Cyber Clash With China (NSC) — Student

Fictional, set in the present day. Cyberspace is a new domain of conflict that has few accepted standards of behavior. Basic questions about it—including how countries should respond to cyberattacks—are still unresolved. In recent years, China has exerted authority over areas of the South China Sea also claimed by other Asian countries, leading to tension with the United States. Last week, following several near misses in the South China Sea between U.S. and Chinese military vessels and aircraft, as well as the theft of documents from U.S. military networks, the U.S. Air Force conducted a flight near a shoal claimed by China. Three days later, the Nasdaq stock market was hacked, which significantly harmed the U.S. economy. U.S. intelligence agencies believe some in the Chinese government knew about the attack, for which a Chinese hacker collective claimed credit. National Security Council members need to advise the president on the merits of a cyber response, economic sanctions, or military measures.

The United States plays a critical role in establishing and maintaining international order. This is particularly true in an increasingly globalized world. The range of foreign policy issues that require its attention is vast. The United States must consider foreign policy issues from conflicts in Afghanistan, Nigeria, and Syria to tensions with Iran and North Korea; from long-standing alliances to complex, evolving relationships with Brazil, China, India, Russia, and South Africa. Issues on the agenda range from the stability of global finance to the promotion of economic opportunity in low-income countries; and from climate to health to nuclear proliferation to terrorism. The United States has a vested interest in myriad world affairs. Further, issues such as immigration, trade, cybersecurity, climate change, and global health underscore the fading distinction between domestic and international matters.

Regardless of the scale of the problem, a successful foreign policy–making process starts by defining interests and goals. Policymakers and their advisors then formulate policy options to meet those goals and consider each option’s strengths and weaknesses. This process is challenging. In the best of times information can be unreliable or incomplete or an adversary’s intentions can be unclear. Often a decision’s consequences can be unknowable. Leaders frequently have to choose from a list on which every option is imperfect. Adding to this uncertainty is the complexity of the U.S. government’s foreign policy machinery. Numerous agencies—each with its own interests and biases—seek to influence how policy is decided and carried out. It takes considerable effort to run a process capable of producing sound policy decisions.

The National Security Council (NSC) plays a critical role in this effort. Its mission is to help the president effectively use a variety of instruments—military, diplomatic, or otherwise—to forge policies that advance U.S. national security goals.

The NSC was created by the National Security Act of 1947. This act defined the NSC as an interagency body intended to “advise the president with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security.” The period after World War II was an age of expanded American interests and responsibilities. The NSC was expected to provide a place where the heads of federal departments and agencies could cooperate to develop recommendations for policies that would advance U.S. aims. The NSC and its staff were also meant to manage the policymaking process. This ensured that the president would receive a full range of advice and opinion from the departments and agencies involved in national security.

The NSC has evolved significantly over the years. The NSC has adapted to the preferences of successive presidents and the challenges they faced. Variables such as the attendees, the frequency of meetings, the manner in which information is passed to the president, the importance of consensus, and the relative dominance of the NSC over other government institutions have changed over the decades.

The NSC has evolved to comprise various interagency committees and a large staff to prepare analysis and coordinate policymaking and implementation. The NSC is at the center of the interagency process. This process is one through which relevant government agencies address foreign policy issues and help the president make and execute policy choices.

I. National Security Advisor

The national security advisor (formally assistant to the president for national security affairs) is at the heart of the NSC structure. The national security advisor’s role is twofold: to offer advice to the president and to coordinate and manage policymaking. Because they have direct access to the president and do not represent a cabinet department, national security advisors are in a unique position. From this neutral perch they drive foreign policy decisions, manage the actors involved, and mitigate conflict throughout the decision-making process.

II. National Security Council Staff

The NSC staff consists of individuals from a collection of agencies that support the president, the vice president, and the administration. NSC staff members are generally organized into directorates that focus on regions or issues. The size and organization of the staff vary with each administration.

The NSC staff provides expertise for the variety of national security policy matters under consideration. It manages numerous responsibilities, including preparing speeches, memos, and discussion papers and handling inquiries from Congress on foreign policy issues. Staff members analyze both immediate and long-standing issues and help prioritize  the agenda.

III. Committee Structure

Committees are at the core of policy deliberation and policymaking in the NSC. They fall into four categories:

This committee structure tackles both immediate crises such as an outbreak of conflict and enduring issues such as climate change. IPCs conduct analysis on an issue, gather views on it and its importance from various departments, formulate and evaluate policy options, and determine what resources and steps would be required to carry out those options. The Deputies Committee manages the interagency process up and down. It decides what IPCs to establish. and gives them specific assignments. It also considers information submitted by the IPCs before relaying it to the Principals Committee or the full NSC.

The Principals Committee is the highest-level setting, aside from the NSC itself, for debating national security issues. It consists of the heads of the NSC’s component agencies. The Principals Committee is essentially all the members of the NSC except the president and vice president. Formal NSC meetings, which the president chairs, occur whenever the president sees fit. They consider issues that require the president’s personal attention and a direct presidential decision.

The goal of this committee structure is to foster consensus on policy options or highlight where and why consensus cannot be reached. If officials at one level agree on an issue, it does not need to go to senior officials for a decision. This practice reserves the president’s time and that of members of the Principals Committee for the most complicated and sensitive debates.

When a crisis erupts issues sometimes do not follow the usual path up from the IPCs. In these cases, NSC staff members and officials in government departments and agencies generally draft papers drawing on their expertise, available intelligence, and any existing contingency plans. Policy options are then debated and decided at the appropriate level. The policymaking process can also deviate from this model based on the preferences of each president.

For the purposes of this NSC simulation, you will role-play the NSC meeting with the assumption that the committees described have already done their jobs. Any critical information has already been passed to the highest-level decision-makers.

Presidential Decisions

When the president makes a policy decision, it can take the form of a verbal instruction recorded and shared with relevant departments and agencies. The president can also issue formal decisions in documents that lay out the administration’s policy and explain its rationale and goals. These documents have gone by different names under different presidents. President Joe Biden issues national security memoranda and national security study memoranda. President Donald Trump issued national security presidential memoranda.

The president can also issue an executive order (EO). EOs are a more formal and public declaration of policy. In contrast, national security directives are generally directed internally to federal departments and are often classified. In the past, presidents have issued EOs for such purposes as facilitating sanctions against foreign individuals and establishing new offices in government departments to carry out foreign policy aims. For federal agencies, both national security directives and executive orders carry the full force of law.

Although many executive branch departments and agencies are involved in foreign policy, the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the intelligence community form the core of the foreign policy bureaucracy. The Department of the Treasury, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of Justice often play crucial roles as well.

Department of State

The Department of State conducts the United States’ relations with other countries and international organizations. It maintains U.S. diplomatic presence abroad. The Department of State also issues visas for foreigners to enter the country, aids U.S. citizens overseas, and manages other programs to promote American interests. The secretary of state is the president’s principal foreign affairs advisor and has a keen understanding of the United States’ international relations. They are also well informed on the relationships between foreign countries, and the behavior and interests of their governments.

Department of Defense

The Department of Defense carries out U.S. defense policy and maintains U.S. military forces. It includes the U.S. Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force, as well as an array of agencies related to defense. The department employs more than two million military and civilian personnel and operates military bases around the world. The secretary of defense is the head of the department and the president’s principal defense policy advisor. They also stay up-to-date on the security situation in foreign countries and the possibilities and implications of U.S. military involvement. The chairman of the joint chiefs of staff is the highest-ranking member of the U.S. armed forces and the president’s top military advisor.

Intelligence Community

The U.S. intelligence community consists of eighteen agencies and organizations, including the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Security Agency (NSA), and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), which gather and analyze intelligence. Each of these agencies has its own mission; for example, the NSA focuses on signals intelligence (information gathered from communications and other electronic signals) and the Defense Intelligence Agency on military information. The director of national intelligence is the president’s principal advisor on intelligence issues. They oversee this network of agencies with the aim of ensuring that they work together and deliver the best possible information to U.S. policymakers.

Department of the Treasury

The Department of the Treasury carries out policy on issues related to the U.S. and global economies and financial systems. The secretary of the treasury serves as one of the president’s chief economic advisors and is responsible for addressing a range of economic concerns. The Treasury’s ten bureaus, which include the U.S. Mint and the Internal Revenue Service, do much of the department’s work, which ranges from collecting tax to printing currency and executing economic sanctions.

Department of Homeland Security

Created soon after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Department of Homeland Security works to counter and respond to risks to American security. It focuses on issues such as terrorism prevention, border security and immigration, disaster response, and cybersecurity. Familiar agencies within the department include U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the U.S. Secret Service, and the Transportation Security Administration. The secretary of homeland security oversees the department and advises the president on relevant issues.

Department of Justice

The Department of Justice investigates and prosecutes possible violations of federal law. The Department of Justice represents the U.S. government in legal matters and works more broadly to prevent and respond to crime. Agencies such as the FBI and the Drug Enforcement Administration are part of the department, as are divisions focusing on particular areas of law, such as national security and civil rights. Leading the department is the attorney general, who offers legal advice to the president and the heads of other departments.

Cyberspace is a new domain of conflict, one guided by few accepted rules or standards of behavior. Policymakers find offensive cyber operations attractive because they are relatively inexpensive, can be designed to be less destructive than attacks against physical targets and can provide a high degree of anonymity to the attacker. Most of these operations include cyber espionage (theft of military and political secrets or intellectual property) and political disruptions (website defacement or distributed denial-of-service [DDoS] attacks, which flood a website with so much data that it can no longer respond). 

The White House’s 2023 National Cyber Strategy states that the United States “will use all instruments of national power to disrupt and dismantle threat actors whose actions threaten our interests.” Experts generally assume that a cyberattack that causes death or physical destruction would be considered an armed attack. However, the threshold for a military response to other forms of cyberattack remains uncertain. Defending against cyber threats is extremely difficult. Would-be defenders need to worry about millions of lines of computer code, hundreds of devices, and scores of networks.  An attacker, on the other hand, only needs to find one vulnerability. 

Determining who is responsible for cyberattacks is a difficult and slow process. Unlike other kinds of attacks, cyber attackers can hide their tracks more easily. The attacks can happen in minutes, if not seconds. Many countries also rely on proxies such as criminal groups, or patriotic hackers to conduct operations for them. Even if the hackers can be located, anyone anywhere could have authorized the attack. This conundrum greatly complicates efforts to retaliate and prevent attacks. 

Successful attacks could also risk military escalation. If military leaders fear that their networks or weapons systems could be subjected to cyberattacks—which would limit their ability to order forces in the field or to launch weapons—they would have an incentive to use their weapons systems preemptively. Such a move would escalate and further destabilize a conflict. 

Hypothetical Decision Point

China, Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam have competing territorial claims in the South China Sea. In recent years, China has exerted authority over the area by increasing the size of existing islands or creating new ones. China has also constructed ports, military installations, and airstrips. The United States has promoted the right of military vessels to operate in China’s claimed two-hundred-mile exclusive economic zone. Furthermore, the United States has rejected China’s claim to a twelve-mile territorial zone around the artificial islands it has built. Since 2015, the United States has signaled its opposition by flying military aircraft and sending U.S. Navy ships near certain islands.

Last week, the U.S. Air Force conducted a flight near a shoal claimed by China in the South China Sea. Three days later, the Nasdaq Stock Market suffered a hack that damaged computers and forced the suspension of trading for two days. This imposed significant costs on various U.S. companies and dented confidence in the U.S. financial system. An underground hacker collective based in China known as the Zheng He Squadron has claimed responsibility for the hack. The group has known ties to the People’s Liberation Army, China’s military. U.S. intelligence agencies assess with 90 percent certainty that the hack occurred with the knowledge or support of parts of the Chinese government. Beijing claims no knowledge of the attack. The president has convened the National Security Council to discuss how the United States should respond. 

The Challenge of Cyberspace

The rapid diffusion of information technology has remade economics, politics, and international affairs. It has transformed commerce, making global supply chains possible and generating enormous wealth. It has created social and cultural networks that span the globe. It has enabled people to overcome distance and share knowledge and ideas. It has provided powerful tools for political organization and protest.

The digital revolution has also created new sources of vulnerability. Countries, terrorists, and criminals can shut down power, communication, transportation, and financial networks with the click of a mouse. These attacks inflict not just massive economic losses but also death and physical destruction. 

In recent years, cyberattacks have grown in frequency and sophistication. The 2016 U.S. presidential election was marked by repeated hacking incidents linked to Russian intelligence. Attacks have also targeted U.S. critical infrastructure. One of the most extensive cyberattacks on the United States to date began in late 2019 or early 2020. This cyberattack began when a group of hackers hid a piece of malware in a widely used network management software made by the company Solar Winds. The hacking campaign ran undetected until December 2020. This span of time allowed the group to gain access to the networks of some eighteen thousand companies and government agencies that installed the software. The group was able to steal data from at least one hundred companies and nine U.S. government agencies. In May 2021, a ransomware attack on Colonial Pipeline forced the U.S. company to shut down operations. This resulted in fuel shortages along the eastern seaboard of the United States. The escalating scale and scope of those attacks have underscored the need to bolster U.S. cyber defenses. 

Countries have yet to figure out how to limit competition in cyberspace. Malicious software (malware) is impossible to count or control. Agreements like those that limit nuclear competition do not exist for digital weapons. Although acceptance of international law in cyberspace is growing, great uncertainty remains about how it should be applied. Major powers, including the United States and China, have been willing to discuss threats in cyberspace but slow to develop a policy framework. 

The evolution of U.S. Cyber Policy

Throughout the early 2000s, the United States was hesitant to openly acknowledge its operations in cyberspace. Experts widely believe that the United States and Israel were behind Stuxnet, one of the world’s first cyber weapons. The malware was designed to slow Iran’s nuclear program by damaging centrifuges at the Natanz nuclear facility in 2009. Still, both countries denied any involvement.

After years of silence, the U.S. government has gradually become more transparent about developing and using cyberattacks. The 2015 Defense Department Cyber Strategy explicitly recognized offensive missions. Furthermore, the Pentagon began to develop cyber capabilities that can support military operations. The first public acknowledgment of the United States using cyberweapons came in February 2016. It was here when Pentagon officials announced that U.S. Cyber Command had launched attacks against the self-proclaimed Islamic State. Since then, Cyber Command has grown from approximately nine hundred personnel to more than six thousand. 

The United States and China have a history of clashes in cyberspace. According to a 2013 Washington Post report, Chinese hackers have stolen information relating to more than two dozen U.S. weapons programs. This stolen information includes the Patriot missile system, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, and the U.S. Navy’s new littoral combat ship. The White House, the State Department, the Office of Personnel Management, and NASA have been breached. Attacks on U.S. companies including Adobe, Disney, General Electric, Google, Johnson & Johnson, and Yahoo have also been publicly reported. In addition,  Chinese hackers have reportedly targeted the negotiation strategies and financial information in energy, banking, law, and other sectors.

In response to U.S. claims of Chinese hacking, China has noted that it is also a victim of cybercrime. China claims that the majority of attacks against it originate from internet protocol (IP) addresses in the United States, Japan, and South Korea. Chinese media were quick to echo claims by former National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden that the United States hacks targets on the Chinese mainland and in Hong Kong.

Washington has steadily increased pressure on Beijing over cyber espionage. In April 2015, President Barack Obama signed an executive order that declared a national emergency to deal with the threat of “significant malicious cyber-enabled activities.” This move allowed for economic sanctions against companies or individuals that profited from cyber theft. The order threatened to block financial transactions routed through the United States, prevent exports to the United States, and prevent executives of the companies that benefit from the hacks from traveling to the United States.

In August 2015, the Washington Post reported that the Obama administration planned to levy these sanctions against Chinese companies in the lead-up to a summit the following month between Presidents Barack Obama and Xi Jinping. Perhaps because of the threat, the summit produced a breakthrough agreement. Both sides agreed that “neither country’s government will conduct or knowingly support cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property, including trade secrets or other confidential business information, with the intent of providing competitive advantages to companies or commercial sectors.” Washington and Beijing also agreed to identify and endorse norms of behavior in cyberspace. They agreed to establish two high-level working groups and a hotline between them. After departing the United States, Xi signed similar agreements with the United Kingdom and at a Group of Twenty meeting in Turkey.

Following the presidents’ September summit, the cybersecurity firm FireEye reported a sharp decline in the number of Chinese cyberattacks. However, the firm also suggested that actors could simply have become stealthier and more difficult to detect. Former U.S. Assistant Attorney General John P. Carlin confirmed the company’s findings that attacks were “less voluminous but more focused, calculated, and still successful.” 

The U.S.-China working group on security issues met only once before the end of the Obama administration, but the cybercrime group reported some progress. The two sides established a point of contact and a designated email address. They also successfully cooperated on taking down websites with false information. After Donald Trump met Xi Jinping in April 2017, Washington and Beijing agreed to a U.S.-China Comprehensive Dialogue that would have four pillars, including one on law enforcement and cybersecurity. The negotiations broke down before the two countries could come to an agreement.

In 2018, the Trump administration implemented a series of sweeping tariffs on Chinese goods. The administration cited unfavorable trade practices and Chinese theft of American intellectual property. The resulting trade war stalled cooperation on cybersecurity. According to cybersecurity firms, cyberattacks on American businesses and government agencies have increased since the trade war began. 

In September 2018, the Trump administration announced a more aggressive cybersecurity strategy. It authorized using offensive cyber operations as a deterrent against foreign cyberattacks. This strategy, known as defend forward, focused on observing, countering, and disrupting adversary operations before they affect U.S. networks. The Trump administration further oversaw the creation of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) within the Department of Homeland Security. The goal of CISA is to coordinate and improve government defenses against cyberattacks. Despite this increase in offensive operations, officials have continued to warn that critical U.S. government agencies remain dangerously unprepared to defend against cyberattacks. For example, in June 2023, a group of Russian cybercriminals led a global cyberattack targeting personnel data from several U.S. government agencies.

The Joe Biden administration has reaffirmed the importance of cyber issues to U.S. national security and  taken steps to improve U.S. cyber defenses. The administration also increased  efforts to deter cyberattacks by imposing costs on perpetrators, and invigorate diplomatic efforts toward cyber norms. Soon after the May 2021 Colonial Pipeline attack, the Biden administration released an executive order designed to improve U.S. cybersecurity. This included a significant increase in funding. Requests for cyber operations in the 2023 defense budget totaled $13.5 billion, an increase of more than 30 percent from 2021. In addition to increasing the financial resources going towards cyber security, U.S. Cyber Command has also changed its approach in responding to cybersecurity threats. In a Cyber Strategy Report published in September 2023, the department called for expanding beyond its previous mandate of just protecting U.S. military networks. Instead, it suggested “opening up communications with other federal agencies and the private sector,...and increasing assistance to foreign allies.” 

Meanwhile, tensions between the United States and China have remained high. The first round of high-level talks between Washington and Beijing since Biden’s inauguration were marked by tense rhetoric and yielded little progress toward addressing ongoing issues including cyber concerns. Although high-level meetings have continued to occur between the two leaders, concerns over Chinese activity in cyberspace have remained high. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence’s 2023 Annual Threat Assessment underscored that China still represents “the broadest, most active, and persistent cyber espionage threat to the U.S. Government and private-sector networks.” This sustained tension, coupled with continued U.S. vulnerabilities in cyberspace, highlights the continued need for increased cyber preparedness.
 

The United States has an interest in ensuring that China does not assert its sovereignty claims over the South China Sea by using force or intimidation. Washington has sought to secure this interest through freedom of navigation operations—sending ships or aircraft into areas that China claims but that the United States considers open to all—as well as increased military exercises with its allies in the region. The United States also has an interest in defining the rules of behavior for cyberspace. It has tried to strengthen deterrence by building up offensive capabilities. It has demonstrated its ability to attribute attacks, indicting foreign hackers, and levying sanctions. It has also promoted norms of behavior through bilateral agreements and multilateral forums. 

The principal policy options available in this case are discussed below. These responses are available individually, in combination, or all together.

Cyber Responses

The United States could pursue a proportionate response. The United States could try to disrupt critical networks within China, such as its banking system, for a limited period. The attacks could also be directed at a target that seems particularly valuable to the Chinese leadership. These attacks could be focused on the censorship technology that constitutes the so-called Great Firewall. The U.S. response should be accompanied by some level of attribution. This means that the United States would need to identify the attackers, and the attack would reveal some of the United States’ technical and intelligence capabilities.

With this option, the United States would essentially be responding in kind. This would keep the U.S.-China dispute in the domain (cyberspace) it is already in rather than extending it. Even if the conflict were to escalate, Washington could claim that it was not the instigator. The United States would likely be capable of mounting a targeted cyberattack that stood a good chance of producing the desired effect.

Nonetheless, a cyber response has costs and risks. A cyberattack could fail if the defender has already patched the vulnerability. Given China’s extensive connection with the global economy, malware used against China could also quickly spread to the rest of the world. This could infect U.S. allies and eventually make its way back to the United States. Although limited to one domain, cyberattacks could also escalate rapidly. If attacks damage Chinese defense networks, Beijing could fear that a conventional strike could soon follow. In this scenario, China could decide to launch conventional strikes on U.S. military assets as quickly as possible. Chinese economic retaliation—such as sanctions or tariffs—against the United States is also possible. In addition, other countries could find U.S. claims of China’s guilt unconvincing. Failing to convince others that the Chinese government was behind the attacks would not only limit support for the U.S. response but also undermine Washington’s efforts to develop international norms for behavior in cyberspace. 

Punitive Sanctions

In April 2015, Obama issued an executive order that laid the groundwork for economic sanctions. Declaring a national emergency to deal with the threat of “significant malicious cyber-enabled activities,” the order enabled the treasury secretary to sanction individuals and entities involved, directly or indirectly, in cyberattacks. Possible sanctions include freezing suspects’ financial assets and barring commercial transactions with them. In the current scenario, the White House could sanction high-level Chinese authorities who it believes ordered the attack and levy economic sanctions on government entities and state-owned enterprises deemed to be connected to the hacks. It could also expel Chinese diplomats from the United States. 

Another response would be to indict the individual hackers involved. Although these individuals are unlikely to ever be handed over to U.S. authorities for trial, their international travel would be limited, and the indictments could deter future Chinese hackers who wish to someday travel abroad. Punitive sanctions would involve identifying the attackers and revealing some U.S. technical and intelligence methods. 

It could take a while for economic sanctions to be imposed. However, it could take even longer for them to cause enough damage to affect the target’s behavior. Chinese firms could also skirt financial restrictions by trading with Russia or others, and China could retaliate against U.S. companies that heavily export to China. The U.S. response could appear weak, undermine deterrence, and embolden other cyberattackers. The United States would need to convince others that the Chinese government was behind the attacks. Otherwise, support for U.S. sanctions would be limited, possibly reducing their effectiveness. 

Military Responses

Washington could increase freedom of navigation operations and the U.S. military presence more broadly in the South China Sea. It could help small countries build maritime law enforcement and security capacity and in particular improve the Philippines’ long-term maritime capabilities. The United States could also expand military exercises with countries in the region.

Such a response is clear and well within the capability of the U.S. military and would also convey the United States’ resolve. Washington could announce that its military initiatives were in response to the Chinese cyberattacks. It could also refrain from doing so. Connecting the response to the attack publicly could be more escalatory. However, it would have the advantage of marking a clear response to the Chinese behavior, ideally leading Beijing to reduce or end this activity. Not making the connection public would be less provocative but could signal to potential attackers that cyberattacks such as the one against Nasdaq fall below the threshold for a forthright response. Regardless of whether the United States announces the connection, military steps could escalate Chinese reclamation behavior in the South China Sea. It could also lead to an incident that escalates into military conflict. Moreover, U.S. support could also embolden the smaller countries to push China harder than they would dare to alone.

Print these custom placards for use during your simulation. If you need to edit them, make a copy to your Google Drive.

All National Security Council (NSC) members except the president will write a position memo before the role-play. You can find more details about writing position memos under Student Resources. The president will write a presidential directive after the role-play. More details about that are also under Student Resources.

What is a memorandum?

After the debate and deliberation close, the president will announce his or her decision, to be later finalized in the form of a written presidential directive. If time permits, you will participate in a debrief following the president’s announcement.

Be active in this debrief. The role-play might seem to be the most challenging part of the experience, but the debrief is equally important. It will reinforce what you learned during the role-play exercise and refine your analytical skills. It will also force you to step out of your role and to view the case from a personal perspective. You will have the opportunity to discuss any challenges you encountered as you worked through the discussion with your peers and how you felt about the final presidential decision.

The debrief will close with a reflection on the complexities and challenges of crafting foreign policy. This should help clarify your understanding of what you learned and answer any lingering questions. This exercise will also assist you in completing your final assignment, a written reflection.

The following questions are proposed to guide the discussion in the in-class debrief. This is not an exhaustive list and may vary depending on how your role-play exercise unfolded. If your class or group does not hold a debrief, these questions will nonetheless help you reflect on the role-play and write your policy review memo: 

The written reflection is your final assignment in the simulation. In the debrief discussion after the role-play, you and your peers went beyond the role you played and thought about the issue from a variety of perspectives. Now that the National Security Council discussion and debrief are behind you, you can consider whether you personally support your recommended policy given the full spectrum of arguments and considerations that arose. Shedding your institutional role and writing from a personal point of view, you will craft a policy review memo that outlines and reflects on the policy options discussed, incorporating and critiquing the president’s decision where appropriate.

If you played the role of president in the simulation, your memo should still reflect your personal opinion. You can comment on the course of action you ordered as president, further justify it, write more extensively on the options you dismissed, or suggest and support alternate options.

No matter which role you played originally, take into account all you have learned. Your instructor or facilitator will want to see whether and how your understanding of the issue and of the policymaking process has evolved from that expressed in your position memo.

More details about the written reflection are available under Student Resources.

Essential Resources

Additional Resources

Research and Preparation

Sources

Note: If you are assigned the role of president, you will not write a position memo. Instead, you will write a two-page presidential directive (PD) at the conclusion of the role-play. You will address the PD, which will follow a memo format, to the NSC members and inform them of your final decision regarding the policy option or options to be implemented (see below).

If your teacher has chosen to assign you the role of general advisor to the president, you will not need to write the position memo from a particular institutional position. Instead, you will have the flexibility to approach the issue from your own perspective, incorporating a comprehensive assessment of the crisis into your argument.

Click here to see a sample of a position memo.

The format of the presidential directive is simpler than that of a position memo. A directive contains a record of the policy option or options that the president has chosen as well as the accompanying orders to various parts of the government with details on how to carry out these decisions.

Click here to see a sample presidential directive.

During the simulated NSC meeting, you will meet to debate and discuss U.S. policy options in response to the issues outlined in the case. Consistent with the NSC’s mission to advise the president, you should raise the issues that are most important for the president to consider. This will enable them to make the most informed decision on policy options. Though you may or may not agree with this decision, your responsibility as an NSC member is to provide the best possible analysis and advice from the perspective of your role.

Role-play Guidelines

Guidelines

Click here to see a full example of a written reflection.