Canada

Protests against pandemic restrictions in Canada have shut down a vital economic link with the United States and inspired copycats around the world. Here’s what to know.

It has been over two years since Chinese officials detained Canadians Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor. How the next U.S. administration handles this issue could foreshadow the future of U.S.-Canada relations.

This post is coauthored by Laurie Trautman, the director of the Border Policy Research Institute at Western Washington University, and a global fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center; and Edward Alden, the Bernard L. Schwartz senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, and the Ross distinguished visiting professor of U.S.-Canada economic relations at Western Washington University. Governors across the United States, reacting to the absence of federal leadership and direction, have been forming regional compacts to try to agree on guidelines for reopening their economies as the new infection rates from the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) begin to diminish. Three arrangements were announced this month: a northeast pact among Delaware, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island; a midwest pact among Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, and Wisconsin; and a western states pact signed by the governors of California, Oregon, and Washington. These initiatives are encouraging, and could create a model for the rest of the country for how neighbors should cooperate when their joint safety and prosperity is under threat. But there is big hole in these efforts. Since the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement in 1989 and the 1995 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the U.S. economy has become increasingly integrated with its northern and southern neighbors. Since the outbreak of the virus in March, those borders have been closed to travel for all but essential workers, increasing the damage to local economies that depend on cross-border exchange. Out in Washington state where we both live, there is a real danger that the western U.S. states will go one way on the speed and rules for reopening while western Canada goes another. This would drive a wedge into a vital component of economic growth in our region, which rests on building a more prosperous, cross-border Cascadia corridor extending from British Columbia to Oregon. In a story that has been replicated across the border states north and south, the virtual shutdown of the U.S.-Canada border at Peace Arch since March 20, 2020, has been one of the most disruptive actions taken by governments in the crisis. The thousands of crossings each day have become a trickle; cross-border passenger travel between Washington and British Columbia has fallen by roughly 98 percent, with steep costs for business on both sides of the border. Those costs may continue even after the U.S. starts to reopen its economy. Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau has said the border will remain restricted for “many weeks”, and the only way the border will fully reopen is if officials on both sides are confident that cross-border travelers will not become a new vector for disseminating the virus. The growing calls from U.S. President Donald Trump urging the states to restart economic activity even as the virus continues to spread in many parts of the country will not help reassure our northern neighbors. On the west coast, the province of British Columbia will need a lot of persuasion to start welcoming Americans again. To date, the province has seen just over 1,700 cases and fewer than 100 deaths, compared to more than 12,000 cases and nearly 700 deaths in Washington alone. The gaps between New York state and the province of Quebec, and Michigan and Ontario, are similarly striking. Both Canada and the United States have a strong stake in reviving cross-border ties as soon as safely possible, and the platform for doing so already exists. The western region, in particular, has a long history of collaboration across various scales of government and industry. Recent initiatives like the Cascadia Innovation Corridor, spearheaded by former Washington state governor Christine Gregoire, are aimed at developing the Pacific Northwest as a global hub of innovation in health care, technology, and other sectors, leveraging the strengths of both the western states and British Columbia. This region is also widely viewed as an innovative border policy incubator for both Canada and the United States, serving as a testing ground for programs like NEXUS and Enhanced Driver’s Licenses, which are later implemented across the northern border. Such accomplishments are unparalleled in other cross-border regions between the United States and Canada. There is a reason that so much energy is invested in the cross-border relationship, and why so many in the region see the value of strengthening those ties. Families, businesses, tribes, and First Nations straddle our shared border, and the social and economic costs of prolonged restrictions are incalculable. If border restrictions persist, or become asymmetrical in nature, there will be long lasting damage, particularly to norther border businesses that depend on Canadian consumers. Such businesses may not recover, despite targeted economic assistance. There is another reason to include discussions with Canada as soon as possible. The pandemic has encouraged nations around the world to pull up their drawbridges, enacting not just sensible measures to restrict travel but harmful ones to restrict the flow of life-saving drugs, protective equipment, and other medical supplies. Even the close U.S.-Canada relationship has not been spared from such actions. As a region, we have proven that we can do better, and we have reaped the benefits of a collaborative approach, not just within our nation’s borders, but beyond them. A new west coast initiative on responsible reopening that includes Canada could become not just a model for the country but for the world in how countries can work together to restore their economies and enhance the safety of their citizens.

This blog post is part of the Women and Foreign Policy program’s interview series on Gender Equality in Foreign Policy, featuring global and U.S. officials leading initiatives to promote gender equality in the defense, development, and diplomatic sectors.

Those entering the United States at Peace Arch and other western border ports of entry are facing a stepped up enforcement regime that creates significant risks for all southbound travelers.

Multilateral institutions often focus on rhetoric over action in countering violence against women. States inclined to do better should take matters into their own hands and adopt feminist foreign policies. 

With the signing of the Protocol of Amendment to the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) on December 10, 2019, the battle over USMCA now moves to the Congress. Throughout the two-and-a-half year negotiating process, a threat by President Trump to withdraw from USMCA’s predecessor, the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), has hung over the negotiations, with significant legal uncertainty over whether the president has the authority to do so absent action by Congress. Congress now has the chance to clear up that ambiguity and to reassert its constitutional authority over trade policy. But to do so, it will have to act fast. It is likely that the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) will bypass the traditional process of holding a “mock markup” that would allow the Congress to propose amendments to both the legislation implementing the USMCA and the accompanying Statement of Administrative Action (SAA), which outlines executive branch commitments on how the provisions of the USMCA will be implemented. Rather than follow the usual order, USTR is expected to introduce a final, non-amendable bill next week, along with a (presumably amended) SAA, for quick consideration by the House Ways and Means Committee before it is sent to the House floor for final passage. Given the indications from Senate Majority Leader McConnell that the Senate will not take up the USMCA until after the impeachment trial ends early next year, it is not clear why all of the procedural steps in the fast track process must be waived. Before it is too late, Congress should insist on including a number of items in the implementing legislation or on essential changes to the May 30, 2019, draft Statement of Administrative Action (SAA). Indeed, U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer’s transmittal letter for the SAA emphasized that the submission “is just that –a draft. It does not in any way prejudice the content of the final implementation package, i.e., the final SAA, final implementation legislation, and the final, binding text.” Now is the time for Congress to hold Ambassador Lighthizer to his word and insist on changes to the implementing bill and the SAA in the following areas: 1. Withdrawal from USMCA The language of the USMCA mirrors that of the NAFTA: any party may withdraw from USMCA by providing written notice of withdrawal to the other parties, with the withdrawal taking effect six months after notice is given. USMCA Article 34.6. What the text of the NAFTA and the USMCA do not say is who gets to decide to submit the withdrawal notice, under what authority, and pursuant to what procedures. Congress should fill in those blanks by insisting on language, preferably in the implementing bill itself but if not, in the SAA, that spells out a process and clear role for Congress before any withdrawal notice can be sent. If it takes an act of Congress under the well defined Trade Promotion Authority procedures, input from stakeholders and advisory committees, and a formal economic evaluation from the United States International Trade Commission (USITC) to enter into the USMCA, surely it ought to take at least some process and congressional input to withdraw. The May 30 draft SAA is completely silent on how the Trump administration intends to implement the withdrawal provision. Congress should insist that either the implementing legislation itself or the SAA include a commitment to a transparent process, including public hearings, input from the trade advisory committees, a USITC economic evaluation of the costs and benefits of withdrawal, and a fast-tracked Congressional vote before a notice of withdrawal can be sent to the USMCA parties. 2. Six-Year Joint Reviews Article 34.7 of USMCA calls for a meeting of the Free Trade Commission (consisting of trade ministers of the United States, Canada, and Mexico) at least every six years. The purpose of the meeting is to conduct a joint review of the USMCA’s operations, to consider any recommendations for action submitted by one of the USMCA parties, and to confirm each party’s desire to extend the USMCA for a sixteen-year period. Here too the May 30 draft SAA is silent on how the Trump administration intends to approach these six-year reviews. Congress should insist that either the implementing legislation or the SAA include a clear role for Congress in developing recommendations to be presented on behalf of the United States at the joint review sessions, and, as noted below, in determining whether to confirm continued U.S. participation in the UMSCA. 3. Decision to Invoke the Sixteen-Year Sunset Clause Article 34.7(1) states that the USMCA shall terminate sixteen years after it enters into force unless each of the three parties affirmatively confirms its desire to continue the agreement for a new sixteen-year period. That confirmation must be made in writing at the six-year joint review meetings. Congress should treat the decision to allow the USMCA to terminate at the end of the sixteen-year period the same as a notice of withdrawal. A decision not to confirm the United States’ continued participation in the USMCA ultimately has the same legal effect as withdrawal. It should be done only following a full process that includes input from all stakeholders and trade advisory committees, a USITC economic evaluation, and a vote of Congress. The uncertainty created by the manner in which U.S. trade policy has been conducted over the past three years has led to numerous calls for Congress to reassert the power expressly given to it by the Constitution to establish tariffs and regulate foreign commerce. The problem has been the limited opportunities for Congress to do so. The USMCA presents just such a chance. On the essential issue of whether to enter into and whether to exit as important a trade agreement as the one with our two largest trading partners—Canada and Mexico—Congress should insist on playing a central role. It should make it clear that the president does not have the authority to act without the express authorization of Congress.