Destabilization of Mali
Recent Developments
Concerns are growing that militant groups in Mali are increasing in number and strength, with violence spreading across the country and across borders. In January 2019, local al-Qaeda affiliate, the Group for Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM), claimed a series of attacks on UN peacekeepers, soldiers from both Mali and Burkina Faso, and local militants.
JNIM—which formed in March 2017 and was designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the U.S. State Department in September 2018—and affiliated militant groups have expanded their influence, spreading from the north into central Mali by capitalizing on communal tensions, and has continued to carry out attacks in the capital, Bamako. A branch of the self-proclaimed Islamic State, known as the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, has also appeared, compounding concerns over the militant threat.
In August 2018, President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita won re-election in a runoff vote that was marred by violence in the run-up to both rounds of the election. In addition to a deteriorating security environment, the Malian government continues to struggle to implement the June 2015 peace agreement it signed with the Coordination of Azawad Movements and a coalition of Tuareg rebel groups. Major components of the deal—including steps to increase autonomy and political representation in the north, bring development, and integrate rebel groups into the Malian security forces—remain unfulfilled.
Background
After gaining independence from France in 1960, Mali endured decades of instability. While the majority of the population resides in the south, Tuareg and Arab groups in the sparsely populated north rebelled against the government in 1963, 1990, and 2006, attempting to gain autonomy for the region they named Azawad. Numerous groups, including Islamist militant groups, have taken advantage of the government’s inability to assert control over territory in the north by continuously asserting territorial claims and attacking Malian government and international security forces, undermining the government and threatening to destabilize neighboring countries.
The current crisis in Mali began in early 2012 when a Tuareg separatist group, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), in the north rebelled for a fourth time. The MNLA was backed by a collection of Islamist militant groups—Ansar Dine, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa—and together the groups moved to take over territory in the north. In March 2012, then-President Amadou Toumani Toure was deposed in a military coup carried out by the Malian army as anger spread over the government’s response to the rebellion. Confusion and infighting created by the power vacuum in the capital of Bamako enabled the MNLA and Islamist groups to seize territory quickly. By April 2012, the groups controlled nearly all of the territory in the north and declared independence.
The alliance between the MNLA and the Islamist groups was short-lived; in June 2012 the MNLA broke with Ansar Dine and AQIM over the Islamists push to impose Sharia law in the north. Islamists gained control over Timbuktu and Gao, destroying shrines and imposing a harsh interpretation of Islamic rule. As Islamist groups began pushing toward the center of the country, the French military intervened in January 2013 at the request of the Malian government, deploying ground troops and launching an air campaign to push back the militants. Through Operation Barkhane, France continues to lead the fight in Mali and three thousand troops have been deployed since July 2014 to protect civilians and aid the efforts of local militaries. The UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) was also created to combat extremism in the region in April 2013. More than thirteen thousand UN peacekeepers remain deployed in Mali and MINUSMA has been called the UN’s most dangerous mission due to the high number of attacks on peacekeepers.
Despite increased international involvement, the campaign against militants has instead resulted in the spread of militancy to countries across the Sahel. In February 2017, France and the Group of Five for the Sahel (G5) countries—Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger—announced the creation of the G5 Sahel Force, a five thousand-troop-strong counterterrorism force aimed at fighting militant groups with an expanded mandate to move across borders in the Sahel region; the multinational force began operations in October 2017. The U.S. military has also increased its presence in the Sahel, deploying approximately 1,500 troops to the region and building a drone base in Niger to serve as a platform for strikes against groups across West and North Africa.
Concerns
The continued strengthening of militant groups in Mali and their spread to neighboring countries could allow al-Qaeda and the Islamic State to establish a new safe haven and destabilize the region through militancy and terrorism. In addition, northern Mali remains a central transit point for young migrants from all over western Africa looking to travel to Algeria or Libya with the ultimate goal of reaching Europe. The weak economy and lack of job prospects in northern Mali has led many to turn to the trafficking and smuggling of migrants and drugs as a primary source of income. This crisis is both a humanitarian and security concern as militant groups in the Sahel region often tax trafficking and smuggling routes to fund their campaigns.
Alerts
A Visual Exploration of the Conflict
Destabilization of Mali
