A Second Trump Term: How Will Each Southeast Asian State Respond? Part 1

In a recent Japan Times piece, I wrote about how a second Trump term might affect Southeast Asian countries. Most importantly, former President Trump would likely force Southeast Asian governments to choose between China and the United States, a decision most of them, save possibly the Philippines, do not want to make. Yet Trump’s tougher approach to China—and China's tougher response to the United States—may make the long-standing Southeast Asian practice of balancing between the superpowers no longer possible. This delicate balance involves deriving increasing trade and investment from China while often still building security ties with the United States. To most Southeast Asian states, this scenario is a nightmare. Southeast Asian officials I have spoken with already seem wracked with worry about the U.S.-China bilateral trajectory and whether Southeast Asia’s balancing act will finally have to end.

But how would specific Southeast Asian states respond to a second Trump administration that could be much tougher on China and lead to heightened competition over Southeast Asian allegiances? Here is a brief summary of how each country would respond. (I am excluding Brunei and Timor-Leste, the two Southeast Asian microstates, from this analysis.) This is the first part, covering five Southeast Asian countries; the others will be covered in the second part of this two-part blog.

Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar: Laos and Cambodia are already de facto Chinese client states, and if forced to choose, they would surely choose China—they basically already have, at this point. If the Myanmar junta remains in control of the country into a second Trump term (not exactly a sure proposition at this point), they too would obviously rely on China since the United States has downgraded its relationship with Myanmar and imposed a range of sanctions on the junta. Were the opposition to triumph in Myanmar, they might take a different approach. Even then, China’s geographical proximity to Myanmar and its significant investment and infrastructure provision are crucial. Given that the United States has historically played a relatively minor role in Myanmar, even if the junta falls, Myanmar will likely remain closer to China and may even strengthen this relationship over the next four years.

The Philippines: Alone among Southeast Asian states, the Philippines under Ferdinand Marcos Jr. seems determined to partner with the United States, regardless of economic and security blowback from China. If things get even tenser between the United States and China, I would expect the Philippines to clearly choose to stand with the United States, perhaps the only Southeast Asian state to do so.

Vietnam: Vietnam has recently upgraded its security partnership with the United States and worked more closely with other regional powers like Japan. While Vietnam has perhaps the most to lose from China’s aggressive activity in the South China Sea (along with the Philippines), Vietnam has set clear red lines it will not cross in its relationship with the United States. Vietnam’s leadership still appears to place its bilateral relationship with China, despite all its problems, on a higher level than the relationship with the United States. If absolutely forced to choose, it might well pick China. In addition, the Trump administration could potentially single out Vietnam for its large trade surplus with the United States, further angering Vietnamese leaders.