Bamako. The UN and Algerian peace process is seeking a solution. Leading up to the peace accord, MNLA has complained that their essential demands are not part of the deal. The concern must be that an upsurge of violence will set the peace process back further. Whether the peace process can broker a deal between Bamako and the MNLA remains to be seen. A breakdown in the peace process may lead to increased violence.

There is increased speculation about the whereabouts of Abubakar Shekau in the Nigerian media. His last media broadcast was in early March when he pledged allegiance to the self-proclaimed Islamic State and threatened to disrupt Nigeria’s presidential and gubernatorial elections. Since the video’s release, Boko Haram terrorism seems to have decreased, but it has not entirely subsided. According to the Nigeria Security Tracker (NST), 505 deaths have been reported in April so far, compared to 1,426 in March. According to the Nigerian media, some in the Nigerian military are taking Shekau’s silence as evidence that Boko Haram is largely in disarray. However, there have always been questions about Shekau. The last time he was seen in public was 2009. Since then, the Nigerian security services have claimed many times to have killed him. There has been speculation that the “Abubakar Shekau” that appeared in Boko Haram videos was actually an actor or a double. Presuming that Shekau does, in fact, continue to exist, his authority or role in the leadership of Boko Haram is also unclear. Some have suggested that Boko Haram is run by a council, of which Shekau is only one member. In 2009, the security services cracked down on Boko Haram, killing its then leader, Mohammed Yusuf, and at least 800 followers. In the aftermath, Boko Haram melted into the countryside and urban slums and re-grouped. It re-emerged as a violent fighting force two years later, in 2011. Boko Haram may be following that same pattern now.

Today, Adam Entous reported the latest confirmation about what informed citizens already knew: the White House’s purported policy guidance for U.S. lethal counterterrorism strikes issued on May 23, 2013 does not apply to CIA drone strikes in Pakistan. The CIA may still target unknown individuals, and they do not have to pose a purported "imminent threat" to the United States. This was widely reported at the time publicly, and I was told by a then-member of a congressional oversight committee that this exception was made clear to them as well. This substantial carve-out for the standards of who can be targeted that apply in Pakistan versus Somalia or Yemen call into question the entire 2013 reform efforts of the Obama administration. Though, long before today, it has been increasingly apparent that U.S. drone strike practices have not matched the promises that President Obama made two years ago. Moreover, this further demonstrates how drones routinely work at cross purposes with other U.S. foreign policy interests. As Secretary of State John Kerry said soon after Obama’s much touted speech, “The only people that we fire a drone at are confirmed terrorist targets at the highest level after a great deal of vetting that takes a long period of time. We don’t just fire a drone at somebody and think they’re a terrorist.” In August 2013, Kerry also pledged while in Pakistan that the guidelines applied to all U.S. drone strikes (we now know this is untrue), and that Obama had “a very real timeline and we hope it’s going to be very, very soon” for ending drone strikes (also apparently not true). What is unclear is whether Kerry was being deliberately misleading or was unaware that the policy guidance does not apply to Pakistan. Either way, it makes America’s leading diplomat appear less credible and believable. Since May 23, 2013, the United States has conducted an estimated total of 96 drone strikes, killing 578 people, 26 of whom were civilians. In Pakistan alone, 44 drone strikes have killed 265 people, including 1 civilian. Therefore, the policy guidance issued in May 2013 has not applied to 46 percent of all drone strikes and 46 percent of all victims. On Thursday, when President Obama wisely declassified the circumstances of the tragic incident regarding Warren Weinstein and Giovanni Lo Porto, he declared, “As President and as Commander-in-Chief, I take full responsibility for all our counterterrorism operations, including the one that inadvertently took the lives of Warren and Giovanni. I profoundly regret what happened.” This, albeit selective, account is admirable. Now, it is long past time that Obama publicly extends the same sympathies to the family of sixteen-year-old Abdulrahman al-Awlaki, a U.S. citizen inadvertently killed in a drone strike in Yemen on October 14, 2011.

Until the past five years, the Philippines and Vietnam had minimal strategic ties other than working together, through ASEAN initiatives, on a range of nontraditional security issues. The two countries had very different styles of leadership---the Philippines is a vibrant democracy with one of the freest media markets in the world, while Vietnam remains run by a highly opaque Party---and Hanoi remained wary of diverging from its strategy of hedging close ties with China with increasingly close relations with the United States. By contrast, the Philippines, despite a very mixed historical relationship with the United States, was (and is) a U.S. treaty ally and one of Washington’s closest partners in Southeast Asia. Vietnam and the Philippines did not hold joint military exercises, rarely had high-level bilateral interactions between senior political and military leaders, and also had only modest two-way trade. But since 2010, as China’s posture in the South China Sea has become increasingly assertive, and Vietnam and the Philippines have pushed back harder against Beijing than any other Southeast Asian nations, the two ASEAN countries have moved much closer together. At first, the closeness was informal---Philippine and Vietnamese sailors mingling on disputed rocks in the South China Sea to drink beers and play sports, top leaders from the two countries holding unannounced bilateral meetings on the sidelines of ASEAN meetings to discuss possible joint responses to Chinese actions like dredging and reported Chinese building of what appears to be a military-use airstrip on an atoll in the Spratly Islands. Now, Hanoi and Manila appear willing to formalize their cooperation, which should be a worrying thought for Beijing, since this cooperation signals that Southeast Asian nations are now becoming more unified in their opposition to Beijing’s South China Sea policies. Manila and Hanoi will formalize a strategic partnership in the coming weeks, according to Philippine media. The strategic partnership likely will include a commitment to work together to resolve maritime disputes in the South China Sea, a commitment to holding joint naval exercises, and an agreement to conduct joint scientific studies in the South China Sea---studies that could potentially relate to hydrocarbons or fisheries, the Sea’s two most valuable resources. The strategic partnership still needs to be signed, and its details could still change. But just the fact that Hanoi and Manila are likely to begin holding joint military exercises, a vast shift from their lukewarm bilateral relations in the 2000s, should demonstrate to Beijing that its South China Sea policy is backfiring badly.

This is a guest post by Amanda Roth, a former intern for the Council on Foreign Relations Africa Program. She is a graduate student at the Columbia School of International and Public Affairs, where she studies international security policy.  Last week, a ship carrying hundreds of migrants trying to reach Europe capsized in the Mediterranean, killing nearly 900. The tragic incident and unprecedented death toll has reignited a discussion of the growing migration crisis in the Mediterranean and Europe’s obligation to assist. Last year, Italy terminated Operation Mare Nostrum, an extensive and relatively successful search and rescue operation. The operation began in response to the 2013 Lampedusa crash, in which more than 300 migrants died. Under Mare Nostrum, Italy rescued thousands of migrants, housed and clothed them, and attempted to adjudicate asylum claims. However, with challenges of its own, Italy struggled to fund the program and to provide services for all migrants within its own borders. The Dublin Regulation, an EU law, dictates that the European country that is the first point of entry must handle the asylum application, leaving countries bordering the Mediterranean, such as Italy and Malta, overwhelmed by applications. Approximately 90 percent of refugees end up in only a few EU member states. European leaders refused to help fund Operation Mare Nostrum and to accommodate migrants. Some argued that rescue missions served as a “pull factor” and encouraged migrants to make the dangerous journey, knowing that they would be rescued. Unable to foot the costs itself, Italy ended the program. It’s difficult to know if Operation Mare Nostrum could have prevented this week’s tragedy. However, two things are clear. The first is the glaring fault in the logic that ended Operation Mare Nostrum—search and rescue operations in the Mediterranean aren’t a significant “pull factor” attracting migrants. Political violence in Mali, terrorism in West Africa, the Syrian civil war, and continued poverty and oppression mean that just as many people continue to make the journey. The second obvious conclusion is that search and rescue operations are a short-term fix, not a long-term solution. Operation Mare Nostrum helped save thousands of lives, but it could not address the root causes of migration from Africa and the Middle East to Europe. European leaders are gathering in Luxemburg this week to discuss possible solutions—including increased funding for operations such as Mare Nostrum, and targeted missions to arrest smugglers and dismantle their networks. Leaders gathered in Luxemburg this week should look at solutions that may help stem the flow of migrants in more incremental yet sustainable ways. While it is beyond Europe’s capacity to fix violence in Mali or stop the repressive regime in Eritrea, improving its own immigration system may help mitigate the flow and reduce deaths. Providing more funding for search and rescue is one critical step, but like that of the United States, Europe’s immigration system is deeply flawed. There are more creative solutions being discussed. Setting up processing centers in Africa and the Middle East, so individuals can apply for asylum before crossing the Mediterranean, may help. Family reunification processes can be simplified. The EU could revisit the Dublin Convention, which disproportionately burdens poorer Southern European nations with the responsibility of responding to waves of undocumented migrants. Immediately allowing for larger number of asylum claims is critical. These measures won’t stop the flow of migrants to Europe. But, they could keep the crisis from escalating. It is clear that leaders must look beyond short-term fixes, and address this issue in a more sustainable and comprehensive way.