Russia and NATO in the Baltics in 2016 (NSC) — Student

Set in July 2016. Since Russia’s annexation of the Ukrainian peninsula of Crimea in 2014, the United States has debated how to best support the Baltic States, three small countries wedged between Russia and the Baltic Sea. Those states—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—are fellow members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which the United States is bound by treaty to help defend. Given Russia’s willingness to openly flout the sovereignty of its neighbors and its increasingly aggressive military presence in the Baltic region, the United States worries that Russia could continue an expansionist policy. 

Before the biennial NATO summit, the U.S. National Security Council (NSC) will convene to determine a policy to address Baltic security that the United States will articulate at the gathering. As the NSC deliberates, it needs to consider the possibility that Russian actions in Ukraine could be replayed in the Baltics. 

The United States plays a critical role in establishing and maintaining international order. This is particularly true in an increasingly globalized world. The range of foreign policy issues that require its attention is vast. The United States must consider foreign policy issues from conflicts in Afghanistan, Nigeria, and Syria to tensions with Iran and North Korea; from long-standing alliances to complex, evolving relationships with Brazil, China, India, Russia, and South Africa. Issues on the agenda range from the stability of global finance to the promotion of economic opportunity in low-income countries; and from climate to health to nuclear proliferation to terrorism. The United States has a vested interest in myriad world affairs. Further, issues such as immigration, trade, cybersecurity, climate change, and global health underscore the fading distinction between domestic and international matters.

Regardless of the scale of the problem, a successful foreign policy–making process starts by defining interests and goals. Policymakers and their advisors then formulate policy options to meet those goals and consider each option’s strengths and weaknesses. This process is challenging. In the best of times information can be unreliable or incomplete or an adversary’s intentions can be unclear. Often a decision’s consequences can be unknowable. Leaders frequently have to choose from a list on which every option is imperfect. Adding to this uncertainty is the complexity of the U.S. government’s foreign policy machinery. Numerous agencies—each with its own interests and biases—seek to influence how policy is decided and carried out. It takes considerable effort to run a process capable of producing sound policy decisions.

The National Security Council (NSC) plays a critical role in this effort. Its mission is to help the president effectively use a variety of instruments—military, diplomatic, or otherwise—to forge policies that advance U.S. national security goals.

The NSC was created by the National Security Act of 1947. This act defined the NSC as an interagency body intended to “advise the president with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security.” The period after World War II was an age of expanded American interests and responsibilities. The NSC was expected to provide a place where the heads of federal departments and agencies could cooperate to develop recommendations for policies that would advance U.S. aims. The NSC and its staff were also meant to manage the policymaking process. This ensured that the president would receive a full range of advice and opinion from the departments and agencies involved in national security.

The NSC has evolved significantly over the years. The NSC has adapted to the preferences of successive presidents and the challenges they faced. Variables such as the attendees, the frequency of meetings, the manner in which information is passed to the president, the importance of consensus, and the relative dominance of the NSC over other government institutions have changed over the decades.

The NSC has evolved to comprise various interagency committees and a large staff to prepare analysis and coordinate policymaking and implementation. The NSC is at the center of the interagency process. This process is one through which relevant government agencies address foreign policy issues and help the president make and execute policy choices.

I. National Security Advisor

The national security advisor (formally assistant to the president for national security affairs) is at the heart of the NSC structure. The national security advisor’s role is twofold: to offer advice to the president and to coordinate and manage policymaking. Because they have direct access to the president and do not represent a cabinet department, national security advisors are in a unique position. From this neutral perch they drive foreign policy decisions, manage the actors involved, and mitigate conflict throughout the decision-making process.

II. National Security Council Staff

The NSC staff consists of individuals from a collection of agencies that support the president, the vice president, and the administration. NSC staff members are generally organized into directorates that focus on regions or issues. The size and organization of the staff vary with each administration.

The NSC staff provides expertise for the variety of national security policy matters under consideration. It manages numerous responsibilities, including preparing speeches, memos, and discussion papers and handling inquiries from Congress on foreign policy issues. Staff members analyze both immediate and long-standing issues and help prioritize  the agenda.

III. Committee Structure

Committees are at the core of policy deliberation and policymaking in the NSC. They fall into four categories:

This committee structure tackles both immediate crises such as an outbreak of conflict and enduring issues such as climate change. IPCs conduct analysis on an issue, gather views on it and its importance from various departments, formulate and evaluate policy options, and determine what resources and steps would be required to carry out those options. The Deputies Committee manages the interagency process up and down. It decides what IPCs to establish. and gives them specific assignments. It also considers information submitted by the IPCs before relaying it to the Principals Committee or the full NSC.

The Principals Committee is the highest-level setting, aside from the NSC itself, for debating national security issues. It consists of the heads of the NSC’s component agencies. The Principals Committee is essentially all the members of the NSC except the president and vice president. Formal NSC meetings, which the president chairs, occur whenever the president sees fit. They consider issues that require the president’s personal attention and a direct presidential decision.

The goal of this committee structure is to foster consensus on policy options or highlight where and why consensus cannot be reached. If officials at one level agree on an issue, it does not need to go to senior officials for a decision. This practice reserves the president’s time and that of members of the Principals Committee for the most complicated and sensitive debates.

When a crisis erupts issues sometimes do not follow the usual path up from the IPCs. In these cases, NSC staff members and officials in government departments and agencies generally draft papers drawing on their expertise, available intelligence, and any existing contingency plans. Policy options are then debated and decided at the appropriate level. The policymaking process can also deviate from this model based on the preferences of each president.

For the purposes of this NSC simulation, you will role-play the NSC meeting with the assumption that the committees described have already done their jobs. Any critical information has already been passed to the highest-level decision-makers.

Presidential Decisions

When the president makes a policy decision, it can take the form of a verbal instruction recorded and shared with relevant departments and agencies. The president can also issue formal decisions in documents that lay out the administration’s policy and explain its rationale and goals. These documents have gone by different names under different presidents. President Joe Biden issues national security memoranda and national security study memoranda. President Donald Trump issued national security presidential memoranda.

The president can also issue an executive order (EO). EOs are a more formal and public declaration of policy. In contrast, national security directives are generally directed internally to federal departments and are often classified. In the past, presidents have issued EOs for such purposes as facilitating sanctions against foreign individuals and establishing new offices in government departments to carry out foreign policy aims. For federal agencies, both national security directives and executive orders carry the full force of law.

Although many executive branch departments and agencies are involved in foreign policy, the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the intelligence community form the core of the foreign policy bureaucracy. The Department of the Treasury, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of Justice often play crucial roles as well.

Department of State

The Department of State conducts the United States’ relations with other countries and international organizations. It maintains U.S. diplomatic presence abroad. The Department of State also issues visas for foreigners to enter the country, aids U.S. citizens overseas, and manages other programs to promote American interests. The secretary of state is the president’s principal foreign affairs advisor and has a keen understanding of the United States’ international relations. They are also well informed on the relationships between foreign countries, and the behavior and interests of their governments.

Department of Defense

The Department of Defense carries out U.S. defense policy and maintains U.S. military forces. It includes the U.S. Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force, as well as an array of agencies related to defense. The department employs more than two million military and civilian personnel and operates military bases around the world. The secretary of defense is the head of the department and the president’s principal defense policy advisor. They also stay up-to-date on the security situation in foreign countries and the possibilities and implications of U.S. military involvement. The chairman of the joint chiefs of staff is the highest-ranking member of the U.S. armed forces and the president’s top military advisor.

Intelligence Community

The U.S. intelligence community consists of eighteen agencies and organizations, including the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Security Agency (NSA), and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), which gather and analyze intelligence. Each of these agencies has its own mission; for example, the NSA focuses on signals intelligence (information gathered from communications and other electronic signals) and the Defense Intelligence Agency on military information. The director of national intelligence is the president’s principal advisor on intelligence issues. They oversee this network of agencies with the aim of ensuring that they work together and deliver the best possible information to U.S. policymakers.

Department of the Treasury

The Department of the Treasury carries out policy on issues related to the U.S. and global economies and financial systems. The secretary of the treasury serves as one of the president’s chief economic advisors and is responsible for addressing a range of economic concerns. The Treasury’s ten bureaus, which include the U.S. Mint and the Internal Revenue Service, do much of the department’s work, which ranges from collecting tax to printing currency and executing economic sanctions.

Department of Homeland Security

Created soon after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Department of Homeland Security works to counter and respond to risks to American security. It focuses on issues such as terrorism prevention, border security and immigration, disaster response, and cybersecurity. Familiar agencies within the department include U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the U.S. Secret Service, and the Transportation Security Administration. The secretary of homeland security oversees the department and advises the president on relevant issues.

Department of Justice

The Department of Justice investigates and prosecutes possible violations of federal law. The Department of Justice represents the U.S. government in legal matters and works more broadly to prevent and respond to crime. Agencies such as the FBI and the Drug Enforcement Administration are part of the department, as are divisions focusing on particular areas of law, such as national security and civil rights. Leading the department is the attorney general, who offers legal advice to the president and the heads of other departments.

Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—collectively known as the Baltic states—are three small countries wedged between Russia and the Baltic Sea. Their total population numbers fewer than six million, and together their land area is smaller than Missouri.

At first glance, the Baltic states’ security can seem beyond question. They are members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and European Union (EU), the two multinational institutions that anchor the Western order in North America and Europe. Yet despite the protection and solidarity that NATO and EU membership provide, the Baltic states feel a sense of uncertainty and vulnerability because they are territorially small and militarily weak. Their economies, though prosperous, are tiny relative to those of other NATO and EU members; the Baltics also include significant ethnic Russian populations, as the states were part of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR, or Soviet Union) for decades until its 1991 collapse. This historical and demographic backdrop shapes the countries’ domestic and alliance politics, and their tenuous relations with present-day Russia.

In 2014, Russia seized the Ukrainian peninsula of Crimea. Shortly afterward, its military began covertly supporting pro-Russian insurgencies in eastern Ukraine. Like the Baltic states, Ukraine is a former Soviet territory and home to ethnic Russian populations. Western governments have worried Russia could similarly exploit the vulnerabilities of the Baltic states. Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, NATO’s founding document, commits its members to defend any member that is attacked. Pressure on the Baltics would thus bring into play the most basic of U.S. diplomatic commitments—to defend a treaty ally. In such a confrontation, U.S. choices would be complicated not only by Russia’s military might and the weakness of its tiny neighbors, but also by the intricate interethnic relations of post-Soviet states.

Decision Point–Set in July 2016

It is July, 2016. American policymakers need to decide how to support the Baltic states now that Russia has annexed Crimea. Russia’s willingness to openly flout the sovereignty of its neighbors leaves the United States worried Russia could continue an expansionist policy. 

Underscoring that fear was Russia’s increasingly aggressive military presence in the Baltic region. In the years before the annexation of Crimea, the territory around the Baltics had seen Russian military buildup, including increased submarine patrols around NATO territory, military drills, and air patrols. In April 2016, tensions flared after the White House reported that a Russian plane had flown “dangerously close” to a U.S. ship and a Polish plane in the Baltic Sea. In a separate incident later that month, a Russian fighter jet came within one hundred feet of an American reconnaissance plane over the Baltic Sea. During the following months, Latvia several times identified Russian military ships and aircraft near its waters and airspace.

The biennial NATO summit is scheduled to convene in Warsaw, Poland, in July of this year (2016). Because tensions with Russia in the Baltic region have been mounting, discussing the alliance’s eastern flank will occupy much of the summit’s agenda. In advance of the meeting, the U.S. National Security Council (NSC) will convene to determine a policy to address Baltic security that it will articulate at the summit. As the United States deliberates, it needs to consider that Russian actions in Ukraine—including the exploitation of a neighbor’s internal divisions, the infiltration of special operations forces, a buildup of regular units on the border, and a potential Russian seizure of neighboring territory—could be replayed in the Baltics. The stakes for the United States and its allies would be considerably higher should such moves occur in a country that, unlike Ukraine, is a member of NATO. As NSC members meet to choose a response, they should consider four different variables:

The Baltic states’ history is deeply intertwined with Russia. All three states fell under Russian rule in the 1700s, gained their independence after World War I, and remained that way until the Soviet Union invaded in 1940 and incorporated them into the USSR. The Baltic states’ status as union republics gave them the constitutional right to secede from the USSR. For almost half a century, that right was merely theoretical, but during 1990 and 1991, as the Soviet Union faltered, the three states became the first Soviet territories to exercise it. Each had seen the growth of new political movements opposed to Soviet rule during the perestroika era of the mid-1980s, a movement for political reform in the Soviet Communist Party. Although the Baltic states had initially declared independence in spring 1990, that independence was not fully realized until a year later, in August 1991, just four months before the formal dissolution of the Soviet Union.

Having regained independence, the Baltic states sought closer ties with the West. All three successfully pursued similar programs of political and economic reform, remaking themselves as democracies with booming market economies. They set their sights on membership in both NATO and the European Union in the 1990s and joined both organizations in 2004.

NATO membership was especially important to the Baltic states’ security strategies. The military alliance had served for decades as the anchor of collective security between the United States and Western Europe, committing the United States to defend its European allies against a Soviet invasion during the Cold War. The Baltic states saw the alliance as the best insurance policy against potential Russian aggression in the future. Russia objected to the states’ entry into NATO, but not forcefully. Russia’s relations with the West were largely cordial at this time, and, as part of what is informally called the NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1997, the alliance had declared it had no plans for permanent large-scale military installations on the territory of new members.

Russia’s annexation of Crimea in February 2014, after protestors calling for closer ties with the West removed Ukraine’s pro-Russia president from office, raised concern among NATO members about the potential for similar Russian actions in the Baltic states. Russia later held a referendum in which an overwhelming majority of Crimean voters chose union with Russia; NATO and EU members dispute the vote’s legality. In the following months, conflict broke out between pro-Russia separatist groups in eastern Ukraine and the new Ukrainian government. Russia stationed troops along its Ukrainian border in response and has allegedly supported separatists and supplied them with arms, though the Kremlin denies doing so.

Russia’s actions in Ukraine in 2014 convinced Western leaders they needed to better prepare for possible escalation by Moscow. In 2015, NATO governments agreed that all members, including the Baltic states, should increase defense spending. NATO has also significantly enlarged its military presence in the Baltic region, increasing air patrols and deploying ground troops in each of the Baltic states on continuous rotations.  

The United States, for its part, has greatly increased funding for new support to NATO. In 2014, following Russia’s annexation of Crimea, President Barack Obama created the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI), which bolsters U.S. military capabilities in Europe to support NATO’s efforts in deterring Russian aggression. As of 2016, the ERI receives nearly $800 million in funding for deterrence initiatives but has requested $3.4 billion for the 2017 fiscal year. 

Baltic leaders took the lessons of the Crimea conflict to heart. They concluded that they needed to be able to respond quickly to the first signs of similar pressure from Russia against their own countries. That meant paying close attention to signs of cross-border support for Russian nationalists in their countries. NATO members have repeatedly emphasized their Article 5 commitment to Baltic members. Furthermore, they have warned Russia against a policy of pressure on NATO members similar to the policy it has pursued with the Crimean Peninsula. 

Because NATO is both a central institution of U.S. foreign policy and a major strategic asset, the United States sees any Russian military activity near the Baltic states as a challenge it needs to—in some fashion—meet. The United States has a strong interest in maintaining the security of its European allies and in sending a firm signal to Russia that it cannot threaten them without consequence. Yet no decision on supporting an ally in trouble is a simple one, especially when the opposing power is a nuclear-armed state with considerable military and economic might. Any escalation in the conflict could have high costs for both U.S. and NATO military personnel.

As a first step, the United States, along with its NATO allies, had to consider how severe the threat from Russia’s actions was. Russian buildup near the Baltics had yet to constitute an armed attack that would justify invoking Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. However, against the backdrop of Russia’s ongoing activity in Ukraine, the Baltic states sought strong signals of U.S. resolve. 

Second, the United States will need to carefully consider how to most effectively assist without unnecessarily escalating the conflict. If, on the other hand, NATO members hold off invoking Article 5, Western policymakers could have more flexibility. In either case, Baltic leaders and other NATO allies will seek strong signals of U.S. resolve, and any U.S. action seen as half-hearted under these circumstances could cause allies in Europe and beyond to question U.S. commitment to collective security. 

Apart from the question of whether Article 5 applies, the United States has a variety of policy tools available in supporting the Baltic states. NSC members will need to examine the costs and benefits of those tools as well as ways to combine them. They could also advise taking none of the steps if they conclude U.S. interests are best served by staying out of the crisis.

Military measures

If the United States believes the Baltic states’ status as treaty allies calls for a strong show of support, it has a range of military options, such as immediately deploying U.S. rapid-reaction troops, mobilizing a larger multinational NATO contingent, and positioning naval forces off the coasts of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. If NSC members choose to pursue military action, they will need to consider how U.S. and NATO forces can most effectively respond while avoiding unnecessary escalation. NATO forces could be deployed to reinforce the Baltic states’ defenses unobtrusively, so as to not inflame Russia, or take a more visible approach that would signal firmness. An immediate deployment of rapid-reaction troops could quickly reinforce critical defenses, whereas a larger response would take longer to assemble but could send a more visible message of NATO solidarity. Additionally, deployments close to the Russian border could risk escalation, but stationing troops at a greater distance could both limit NATO’s ability to react quickly and convey uncertain resolve.

A military response would send a strong message of resolve to Russia and potentially deter further escalation if the Kremlin decides the risk of open conflict with NATO is too great. Moreover, it would position troops to respond quickly and effectively if the situation escalated into open conflict. However, a military response is not a guaranteed deterrent: Moscow could respond by bolstering its own military presence, increasing the risk of a miscalculation or miscommunication that could ignite a large-scale conflict.

Diplomatic initiatives

Interest in solving this crisis peacefully is strong. To pursue a diplomatic resolution, NSC members could consider consultations between the United States and the Baltic states. The United States could also call for a meeting of NATO foreign or defense ministers, or even a meeting of the NATO-Russia Council, which was created to address security issues between NATO and Russia but has met only intermittently since the 2014 Crimea crisis. The United States could also take a more direct approach, dispatching a high-level U.S. representative to Moscow—perhaps preceded by a U.S.-Russia presidential phone call. NSC members will need to decide whether diplomatic steps should be tried before military steps are taken or whether pursuing both steps in parallel would be more effective. They will also need to consider whether to seek concessions and what sort of concessions to seek: assurances of security in the Baltics, trust-building measures, or merely beginning talks.

Economic measures

NSC members could also choose to impose economic sanctions on Russia to signal Western opposition to Russia’s actions. Sanctions would reduce the risk of direct military confrontation but could be interpreted by NATO allies as a weak show of support. Moreover, sanctions would not necessarily compel Moscow to act. Sanctions played a large role in Western strategy during the confrontation over the Crimean Peninsula but ultimately have had no effect on Russia’s involvement in that country. Moscow has also used the sanctions as a tool to inflame anti-Western sentiment. However, combined with a fall in oil prices, sanctions significantly weakened Russia’s economy in 2014. Although Russia has largely recovered from that downturn, new and more severe sanctions could have a stronger effect on its actions. As they were during the annexation of Crimea, sanctions can be applied in many forms: against individual leaders, particular companies, or entire sectors of the economy. 

Print these custom placards for use during your simulation. If you need to edit them, make a copy to your Google Drive.

All National Security Council (NSC) members except the president will write a position memo before the role-play. You can find more details about writing position memos under Student Resources. The president will write a presidential directive after the role-play. More details about that are also under Student Resources.

What is a memorandum?

In July 2016, NATO held its biennial summit in Warsaw, Poland, issuing a communiqué that cited “Russia’s aggressive actions, including provocative military activities in the periphery of NATO territory and its demonstrated willingness to attain political goals by the threat and use of force.” Members agreed to deploy four new battalions to Poland and the Baltic states on a “persistent rotational basis.” The communiqué also highlighted recent increases in military spending by allies but noted that “there is still much work to be done,” a reflection of frustration, especially in Washington, at unequal contributions to allied security. Another meeting of the NATO-Russia Council was held after the summit; it again failed to make significant progress. 

By the end of 2021, each country in the alliance had increased its defense spending from its 2014 level. Eight NATO members [PDF] including each of the Baltic states, had met the alliance-wide standard of allocating 2 percent of the GDP to defense.

The United States, for its part, has remained committed to NATO in the years since. Despite frequently criticizing NATO allies, the Donald Trump administration ultimately upheld its commitment to the alliance, and after taking office in 2021, President Joe Biden has stated that the U.S. commitment to the alliance remains “unshakeable.” Baltic leaders have joined in those expressions of solidarity. 

What Did the Decision Mean?

Tensions between NATO and Russia in the Baltic region remained high in the following years. NATO began conducting larger military exercises in the region to both train its forces and signal its resolve. Russia has responded in kind; in fall 2018, both NATO and Russia conducted their largest exercises since the early 1980s within months of each other. 

However, fears of a Baltic country coming under threat have remained and gained renewed prominence in February of 2022 after Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. As the war continues, NATO members, especially in the Baltics, have voiced concern that the conflict could spill over or lead Putin to point his aggression toward them. 

As they did after the annexation of Crimea in 2014, NATO members quickly reaffirmed their commitment to the alliance after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. NATO doubled the number of battle groups positioned along the alliance’s eastern flank from four to eight. Although the alliance has, to date, avoided steps that would lead it into direct conflict with Russia, many NATO members have also contributed billions of dollars’ worth of military assistance toward Ukraine’s defense. Even as the war has become more limited in its scope, with Russian forces focusing their efforts on the east of the country, the prospect of conflict extending beyond Ukraine’s borders and into a NATO country remains a point of grave concern for alliance members.

Was it a Good Idea?

The role of NATO in shaping relations between Russia and the West is a hotly debated topic. The decision in 2016 to strengthen the alliance’s forward posture renewed conversation. Some experts argue that NATO’s expanding presence isolates Russia from the rest of Europe and contributes to rising tensions. Russia characterizes the alliance as a direct threat to its interests and has used NATO’s expanding presence to partially justify its aggressive foreign policies in the past. Increasing activity close to Russian borders, some argue, further validated Russia’s fears about NATO.

On the other hand, many policymakers, especially those in member countries bordering Russia, argue that a changing NATO posture is a necessary response to secure the alliance against Russian aggression, regardless of what policies Putin could justify with it. Many also contend that Putin’s adversarial foreign policy would unfold regardless of NATO’s actions. Often, those experts point to the fact that NATO members have made numerous attempts to diplomatically manage relations and ease Russian concerns over the alliance, with limited success. Moreover, many NATO members, especially the Baltic countries, point to Russia’s war in Ukraine as evidence of the need to take the threat of Russian aggression seriously.

Ultimately, policymakers cannot be certain about how NATO’s increasing presence in the Baltics shaped the course of events in the following years. Whether it was a necessary step to safeguard the alliance or a move that spurred greater Russian aggression will remain a fiercely debated topic for years to come. 

After the debate and deliberation close, the president will announce his or her decision, to be later finalized in the form of a written presidential directive. If time permits, you will participate in a debrief following the president’s announcement.

Be active in this debrief. The role-play might seem to be the most challenging part of the experience, but the debrief is equally important. It will reinforce what you learned during the role-play exercise and refine your analytical skills. It will also force you to step out of your role and to view the case from a personal perspective. You will have the opportunity to discuss any challenges you encountered as you worked through the discussion with your peers and how you felt about the final presidential decision.

The debrief will close with a reflection on the complexities and challenges of crafting foreign policy. This should help clarify your understanding of what you learned and answer any lingering questions. This exercise will also assist you in completing your final assignment, a written reflection.

The following questions are proposed to guide the discussion in the in-class debrief. This is not an exhaustive list and may vary depending on how your role-play exercise unfolded. If your class or group does not hold a debrief, these questions will nonetheless help you reflect on the role-play and write your policy review memo: 

The written reflection is your final assignment in the simulation. In the debrief discussion after the role-play, you and your peers went beyond the role you played and thought about the issue from a variety of perspectives. Now that the National Security Council discussion and debrief are behind you, you can consider whether you personally support your recommended policy given the full spectrum of arguments and considerations that arose. Shedding your institutional role and writing from a personal point of view, you will craft a policy review memo that outlines and reflects on the policy options discussed, incorporating and critiquing the president’s decision where appropriate.

If you played the role of president in the simulation, your memo should still reflect your personal opinion. You can comment on the course of action you ordered as president, further justify it, write more extensively on the options you dismissed, or suggest and support alternate options.

No matter which role you played originally, take into account all you have learned. Your instructor or facilitator will want to see whether and how your understanding of the issue and of the policymaking process has evolved from that expressed in your position memo.

More details about the written reflection are available under Student Resources.

Essential Resources

Additional Resources

Research and Preparation

Sources

Note: If you are assigned the role of president, you will not write a position memo. Instead, you will write a two-page presidential directive (PD) at the conclusion of the role-play. You will address the PD, which will follow a memo format, to the NSC members and inform them of your final decision regarding the policy option or options to be implemented (see below).

If your teacher has chosen to assign you the role of general advisor to the president, you will not need to write the position memo from a particular institutional position. Instead, you will have the flexibility to approach the issue from your own perspective, incorporating a comprehensive assessment of the crisis into your argument.

Click here to see a sample of a position memo.

The format of the presidential directive is simpler than that of a position memo. A directive contains a record of the policy option or options that the president has chosen as well as the accompanying orders to various parts of the government with details on how to carry out these decisions.

Click here to see a sample presidential directive.

During the simulated NSC meeting, you will meet to debate and discuss U.S. policy options in response to the issues outlined in the case. Consistent with the NSC’s mission to advise the president, you should raise the issues that are most important for the president to consider. This will enable them to make the most informed decision on policy options. Though you may or may not agree with this decision, your responsibility as an NSC member is to provide the best possible analysis and advice from the perspective of your role.

Role-play Guidelines

Guidelines

Click here to see a full example of a written reflection.