

American National Interests and the United Nations

Council on Foreign Relations, January, 1996

The following is the statement and report of an independent task force, "American National Interest and the United Nations," chaired by George Soros, sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations.

Statement and Report of an Independent Task Force American National Interest and the United Nations

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Note: Institutional affiliation is for identification purposes only.

Introduction

The independent Task Force on U.N. reform was chaired by George Soros and cosponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations and the United Nations Association of the United States. Its purpose was to examine whether the United Nations has advanced or hindered the pursuit of U.S. interests in the last five years and to determine what changes within the United Nations will allow the United States to pursue its objectives more effectively. Members of the Task Force included both critics and supporters of the United Nations.

The members of the Task Force met on four occasions, and their discussion is reflected in both the statement and the report entitled American National Interest and the United Nations. The statement summarizes the groups findings and recommendations, and the report provides background information brought forth during the meetings.

The following people participated in Task Force discussions but were not asked to endorse the statement because of their official capacities: James P. Rubin (U.S. Mission to the United Nations), Charles E. Santos (United Nations), Sarah B. Sewall (U.S. Department of Defense), Gillian Martin Sorensen (United Nations), James B. Steinberg (U.S. Department of State), and George Ward (U.S. Department of State).

Leslie H. Gelb, President, Council on Foreign Relations

August 1996

Statement of the Task Force

The United Nations is in crisis. It is seen by many around the world to have failed critical tests in Bosnia and Rwanda. It is in perpetual financial difficulty due to the failure of many members including the United States to pay dues and peacekeeping assessments.

In the United States, the United Nations has unfortunately become a focus of dispute between the Congress and the executive branch, and, more recently, between the two political parties. Despite the urgings of Presidents Reagan, Bush, and Clinton that the United States meet its treaty obligations by paying its U.N. dues and peacekeeping assessments, Congress, under both Democratic and Republican leadership, has repeatedly failed to appropriate the full amount. In some instances, this resistance stemmed from objections to a particular U.N. operation or from a desire to pressure the United Nations to reform; in general, it was the result of national budget pressures and a feeling that the United States was being assessed too large a share of the U.N. budget.

Some members of Congress object to American participation in the United Nations and have introduced legislation calling for U.S. withdrawal from the organization. Others have criticized what they view as excessive dependence on and deference to the United Nations and have opposed the participation of American troops in U.N. peacekeeping operations particularly under foreign operational control.

The Clinton administration came into office talking expansively about multilateral cooperation through the United Nations. After controversy over this policy developed especially about Somalia the administration adopted a more modulated position while continuing to press for payment of U.N. dues and assessments and support for strengthening the U.N. capacity for peacekeeping.

There is agreement among the president, the Congress, and interested private citizens and organizations that the U.N. system needs extensive reform.

At the same time, many argue that the United Nations has been effective in traditional peacekeeping, in helping to end some persistent conflicts, in ameliorating humanitarian crises, and in addressing issues that can only be dealt with on a global basis, such as the environment, crime, terrorism, and health.

In light of these conflicting views, the Council on Foreign Relations asked a group of distinguished Americans with a variety of perspectives to come together in a Task Force to discuss the United Nations. The charge given to the Task Force was to examine whether the United Nations has advanced or hindered the pursuit of U.S. interests as they have been defined by successive presidents. The Task Force was also asked to recommend reforms in the United Nations that would allow the United States to pursue its objectives more effectively.

This statement and the accompanying report are the result.¹

Findings

The Task Force reached the following conclusions:

1. Since the end of the Cold War, the United Nations has served U.S. interests well when U.S. presidents have had a clear and firm position. Perhaps these interests also could have been served by stitching together ad hoc coalitions, but such remedies would have lacked the international legitimacy now possessed by the United Nations. These judgments of the United Nations utility have been shared by both the Bush and Clinton administrations.

2. Nonetheless, the United Nations is in crisis, mainly in the United States and partly because of political jockeying, but principally because member states including the United States have failed to pay their bills, have given the United Nations responsibilities without the power to carry them out, and have blamed the United Nations for failures in national policies. The United Nations remains, first and last, simply an organization of member states, with little or no independent power, and with its ultimate effectiveness dependent on the unity of the major powers.²

3. The principal way to make the United Nations a better organization and to better serve U.S. interests is to fix American perceptions of what the United Nations is and is not, and of what it can and cannot do. To be sure, the United Nations needs reform, streamlining, and cost-cutting. But what it needs most is for the major powers to agree on when, how, and where to use it well and wisely.

Analysis

In order to judge whether the United Nations has served American interests, as defined by U.S. presidents, the Task Force examined a number of situations in which presidents have turned to the United Nations.

U.S. Military Operations

The Task Force devoted much of its attention to situations in which American objectives led to the deployment of U.S. Armed Forces unilaterally, in multilateral coalitions, or under U.N. auspices. The Task Force's finding is that when the United States knew what it wanted from the United Nations and took the lead in getting it, the United Nations provided important assistance in advancing American interests in these situations. When the United States had unrealistic objectives or sought to hide its indecision by turning the problem over to the United Nations, the results were often disastrous.

The Bush administration, recognizing that U.N. support would be invaluable, sought and received the full backing of the U.N. Security Council for its efforts to force Iraq out of Kuwait and to impose critical restrictions on Iraq after the war. While the United States no doubt would have accomplished its objective of freeing Kuwait without the support of the United Nations, there can be no question that the United Nations facilitated the task; the efforts of the Bush and Clinton administrations to contain Iraq after the war depended on sanctions that would not have been effective without the legitimacy deriving from a global Security Council resolution.

U.N. Security Council Resolution 678, which authorized member states to use all necessary means to liberate Kuwait if Iraq was still in noncompliance with previous U.N. resolutions, made it easier for the United States to persuade states to join the coalition, to grant base and transit rights, and to provide financial assistance. After the war, Security Council resolutions were critical to providing humanitarian assistance to the Kurds in northern Iraq, to the effective oil embargo, and to continuing weapons inspections in Iraq by the U.N. Special Commission (UNSCOM).

In Haiti, a similar U.N. Security Council resolution, Resolution 940, made it easier for the Clinton administration to secure the support of other nations, particularly in the Western Hemisphere, for the U.S.-led military intervention. In this case, the United Nations also took over responsibility for the military force in Haiti, enabling the United States to withdraw its forces promptly.

The Bush administration also sought and obtained a U.N. Security Council resolution, Resolution 794, to authorize its initial intervention in Somalia, an intervention that succeeded in alleviating the drastic humanitarian consequences of the breakdown of order. The succeeding U.N. force permitted the withdrawal of most U.S. forces while continuing to facilitate the flow of relief supplies into Somalia. However, under pressure from both the United States and the U.N. Secretariat, the peacekeeping mission eventually sought to use force to intervene in the Somali civil war with unfortunate results.

Bosnia shows both the limits and the value of the United Nations. When member states, including the United States, sought to hide their own indecision about what to do in the former Yugoslavia as well as their unwillingness to act by giving assignments to the U.N. peacekeeping force that it was not capable of carrying out, the results were unacceptable. On the other hand, the U.N. agencies active in Bosnia, including the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, have helped to alleviate human suffering. In December 1995, following the signing of the Dayton agreement, the U.N. Security Council sanctioned the introduction of a multinational implementation force (IFOR) led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), while the United Nations was assigned the difficult task of overseeing the withdrawal of Serb forces from Eastern Slavonia.

In Rwanda, no country was willing to provide the combat forces that might have prevented the genocide, but U.N. institutions helped to alleviate the suffering, minimizing the requirements for U.S. military intervention.

Other Threats to International Peace and Security

The Task Force also examined other situations in which the United States turned to the United Nations for action to deal with threats to peace that might have affected U.S. interests. Here again, the Task Force found that when the United States knew what it wanted and charged the United Nations with realistic tasks, the United Nations performed well and advanced American interests.

The American effort to terminate the North Korean nuclear program was bolstered by the threat of U.N. sanctions if North Korea failed to permit international inspections and continues to be underpinned by the work of the United Nations International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). More generally, the United Nations has played an important role in preventing proliferation.

Responding to American leadership, the U.N. Security Council broke new ground by imposing sanctions against Libya for its refusal to extradite those indicted for the terrorist bombing of Pan Am flight 103. Both the cutoff of air traffic and the arms embargo set a precedent that should help discourage other states from supporting terrorism.

Meeting its most comprehensive challenge, the United Nations played a critical role in bringing relative peace to Cambodia, managing elections that put in place a government recognized and supported by the international community as well as the Cambodian people.

The United Nations has also facilitated the settlement of internal conflicts in El Salvador, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Angola, Namibia, Eritrea, and Mozambique disputes that had been exacerbated by the Cold War.

Global Issues

Moreover, the United Nations plays an important role in seeking solutions for such global issues as international narcotics flows, threats to the environment, and disease control. It also advances U.S. interests by combating genocide, promoting democracy and respect for human rights, and addressing the humanitarian aspects of movements of people both within countries and across borders.

The Task Force spent some time discussing the role of the United Nations in promoting sustainable development but could not reach agreement. Some members argued that the role of the U.N. Development Program (UNDP) and other U.N. agencies was important in complementing the activities of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the regional banks, and bilateral programs. Others viewed U.N. efforts in this area as superfluous, and still others thought them counterproductive, while recognizing that they may be necessary to secure the support of other nations for those U.N. programs that are considered important to the United States.

Recommendations

The American people must recognize that the United Nations is an association of states. It can do only what its member states direct it to do. The United States is the most important member of the United Nations and the greatest single contributor of funds. The U.S. veto in the Security Council and the requirement for consensus in the adoption of the budget by the General Assembly mean that the United States can prevent most U.N. actions to which it objects. When the United States has exerted strong influence and leadership, it has almost always persuaded the Security Council to take the actions that

the United States desired. Thus, the United States must and can take the lead in deciding what kind of United Nations will exist.

Although the United States, of course, retains the right to act in self-defense without the concurrence of the U.N. Security Council and must maintain that prerogative, the right of the Security Council to authorize the use of force by member states to deal with threats to international security is the single most important responsibility of the United Nations. This authority of the Security Council is also a highly significant tool for the United States in promoting U.S. security objectives by facilitating effective support of many nations for the actions that the United States believes must be taken to protect its security. The United States should thus work to strengthen this capacity.

The effective functioning of the United Nations requires changes in its procedures and operations to remove waste, inefficiency, and redundancy and to increase its capacity to act. This means that:

1. The United Nations must give the most serious consideration to the recommendations being made by its under-secretary-general for administration and management, Joseph E. Connor, and others for the reform of U.N. procedures.
2. The United Nations must continue to operate on a zero-growth regular budget,³ pruning unnecessary and duplicative programs so as to permit some growth in important activities. At the same time, it must be ready to respond to genuine emergencies.
3. The United States should work for the election of a U.N. secretary-general who will act decisively to improve the performance of the organization.
4. The United States should work with other nations to improve the capacity of the United Nations to conduct peacekeeping operations. The United States should support peacekeeping operations only when there is a realistic source of funding for the U.S. share of the cost and the task is one that the U.N. force can perform.
5. The United States should oppose giving tasks to the United Nations that it does not have the capacity to perform or that member states lack the will to implement; this applies in particular to Chapter VII peace enforcement operations that require a credible threat of combat and that must be conducted by ad hoc coalitions with the endorsement of the Security Council.⁴

The United Nations has contributed in important ways to U.S. security interests and can continue to do so. This will require the reestablishment of bipartisan and executive-legislative cooperation in support of the essential activities of the United Nations. To that end the Task Force recommends the following:

1. The administration and Congress resist the temptation both to turn tasks over to the United Nations that it has neither the capacity nor the authority to accomplish and to blame the United Nations for failures that are those of the member states.

2. The president and Congress establish a process for approving peacekeeping operations that gives Congress a role consistent with its responsibility to provide the funds for such operations. Once the United States votes to support an operation, the United States should pay its assessment.

3. More generally, the president and Congress should reach an understanding on the role of the United Nations that will lead to the appropriation of funds to pay U.S. arrears and to a unified approach to support for the United Nations.

Whatever may have been the case in earlier periods, in the postCold War period the United Nations can be a useful and effective means to advance U.S. interests in the world. As such, it deserves the support of the American people and the American government.

Report of the Task Force

Introduction

Is America's national interest served by the United Nations? The surprising currency in Washington of proposals to slash funding for the United Nations, even to withdraw from U.N. membership, has framed this bottom-line question.⁵ The United States cofounded the United Nations in 1945 to advance shared interests in peace and security, human rights, and economic development. The United States has supported the organization through a 50-year history, using its voice and veto in the Security Council, and its influence in the General Assembly, to serve common interests and American national objectives. Nonetheless, in the last two years, the United States has fallen farther behind its pledged share of U.N. support. Each member country is supposed to send its contribution to the United Nations at the start of the new year. The 1995 payment, due and owing, was not appropriated by the U.S. Congress until April 1996, creating a severe cash crisis within the United Nations. The American voluntary contribution to U.N. development agencies has been cut by more than 25 percent in the most recent budget bill, and Congress has imposed a series of complex conditions on all contributions to the United Nations. The United States is \$1.5 billion in arrears for U.N. peacekeeping operations, and the five-year budget recommendation of the House and Senate proposes ignoring this debt. These measures seem to reflect a deep skepticism about the purpose and value of maintaining the United Nations as a working organization.

To those who work in foreign affairs, the utility of the United Nations may seem second nature. Its purposes include maintaining and restoring peace among member states; stemming the proliferation of nuclear weapons and denying weapons of mass destruction to rogue states; providing humanitarian relief in manmade and natural catastrophes; establishing international norms on the sanctity of borders, the use of force, human rights, refugees, environmental protection, and free trade; aiding the economic development of the world's poor countries; and establishing and policing technical standards in activities such as international aviation, satellite communication, postal services, the protection of intellectual property, and pharmaceutical drugs.

At a minimum, the United Nations is an extremely convenient place for diplomatic consultations, where countries can negotiate without preconditions about the shape of the table. As Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich recently observed, the United Nations has a role as a center of discussion and as a center of diplomatic activity for the many varied problems where the great powers are not in conflict. The U.S. should see the U.N. as a key opportunity for us to interact on a world basis, the Speaker noted. [W]e should continue to be prepared within a realistic framework of being active in the U.N.⁶ Former Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger has similarly observed:

There's no dispute that the vast range of U.N. activities are indispensable. There's no easier place for meetings with people where otherwise the fact of the meeting might be controversial, than the annual sessions of the General Assembly. There are many occasions when a negotiation has been completed, where the mechanism which the United Nations provides for observing compliance with the agreement would be very difficult to replace, if not impossible to replace. Many of the technical organizations of the United Nations perform a very crucial function, and in none of this should there be any dispute.⁷

The skeptics, however, question whether the United Nations can meet a basic test. They ask whether participation in the United Nations is consistent with American national security interests. Some of the foreign policy challenges of the last several years, in difficult situations such as the breakup of the former Yugoslavia, have led to quick claims that the difficulty lay not in the problem but in the institution trying to deal with the problem.

To test the United Nations against the rock-hard standard of American national interest, the Council on Foreign Relations convened a Task Force to review the relationship of the United States and the United Nations in meeting the objectives of American foreign policy. The Task Force members come from widely varied professional backgrounds and political philosophies, including former members of the Reagan, Bush, Carter, and Clinton administrations. They looked at the foreign policy aims defined by each recent administration and asked a simple question: Did the United Nations help or hinder the achievement of U.S. objectives?

The bottom line is plain. When the United States has had a clear and firm position, the United Nations has aided U.S. interests as a useful source of authority, burden-sharing, and power. Those who flirt with abdication from the United Nations underestimate the variety of diplomatic, security, and economic instruments that the United Nations provides for the achievement of American foreign policy objectives. Of course, when the United States does not have a clear aim in mind, the record is less promising. Unilateral action and multilateral action alike will flounder if objectives are unfocused.

The authority of the Security Council in which the United States holds a decisive veto and preeminent sway has remained ready at hand for American presidents to appeal to in building international coalitions, monitoring adversaries, and isolating rogue states. The Security Council is a unique instrument allowing the United States to veto actions it does

not like and yet to obtain the compliance of all members of the world community with Council decisions. The broad legal authority of the Security Council, under the U.N. Charter, has been used to address a number of emergencies in recent years, where this combination of power and legal authority was crucial. Its sharp instruments include economic sanctions as well as the use of force. In peacekeeping operations, the Council allows the major powers to combine their strategic military capabilities and logistics with the manpower of developing countries, in order to enter situations that otherwise would be difficult to manage. The Council also permits the United States to garner broad support for the use of strategic force, even while the United States carefully protects its right to act unilaterally when necessary. With the support of the Council, the United States is able to impose economic isolation and economic sanctions on rogue states, without opportunistic evasion by other trading nations.

The coalition-building success of the Gulf War and tough economic sanctions designed to dismantle Iraq's nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons capabilities; the countermeasures threatened against North Korea to persuade Pyongyang to shelve its dangerous nuclear program; and the economic isolation of Libya to force the surrender of indicted terrorists—all of these have been achievements of the United States working through the Security Council. U.N. treaty processes have set new limits on nuclear proliferation. Stabilizing Haiti's new democratic government so that Haitian citizens are not forced to seek refuge elsewhere and winding down Cold War conflicts in Central America through the monitoring of democratic elections and demobilization of combatants in El Salvador and Nicaragua and a cease-fire in Guatemala have depended centrally on U.N. contributions.

There have been more difficult cases as well. Reasonable people can debate the outcomes in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Somalia. The fits and starts of U.N. involvement have reflected disagreements on appropriate objectives or unwillingness to commit decisive military force. But even here, many American aims were met. The famine in Somalia was quelled. The Dayton peace plan is up and running in Bosnia. The United Nations is operating war crimes tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, using the authority of international human rights law and humanitarian law as well as the U.N. convention condemning genocide as an international crime.

Reform of U.N. agencies for efficiency and savings is necessary and desirable. American leadership is prominent in these efforts. The Department of Defense has advised the United Nations on the overhaul of peacekeeping operations. Americans serve as the directors of UNICEF and UNDP. A widely admired American business executive is serving as U.N. under-secretary-general for administration and management, charged with remaking the U.N. personnel system, budgeting, and procurement. Cost containment has been served: the United Nations is operating on a no-growth nominal regular budget. This means the absolute dollar amount cannot increase—the United Nations has to cut costs to absorb any loss from inflation. U.N. dependence on U.S. financial support is also likely to decrease. The secretary-general and U.S. Permanent Representative Madeleine Albright have adopted the suggestion of former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance that the U.S. share be reduced to historic low levels.

In pressing reform efforts, we must preserve what is useful. The United Nations has contributed to the fight against rogue states, nuclear terrorism, narcotics, and old-fashioned aggressors, and has served our common interests in international human rights, disease control, and the environment. National interest is a bottom-line test, and by this test, proposals to hamstring or financially starve the United Nations are misguided.

This Task Force report will proceed in two parts. First, it will look at recent central objectives of American foreign policy, to ask whether the United Nations advanced or hindered the pursuit of common interests. Second, it will look at some of the current problems of U.N. operations and constructive measures for reform.

The Pursuit of American Foreign Policy Interests

A. Iraq and Desert Storm

Sadaam Husseins audacious challenge to the civilized world, by the sudden invasion of Kuwait and threat to Saudi Arabia, was a defining moment for postCold War American foreign policy. Some of our allies had commercial interests in Iraq and regional concerns about balance of power. Even so, the United States successfully argued in the Security Council that the respect for international borders must be preserved and that Iraqs action could not be allowed to stand. The United States won support for a binding embargo against Iraqi oil sales and a full arms embargo as incentives for Iraqi withdrawal.⁸When Iraq failed to withdraw, the United States won a Security Council resolution for the use of all necessary means to remove Iraq from Kuwait.⁹

The advantages of U.N. machinery in this were plain. By going to the Security Council, the United States obtained worldwide scope for anti-Iraq sanctions. The United States holds a veto over Security Council decisions; the Council cannot act without U.S. approval. But when the Security Council does decide a matter under Chapter VII of the Charter, it has binding international legal force over all countries of the world. The U.N. Security Council combines the muscle of great power politics with a universal authoritythe legal right to demand compliance by all member states.

In Desert Storm, the United States had a right to use military force against Iraq as a measure of self-defense even without a Security Council vote. But the Councils resolution made it easier for a number of countries to join the U.S.-led coalition. Our partners provided base support and overflight rights and financed most of the effort. Germany and Japan contributed over \$15 billion; the Gulf states contributed \$37 billion. The Arab states remained in the coalition throughout the allied operations. When the United Nations is debated in the United States, we should not forget its prominence and appeal in the decision-making of our foreign partners.

Following the coalition victory, the United Nations has acted to prevent Sadaam Hussein from threatening the region again. The Security Council demanded the dismantling of Sadaams weapons of mass destruction and authorized an unprecedented U.N. inspection program operating on Iraqi soil to disarm a proven aggressor of these dangerous

capacities.¹⁰ Under Swedish diplomat Rolf Ekus, UNSCOM has used investigative doggedness and persistence, national technical resources, and the power of continuing economic sanctions to investigate and dismantle Sadaams programs in ballistic missiles and chemical and biological weapons. The monitoring has included on-site inspections in Iraq, demands for Iraqi records, and technical monitoring. The commission has blown up Sadaams chemical weapons facility and his biological weapons factory and is continuing to demand more information and access to sites to thwart Iraqi plans to build ballistic missiles with a 2,000-kilometer range and to account for existing inventories of biological reagents. With the IAEA, the commission is dismantling Sadaams nuclear capabilities. The special commission provides a new model on how to monitor and move against rogue state weapons activity. The Security Council oil embargo has been key to Iraqi compliance; the embargo remains effective through U.N. Security Council sanctions, including a carefully structured program to allow limited and monitored oil sales for humanitarian purposes.

So, too, the United States was able to protect the Kurds in the north of Iraq, a people who suffered chemical weapons attacks by Sadaam Hussein in the 1980s. The United Nations Operation Provide Comfort was an unprecedented safeguard against a states mistreatment of a minority population; it prevented Sadaam from using northern airspace and deployed U.N. guards to resettle Kurdish refugees in their traditional areas and to monitor Iraqi actions. Even beyond supplying ground personnel, the United Nations provided the legal authority that forbade Iraq from entering the northern sector of its own territory.¹¹

The United States can engage in individual and collective measures of self-defense even without the United Nations. But, as shown by the case of Iraq, Security Council authority aids American policy by adding the teeth of economic sanctions, extending a broad political umbrella, and authorizing on-site monitoring on foreign state territory.

B. North Korea and the Nuclear Crisis

In 1993, it became clear that the government of Kim Il Sung in Pyongyang, North Korea, was engaged in a nuclear development program using reprocessed fuel from gas-graphite reactors. This posed a direct threat to U.S. security interests in the region. The commitment of the United States to the defense of South Korea is historic, serving to maintain the balance of power; the United States seeks to prevent any Asian nation from threatening its neighbors. The growth of Asia as a trading partner also makes plain our economic interests in the area.

The IAEA conducted close on-site inspections of North Korean facilities something the United States could not have achieved alone. Indeed, the first alert on North Korea's misbehavior was provided by IAEA monitoring; U.N. inspectors issued a warning against North Korea's apparent diversion of spent fuel, leading to North Korea's provocative announcement that it would refuse further IAEA inspections and withdraw from the U.N. treaty against nuclear proliferation.¹²

With Security Council backing, the United States was able to threaten effective economic sanctions against North Korea. This threat was key to gaining the agreement negotiated by American envoy Robert Gallucci, requiring North Korea to shut down its diversion-prone gas-graphite nuclear reactors in exchange for assistance in planning far safer light-water reactors. In the new Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), headed by American diplomat Stephen Bosworth, the North Koreans are sitting down for the first time with government representatives of South Korea and Japan to plan the financing and construction of safe and monitored North Korean atomic power plants, to be carried out by the South Korean Electric Power Company. A crisis was turned into an unprecedented forum for intergovernmental contact, to try to bring North Korea out of its truculent isolation from the world community. The energy agreement will be policed by KEDO and the IAEA.¹³

C. Libya and Terrorism

The 1988 terrorist bomb that destroyed Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, was shocking to all Americans. The United States concluded that Libya provided support for terrorist activities resulting in the aircraft's destruction and took action through the Security Council. The United States obtained Council sanctions against Libya that cut off all arms sales and civil aviation links. The United States also has highlighted Muammar al-Qaddafi's responsibility for state-sponsored terrorism, and the Council has issued a legally binding demand that Libya turn over the suspects in the bombing for trial. Council authority has been highly useful in maintaining a common bulwark against Libya, a country that traditionally has had economic attractions for many allies.

Use of the Security Council also has developed international law against terrorism. Before, there was little established basis to demand that a country surrender its own nationals for trial abroad, unless there was an extradition treaty obligation. The U.S.-sponsored action clarified the rules of international criminal law and established that state-sponsored terrorism would not go unpunished.¹⁴ This precedent has been followed in demanding that Sudan extradite individuals responsible for the 1995 attempted assassination of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.¹⁵

D. Transition to Democracy in Haiti

In 1994 Haiti's democratically elected government was restored and the flow of Haitian refugees to American shores was stemmed by the joint efforts of the United States, the Organization of American States (OAS), and the United Nations. In 1990 Haiti enjoyed its first democratic elections in decades in accord with the decision of the last three American presidents to make the advancement of democracy an important objective of American foreign policy. The democratic process was thwarted by a Haitian military coup in 1991, blocking President Jean-Bertrand Aristide from office. The United States put pressure on the Haitian military regime to step down, with economic sanctions voted by the U.N. Security Council.¹⁶ A joint OAS-U.N. human rights monitoring mission also exposed the abusive nature of the Haitian regime.

After attempts at a negotiated solution were exhausted, the United States obtained a unanimous resolution approving a forced entry into Haiti from the U.N. Security Council. An American-led coalition of armed forces was deployed to Haiti in October 1994 and restored the elected government.¹⁷ U.N. authority enhanced the legitimacy of the action within Haitian society, where military intervention might otherwise have evoked nationalist feelings, since the United States occupied Haiti from 1915 to 1934. The U.N. umbrella also helped to persuade other nations to participate and permitted a rapid drawdown of U.S. personnel from 20,000 to 6,000 within a few months, succeeded by a U.N. multinational force.¹⁸ New democratic elections for the Haitian parliament and presidency were conducted under U.N. and OAS monitoring, with the stabilizing presence of U.N. peacekeepers from more than a dozen nations. In February 1996 and again in late June 1996, the Security Council authorized a small continuing force, including a national contingent from Canada, to provide future stability.¹⁹

E. Bosnia

Bosnia's cruel conflict has concerned two presidents, even while Americans debated how the United States should contribute to resolving the crisis. In the attempt to mitigate the harshness of the war, the United Nations distributed humanitarian aid to civilians in hazardous convoys run by relief workers and peacekeepers and mounted economic sanctions against Serbia to discourage that country's intervention in the war.²⁰ The United Nations authorized a no-fly zone over Bosnia to prevent the Serbs from using air power against the Bosnian government. A U.N.-sponsored blockade of Serbian commerce through Operation Sharp Guard on the Adriatic Sea and monitoring on the Danube River put pressure on Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic to agree to the American-sponsored Dayton peace plan.

The Bosnian war involved issues that rightfully need examination. At the outset, the major powers were unwilling to commit forces for the purpose of enforcing peace. Those who now criticize U.N. performance in Bosnia rarely do so for the mission it was actually chartered and resourced to perform: peacekeeping and the distribution of humanitarian aid. Over time, public expectations grew, but the United Nations was not given the Chapter VII authority or the firepower needed to quash the fighting. There was never an adequately sized and equipped force to provide for the protection of Bosnian civilian safe areas to prevent their use by Muslims as military sanctuaries and staging points for launching offensives, or to prevent Serb forces from shelling civilian targets. The U.N. peacekeeping force was never tasked to stop the ethnic cleansing of disputed areas or to protect the lives of prisoners-of-war captured by the combatants. The traditional reticence of the United Nations in the use of force in peacekeeping is open to debate and is changing. But the member states that failed to agree on a more robust policy cannot deflect all blame onto the United Nations. The United Nations was limited in its resources and its mandate.

At the same time, one strategic success was achieved: the war was prevented from spreading. Unilateral intervention in the conflict by other powers could have been highly destabilizing. Through the ongoing consultations of the Security Council and the five-

nation Contact Group, outside military forces were largely excluded, and the conflict was kept local. In addition, the United Nations delivered humanitarian aid that kept civilians alive in the harsh conditions of the war.

In the Dayton peace plan, the U.N. Security Council has played an important legal role, authorizing the use of force to carry out the cease-fire and peace agreement. At Dayton, the parties accepted the peace plan and agreed to the deployment of a multinational Implementation Force, including NATO forces and troops from other countries. But the belligerents consent is backstopped by a Security Council Chapter VII resolution authorizing the use of force if the parties stray from the cease-fire or agreement.²¹ The United Nations also has recruited international police monitors, to watch the performance of local police agencies in the Republika Srpska and the Muslim-Croat Federation in Bosnia, seeking to prevent the abuse of ethnic minorities.

U.N. forces are supervising the restoration of Croatian authority in Eastern Slavonia, a task that NATO did not wish to take on, but one that is crucial to the acceptance of the Dayton peace agreement. U.N. forces have successfully served in a first-ever preventive deployment in Macedonia, providing reassurance to that former Yugoslav republic. U.N.-sponsored negotiations led to an important treaty settlement between Macedonia and Greece, fixing the border, winning mutual recognition, and ending Greece's disastrous economic embargo against Macedonia.

The United Nations has helped to focus world public opinion on civilian casualties in the war. A recent prominent study by UNICEF, the U.N. children's aid agency, headed by an American, noted that in recent wars 90 percent of the casualties have been civilian. The maiming and death of women and children from land mines used in civil wars also has been at the center of multilateral negotiations on new protocols to the 1980 U.N. Convention on Conventional Weapons.

F. Somalia and Rwanda

The United States traditionally has pitched in to meet natural disasters. The United Nations has provided a cooperative mechanism to deal with man-made disasters. The record of response in Rwanda and Somalia, trying to thwart genocide and famine in those two countries, was mixed. In Rwanda, no country was willing to contribute combat troops for a U.N. operation to stem the slaughter of 500,000 Tutsi by the Hutu in mid-1994. Canadian General Romeo Dallaire, commanding the lightly armed U.N. contingent in Rwanda, maintains that prompt military intervention could have successfully quashed the fighting with few casualties. But the deaths of ten Belgian peacekeepers at the outset of the conflict was traumatic to troop-donating countries, and the United States was still assessing its experience in Somalia. One necessary lesson of Rwanda is that there is no substitute for political will. Nonetheless, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees coordinated relief efforts among many governments and private organizations. Under U.N. auspices, American troops contributed to the refugee efforts in the face of an unstable environment, including the delivery of clean water, which helped save thousands of lives.

In Somalia, the United States committed its forces for a short-term intervention to protect food deliveries in the midst of a famine and the breakdown of civil order. The United States ran into difficulty in October 1993 when it attempted to arrest clan leader Mohammed Aideed.²² This operation cost 18 American lives; it was conducted under American military command,²³ although in the aftermath political leaders in Washington sometimes preferred to sidestep this fact. The loss of American troops in Somalia was a wake-up call to think through how to structure peacekeeping operations so that there is unified command within the American contingent, adequate U.S. backup forces, and secure use of military intelligence.

G. Cambodia

The successful resolution of the conflict in Cambodia has stabilized a region that is important to American security interests. The Cambodian conflict was in large part a surrogate war, pitting the Soviet- and Vietnamese-backed regime of Hun Sen against the Chinese-backed Khmer Rouge and the Khmer Peoples National Liberation Front (KPNLF), a U.S. ally. Exhaustion of the parties; changed policies in Russia, China, and Vietnam; and a facilitating role by regional powers such as Australia, Indonesia, and Japan enabled the United Nations to gain a peace accord and to organize the first democratic elections in Cambodia. Held in 1993, these elections closed a chapter of the long nightmare of Cambodia's genocide. The successful elections in Cambodia required a large-scale ground presence by U.N. peacekeeping troops, international civilian police, and human rights monitors. Regional powers helped to fund the successful transition to democracy. Troops were contributed by countries such as the Netherlands, Malaysia, Uruguay, Bulgaria, and Japan. Although the long-term situation is delicate, the Khmer Rouge were discredited by their aloofness from the U.N.-sponsored elections. Without the United Nations, this peacekeeping operation and negotiated end of a Cold War conflict would have been harder to arrange.

H. El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Guatemala

The stability of Central America has been a traditional interest of American foreign policy. The El Salvador civil war was resolved through negotiations led by U.N. Secretary-General Javier Prez de Cullar and other interested leaders in the region, with the cooperation of the United States. The United Nations establishment of a Truth Commission to inquire into human rights problems, supervision of the demobilization of combatants and financing of farmland for their reemployment, and the creation of a new police force all helped to resolve the Salvadoran conflict. In Nicaragua, democratic elections were supervised by the United Nations in 1989, dislodging the Sandinistas from authority, although they still share power in the armed forces. Demobilization of civil war combatants was supervised by the United Nations and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. A U.N. human rights mission is currently deployed throughout Guatemala, deterring human rights violations and monitoring a cease-fire between the combatants in the civil war. In each case, the confidence of the opposing sides has depended crucially on the impartiality of an international organization, especially since the United States was involved in the region throughout the 1980s.

I. Angola and Mozambique

A pair of Cold War conflicts in Africa is reaching settlement through U.N. peacekeeping. In 1975 Cuban involvement in Angola complicated that country's Cold War conflict; fighting in the former Portuguese colony of Mozambique also was embroiled in the East-West conflict. In the last three years, the United Nations has gained an end to the war in Mozambique, through negotiations sponsored by the Roman Catholic community of Sant Egidio and the efforts of the U.N. secretary-general's representative, Italian diplomat Aldo Ajello, who supervised the cantonment and demobilization of combatants, persuaded the insurgents to opt for democratic political participation, and watched over Mozambique's first democratic elections. The new peace in Mozambique is apparently stable. The United Nations served as a workable mechanism for Western powers to coordinate diplomatic support for the peace process.

The civil conflict in Angola has been less tractable, due to the willingness of insurgent Jonas Savimbi to continue the war. A new U.N. peacekeeping force has been deployed and diplomatic efforts are under way, under the supervision of the secretary-general's representative, Malian diplomat Alioune Blondin Beye. The new relative stability in these southern African conflicts brings to a successful close two decades of Cold War conflict and prevents further hardship for innocent civilians.

J. South Africa and Namibia

The peaceful transformation of South Africa into a democratic state, through a sanctions regime maintained by the United Nations over many years and the 1994 elections supervised by the United Nations, should count as one of the triumphs of our time. It was a victory for democracy and the future of multiethnic states, and it stabilized the political situation of all of southern Africa. Similarly, the U.N. role in urging independence for Namibia and in contributing to democratic elections is another example of how international efforts can quell a civil conflict.

K. Other American Security Interests: Nuclear Nonproliferation, Counterterrorism, Counternarcotics, Genocide and Human Rights, Disease Control

The United States has other security interests beyond these immediate crises. The United Nations has provided useful tools in addressing issues such as nuclear nonproliferation, terrorism, narcotics, human rights, and disease. Sri Lanka's former ambassador to the United Nations, Jayantha Dhanapala, successfully led the 1995 conference to extend the U.N. Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, persuading nonnuclear countries to refrain from acquiring destabilizing weapons.

In the fight against terrorism, the U.N. General Assembly has proposed treaty law that recognizes terrorist acts as international crimes. These treaties protecting civil aviation, diplomats, and other international persons have been ratified by most countries of the world. Terrorists committing these acts can no longer be sheltered in a host country under

a political crime loophole; the U.N. treaties require that each treaty partner either prosecute or extradite the terror suspects.

U.N. antinarcotics efforts also have created a treaty framework that requires countries to enact criminal legislation against drug dealers and money launderers. Former U.S. Attorney General Dick Thornburgh recently praised the effort as worthy of emulation in fighting transnational corporate crime as well.

International norms protecting human rights and the growing acceptance by governments of the human rights monitoring responsibility of U.N. bodies also have served U.S. interests. The Genocide Convention condemns any country engaged in destruction of a distinct ethnic group. The forum of the U.N. Human Rights Commission and the Human Rights Committee in Geneva can turn bright lights on regimes that abuse minority peoples and nationalities; this serves international security by heading off civil conflicts. The human rights framework created by the United Nations with the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights was grandfather to the Helsinki process that helped unravel the Soviet bloc. An emphasis on human rights served to distinguish the United States in Cold War competitions and still gives worldwide reason to respect American leadership. The United Nations also has created a High Commissioner for Human Rights to mediate and focus attention on troubled situations.

The plight of refugees and displaced persons is addressed by the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, the singularly effective Sadako Ogata, with support from UNDP, the World Food Program, and UNICEF, among other agencies. Refugee flows destabilize neighboring countries, even draw them into the conflict. Providing a mechanism for humanitarian aid and repatriation saves human lives and mitigates the crises created by sudden refugee movements. Worldwide, over 45 million men, women, and children are refugees and displaced persons. This is obviously a problem that the United States cannot resolve alone.

U.N. Security Council authority also has been used to establish War Crimes Tribunals in the Hague to prosecute war crimes and genocide committed in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda. Without the Security Council, setting up a new institution would have been a slow process, requiring treaty negotiations country by country. The possibility of Security Council economic sanctions also provides an incentive for cooperation with the tribunals.

Controlling infectious diseases and world epidemics is another security interest of the United States. There is no waters edge solution to infectious disease; beating it back at the source is essential for American health security. The high volume of air travel and international trade makes this plain; domestic health cannot be insulated from virulent changes in the outside environment. The United Nations has eradicated smallpox and has led successful efforts to inoculate 80 percent of the worlds children against the most common childhood diseases. With U.N. leadership on issues such as oral rehydration therapy, childhood mortality rates have been cut by 50 percent since the 1960s. The Belgian doctor who discovered the Ebola slow virus is now heading a Geneva-based AIDS commission to persuade developing countries that they must address the problem

of infected populations. Ebola virus, river blindness, and recurrent tuberculosis also have been the focus of U.N. efforts through UNICEF and the World Health Organization (WHO).

L. Democracy and Development

Many political analysts believe that democracies are unlikely to fight each other.²⁴ In a democracy, belligerent intentions become transparent; democratic electorates dislike casualties; and economic growth is a likelier way of winning votes. The United Nations recognition of a right to democracy in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 1976 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, has served to delegitimize many belligerent regimes.²⁵ New programs carried out by UNDP and other agencies to support and monitor democratic elections and build civil institutions give concrete reinforcement to this norm. A new Initiative on Africa, for example, involving the United Nations and World Bank, will focus on governance.

Economic development to relieve the hardship of the world's poor has been a central purpose of the United Nations since its founding in 1945. The Bretton Woods agencies of the larger U.N. system—the World Bank and the IMF—have taken the lead in proposing market-based reforms for countries that formerly followed socialist or protectionist paths. UNDP, under the leadership of U.S. administrator James Gustave Speth, has addressed problems of environment, poverty, and women's roles to supplement the Bretton Woods institutions. UNDP also helps to strengthen technical and administrative capacities in poor countries, allowing them to adopt market solutions. UNDP has the strongest in-country presence of any U.N. agency, crucial in program monitoring and delivery capacity and has been central in post-conflict reconstruction in places such as El Salvador and Mozambique. The United Nations has limited capacity for crisis response, and UNDP also has acted to provide emergency humanitarian aid and economic reconstruction in Rwanda and elsewhere.

UNICEF has provided an emphasis on human capital and small enterprise, a strategy now adopted by the World Bank and the IMF as well, in addition to its mission of protecting mothers and children. In the annual State of the World's Children report, UNICEF focuses the attention of member governments on children's welfare as a crucial measure of performance. UNICEF is the most popular international program, traditionally headed by an American, and has provided an important mechanism for projecting U.S. values across divergent cultures.

The multiplier effect of U.N. development work also is important. U.S. contributions have been matched many times over by other countries interested in attacking underdevelopment. These U.N. projects are funded by voluntary donations from other countries. The Nordic nations give development and humanitarian aid far in excess of their mandatory dues—approximately \$1 billion per year. UNDP receives over \$2 billion per year in voluntary aid funds. The High Commissioner for Refugees runs her refugee operations for victims of war and natural disaster on voluntary donations totaling \$1 billion. At a time when the United States is cutting back its economic assistance overseas

because of budget demands at home, this magnifying effect is important. The United Nations serves as a common pool for development monies and targets the conditions of poverty and social breakdown that, if unattended, can precipitate the next crisis. It helps to avoid the occasions when armed force might otherwise be needed and to develop markets for trade and American goods.

Some observers believe that a number of U.N. economic development agencies are duplicative and need consolidation, especially with the advent of the World Trade Organization (WTO). At the same time, others believe that these agencies are important as an alternative source of advice for developing countries, especially in economic negotiations with the Bretton Woods institutions.

M. Environment

The United Nations is a key tool for the United States in advancing its enormous interest in environmental protection. The United States has a strong interest in reaching agreement with other nations on remedial measures to address loss of biological diversity, reducing the use of chlorofluorocarbons, stemming the effects of deforestation and other resource depletions, and mitigating possible human impacts on climate change. No one nation could address these problems by itself, and they affect the physical well-being of Americans in an immediate way. The United Nations is the only universal forum in which we can seek the intergovernmental consensus required for common action.

N. Setting Technical Standards

Although often overlooked, the work of U.N. specialized agencies is central in setting standards and preventing disputes in a host of technical areas that are crucial in international transactions, communications, and transportation. U.N. bodies coordinate civil aviation, allocate radio frequencies, monitor maritime safety, and coordinate worldwide weather forecasting. Other crucial tasks include worldwide postal service cooperation, intellectual property protection (for American patents, copyrights, and trademarks), and international labor standards to maintain some minimum standard for working men and women. The standard-setting avoids a race to the bottom and opportunistic behavior. It solves the disputes that inevitably would arise if all states acted unilaterally.

U.N. Problems and Reforms

The U.S. interest in an effective United Nations requires that we reform and streamline U.N. operations. The call for U.N. reform deserves sustained and serious attention but must begin with three caveats. Member countries often have preferred to limit the United Nations ability to act, in order to retain political control in situations of interest to them. Member countries often have given the United Nations the most difficult problems that lack any quick solution, as a political expedient, and then, at a safe distance, have inconsistently complained that the problems were not easily solved. And finally, reform-minded states will fail at the effort if a basic commitment to the success of the institution

is in doubt. Reform requires frank self-examination, and this is made more difficult by an environment in which an institution is under threat. Starving the United Nations for funds or threatening unilateral withdrawal can interfere with the attempt to reform the institution.

There has been a host of studies of the United Nations in the last half-dozen years, debating possible changes to the U.N. Charter, reconstitution of the United Nations political structure, and possible expansion of the Security Council. These changes are highly contentious and are unlikely to be put into practice in any near term. The basic operational problems of the United Nations are much plainer. The United States should concentrate on these achievable goals.

The first requirement is to streamline the organization by eliminating redundant agencies and scaling down unnecessary operations. There is heated debate over which agencies can be consolidated or eliminated, especially in the economic and social area. The triage should not mistake box-moving on an organizational chart with real economies of scale. The United States has withdrawn from the U.N. Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO). The Commission on Global Governance co-chaired by former Commonwealth Secretary-General Shridath Ramphal and former Swedish Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson has proposed that the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) be merged into the WTO. UNCTAD is now meeting every six months with the WTO to coordinate working plans, under the new U.N.-WTO agreement. It is reasonable, in our view, to require that agencies with concurrent areas of competence justify their separate identities. Nonetheless, the wide tent membership of the United Nations useful to the United States in binding other countries through Security Council decisions may require some latitude in preserving agencies that developing countries believe to be important.

Every American government agency and corporation has been forced in the last ten years to address whether its work can be done with fewer personnel. There is no reason that the United Nations should be exempt from this process. An international organization needs to give its members a role in the enterprise; the distribution of posts among talented citizens of many nations is part of giving confidence and building support for the organization. But national rosters need to be scrutinized to assure that candidates are well qualified and good managers. The effort of Under-Secretary-General Joseph Connor to put in place a rigorous system of performance evaluation is worthwhile and should be supported. The current U.N. system of permanent posts and lifetime contracts is open to question. While at-pleasure appointments can expose U.N. personnel to high-pressure tactics from member countries and political undercutting, a workable compromise may lie with limited-term appointments. Meritocratic appointments are wanting in another respect: the United Nations has appointed few women to senior posts within the Secretariat. A commitment to use this pool of talent is not yet part of the United Nations working culture.

It is crucial to encourage management responsibility. The United Nations often suffers from overly detailed micromanagement. For example, the General Assemblys Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budget Questions sets detailed expenditure categories

for each agency and peacekeeping operation rather than giving responsibility to the mission head for successful performance. At the same time, there is no adequate top-level supervision. Member countries are able to protect ineffective agency administrators. The poor performance of the current head of the WHO is a case in point. A secretary-general often has limited time for administration, yet there is no deputy-secretary-general to fill the gap. The current management style of rotating posts among under-secretaries at frequent intervals also interferes with efficient administration, since there is a steep learning curve for each new head. Finally, it is crucial that the United Nations elect a secretary-general who gives clear and consistent priority to management reform as well as international emergencies.

U.N. budgeting and finances are a second concern. The sudden ballooning of expenses for peacekeeping from 1991 to 1995, because of the large-scale operations in Somalia, Cambodia, and the former Yugoslavia, combined with American budget cutbacks in 1995, has led to a new scrutiny of U.N. expenses. The opaqueness of the U.N. budget process adds to the tension. But there is every reason to suppose that U.N. expenses will moderate for the foreseeable future. The organization has held to a commitment of no real growth in the regular budget for nearly ten years and, for the last year, no nominal growth. The United States can wield its veto in the Security Council to assure a sensible triage of peacekeeping commitments. Thanks to reforms agreed on in 1986⁸⁷, U.N. budget decisions are subject to a consensus decision in the General Assembly, and the United States can withhold its consent. Mr. Connors charged tasks include rationalizing the budget process, so that member countries can more easily follow the bottom line.

The failure of the United States to pay its regular budget and peacekeeping assessments has made budget reform more difficult in some respects. U.S. failure to pay allows an easy riposte by countries that resist reform. It forces the use of budgetary shortcuts such as borrowing from the peacekeeping account to pay ordinary expenses of the United Nations that are not desirable. We also should be aware that the arrearages can prevent the United Nations from doing some things the United States would very much like for example, sending additional human rights monitors to Burundi and other crisis areas.

A working group chaired by Austrian Ambassador Ernst Sucharipa and Trinidad and Tobago Ambassador Annette des Iles is examining how to reallocate expenses among U.N. members. U.N. dues are scaled generally to the size of a member's economy, that is, gross domestic product (GDP), with discounts for countries that have low per-capita incomes. The American economy produces approximately one-quarter of the world's wealth, and American dues have been 25 percent in recent years.²⁶ Some countries are considering the advice given by the late Swedish Prime Minister Olaf Palme, that no single country should be asked to fund too large a proportion of the organization's expenses, if only because doing so encourages undue dependence. Recently, former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance proposed that the United Nations should depend on the United States for no more than 15 to 20 percent of its expenses,²⁷ and the suggestion was reiterated by the secretary-general²⁸ and U.S. Ambassador Madeleine Albright.²⁹ On the other hand, our budget contribution increases U.S. influence in U.N. affairs, a desirable objective from the point of view of many observers. The Reagan administration resisted

earlier proposals to cut the U.S. share for this reason. In addition, a zero-based nominal budget for the United Nations will continue to reduce the real cost to the United States.

The amount that the United States should pay is open to debate. What is clear is that the United Nations cannot run efficiently if the United States pays its dues late and erratically. The standards of any ordinary business require predictability in cash flows and capital reserves for unexpected expenses. The United States should enable the United Nations to meet these standards. Any reduction of our share of U.N. assessments must be done in a realistic way, identifying which countries may plug the gap and understanding that this hand-off is likely to increase other countries political influence. We should seek to accomplish reduction by political agreement within the General Assembly, abiding by our treaty obligations. We should continue to remember that U.S. companies obtain a far larger proportion of U.N. contracts and business than we contribute to the overall U.N. budget.

A valuable proposal is currently before the United Nations to reduce the number of years over which a country's GDP is averaged in setting assessment shares, so that newly prosperous countries will pay a larger share; the United Nations formerly used a 10-year average and now uses a 7.5-year average; it should be changed to a 3-year average. The General Assembly also has adopted an important reform proposal ending the long-standing scheme of limits, which formerly capped changes in assessment rates from one year to the next; this deregulation of the rate of change of assessments will be phased in fully for the 1997 assessment year. The United Nations also is considering useful proposals to reduce the size of discount on assessed rates for large economies that have low per-capita income.

A third problem is to continue to modernize the U.N. capacity to oversee complicated security operations. It is generally conceded, inside the United Nations and among member countries, that war-fighting and combat operations lie outside the United Nations capability; peace enforcement must be left to willing coalitions of member countries, aided by Security Council authorization. Nonetheless, it still is crucial to strengthen and maintain U.N. management capacity to handle future peacekeeping operations where robust force may have to be available as a deterrent for example, in the winding down of a conflict and the separation of forces. The United Nations must be able to analyze intelligence information, must have real-time communications equipment to maintain contact with commanders of national military contingents, and must have an adequate source of realistic military advice.

The U.S. Department of Defense has worked hand-in-glove with the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations over the last two years, to improve U.N. capability in planning and managing peace operations. The United Nations now has an operations center, staffed 24 hours a day, seven days a week, to respond to requests from the field and to provide the secretary-general with up-to-date information and analysis necessary for mission planning and recommendations to the Security Council. (In contrast, at the time of the Rwanda emergency in 1994, the secretary-general could not communicate directly with the U.N. force commander in Rwanda.) There are now

satellite telephones, something any modern crisis response team must have. U.S. military officers report that the Peacekeeping Operations Department is now staffed with competent professionals in whom they have confidence and with whom they can work effectively. Further improvements can be made, but withholding money from the United Nations has stood in the way. For example, the U.S. Department of Defense has designed a package to update the communications and information system of peacekeeping operations, but the current budget crisis has prevented its purchase. Limited budgets have forced the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to depend heavily on personnel borrowed from member countries, and only the richer members can afford to supply such personnel. With cut-back funding, fewer planners are directly familiar with the militaries of developing countries that supply so many of the troops deployed in peacekeeping in difficult conditions. Although some country missions at the United Nations have military advisers, the United Nations has limited in-house capacity to design realistic scenarios for U.N. operations. In the past, far too much in planning operations has been left to wishfulness and ad hoc improvisation in the field.

A fourth problem is how to remind member countries of the realistic limitations of the organization. The secretary-general can serve this role through clear public statements and private consultations. A secretary-general can build influence with member countries by attending Security Council deliberations regularly and consulting broadly on proposed plans in advance. In the past this has not always been the modus operandi. In addition, the selection process for the office of secretary-general has been haphazard, often ending up in a choice by default. A secretary-general is chosen by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the Security Council. The race for office is based on veto avoidance, sometimes leading to a field of candidates who lack appropriate experience and stature. The selection process is subject to less scrutiny than is common to any Fortune 500 or major university search.

A fifth challenge, at least for Americans, is how to provide national legislators with an adequate sense of oversight of U.N. operations. While the United Nations is an international treaty organization, and treaty supervision in the United States falls to the president and Department of State, it is not surprising that the Congress wishes to have a voice in how U.N. affairs are handled when substantial amounts of money are expended and U.S. military forces are involved in U.N. security operations. The physical distance of the United Nations from Washington, the confidentiality of Security Council deliberations, the complexity of U.N. organizations and specialized agencies, and traditional American interbranch competition adds to this sense of removal. Presidential Decision Directive 25, issued in May 1994, pledges the executive branch to frequent consultations with the Congress, including sharing the agenda of upcoming Security Council matters. This directive should be built upon. While views of the constitutional scope of executive and legislative powers will differ, every president should find it prudent to involve the Congress wherever possible in decisions concerning the use of American armed forces abroad under U.N. authority.

Senate and House members are regularly included in the U.S. delegation to the General Assembly; members of Congress have not been able to spend much time in New York in

recent years because of the press of legislative business, but the Congress may wish to explore how to use this privilege to participate in the U.N. political process. So, too, the U.N. secretary-general may wish to seek new ways to consult with legislative leaders, necessarily respecting the prime place of heads of state and government but recognizing that modern presidential government involves shared power.

The United Nations should be intelligible to its varied constituencies. Voting publics must understand the United Nations if they are to support it. The vigorous and hazardous work of U.N. personnel in the field in health care delivery, refugee work, peacekeeping, and development assistance often is less visible than the political functions. The same is true of essential U.N. agencies that regulate maritime and aviation safety, allocate radio communications spectra, and undertake worldwide weather reporting to track hurricanes and disasters. The United Nations should overhaul its Department of Public Information and make information about U.N. operations more accessible to the American press and public. A political unbundling would allow church and evangelical groups, American corporations, environmental organizations, transportation safety groups, and other citizen associations to identify the U.N. operations that enhance their own international efforts. Even so, American public opinion has consistently registered strong support of American participation in U.N. programs, including peacekeeping.³⁰ In a democracy, the views of the public will matter in shaping foreign policy.

A final challenge is how to handle new civil war and ethnic conflicts. The United Nations should continue to seek out senior international mediators who enjoy the confidence of their own governments and are skilled in dispute resolution. The American military and other national militaries need to address and to war-game what can be done with reasonable force structures to separate combatants and deter genocide early in a conflict. The complicated circumstances that brought political success and failure in recent peacekeeping missions need to be sorted through by scholars, analysts, and statesmen. The successful management of these conflicts ultimately requires political focus at the highest level of interested governments, including our own.

Conclusion

We do not belittle the problems that face the United Nations in managing effective operations, recovering from the disappointments of Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda, and inducing its members to decide on clear policy. But the bottom line is equally plain. Continuing the organization we founded in 1945 is an important part of the architecture for an effective American foreign policy. The United Nations has served Americas security interests, when the United States has had a clear and firm position on a desirable course of action, and has served common interests of the world community. The United States often will act alone or through other alliances. Our status as a superpower gives us options that other nations lack. But international institutions have a purpose. Framing common norms, providing a ready place for consultations, enhancing the legitimacy of superpower action, and gaining the compliance of other nations through Security Council decisions are among the United Nations invaluable functions and are crucial to U.S. interests. Not every decision taken in the U.N. framework will be to our liking. But

overall, we gain far more than we lose. Our friends and allies would take our rejection of the United Nations the institutional structure we chose to create after World War II as a radical retreat by the United States from international engagement and responsibility.

Additional Signatories

The Task Force statement is also endorsed by the following people, who met for one session each in Atlanta, Chicago, Houston, and San Francisco.

Atlanta

DAVID BEDERMAN: Mr. Bederman is Associate Professor of Law at Emory University School of Law. He is Visiting Professor (1996-1997) at the University of Virginia School of Law.

PETER D. BELL: Mr. Bell is President of CARE, the international development and relief agency. He was President of the Edna McConnell Clark Foundation, President of the Inter-American Foundation, and Deputy Under Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare.

E. MILTON BEVINGTON: Mr. Bevington is Founder and President of Servidyne Incorporated and Servidyne Systems, Inc., firms that offer engineering-based services to improve efficiency in buildings. He has held a number of community leadership positions, especially in the environmental movement and with organizations serving youth.

ZEB B. BRADFORD, Jr.: General Bradford is Vice President of Primerica Financial Services, Inc., a subsidiary of The Travelers Group. He was Chief, Plans and Programs Division, at NATO Military Headquarters (SHAPE, Belgium) and headed the International Strategic Planning Staff of United Technologies Corporation, Hartford.

LINDA P. BRADY: Dr. Brady is Chair of the School of International Affairs at the Georgia Institute of Technology. She served as defense adviser on U.S. arms control delegations during the Carter and Reagan administrations.

MARY BROWN BULLOCK: Dr. Bullock is President of Agnes Scott College, a private liberal arts college for women located in Atlanta. She served as Director of the Asia Program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

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PERRY M. SMITH: Major General Smith, USAF (ret.), is President of Visionary Leadership of Augusta, and serves as a military analyst for the Cable News Network

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L. PATRICK WRIGHT: Mr. Wright is Senior Vice President for the Center for Business Solutions, Inc. He was a Colonel in the U.S. Army before retiring to accept employment in the civilian sector.

Chicago

ROBERT Z. ALIBER: Dr. Aliber teaches international finance at the University of Chicago.

BRUCE CUMINGS: Dr. Cumings is Director of the Center for International and Comparative Studies at Northwestern University. He is the author of several books on East Asian affairs and American East Asian relations.

ARTHUR I. CYR: Dr. Cyr is President of the World Trade Center Chicago and teaches at Northwestern University. Previously he was Vice President of the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations.

KENNETH W. DAM: Mr. Dam is Max Pam Professor of American and Foreign Law at the University of Chicago Law School. He served as Deputy Secretary of State from 1982 to 1985.

JOHN M. FLANAGIN: Mr. Flanagan is Research Director of the National Strategy Forum, a Chicago-based research and education organization specializing in international politics and national security.

STEVEN LAZARUS: Mr. Lazarus is a managing partner of ARCH Venture Partners, L.P.

CHARLES LIPSON: Mr. Lipson is Chair of the Committee on International Relations at the University of Chicago. He also codirects the university's Program on International Politics, Economics, and Security (PIPES).

RICHARD C. LONGWORTH: Mr. Longworth is a senior writer for The Chicago Tribune. He is a former foreign correspondent who won the 1995 Overseas Press Club Award for a series of articles on the United Nations.

GARY E. MACDOUGAL: Mr. MacDougal was a delegate to the U.N. General Assembly, a member of the U.S. Commission on Improving the Effectiveness of the United Nations, and is Chairman Emeritus and Director of the Bulgarian-American Enterprise Fund.

LEWIS MANILOW: Mr. Manilow is a member of the Board of the National Democratic Institute and Chairman of its Middle East Committee.

DAVID J. ROSSO: Mr. Rosso is a partner in the law firm of Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue in charge of the firms international project finance practice. He is a Director of the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations and was awarded the Order of Merit of the Republic of Italy.

HUGH J. SCHWARTZBERG: Mr. Schwartzberg is a senior partner in the law firm of Schwartzberg, Barnett & Cohen and is active with various foundations. He is also a Director of several Jewish organizations, including Bnai Brith, where he is Senior International Vice President.

THOM SHANKER: Mr. Shanker is a member of The Chicago Tribune editorial board. He has served as bureau chief in Moscow and in Berlin and covered the war in the former Yugoslavia from 1992 to 1994.

ADELE SMITH Simmons: Dr. Simmons is President of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation in Chicago. She has served as a member of the Commission on Global Governance, the U.N. High-Level Advisory Board on Sustainable Development, President Carters Commission on World Hunger, and President Bushs Commission on Environmental Quality.

ADLAI E. STEVENSON III: Senator Stevenson, a former U.S. Senator, is President and Chief Executive Officer of SC & M International, Ltd., an international merchant banking firm.

Houston

JOHN A. BARRETT: Mr. Barrett is a partner in the law firm of Fulbright & Jaworski. He is a U.S. delegate to the United Nations Commission on Cross-Border Insolvency (UNCITRAL).

HENRY E. CATTO, Jr.: Ambassador Catto is Diplomat in Residence at the University of Texas, San Antonio. He served as Ambassador to El Salvador, to the U.N. Office in Geneva, and to Great Britain, and was Director of the United States Information Agency.

LEE CULLUM: Ms. Cullum is a contributing columnist at the Dallas Morning News. She also is a regular commentator on the NewsHour with Jim Lehrer and All Things Considered on National Public Radio.

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KEITH P. ELLISON: Mr. Ellison, a former Supreme Court law clerk, is a lawyer who practices in his own firm in Houston. He is a graduate of Harvard, Yale Law School, and Oxford, which he attended on a Rhodes Scholarship.

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HARRIS L. KEMPNER, Jr.: Mr. Kempner is President of Kempner Capital Management, Inc., and Trustee of the

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EWELL E. MURPHY, Jr.: Mr. Murphy is a retired partner of the law firm of Baker & Botts, L.L.P., in Houston, Texas, and a former Chairman of the J. William Fulbright Foreign Scholarship Board in Washington, D.C. He is currently Distinguished Lecturer at the University of Houston Law Center and Visiting Professor at the University of Texas Law School.

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PATRICK J. WARD: Mr. Ward is former Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Caltex Petroleum Corporation. He was also Chairman of the National Foreign Trade Council, Vice Chairman of the U.S.-ASEAN Council, and Governor of the World Energy Council.

San Francisco

JULIA CHANG BLOCH: Ambassador Bloch, currently President and Chief Executive Officer of the United StatesJapan Foundation, has moved from a 25-year career in government to the corporate world and now to the nonprofit sector. Her career in international affairs began as a Peace Corps Volunteer and culminated as U.S. Ambassador to the Kingdom of Nepal.

A. LAWRENCE CHICKERING: Mr. Chickering is Founder and Associate Director of the International Center for Economic Growth, which works with an international network of correspondent institutes in developing and transitional countries to promote economic and social reform.

WILLIAM H. DRAPER III: Mr. Draper is Managing Director of Draper International. He served as President and Chairman of the United States Export-Import Bank and as Administrator and Chief Executive Officer of the U.N. Development Program.

WILLIAM S. HARAF: Mr. Haraf is Senior Vice President and Director of Public Policy for Bank of America. He served on the Presidents Council of Economic Advisers during the Reagan administration from 1983 to 1985.

MAURICE HARARI: Dr. Harari is Secretary General of the International Association of University Presidents. He was Dean of International Education at California State University, Long Beach, and taught international relations at Columbia University, Dartmouth, and Kyung Hee University (Korea).

NANCY A. JARVIS: Ms. Jarvis is a San Francisco attorney whose practice includes clients headquartered in Asia. She served as Chairman of the World Affairs Council of Northern California and was a foreign policy editor at MIT Press prior to becoming an attorney.

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SALLY LILIENTHAL: Ms. Lilienthal is Founder and working President of the 15-year-old Ploughshares Fund. She is former Vice-Chair of Amnesty International, USA.

A. KENNETH NILSSON: Mr. Nilsson is Chairman of the Board of the Monterey Institute of International Studies. He is a consultant on international business development and the retired President of Cooper Laboratories, Inc.

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WILLIAM W. SCHWARZER: Judge Schwarzer is a Senior U.S. District Judge and Distinguished Professor of Law at the University of California, Hastings College of Law. He is former Director of the Federal Judicial Center.

GEORGE H. SHENK: Mr. Shenk is an international business lawyer with Heller, Ehrman, White & McAuliffe in San Francisco.

ABRAHAM D. SOFAER: Mr. Sofaer is the George P. Shultz Senior Fellow at The Hoover Institution, Stanford University. He was U.S. District Judge and Legal Adviser to the Department of State.

JAMES M. STROCK: Mr. Strock is Secretary for Environmental Protection for the State of California. He was Assistant Administrator for Enforcement for the Environmental Protection Agency.

MASON WILLRICH: Mr. Willrich is Chairman of EnergyWorks. He was Chief Executive Officer of PG&E Enterprises; Director for International Relations, the Rockefeller Foundation; and Professor of Law, University of Virginia.

Note: Institutional Affiliation is for identification purposes only.

1. Members of the Task Force endorse this statement except where differing views are indicated in footnotes. Background information is provided in the following report. The report was distributed to members of the Task Force and benefited from their advice as well as from the advice of groups that met for one session each in Atlanta, Chicago, Houston, and San Francisco. The report reflects the general policy thrust and judgments reached by the group, although not all members of the group necessarily subscribe to every finding and recommendation in the report.

2. The signers of this footnote believe that while the United Nations indeed operates primarily as an organization of member states, it is also more than the sum of its national parts: It gives political expression to the idea of world community; it helps establish international law; it enjoys public attention and support, and appeals to idealism, among Americans and people around the world; and it realizes, however imperfectly, its Charter aspiration to represent We the peoples by affording ever-increasing roles to non-state actors and citizen movements in its policy and programs. The United Nations has intangible sources of authority that distinguish it qualitatively from any other association of states (Cwerman, Kennedy, Laurenti, Leonard, Mathews, Ross, and vanden Heuvel).

3. The signers of this footnote qualify their support for this recommendation by here inserting for the immediate future: There is no inherent policy logic for keeping

international organizations in a zero-growth straitjacket in perpetuity. After the fat has been cut, this policy effectively mandates annual contractions in U.N. capabilities, even as cross-border problems multiply. As the world economy grows, global institutions may well require concomitant growth in resources to respond to nations common needs (Cwerman, Kennedy, Laurenti, Leonard, Mathews, Mead, Ross, Ruggie, Russett, and vanden Heuvel).

4. The signers of this footnote qualify their support for this recommendation by here inserting in current circumstances: The reason peace enforcement must be conducted by ad hoc coalitions is because the United Nations currently does not have the capability to undertake enforcement, not because reliance on ad hoc coalitions is intrinsically desirable a deficiency that could be remedied by relatively modest investment in U.N. force capabilities

5. U.N. Withdrawal Act (H.R. 2535), cosponsored by House Majority Whip Tom Delay (R-Tex.), House Deputy Majority Whip John Doolittle (R-Calif.), and Joe Scarborough (R-Fla.).

6. Remarks of the Honorable Newt Gingrich, Speaker of the House of Representatives, at the Council on Foreign Relations, April 27, 1996.

7. Remarks of former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger at a conference of the United Nations Association of the United States entitled The Future of U.S.-U.N. Relations, New York, May 21, 1996.

8. U.N.S.C. Res. 661 (August 2, 1990). See also U.N.S.C. Res. 665 (August 25, 1990), calling on member states with maritime forces in the area to enforce the embargo.

9. U.N.S.C. Res. 678 (November 29, 1990).

10. See U.N.S.C. Res. 687 (June 17, 1991) and U.N.S.C. Res. 715 (October 11, 1991).

11. U.N.S.C. Res. 688 (April 5, 1991).

12 See U.N.S.C. Res. 825 (May 11, 1993), calling on North Korea to reconsider its decision.

13. United States Democratic Peoples Republic of North Korea Framework Agreement, 34 International Legal Materials 603 (1994).

14. U.N.S.C. Res. 731 (January 21, 1992).

15. U.N.S.C. Res. 1044 (January 31, 1996).

16. U.N.S.C. Res. 841 (June 16, 1993). See also U.N.S.C. Res 917 (May 6, 1994), extending the sanctions.

17. U.N.S.C. Res. 940 (July 31, 1994).
18. U.N.S.C. Res. 975 (January 30, 1995).
19. U.N.S.C. Res. 1048 (February 29, 1996); U.N.S.C. Res. 1063 (June 28, 1996).
20. U.N.S.C. Res. 757 (May 30, 1992). An embargo on the sales of arms and other military goods was put in place in September 1991. U.N.S.C. Res. 713 (September 25, 1991).
21. U.N.S.C. Res. 1031 (December 15, 1995).
22. U.N. Security Council Resolution 837 authorized the arrest of Somali persons responsible for a June 5, 1993, attack on Pakistani peacekeepers. The decision to hunt for Aided clearly resulted from specific decisions reached by the national command authority. See Kenneth Allard, *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1995), pp.3132.
23. *Ibid.*, pp. 5758.
24. See, for example, Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a PostCold War World* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993).
25. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.N.G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), December 16, 1966, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), entered into force March 23, 1976.
26. Historically, U.S. dues have been smaller than the proportionate size of the American economy. For example, in 1945, the U.S. dues assessment was 42 percent, against a U.S. share of 50 percent of the worlds GDP; in 1972, with the admission of Germany to the United Nations, U.S. dues were reduced from approximately 31.5 percent to 25 percent, against a U.S. share of 31.7 percent of the worlds GDP. Peacekeeping payments are now capped by the United States at 25 percent, less than the U.N. assessment of 30.7 percent. In light of their veto power, the five permanent members of the Security Council have been assessed for peacekeeping at a rate slightly higher than GDP.
27. Speech by Cyrus Vance on receiving the George S. Kennan Award of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy, November 21, 1995.
28. U.N. Chief Urges Reducing U.S. Dues, *New York Times*, February 7, 1996, p. A 4.
29. Ambassador Albright has suggested a reduction in the U.S. regular assessment to 20 percent with a pledge to pay U.S. arrears. See U.S. to Offer U.N. a Plan to Pay \$1.5 Billion Debt, *New York Times*, March 5, 1996, p. A 10.

30. See *Americans on U.N. Peacekeeping: A Study of U.S. Public Attitudes* (College Park, MD: University of Maryland, Center for the Study of Public Attitudes, 1995); Chicago Council on Foreign Relations Poll, 1995; Times-Mirror Poll, 1995 (67 percent of those polled gave the United Nations a favorable rating); United Nations Association of the United States/Wirthlin Group Survey, April 1996 (71 percent said they would be more likely to vote for a presidential candidate who would strengthen the United Nations).