Is a Russia-Ukraine Cease-Fire Deal Slipping Away From Trump?

Is a Russia-Ukraine Cease-Fire Deal Slipping Away From Trump?

French President Emmanuel Macron shakes hands with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio before a meeting at the Élysée presidential palace.
French President Emmanuel Macron shakes hands with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio before a meeting at the Élysée presidential palace. Ludovic Marin/Pool/Reuters

Senior U.S. and French officials are meeting in Paris this week as part of President Donald Trump’s effort to negotiate a cease-fire in Ukraine—but the chances of that deal becoming a reality appear increasingly slim.

April 17, 2025 11:17 am (EST)

French President Emmanuel Macron shakes hands with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio before a meeting at the Élysée presidential palace.
French President Emmanuel Macron shakes hands with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio before a meeting at the Élysée presidential palace. Ludovic Marin/Pool/Reuters
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Max Boot is the Jeane J. Kirkpatrick senior fellow for national security studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.

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U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff arrived in Paris on Wednesday to consult with French leaders about President Donald Trump’s efforts to negotiate a cease-fire in Ukraine, among other topics.

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The trip could be interpreted as a welcome recalibration by the Trump administration given how little heed its officials have previously paid to European views—and how often the president has belittled these allies for supposedly not paying enough for defense and not trading fairly with the United States. Now, with the Trump administration seeing the chances of a Ukraine cease-fire slipping away, its representatives seem to be hoping the French can help salvage Trump’s hopes of ending the Russia-Ukraine war. French President Emmanuel Macron is leading Europe’s effort to provide Kyiv security guarantees if a deal is hammered out.

Regardless of what the Europeans do, the odds of a successful cease-fire seem remote because Russian President Vladimir Putin has shown scant interest in calling off his brutal war of aggression. Witkoff’s meeting with Macron follows his visit to Moscow last week where he said he had “compelling” talks with Putin about the conflict in Ukraine—though it does not appear to have compelled the Russians to do much.

The question now is what, if anything, the Trump administration will do about Russian intransigence. Until now, the president and his envoys have been focused solely on applying pressure to Ukraine. After a contentious Oval Office meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on February 28, Trump briefly cut off all U.S. supplies and intelligence sharing with Ukraine.

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The president has also attempted to pressure Zelenskyy into signing an extortionate deal that would force Ukraine to hand over to a U.S. investment fund half of the revenue from its natural resources, ports, pipelines, and other infrastructure until it repays a cost estimate for U.S. assistance. Ukraine’s First Deputy Prime Minister Yulia Svyrydenko said on Wednesday that the two sides had made “substantial progress” on the deal and would sign an agreement soon.

And yet, it was Zelenskyy who quickly accepted the U.S. demand for a thirty-day cease-fire six weeks ago. Meanwhile, rather than directly replying “da” or “nyet” to the proposal, Putin responded by laying out a series of conditions. He demanded, among other things, that Ukraine not “use those thirty days to continue forced mobilization, get weapons supplies, and prepare its mobilized units”—which he knew made a cease-fire impossible.

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This led to a scaled-down U.S. proposal for a thirty-day moratorium limited only to attacks on energy infrastructure and Black Sea shipping. Putin and Zelenskyy tentatively agreed to the limits on energy attacks, although both sides have accused the other of violations. Putin would not agree to a Black Sea cease-fire without getting the West to lift sanctions on a major Russian bank. This, as Putin had to have known, would be another nonstarter.

It seems that Russia’s real reply has not come at the negotiating table but on the battlefield. On April 13, Russian ballistic missiles slammed into the Ukrainian city of Sumy, killing 34 people and wounding 117 more—many of them heading to Palm Sunday celebrations. This shocking attack on civilians made a mockery of the Trump administration’s attempts to broker a cease-fire and showed that the only peace that Putin is interested in is a large piece of Ukraine.

Trump did condemn the Sumy attack as “terrible” at first, but then he seemed to apologize for the Kremlin’s brutality by suggesting that “they made a mistake.” At the same time, Trump again blamed Zelenskyy for somehow causing Russia’s invasion, saying, “You don't start a war with someone twenty times your size and then hope people give you some missiles.” Bloomberg also reported that Trump blocked a Group of Seven (G7) statement condemning the Palm Sunday attack.

Trump did say in late March in an interview with NBC News that he was “very angry” and “pissed off” because Putin had questioned Zelenskyy’s legitimacy as president. Trump threatened secondary tariffs on Russian oil if he was unable to make a deal with Putin and thought “it was Russia’s fault—which it might not be.”

But Trump said that more than two weeks ago, and, although he did renew the existing sanctions, he has not made any move to ratchet up sanctions on Russia. Rubio and U.S. Special Envoy for Russia and Ukraine Keith Kellogg have reportedly pushed for a more hardline approach toward Russia, but Witkoff has resisted this effort. He has repeatedly (and naively) vouched for Putin’s bona fides as a partner for peace.

In any case, it would be hard for Trump to significantly ramp up secondary sanctions on Russia given that he has already imposed 145 percent tariffs on the leading importer of Russian energy: China. Far more effective would be to open the spigot of U.S. military aid to Ukraine, which will soon dry up. Only when Putin is convinced that Ukraine can fight indefinitely and successfully will he have any incentive to bargain in good faith. But, as seen in Trump’s contemptuous comment about Ukraine wanting missiles, there is no sign that the president is rethinking his opposition to that aid.

The likelihood is that, unless Trump reverses course and soon, any hope of bringing about a cease-fire in Ukraine in the near future will vanish.

This work represents the views and opinions solely of the author. The Council on Foreign Relations is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher, and takes no institutional positions on matters of policy.

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Artificial Intelligence (AI)

Sign up to receive CFR President Mike Froman’s analysis on the most important foreign policy story of the week, delivered to your inbox every Friday afternoon. Subscribe to The World This Week. In the Middle East, Israel and Iran are engaged in what could be the most consequential conflict in the region since the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. CFR’s experts continue to cover all aspects of the evolving conflict on CFR.org. While the situation evolves, including the potential for direct U.S. involvement, it is worth touching on another recent development in the region which could have far-reaching consequences: the diffusion of cutting-edge U.S. artificial intelligence (AI) technology to leading Gulf powers. The defining feature of President Donald Trump’s foreign policy is his willingness to question and, in many cases, reject the prevailing consensus on matters ranging from European security to trade. His approach to AI policy is no exception. Less than six months into his second term, Trump is set to fundamentally rewrite the United States’ international AI strategy in ways that could influence the balance of global power for decades to come. In February, at the Artificial Intelligence Action Summit in Paris, Vice President JD Vance delivered a rousing speech at the Grand Palais, and made it clear that the Trump administration planned to abandon the Biden administration’s safety-centric approach to AI governance in favor of a laissez-faire regulatory regime. “The AI future is not going to be won by hand-wringing about safety,” Vance said. “It will be won by building—from reliable power plants to the manufacturing facilities that can produce the chips of the future.” And as Trump’s AI czar David Sacks put it, “Washington wants to control things, the bureaucracy wants to control things. That’s not a winning formula for technology development. We’ve got to let the private sector cook.” The accelerationist thrust of Vance and Sacks’s remarks is manifesting on a global scale. Last month, during Trump’s tour of the Middle East, the United States announced a series of deals to permit the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia to import huge quantities (potentially over one million units) of advanced AI chips to be housed in massive new data centers that will serve U.S. and Gulf AI firms that are training and operating cutting-edge models. These imports were made possible by the Trump administration’s decision to scrap a Biden administration executive order that capped chip exports to geopolitical swing states in the Gulf and beyond, and which represents the most significant proliferation of AI capabilities outside the United States and China to date. The recipe for building and operating cutting-edge AI models has a few key raw ingredients: training data, algorithms (the governing logic of AI models like ChatGPT), advanced chips like Graphics Processing Units (GPUs) or Tensor Processing Units (TPUs)—and massive, power-hungry data centers filled with advanced chips.  Today, the United States maintains a monopoly of only one of these inputs: advanced semiconductors, and more specifically, the design of advanced semiconductors—a field in which U.S. tech giants like Nvidia and AMD, remain far ahead of their global competitors. To weaponize this chokepoint, the first Trump administration and the Biden administration placed a series of ever-stricter export controls on the sale of advanced U.S.-designed AI chips to countries of concern, including China.  The semiconductor export control regime culminated in the final days of the Biden administration with the rollout of the Framework for Artificial Intelligence Diffusion, more commonly known as the AI diffusion rule—a comprehensive global framework for limiting the proliferation of advanced semiconductors. The rule sorted the world into three camps. Tier 1 countries, including core U.S. allies such as Australia, Japan, and the United Kingdom, were exempt from restrictions, whereas tier 3 countries, such as Russia, China, and Iran, were subject to the extremely stringent controls. The core controversy of the diffusion rule stemmed from the tier 2 bucket, which included some 150 countries including India, Mexico, Israel, Switzerland, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Many tier 2 states, particularly Gulf powers with deep economic and military ties to the United States, were furious.  The rule wasn’t just a matter of how many chips could be imported and by whom. It refashioned how the United States could steer the distribution of computing resources, including the regulation and real-time monitoring of their deployment abroad and the terms by which the technologies can be shared with third parties. Proponents of the restrictions pointed to the need to limit geopolitical swing states’ access to leading AI capabilities and to prevent Chinese, Russian, and other adversarial actors from accessing powerful AI chips by contracting cloud service providers in these swing states.  However, critics of the rule, including leading AI model developers and cloud service providers, claimed that the constraints would stifle U.S. innovation and incentivize tier 2 countries to adopt Chinese AI infrastructure. Moreover, critics argued that with domestic capital expenditures on AI development and infrastructure running into the hundreds of billions of dollars in 2025 alone, fresh capital and scale-up opportunities in the Gulf and beyond represented the most viable option for expanding the U.S. AI ecosystem. This hypothesis is about to be tested in real time. In May, the Trump administration killed the diffusion rule, days before it would have been set into motion, in part to facilitate the export of these cutting-edge chips abroad to the Gulf powers. This represents a fundamental pivot for AI policy, but potentially also in the logic of U.S. grand strategy vis-à-vis China. The most recent era of great power competition, the Cold War, was fundamentally bipolar and the United States leaned heavily on the principle of non-proliferation, particularly in the nuclear domain, to limit the possibility of new entrants. We are now playing by a new set of rules where the diffusion of U.S. technology—and an effort to box out Chinese technology—is of paramount importance. Perhaps maintaining and expanding the United States’ global market share in key AI chokepoint technologies will deny China the scale it needs to outcompete the United States—but it also introduces the risk of U.S. chips falling into the wrong hands via transhipment, smuggling, and other means, or being co-opted by authoritarian regimes for malign purposes.  Such risks are not illusory: there is already ample evidence of Chinese firms using shell entities to access leading-edge U.S. chips through cloud service providers in Southeast Asia. And Chinese firms, including Huawei, were important vendors for leading Gulf AI firms, including the UAE’s G-42, until the U.S. government forced the firm to divest its Chinese hardware as a condition for receiving a strategic investment from Microsoft in 2024. In the United States, the ability to build new data centers is severely constrained by complex permitting processes and limited capacity to bring new power to the grid. What the Gulf countries lack in terms of semiconductor prowess and AI talent, they make up for with abundant capital, energy, and accommodating regulations. The Gulf countries are well-positioned for massive AI infrastructure buildouts. The question is simply, using whose technology—American or Chinese—and on what terms? In Saudi Arabia and the UAE, it will be American technology for now. The question remains whether the diffusion of the most powerful dual-use technologies of our day will bind foreign users to the United States and what impact it will have on the global balance of power.  We welcome your feedback on this column. Let me know what foreign policy issues you’d like me to address next by replying to [email protected].

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