NATO Enlargement in 1994 (NSC) — Student

In the years following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the role and purpose of NATO increasingly came into question. Some claimed that the organization, formed in 1949 to counter the Soviet Union and its nuclear weapons, was now obsolete. Others argued for a renewed and reinvigorated NATO in a post–Cold War world. Others still fell somewhere in the middle, acknowledging the importance of NATO’s role in European security, but urging caution in dealing with a newly subdued Russia. 

The president has called a meeting of the NSC in advance of an important NATO summit in Brussels. He plans to make an announcement detailing his administration’s views on the prospect of NATO enlargement and has convened NSC members to advise him on the matter.

The United States plays a critical role in establishing and maintaining international order. This is particularly true in an increasingly globalized world. The range of foreign policy issues that require its attention is vast. The United States must consider foreign policy issues from conflicts in Afghanistan, Nigeria, and Syria to tensions with Iran and North Korea; from long-standing alliances to complex, evolving relationships with Brazil, China, India, Russia, and South Africa. Issues on the agenda range from the stability of global finance to the promotion of economic opportunity in low-income countries; and from climate to health to nuclear proliferation to terrorism. The United States has a vested interest in myriad world affairs. Further, issues such as immigration, trade, cybersecurity, climate change, and global health underscore the fading distinction between domestic and international matters.

Regardless of the scale of the problem, a successful foreign policy–making process starts by defining interests and goals. Policymakers and their advisors then formulate policy options to meet those goals and consider each option’s strengths and weaknesses. This process is challenging. In the best of times information can be unreliable or incomplete or an adversary’s intentions can be unclear. Often a decision’s consequences can be unknowable. Leaders frequently have to choose from a list on which every option is imperfect. Adding to this uncertainty is the complexity of the U.S. government’s foreign policy machinery. Numerous agencies—each with its own interests and biases—seek to influence how policy is decided and carried out. It takes considerable effort to run a process capable of producing sound policy decisions.

The National Security Council (NSC) plays a critical role in this effort. Its mission is to help the president effectively use a variety of instruments—military, diplomatic, or otherwise—to forge policies that advance U.S. national security goals.

The NSC was created by the National Security Act of 1947. This act defined the NSC as an interagency body intended to “advise the president with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security.” The period after World War II was an age of expanded American interests and responsibilities. The NSC was expected to provide a place where the heads of federal departments and agencies could cooperate to develop recommendations for policies that would advance U.S. aims. The NSC and its staff were also meant to manage the policymaking process. This ensured that the president would receive a full range of advice and opinion from the departments and agencies involved in national security.

The NSC has evolved significantly over the years. The NSC has adapted to the preferences of successive presidents and the challenges they faced. Variables such as the attendees, the frequency of meetings, the manner in which information is passed to the president, the importance of consensus, and the relative dominance of the NSC over other government institutions have changed over the decades.

The NSC has evolved to comprise various interagency committees and a large staff to prepare analysis and coordinate policymaking and implementation. The NSC is at the center of the interagency process. This process is one through which relevant government agencies address foreign policy issues and help the president make and execute policy choices.

I. National Security Advisor

The national security advisor (formally assistant to the president for national security affairs) is at the heart of the NSC structure. The national security advisor’s role is twofold: to offer advice to the president and to coordinate and manage policymaking. Because they have direct access to the president and do not represent a cabinet department, national security advisors are in a unique position. From this neutral perch they drive foreign policy decisions, manage the actors involved, and mitigate conflict throughout the decision-making process.

II. National Security Council Staff

The NSC staff consists of individuals from a collection of agencies that support the president, the vice president, and the administration. NSC staff members are generally organized into directorates that focus on regions or issues. The size and organization of the staff vary with each administration.

The NSC staff provides expertise for the variety of national security policy matters under consideration. It manages numerous responsibilities, including preparing speeches, memos, and discussion papers and handling inquiries from Congress on foreign policy issues. Staff members analyze both immediate and long-standing issues and help prioritize  the agenda.

III. Committee Structure

Committees are at the core of policy deliberation and policymaking in the NSC. They fall into four categories:

This committee structure tackles both immediate crises such as an outbreak of conflict and enduring issues such as climate change. IPCs conduct analysis on an issue, gather views on it and its importance from various departments, formulate and evaluate policy options, and determine what resources and steps would be required to carry out those options. The Deputies Committee manages the interagency process up and down. It decides what IPCs to establish. and gives them specific assignments. It also considers information submitted by the IPCs before relaying it to the Principals Committee or the full NSC.

The Principals Committee is the highest-level setting, aside from the NSC itself, for debating national security issues. It consists of the heads of the NSC’s component agencies. The Principals Committee is essentially all the members of the NSC except the president and vice president. Formal NSC meetings, which the president chairs, occur whenever the president sees fit. They consider issues that require the president’s personal attention and a direct presidential decision.

The goal of this committee structure is to foster consensus on policy options or highlight where and why consensus cannot be reached. If officials at one level agree on an issue, it does not need to go to senior officials for a decision. This practice reserves the president’s time and that of members of the Principals Committee for the most complicated and sensitive debates.

When a crisis erupts issues sometimes do not follow the usual path up from the IPCs. In these cases, NSC staff members and officials in government departments and agencies generally draft papers drawing on their expertise, available intelligence, and any existing contingency plans. Policy options are then debated and decided at the appropriate level. The policymaking process can also deviate from this model based on the preferences of each president.

For the purposes of this NSC simulation, you will role-play the NSC meeting with the assumption that the committees described have already done their jobs. Any critical information has already been passed to the highest-level decision-makers.

Presidential Decisions

When the president makes a policy decision, it can take the form of a verbal instruction recorded and shared with relevant departments and agencies. The president can also issue formal decisions in documents that lay out the administration’s policy and explain its rationale and goals. These documents have gone by different names under different presidents. President Joe Biden issues national security memoranda and national security study memoranda. President Donald Trump issued national security presidential memoranda.

The president can also issue an executive order (EO). EOs are a more formal and public declaration of policy. In contrast, national security directives are generally directed internally to federal departments and are often classified. In the past, presidents have issued EOs for such purposes as facilitating sanctions against foreign individuals and establishing new offices in government departments to carry out foreign policy aims. For federal agencies, both national security directives and executive orders carry the full force of law.

Although many executive branch departments and agencies are involved in foreign policy, the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the intelligence community form the core of the foreign policy bureaucracy. The Department of the Treasury, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of Justice often play crucial roles as well.

Department of State

The Department of State conducts the United States’ relations with other countries and international organizations. It maintains U.S. diplomatic presence abroad. The Department of State also issues visas for foreigners to enter the country, aids U.S. citizens overseas, and manages other programs to promote American interests. The secretary of state is the president’s principal foreign affairs advisor and has a keen understanding of the United States’ international relations. They are also well informed on the relationships between foreign countries, and the behavior and interests of their governments.

Department of Defense

The Department of Defense carries out U.S. defense policy and maintains U.S. military forces. It includes the U.S. Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force, as well as an array of agencies related to defense. The department employs more than two million military and civilian personnel and operates military bases around the world. The secretary of defense is the head of the department and the president’s principal defense policy advisor. They also stay up-to-date on the security situation in foreign countries and the possibilities and implications of U.S. military involvement. The chairman of the joint chiefs of staff is the highest-ranking member of the U.S. armed forces and the president’s top military advisor.

Intelligence Community

The U.S. intelligence community consists of eighteen agencies and organizations, including the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Security Agency (NSA), and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), which gather and analyze intelligence. Each of these agencies has its own mission; for example, the NSA focuses on signals intelligence (information gathered from communications and other electronic signals) and the Defense Intelligence Agency on military information. The director of national intelligence is the president’s principal advisor on intelligence issues. They oversee this network of agencies with the aim of ensuring that they work together and deliver the best possible information to U.S. policymakers.

Department of the Treasury

The Department of the Treasury carries out policy on issues related to the U.S. and global economies and financial systems. The secretary of the treasury serves as one of the president’s chief economic advisors and is responsible for addressing a range of economic concerns. The Treasury’s ten bureaus, which include the U.S. Mint and the Internal Revenue Service, do much of the department’s work, which ranges from collecting tax to printing currency and executing economic sanctions.

Department of Homeland Security

Created soon after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Department of Homeland Security works to counter and respond to risks to American security. It focuses on issues such as terrorism prevention, border security and immigration, disaster response, and cybersecurity. Familiar agencies within the department include U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the U.S. Secret Service, and the Transportation Security Administration. The secretary of homeland security oversees the department and advises the president on relevant issues.

Department of Justice

The Department of Justice investigates and prosecutes possible violations of federal law. The Department of Justice represents the U.S. government in legal matters and works more broadly to prevent and respond to crime. Agencies such as the FBI and the Drug Enforcement Administration are part of the department, as are divisions focusing on particular areas of law, such as national security and civil rights. Leading the department is the attorney general, who offers legal advice to the president and the heads of other departments.

Founded in 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has stood for decades as the world’s foremost military alliance. Initially comprising the United States, Canada, and ten European countries, NATO connects the United States with many of its closest allies. It has thus long been a critical instrument of U.S. foreign policy.

NATO was established as the Cold War set in between the Soviet Union and the U.S.-led West. The alliance embodied the concept of collective defense: its members pledged to defend one another from security threats. In particular, given the outsize strength of the U.S. military, NATO membership obligated the United States to defend its European allies from possible Soviet attack. In an extreme case, this defense could include the United States’ using its nuclear weapons, placing the NATO allies under what is called the U.S. nuclear umbrella.

The Soviet Union never attacked a NATO state. It collapsed in 1991, breaking into an array of weak countries in deep economic distress. Even the strongest of them, Russia, posed little threat to the West. But as the Soviet threat dissipated, so did NATO’s original reason for being. NATO leaders had to decide whether the alliance should survive—and if so, how its purpose and activities should evolve in this new era. One critical question, if NATO continued, was about enlargement: whether, when, and how it should admit new countries from Central and Eastern Europe. 

This question sparked intense debate in the U.S. government and beyond. Shortly after President Bill Clinton took office in January 1993, the idea arose for what would become the Partnership for Peace (PfP), a forum for military cooperation between the alliance and countries from the former Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact. This idea gained support among U.S. officials, though they disagreed over whether to go further and outline a clear path for new countries to formally join the alliance in the foreseeable future. At stake was the future of a continent that had been plagued for eighty years by two world wars and a cold war.

DECISION POINT–Set in January 1994.

It is January 1994. In a few days, President Bill Clinton plans to attend a NATO summit in Brussels and to make remarks elsewhere in the city. Administration officials have agreed to coordinate with NATO allies to announce the PfP at the summit. However, allied leaders and those from central and east European states hoping to join the alliance expect the president to announce U.S. views on NATO’s eventual enlargement as well. The president has therefore convened National Security Council (NSC) members to advise him on the matter. Two options are under consideration:

NATO’s Foundation

NATO arose from the political and economic shifts in Europe that followed World War II. Although the Soviet Union had been allied with the United States, France, and the United Kingdom during the war, postwar Europe fell into a stark division between a democratic West friendly to Washington and a communist East that looked to Moscow. The division solidified along ideological lines. Moscow’s assertion of control over Eastern Europe served its ambition to maintain a foothold in Europe and spread communism throughout the world. The Western ideals of free market capitalism and democracy opposed this, and U.S. and west European leaders feared the threat of communism to democracies in Europe and elsewhere. It became clear that the Soviet Union was no longer a partner, as it had been during the war. It was instead a rival.

As tensions between the Soviet Union and the West rose, west European countries became worried about their security. The United States was also prepared to sustain a long-term presence in Europe. These factors drove the United States, Canada, and ten west European countries to establish NATO. The alliance’s founding document, the North Atlantic Treaty, was signed in Washington, DC, on April 4, 1949. In Article 5 of the treaty, the allies “agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.” Each also agreed to aid any other that was attacked. This notion of collective defense is the heart of the alliance. Because the United States was at the time the only nuclear-armed state among them, the allies came under the so-called U.S. nuclear umbrella. This security guarantee has always been a critical aspect of NATO’s strategic position. 

By its own account, NATO was formed for three purposes: to deter Soviet expansionism, to prevent violent nationalism from reemerging, and to encourage democratic norms and political cooperation in Europe. These purposes aligned with the views of U.S. and other NATO leaders that a continent of economically vibrant and militarily capable states, firmly linked with one another, could best resist communist expansion. NATO was also a vehicle to keep the United States committed to Europe’s security. NATO’s first secretary-general, Hastings Lionel Ismay of the United Kingdom, memorably put the alliance’s aims succinctly: to “keep the Soviet Union out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.” 

NATO During the Cold War

NATO quickly began to fulfill its mission as both a military alliance and a political anchor of the U.S.-led Western order. One early area of activity was enlargement. Greece and Turkey joined in 1952, followed by what was then West Germany in 1955. 

Eight days after West Germany’s entrance, the Soviet Union and seven of its east European satellite states established the Warsaw Treaty Organization, an alliance better known as the Warsaw Pact. Soviet leaders intended the pact to be a counterweight to NATO and to strengthen Soviet control over the region. Like NATO, the Warsaw Pact was a nuclear alliance; the Soviet Union had tested its first nuclear weapon in 1949. 

Given that any conflict between the Soviet Union and the West could escalate to nuclear war, military doctrine focused heavily on deterrence—the idea of preventing an attack by threatening retaliation. This approach was underscored by the concept of mutually assured destruction, premised on the idea that the United States and the Soviet Union each had nuclear arsenals large and reliable enough to destroy the other.

Throughout the Cold War, NATO retained an important political role. The 1967 NATO report “The Future Tasks of the Alliance” introduced a dual-track policy: the idea of both maintaining adequate defense and promoting political cooperation and dialogue. This line of thinking—broadening the organization’s goals and approach to security—had a lasting effect on NATO’s strategic vision. The report laid the foundation for the negotiation of the Helsinki Final Act, which offered inspiration and a legal foundation for later efforts to bring democracy and human rights to Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe. Meanwhile, NATO endured as a mechanism to support and maintain democracy in Europe. A newly democratic Spain joined the alliance in 1982, the first addition since West Germany. 

Conclusion of the Cold War

In the 1980s, the Soviet Union began to face growing economic strain and civil discontent. Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev responded with two initiatives: perestroika (restructuring) and glasnost (openness). Perestroika aimed to reform the Soviet economy and political system by, for example, giving local governments more power and reducing the state’s role in planning and directing companies’ actions. Glasnost eased the strict social controls that Moscow imposed on Soviet citizens. Even with these reforms, the Soviet Union was far from a free market democracy. It was, however, inching in this direction. 

These transitions took hold outside the Soviet Union as well, and communist rule began to crumble in Warsaw Pact countries. Civil society leaders throughout Eastern Europe had long campaigned, often under severe repression, to free their countries from Soviet domination. Gorbachev’s reforms in the Soviet Union emboldened these democratic movements. In the late 1980s, Gorbachev allowed them to break through. In a landmark speech at the United Nations in December 1988, he announced that the Soviet Union would reduce its military presence in Eastern Bloc countries. The following July, he said that he would no longer prop up their communist governments. In other words, the Soviet Union would not use repression and force to impose its will, as it had long done. This so-called Sinatra Doctrine signaled that democracy was coming.

By mid-1990, all the formerly communist states in Eastern Europe had undergone democratic transitions. One of the most dramatic moments came, fittingly, in divided Berlin. On November 9, 1989, the East German government’s spokesman announced, apparently unintentionally, that East German citizens could cross freely into the West. Within minutes, Berliners used hammers and picks to start bringing down the wall that had divided their city since 1961.

It took less than a year for Germany to be unified, West Germany absorbing East. Critically, the entire country then became a member of NATO. Taking in the former East German territory in October 1990 was the alliance’s first enlargement into the Eastern Bloc. Soviet leaders resisted this, pushing instead for Germany to have “associate membership” in both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. This initiative failed. Leaders did not view it at the time as the first step in a larger NATO expansion. Instead, they considered Germany a unique case. Either way, this event was a clear sign that NATO’s role in Europe was to endure.

The addition of a unified Germany to NATO was a harbinger of the collapse of the Warsaw Pact. Shortly after East Germany left the pact in preparation for its unification with the West, other countries, including newly democratic Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, began expressing a desire to withdraw from the organization and escape Soviet control. By July 1991, the Warsaw Pact had ceased to exist. 

The Soviet Union itself would not exist for much longer. In August 1991, hard-line communists seeking to regain control of the state attempted a coup d’état. Although unsuccessful, the event undermined Gorbachev’s power and strengthened the appeal of Boris Yeltsin, the leader of Russia’s democratic movement. Fall 1991 brought declarations of independence from numerous Soviet republics. On December 25, 1991, Gorbachev resigned as leader of the Soviet Union, which then dissolved into fifteen separate and struggling states. Yeltsin became president of the main one, formally called the Russian Federation and commonly known as Russia. 

In only a few years, Europe had undergone a radical transformation. The Soviet Union, the main adversary of the United States, had collapsed. Democratic governments were in power throughout Central and Eastern Europe.

Finally free to chart their own course, many newly independent east European countries were eager to cooperate with the West. NATO membership, and the security guarantee that came with it, seemed to be the perfect bulwark against any reassertion of Soviet dominance. In May 1990, President Vaclav Havel of Czechoslovakia had predicted that NATO could “become the seed of a new European security system.” Two years later, Havel, Polish President Lech Walesa, and Hungarian Prime Minister Jozsef Antall announced their intention to seek full membership in NATO. 

Once in office, President Bill Clinton prioritized forming a strong relationship with Russian President Boris Yeltsin. He encouraged Yeltsin’s efforts to reform Russia’s economy and government, aiming to help the country build a stable democracy. In March 1993, newly appointed Secretary of State Warren Christopher called supporting Russia’s transition to democracy the “greatest security challenge of our time.” Later he would write, “Our assessment was that America’s national interest lay squarely in supporting the process of reform—and that this was the key payoff of the end of the Cold War.”

The Clinton administration’s desire to consolidate the Cold War victory was not limited to Russia, however. On April 21, 1993, Clinton met several central and east European leaders in Washington. Among them were Vaclav Havel and Lech Walesa, both giants of the resistance to Soviet rule. At a press conference in June, Clinton recalled, “Every one of those presidents said that their number one priority was to get into NATO.” The encounter, only three months into Clinton’s presidency, left him favorably disposed to enlargement. However, enlargement was far from a sure thing as the Clinton administration settled in.

Opinion on NATO enlargement within the administration was not neatly divided. On one end of the continuum were those, such as National Security Advisor Tony Lake and several State Department officials, who supported enlargement as soon as possible. Those supporting prompt enlargement believed that outlining a timetable and criteria at the Brussels summit was essential to keeping Central and Eastern Europe on the path of democratic reform, even if it took time for new members to fully join the alliance. Others favored enlargement, or at least were open to it, but wanted a slower approach that did not include an early membership plan. This framework would leave time to solidify democratic reforms and address Russian concerns about NATO’s expansion.

Opinions varied even among those unfavorable toward enlargement. Many officials, mostly leading figures in defense, did not want to close NATO’s door forever, but did not want to consider the question anytime soon. Most notable among them were Secretary of Defense Les Aspin and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff John Shalikashvili. Aspin and Shalikashvili believed that from a military perspective, expansion would reduce NATO’s effectiveness by making operations more unwieldy and consensus harder to forge. They also thought that extending a security guarantee to central European states did not serve U.S. interests. 

Many opponents of enlargement in the immediate future also feared “jeopardizing the West’s relations with Russia,” as the scholar and former NSC staff member Charles Kupchan puts it. Moscow was too weak to prevent NATO enlargement, but it remained a nuclear power. Maintaining good relations was important. Doing so would advance Clinton’s priority of supporting Russia’s democratic reforms; a Russia angered by NATO expansion would be more likely to resist U.S. advice. Furthermore, some policymakers argued, enlargement would foster nationalism and resentment in Russia that could prove dangerous when the country became stronger down the road. Meanwhile, enlargement could undercut Yeltsin, a reformist leader who was building a warm relationship with Clinton. Finally, some opponents of enlargement said that adding new members to NATO over Russian objections would rebuild the dividing line that afflicted Europe throughout the Cold War. The new line would merely be further east. Proponents of enlargement countered that such a line would at least reflect the contemporary reality, not that of 1945. 

Supporters of enlargement did not dismiss the need for constructive U.S.-Russia ties. Rather, they believed the administration could minimize and manage Russian apprehension by reassuring Moscow that NATO expansion was not a threat. As noted, some proponents believed a relatively long timeline for enlargement would help. Some also contended that enlargement would prevent a “security vacuum” from forming in central and eastern Europe, a vacuum both Russia and Western powers could be tempted to fill. By avoiding this competition, NATO enlargement could “in fact benefit Russia’s relationship with the West,” as Kupchan recounts.

Proponents of enlargement also argued that fully integrating former Warsaw Pact states would boost their movement toward democracy and prosperity. The clear prospect of NATO membership could prove an incentive for reforms over time. It would also, in some supporters’ eyes, strengthen the Cold War triumph of American ideals and reinforce Washington’s continued leadership and influence in Europe. 

Amid these competing arguments, an idea called the Partnership for Peace (PfP) became the focus of debate within the Clinton administration. The proposal originated in the Department of Defense, whose leaders supported PfP as a useful initiative that could postpone discussion of NATO’s enlargement. It was a military-to-military program intended to allow NATO countries to build defense ties with the countries of the former Warsaw Pact, including post-Soviet states such as Russia. These ties would operate between NATO and each country, not through the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. PfP would focus on military cooperation, joint exercises, defense reform, and cooperation on science and environmental issues. Many experts saw PfP as a win-win alternative to immediate NATO enlargement. The partnership would not be a military alliance, thus allowing Russia to come into the fold and reassuring it that NATO would not be a threat to its security. Because each relationship would be between an individual partner country and NATO, old enemies such as Hungary and Romania would not have to work together. And, more important, some proponents saw PfP as an eventual path to membership for those countries that did the most to upgrade their militaries, consolidate their democratic institutions, and strengthen their relationships with NATO countries. 

Detractors, however, saw the partnership as a weak attempt to placate Russia. Many, including both U.S. and European politicians, thought it would either be ineffective at establishing peace and security or indicate that the Americans were too weak to stand up to Russia—or both. Despite these arguments, the Clinton administration came to a consensus on PfP over fall 1993. Officials agreed to advance it as part of the U.S. position at the Brussels summit in January 1994. However, doing so did not settle the disagreement within the administration over NATO expansion. Was PfP a substitute for enlargement in the coming years? Or should a clear path to NATO membership exist alongside PfP? As the summit approached, the debate churned on.

Print these custom placards for use during your simulation. If you need to edit them, make a copy to your Google Drive.

All National Security Council (NSC) members except the president will write a position memo before the role-play. You can find more details about writing position memos under Student Resources. The president will write a presidential directive after the role-play. More details about that are also under Student Resources.

What is a memorandum?

On January 10, 1994, President Bill Clinton made a speech at a North Atlantic Council summit in Brussels, Belgium. He announced the creation of the Partnership for Peace, based on military cooperation, defense reform, and information-sharing, between European members and nonmembers of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The partnership, conceptualized by U.S. military officials, was envisaged as a way to increase cooperation between former Soviet states and NATO.

More important, Clinton said the partnership would set in motion “a process that leads to the enlargement of NATO.” At a speech in Prague two days later, Clinton went further, saying that “the question is no longer whether NATO will take on new members but when and how.” With these statements, he affirmed that NATO would extend membership to former Eastern Bloc states, settling a question that had preoccupied NATO and U.S. officials since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Unlike the Warsaw Pact, which had been dissolved in 1991, NATO would carve a place for itself in post–Cold War Europe.

Yet the pace of enlargement was slow. The Clinton administration thought that moving too quickly would jeopardize the development of a cooperative relationship with Moscow and undercut U.S. support for reform in Russia. This in mind, Clinton avoided announcing an explicit timeline and plan for enlargement. In May 1997, NATO and Russian leaders met in Paris to sign the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation, and Security, which was meant to serve as a road map for future NATO-Russia cooperation. Under the agreement, which noted that the two parties did “not consider each other as adversaries,” the parties agreed to establish a joint council “to build increasing levels of trust, unity of purpose, and habits of consultation and cooperation between NATO and Russia.”

In July 1997, three years after Clinton’s landmark speech in Brussels, NATO formally invited the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland to join the alliance. Almost two years later, after the accession of the three countries was ratified by each NATO member’s parliament, the countries formally became members of NATO. On March 16, 1999, their flags were raised at the NATO headquarters in Brussels. 

How was the decision made? 

Many important figures in the Clinton administration pushed for enlargement. The strongest support came from National Security Advisor Anthony Lake and U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Madeleine Albright, who would become Secretary of State in 1997. They believed that enlargement was necessary to provide stability to Europe and ensure the consolidation of democracy and free market economies in Eastern Europe. The outbreak of ethnic conflict in the Balkans following the collapse of the Soviet Union also gave enlargement a sense of urgency: many policymakers felt the need to fill the security vacuum in Eastern Europe and prevent any backsliding to authoritarianism or animosity towards the West. 

Outside the halls of the West Wing, both domestic and international actors supported enlargement. Domestic public opinion of enlargement was strongly favorable, particularly in critical electoral districts in the midwest. There, large numbers of Americans of Eastern European descent, particularly from Poland, supported NATO enlargement The European member states of NATO, particularly Germany, were also strong proponents of enlargement, which they saw as a way to push NATO’s eastern border—and thus their buffer against invasion—further east. 

Skepticism about enlargement mainly came from U.S. military leaders, who did not want to overcommit U.S. military resources to the defense of Central and Eastern Europe out of concern that it would dilute NATO’s effectiveness. Other critics, including former diplomats such as George Kennan, argued against enlargement for other reasons, including that it would jeopardize the West’s relations with Russia. Their arguments, however, were ultimately outweighed by the overwhelming support for enlargement elsewhere in the government. 

What did the decision mean? 

The decision to enlarge NATO sent ripples through domestic and international politics. In particular, NATO enlargement has had the most effect in three crucial areas: NATO membership, its strategic orientation, and its relations with Russia.

1. NATO Membership 

The accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland to NATO heralded a number of future expansion rounds. Shortly after they joined the alliance, a Membership Action Plan (MAP) was created, which provided a structured approach and specific guidelines for new countries wishing to join the alliance. 

In 2004 seven new countries, including the three Baltic states, joined NATO, marking the first accession to NATO by former Soviet Republics. A third round of expansion added two new countries, Albania and Croatia, in 2009. Montenegro joined in 2017 and North Macedonia in 2020.  In the wake of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Finland and Sweden joined. Today, NATO has thirty-two members, covering almost one billion citizens. It has recognized three aspiring countries—Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, and Ukraine—that are currently pursuing membership. 

2. NATO’s Strategic Orientation

The decision to enlarge NATO after the disintegration of the Soviet threat was a harbinger of a new strategic orientation for the alliance. In a continuation of its dual-track policy, launched in the 1960s, NATO refocused its mission and expanded its political aims to ensuring European cooperation and democratic stability in its member states. Hans Jochen Peters, a German diplomat, argues that enlargement was a crucial component of this reorientation, by signaling that NATO was “adapting . . . to the new international strategic environment.” 

3. NATO-Russia Relations 

In the two decades following NATO’s decision to expand membership, Russia’s relations with the West have been marked by disagreement, tension, and mistrust. But scholars hotly debate whether NATO enlargement caused this deterioration in relations—and if so, to what extent. 

Some scholars argue that upon enlarging NATO, the alliance isolated Russia from the rest of Europe, framing the country as an outsider and adversary. George Kennan, author of the famous “X Article,” famously called NATO enlargement policy “the beginning of a new cold war.” Vladimir Putin has called NATO enlargement a “direct threat” to Russia’s security and has often used it to partially justify Russia’s aggressive foreign policy. Putin’s strategy has been very effective, argues Charles Kupchan: “Putin essentially creates a political legitimacy that is grounded on standing up to the West.”

On the other hand, some scholars argue that it was not NATO enlargement itself that damaged U.S.-Russia relations but something else along the way. Celeste Wallander, president of the U.S. Russia Foundation, argues that the state of the relationship is due to “the Russian leadership, under Putin, [rejecting] the entire project of integration, of globalization, of transparency.” Proponents of this viewpoint emphasize the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, in which both parties declared their commitment to a non-adversarial relationship, and the subsequent periods of relative cooperation that occurred before the 2008 Russian intervention in Georgia. (Russian leaders argue that NATO violated the Founding Act when it deployed troops to Central and Eastern Europe in 2016.) 

Was it a good idea? 

Even less agreement exists on whether NATO enlargement was the correct policy decision. Some think it was the right decision; others think it was the right decision but executed incorrectly; yet others think it was a disastrous mistake. 

The late Ronald D. Asmus, who had served as deputy assistant secretary of state for European affairs, contended that NATO enlargement achieved its goals of stabilizing Europe and even argued that it was “partially successful in dealing with Russia.” Kupchan, conversely, argues that in the end the costs of enlargement far outweighed the benefits, ultimately jeopardizing Russia’s relationship with the West. Somewhere in the middle, Wallander claims that while NATO enlargement achieved its objectives of stabilization and democratization, a strategic mistake was made in discounting how Russia would react to the policy. 

Ultimately, the decision to expand NATO membership resists a clear-cut assessment. Whether NATO enlargement was the right choice—whether it irrevocably damaged the West’s relations with Russia or stabilized the European security environment or achieved something in between—it will fall to future generations to navigate NATO-Russia relations and set the course for NATO’s future.

After the debate and deliberation close, the president will announce his or her decision, to be later finalized in the form of a written presidential directive. If time permits, you will participate in a debrief following the president’s announcement.

Be active in this debrief. The role-play might seem to be the most challenging part of the experience, but the debrief is equally important. It will reinforce what you learned during the role-play exercise and refine your analytical skills. It will also force you to step out of your role and to view the case from a personal perspective. You will have the opportunity to discuss any challenges you encountered as you worked through the discussion with your peers and how you felt about the final presidential decision.

The debrief will close with a reflection on the complexities and challenges of crafting foreign policy. This should help clarify your understanding of what you learned and answer any lingering questions. This exercise will also assist you in completing your final assignment, a written reflection.

The following questions are proposed to guide the discussion in the in-class debrief. This is not an exhaustive list and may vary depending on how your role-play exercise unfolded. If your class or group does not hold a debrief, these questions will nonetheless help you reflect on the role-play and write your policy review memo: 

The written reflection is your final assignment in the simulation. In the debrief discussion after the role-play, you and your peers went beyond the role you played and thought about the issue from a variety of perspectives. Now that the National Security Council discussion and debrief are behind you, you can consider whether you personally support your recommended policy given the full spectrum of arguments and considerations that arose. Shedding your institutional role and writing from a personal point of view, you will craft a policy review memo that outlines and reflects on the policy options discussed, incorporating and critiquing the president’s decision where appropriate.

If you played the role of president in the simulation, your memo should still reflect your personal opinion. You can comment on the course of action you ordered as president, further justify it, write more extensively on the options you dismissed, or suggest and support alternate options.

No matter which role you played originally, take into account all you have learned. Your instructor or facilitator will want to see whether and how your understanding of the issue and of the policymaking process has evolved from that expressed in your position memo.

More details about the written reflection are available under Student Resources.

Essential Resources

Additional Resources

Research and Preparation

Sources

Note: If you are assigned the role of president, you will not write a position memo. Instead, you will write a two-page presidential directive (PD) at the conclusion of the role-play. You will address the PD, which will follow a memo format, to the NSC members and inform them of your final decision regarding the policy option or options to be implemented (see below).

If your teacher has chosen to assign you the role of general advisor to the president, you will not need to write the position memo from a particular institutional position. Instead, you will have the flexibility to approach the issue from your own perspective, incorporating a comprehensive assessment of the crisis into your argument.

Click here to see a sample of a position memo.

The format of the presidential directive is simpler than that of a position memo. A directive contains a record of the policy option or options that the president has chosen as well as the accompanying orders to various parts of the government with details on how to carry out these decisions.

Click here to see a sample presidential directive.

During the simulated NSC meeting, you will meet to debate and discuss U.S. policy options in response to the issues outlined in the case. Consistent with the NSC’s mission to advise the president, you should raise the issues that are most important for the president to consider. This will enable them to make the most informed decision on policy options. Though you may or may not agree with this decision, your responsibility as an NSC member is to provide the best possible analysis and advice from the perspective of your role.

Role-play Guidelines

Guidelines

Click here to see a full example of a written reflection.