Securing Space

Securing Space
CFR.org
Task Force Report No. 82
Securing Space A Plan for U.S. Action
Updated February 2025
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Findings

1. U.S. leadership in space is critical to U.S. national security, to U.S. global leadership, to U.S. hard and soft power, and to the security and prosperity of the American people.

Geopolitical competition in space is heating up. After a long, post–Cold War lull, the United States’ command of the commons is once again contested. Whether in the South China Sea or in the thawing Arctic, superpowers, great powers, and middle powers seek to have a say in the governance of the global commons. Not surprisingly, that competition is now extending to space, the next big domain for human activity. U.S. leadership in space will increasingly be a vital component of maintaining U.S. leadership on Earth.

Space activity can be divided into three categories: civil, national security, and commercial. Civil space activities include the iconic feats of scientific exploration that have taken place since the 1950s, largely led by NASA. Those accomplishments engender soft power emanating from space-inspired respect and goodwill. National security activities include surveilling the globe and monitoring compliance with arms control agreements. The United States, for its part, has satellites in GEO that provide warning and assessments of a strategic nuclear attack on its territory, as well as space assets in LEO that are critical to U.S. military operations. Commercial space activities, the newest category, include companies providing launch services or information based on Earth observation. The U.S. economy is increasingly dependent on networks of commercial satellites launched by a subset of private companies: notably SpaceX and Amazon’s forthcoming Project Kuiper (see figure below).

2. Space traffic management is crucial to the well-being of modern human societies. Actions taken—or not taken—now will shape human activity in space for decades. Without changes in how humans use space, the benefits of access to space could be lost to everyone.

Concern about space congestion is not new, but the increasing number of objects in space is causing alarm. As Kessler predicted in 1978, the rising number of objects in space could cause a cascading cycle of increased collisions and debris creation. Half a century later, the challenge of the Kessler Effect is even more real.

When speaking at the Space Symposium on April 9, 2024, NASA Deputy Administrator Pamela Melroy described a close call:

“Let me tell you what: this time was really different. It was very shocking, personally, and also for all of us at NASA. On February 28, at 1:30 in the morning, a NASA spacecraft called “TIMED,” and a Russian satellite—neither of them maneuverable—were expected to make a close pass to one another. Not kilometers apart. We recently learned through analysis that the pass ended up being less than ten meters apart. Within the hard-body parameters of both satellites. Less than the distance of me to the front row. Had the two satellites collided, we would have seen significant debris generation.”14

Even when operators of spacecraft want to pass each other safely and avoid collision, there are not established rules of who passes whom and how. Bringing together countries and companies to set such rules would be a practical step toward better space governance.

3. U.S. space assets are increasingly vulnerable to attacks by China, Russia, and other potential adversaries—attacks that could come from the ground, the air, or space itself.

The United States leads the world in the number of operational satellites, a portfolio that includes many large, sophisticated, “exquisite” satellites in GEO with unique arms control verification, nuclear attack warning, and intelligence capabilities. Those national security and commercial space assets are increasingly vulnerable. China and Russia have developed the means to divert, disable, or destroy those assets through a diverse set of capabilities, including electronic warfare and jamming, direct-ascent ASAT missiles, directed energy systems such as ground-based lasers, and potential developments such as space-based kinetic weapons and orbiting space robots that could attack adversaries’ satellites.15 In recent years, the United States has begun to deploy a larger number of smaller assets in other orbits to distribute the risk. Even so, U.S. efforts to counter the vulnerability of its satellites have not kept up with the threat.

China and Russia pose different types of threats to strategic stability in space. Russia’s actions endanger satellites in space now, while China’s plans not only threaten space assets, but also challenge the United States’ future leadership in space. This section focuses on Russia, the next on China.

Russia’s November 2021 ASAT test against its own satellite was an ominous sign. Worrisome threats continue to come from Russia. The country already has interfered with a space asset for military reasons. Just before its 2022 invasion of Ukraine, a Russian cyberattack disabled terminals for Viasat, a U.S. company on contract to provide satellite communications to Ukraine. As the attack made clear, space and cyberspace are interdependent. Global information technology infrastructure is becoming more dependent on space systems with companies such as Amazon, SpaceX, and others building global space-based 5G backplanes that will serve communication and information processing needs worldwide. As a result, space systems that comprise segments of those infrastructures have become cyber targets. In the words of a report by the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, “…the transnational nature of space operations makes the cybersecurity of space systems a matter that should be of common interest to all countries.”16

Moscow seems intent on gaining the ability to disrupt key U.S. capabilities, including communications, GPS, early warning, intelligence, and command and control. In May 2024, then Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy John F. Plumb testified to Congress that Moscow is “developing a concerning anti-satellite capability,” including “electronic warfare, directed energy weapons, direct-ascent anti-satellite systems, and orbital systems with counterspace applications.” Those investments, he went on to explain, “are designed to exploit what it views as a U.S. overreliance on space for conducting military operations and to offset perceived U.S. military advantages.”17

Even more concerning is Russia’s possible intention to deploy a nuclear weapon in space, which would pose a catastrophic threat to satellites, particularly those also orbiting in LEO. U.S. officials have warned of that threat.

Although current international treaties prohibit governments from placing nuclear weapons in space, U.S. adversaries have moved increasingly closer to breaking international norms on Earth and in orbit. Putting a nuclear weapon in space would be a dangerous escalation and would violate two important international treaties. Such a weapon could be used to create an electromagnetic pulse and disable many satellites, or worse. It would also violate the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty, which the United States and the Soviet Union (and other countries) signed after the United States’ disastrous “Starfish Prime” nuclear test in 1962. Detonated 250 miles above Earth, that test not only caused an electrical blackout 900 miles away in Hawaii but also knocked out Telstar 1, a communications satellite launched by NASA months earlier.

Sending a nuclear weapon into space would also violate the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, an agreement ratified by spacefaring powers with nuclear weapons—China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—and 110 other countries. As Article IV of the treaty states:

“States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner.

The moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties to the Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes. The establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military maneuvers on celestial bodies shall be forbidden. The use of military personnel for scientific research or for any other peaceful purposes shall not be prohibited. The use of any equipment or facility necessary for peaceful exploration of the moon and other celestial bodies shall also not be prohibited.”18

The United States is not the only country concerned about Russia’s intentions, which would contravene the text of the Outer Space Treaty. According to then Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Deterrence, and Stability Mallory Stewart, the U.S. government has discussed Russia’s plans with China and India.19 Familiar geostrategic rifts are evident. The United States’ claims of Russian plans to weaponize space led to debates in the UN Security Council. In April 2024, the UN Security Council considered a resolution that was sponsored by the United States and Japan and called for “all States, in particular those with major space capabilities, to contribute actively to the objective of the peaceful use of outer space and of the prevention of an arms race in outer space.”20 Thirteen of the fifteen Security Council members approved. China abstained, while Russia vetoed the resolution. In December 2024, the UN General Assembly voted 167 to 4 to adopt a resolution on “prevention of an arms race in outer space.”21 Again, Russia voted no, and China abstained.22 As there is no veto in the General Assembly, the measure passed.

4. While the United States remains the leading space power across the civil, commercial, and national security realms, China is emerging as a peer competitor.

China could soon reach its goal to overtake the United States as the leading space power. In a declassified 2021 report, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence assesses that “China is steadily progressing toward its goal of becoming a world-class space leader with the intent to match or exceed the United States by 2045. Even by 2030, China probably will achieve world-class status in all but a few space technology areas.” The report further states that “by 2030 Chinese space activities will increasingly erode the national security, commercial, and global influence advantage that the United States has accrued from its leadership in space.”23

In the past five years, China has launched over five hundred objects into space, built its own orbiting space station, and placed two landers on the far side of the Moon.24 As Major General Greg Gagnon, the deputy chief of space operations for intelligence in the U.S. Space Force, put it in May 2024, the country “has rapidly advanced in space in a way that few people can appreciate.”25 In 2021, China began construction on its Tiangong space station, which, although much smaller than the ISS, could be expanded.26 The ISS, for its part, will be retired by 2030. NASA is looking to commercial space stations to meet its needs beyond then, freeing up agency resources for more ambitious exploration goals. NASA’s decision is indicative of its changing priorities, fostered by scarce financial resources.

China is building space capabilities for military use. In its 2023 report Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, the U.S. Department of Defense stated, “The PLA [People’s Liberation Army] views space superiority, the ability to control the space-enabled information sphere and to deny adversaries their own space-based information gathering and communication capabilities, as critical components to conduct modern ‘informatized warfare.’”27 The United States relies heavily on space-based assets for surveillance and weapons guidance, making it especially wary of adversaries’ capabilities to deny access to those assets. In the previously cited May 1, 2024, congressional testimony, Plumb went on to describe China’s capabilities, including “electronic warfare, direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) missiles, directed-energy systems such as ground-based lasers, potential space-based kinetic weapons, and orbiting space robots,” which could “hold our on-orbit assets at risk.”28

Unsurprisingly, China has made space a prominent part of its grand strategy. The country’s New Strategic Frontiers policy, which began over a decade ago, includes space, polar, sea, and cyberspace, areas Chinese officials appear to see as ungoverned spaces.29 In the same vein, China’s thirteenth Five-Year Plan, released in 2016, promised that the country would take “an active role in formulating international rules in areas such as the internet, the deep sea, the polar regions, and space.” 30 

China even has its own form of a growing commercial space sector. The China Satellite Network Group is in the process of launching the Guowang constellation of thirteen thousand satellites—its answer to Starlink. As of February 2024, Shanghai Spacecom Satellite Technology had raised $943 million for its projected G60 constellation of twelve thousand satellites, another Starlink-like endeavor.31 In August 2024, the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation, the largest state-owned contractor, launched into orbit the project’s first eighteen satellites. Like China’s advances in electric vehicles, the country’s commercial space sector benefits from heavy government investment in new technology. Furthermore, to some observers, China’s collection of soil samples suggests not only scientific exploration but also possible plans to mine the Moon.32

In an era of competition, dual-use technologies take on added significance. China has invested in a robotic arm to grab space debris, but this tool is capable of completing not only a civil clean up task but also a military mission to disable an adversary’s satellite. China has already demonstrated its ability to wield the arm for the more sinister scenario, using it to move a defunct Beidou satellite out of its operational orbit.

China is also making space a part of its strategy toward the Global South. The Space Information Corridor, a component of its Belt and Road Initiative, connects countries to Beidou’s GNSS services. In a similar way, China’s leadership of the Asia Pacific Space Cooperation Organization, which promotes collaborative space programs, gives it soft power advantages across developing countries.

Competition between the United States and China is evident in other types of space exploration. Just as certain spots on Earth provide strategic advantage, favorable orbital positions will be contested (see figure below). Examples include areas in Earth and lunar orbit called “Lagrange points.” Named for the mathematician Joseph-Louis Lagrange, those desirable positions in space occur, as NASA has explained, “where the gravitational forces of a two-body system like the Sun and the Earth produce enhanced regions of attraction and repulsion.”33 Held in place by gravity from two different bodies, spacecraft positioned at such points need less fuel to remain stationary. NASA’s James Webb Space Telescope, for instance, gazes into outer space from L2, the Lagrange point on the far side of the Moon. China’s Queqiao communications relay satellite sits near that same point and communicated with the Chang’e 4 lander when it made its historic touchdown on the far side of the Moon in 2019.

Although China is the pressing challenge, U.S. policymakers should remember that not all competition in space raises geostrategic enmity. Even non-adversarial countries see space programs as a mark of great power status. Indian authorities have noted that they want to be included in making the decisions regarding use of the Moon. Being technologically advanced helps states be part of the “in” group setting international rules. Strategists recall that already-existing nuclear powers gained a special status under the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons.34 Having successfully landed a device near the lunar south pole, India stakes its claim to be part of whatever system will govern lunar affairs in the future. In 2023, India signed the Artemis Accords.

5. Current international organizations and treaties are ill suited to the new realities of space activity, and no single multilateral body is designed to comprehensively manage space traffic.

Unlike aviation, shipping, and telecommunications, the space economy lacks a unified, single international institution that can establish or enforce an agreed-on set of best practices. Other domains boast international organizations that can issue legally binding rules based on treaties that governments have ratified. Aviation has the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). Ocean shipping has the International Maritime Organization (IMO). Telecommunications has the ITU.

Space issues, by contrast, come under the remit of three different UN bodies (see figure below):

  • COPUOS, based in Vienna, has a broad mandate to discuss developments in space. Among its actions, it promotes sharing of space-related information among its members, which helps disseminate best practices. COPUOS is supported by UNOOSA, an office of the UN Secretariat, and reports to the UN General Assembly through the Fourth Committee, which handles special political and decolonization issues.
     
  • The ITU, based in Geneva, is a specialized agency that allocates frequencies and orbital positions for satellites in GEO and frequencies for satellites in LEO. Every three to four years, it holds the World Radiocommunication Conference (WRC), where its members agree to policies and programs to update telecommunications.35 The 2027 iteration of the conference is slated to consider communications on the Moon, the growth of the satellites sector, and space weather (solar phenomena, such as a burst of radiation, can create space weather that interferes with satellite communications near Earth). ITU Secretary-General Doreen Bogdan-Martin has estimated that 80 percent of the agenda will be space-related.36 
     
  • The Conference on Disarmament (CD) is a third UN body ostensibly responsible for space. The CD was supposed to address the demilitarization of space, among other duties. But the CD’s work has been deadlocked for years, stalled by disputes unrelated to space.

Some of the various institutions responsible for space have made efforts to cooperate with one another. In 2015, 2016, and 2017, for example, UNOOSA and ICAO held a joint Aerospace Symposium.37 At the sixty-seventh session of COPUOS, in June 2024, an IMO representative gave a presentation on “marine environmental effects of jettisoned waste from commercial spaceflight activities.”38 This topic previews a coming issue: heightened concern about the effects on marine life and conditions of the practice of deorbiting spacecraft by crashing them into Earth’s oceans.

Outside formal institutions, the United States cooperates on space directly with its allies and partners. In September 2024, the Combined Space Operations Initiative, a diplomatic grouping of U.S. allies, marked its tenth anniversary of “cooperation and coordination of national security space activities.” The group now counts nine countries in addition to the United States: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, and the United Kingdom.39 The same year, General Chance Saltzman, the highest-ranking officer in the U.S. Space Force, added an officer from an allied country to his leadership team: UK Air Marshal Paul Godfrey, who serves as assistant chief of space operations for future concepts and partnerships.

In past decades, the superpowers did not want a powerful body managing space. Therefore, neither the UN system nor any other multilateral body is configured to deal comprehensively with space issues. Nor is there any international agency for managing space traffic or removing space debris. China, Russia, and the United States are the source of most of this debris, but they are also at the greatest risk from it as the three countries with the most assets in space (see figure below).

Further complicating matters, geopolitical divisions are already characterizing the emerging institutional architecture.40 For example, the United States and its partners have developed the Artemis Accords. Meanwhile, China has promoted its International Lunar Research Station program. So far, countries have joined one program or the other. However, with its signature of the Artemis Accords in December 2024, Thailand became the first country to join both programs. If more countries eventually join both, it could say just as much about geopolitics on Earth as about exploration in space. A country that joins both programs might want to be seen as independent or friendly to both sides (see figure below).

6. The expertise and perspective of the private sector and other nonstate actors is critical to effective space traffic management.

Expert input from the private sector is necessary to shape effective rules of the road for space traffic management. The space economy is powered by innovation in the private sector. Private companies have combined technological advances with efficient managerial practices to expand the space sector. The private sector understands how proposed rules would actually affect operations. Without their constructive input, rules and regulations adopted by policymakers risk being ineffective or—even worse—deleterious to the responsible use of space. Like commercial uses of cyberspace, the outer space economy aims to combine expertise and efficiency. However, current governance mechanisms are the responsibility of states.

7. In an era of increased competition in space, the United States may not always be the first to reach new destinations in space. Therefore, the United States benefits from the principle in the Outer Space Treaty that outer space “is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty.”

Commercial leaders and some policymakers assume that the United States will always benefit from a so-called first come, first claim approach. In an era of space competition, however, the United States may not always be first. Denial of ownership of space by any person, company, or government (and rejection of a first come, first claim approach) would help ensure the use of space by the United States, other countries, and populations worldwide—and would hedge against the possibility that in some areas of space (and celestial bodies), the United States might not be first to arrive or stake a claim.

The ability of more countries to reach the Moon has raised concerns among some governments and companies about the intentions of other spacefarers. Governments have not made claims but are considering use of materials found on the Moon. Although China landed a device on the far side of the Moon, it does not own the soil there. Although India landed a device on the lunar south pole, it does not own the ice that may be found there. That said, in 2015, the United States opened a path to owning and selling certain space resources by passing the Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act of 2015, which states that working through the federal agencies, the president “shall promote the right of United States citizens to engage in commercial exploration for and commercial recovery of space resources free from harmful interference, in accordance with the international obligations of the United States and subject to authorization and continuing supervision by the Federal Government.”41

In the same legislation, the United States also explains that it is “the sense of Congress that by the enactment of this Act, the United States does not thereby assert sovereignty or sovereign or exclusive rights or jurisdiction over, or the ownership of any celestial body”42 The legislation sought to achieve a delicate balance among principles.

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