Americas

Bolivia

  • Bolivia
    Bolivia’s Power Vacuum: What to Know
    Election fraud allegations have prompted President Evo Morales to resign with no clear successor, plunging Bolivia into political uncertainty.
  • Americas
    Five Things Washington Should Do to Help Latin America Curb Corruption
    This is a guest blog post by Dr. Richard Messick, an anticorruption specialist. It is based on a talk he gave at a CFR roundtable on March 24 hosted by Matthew M. Taylor, adjunct senior fellow for Latin America Studies. One of the most promising developments in U.S. foreign relations is the all-out war on corruption being waged across Latin America. From “Operation Car Wash” in Brazil to investigations of presidential wrongdoing in Bolivia, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, and Panama, across the region independent, tenacious prosecutors and investigators are out to end the massive theft of state resources that for so long has hobbled political development and throttled economic growth. The United States should be cheering for these corruption warriors, for we have much to gain if they succeed. Less corruption translates into more stable, reliable political allies; it means faster, more equitable growth and that means shared prosperity and less northward migration. Finally, less corruption in government will offer U.S. firms new opportunities. Think what the end of corruption in Brazilian public works would mean for U.S. engineering and construction companies. But given the stakes in Latin America’s corruption war, the United States should be doing more than cheering from the sidelines. It should be doing everything it can—without infringing the sovereignty or sensibilities of Latin American neighbors—to see its corruption warriors succeed. Here are five things to start with: Fund the U.S. Department of Justice’s Office of International Affairs (OIA) budget request. If a Latin American investigator learns an official he or she is investigating has a bank account in the United States, the investigator can ask the OIA to obtain the account’s records to see if corrupt money is being parked there. But the office had at latest count more than 11,000 requests pending and was receiving 3,000 plus new ones each year. Unless the investigator gets lucky and the request finds its way to the top of the pile, he or she will be long retired, and the suspect long dead, before the OIA responds. For years the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) has asked Congress, without success, for funds to hire more staff to speed requests. This year it has requested $10 millionto add 97 positions, 54 attorneys, and 43 paralegals and support staff. Isn’t it time Congress said yes to this modest request? Name a single focal point to help Latin American law enforcement agencies. When looking to the United States for assistance, Latin Americans face a bewildering number of agencies, bureaus, and offices: the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the U.S. Secret Service, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), the 92 U.S. Attorney’s offices, and these are just at the federal level. There are hundreds, if not thousands, at the state and local level. It takes experienced U.S. law enforcement officers years to figure out where to go for information. Why not make it easy for Latin Americans who don’t have years to decipher the complex and bewildering U.S. system? Create one office, staffed with personnel fluent in Spanish and Portuguese from across the federal and state governments who can serve as a “one-stop shop” for Latin American police, prosecutors, and judges needing information from their U.S. counterparts. Create an interagency task force to work with Latin American counterparts to target corrupt Latin American officials. Whenever a corrupt Latin American official uses the proceeds of a bribe to buy an apartment in Miami or open a bank account in Houston or Los Angeles, he or she has violated U.S. antimoney laundering laws. Depending upon whether they traveled in the United States, used U.S. mail services, or U.S. email servers, they may have also committed wire fraud or violated the laws forbidding travel across state lines in furtherance of fraud or corruption. A task force of U.S. personnel drawn from ICE’s Foreign Corruption Investigations Group, DOJ’s Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) unit, the U.S. Attorney’s offices in Miami, the FBI’s international corruption squads, DOJ’s kleptocracy unit, and other relevant agencies should be available to work with Latin American counterparts on possible violations of U.S. law committed by corrupt Latin American officials. Greater intelligence sharing and joint investigations in association with Latin American anticorruption agencies and prosecutors would enhance both regional and domestic efforts against corruption and ill-gotten gains. Enact the Incorporation Transparency and Law Enforcement Assistance Act. Introduced by Congresswoman Carolyn Maloney and colleagues in the House of Representatives and Senator Sheldon Whitehouse and colleagues in the Senate, this would end the ability of corrupt officials, as well as drug traffickers and other unsavory individuals, to keep investigators from learning how much money they have and where it came from. Under current law, a corrupt Latin American official can open a bank account in the United States in the name of a Delaware limited liability company. He or she can own the company anonymously, that is, without anyone, in Delaware or elsewhere, knowing his or her identity. If Global Witness’ expose of U.S. lawyers counseling an investigator posing as the agent of a corrupt minister weren’t enough to persuade lawmakers of the need for the legislation, the April 3 revelations of massive abuses in the use of anonymous shell companies by the International Center for Investigative Journalism (ICIJ) should lay to rest any lingering doubts about how critical this legislation is to the fight against not only corruption but terrorism and organized crime as well. End secrecy in the U.S. real estate market. Thanks to gaps in U.S. antimoney laundering regulations, corrupt officials in Latin America (and elsewhere) can use the proceeds of corruption to secretly buy property in the United States. Requiring real estate agents, title insurance companies, and others involved in the purchase and sale of condominiums, houses, and other U.S. real estate to comply with the antimoney laundering rules will expose attempts by corrupt officials to create a “safe haven” for when they leave office. The U.S. Department of the Treasury took a small, first step in this direction in January when it issued an emergency order (in response to a New York Times’ expose) requiring title insurance companies in Manhattan and Miami-Dade Country to apply antimoney laundering rules to all real estate purchases over $1 million in cash for the next six months. The rule should be made permanent and extended to all regions. Since 2002 the Treasury Department has given real estate brokers a “temporary” exemption from the antimoney laundering rules while it studies their situation. The time for study is over. The Treasury Department should follow the European Union’s lead and require brokers to comply with the antimoney laundering rules. The burden of ridding Latin America of the corruption that infests so many of its governments remains first and foremost the responsibility of its governments. But the United States has much to gain if they succeed, and there is much it can do to help them. The steps above are a modest beginning; it should move on them expeditiously. This piece also appeared on the Global Anticorruption Blog.
  • Global
    The World Next Week: October 9, 2014
    Podcast
    Bosnia, Bolivia, and Mozambique hold general elections; the United Nations Security Council holds its elections; and Nigeria tackles the issue of violent extremism.
  • Americas
    This Year’s Presidential Elections in Latin America
    Earlier this week, Salvadorans headed to the polls to cast their ballots in a presidential runoff election, since on February 2 the candidates failed to reach the 50 percent threshold to avoid a second round. In the runoff’s lead up, Salvador Sánchez Cerén, a former guerrilla commander and the current vice president from the ruling party, looked poised for an easy win over his closest opponent Norman Quijano from the conservative Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA). But with the final ballot count separating the candidates by some 0.2 percent of the votes and with allegations of fraud, it seems that the protests and debates surrounding this election are far from over. The Costa Rican elections were also held on February 2 and similarly, were pushed into a run-off scheduled for April 6. With second place finisher Johnny Araya’s (from the ruling National Liberation Party) recent exit from the race, Leftist Luis Guillermo Solís’s (from the Citizens’ Action Party) victory is all but assured. While neither of these two elections are yet resolved, there are others on the horizon in Latin America. On May 4, Panamanians will elect their president for the next five years. Current President Ricardo Martinelli’s time in office is coming to an end, at least for now, given Panama’s restriction that presidents must wait two terms before trying again for office. Though Martinelli and his conservative Democratic Change (CD) party led Panama through a period of extraordinary 8 percent (on average) economic growth and declining crime, the country’s stark income inequality (which I talk about in this blog post) combined with shifting political alliances, could provide headwinds for the party’s candidate José Domingo Arias. On May 25, Colombians will head to the ballot boxes to decide whether or not to reelect President Juan Manuel Santos. As of now, Santos’s odds look fairly good—garnering 26 percent of the vote in a hypothetical “next-day election” scenario; 19 percent more than his nearest rival, Óscar Iván Zuluaga of the Democratic Center party, 18 percent more than Enrique Peñalosa of the Green Alliance party, and far above the more recent entrant to the race, Marta Lucía Ramírez from the Conservative Party. Santos  is staking much of his campaign on the peace agreement with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (even as Colombians become increasingly pessimistic over its success), and he will also face tough questioning over his economic policies and subsequent handling of rural protests (that pushed his approval ratings down to 25 percent last August). Still, his popular support has rebounded—up to near 40 percent in March—and this momentum, without a strong challenger, will likely take him back to the Casa de Nariño. October brings presidential elections in Brazil, Bolivia, and Uruguay. In Brazil, most expect President Dilma Rousseff of the Worker’s Party (PT) to win reelection against Aecio Neves (from the PSBD party) and Eduardo Campos (from the PSB party). Still, with economic growth faltering, worries about the coming World Cup (with latest reports questioning both the sporting event’s expense and the country’s readiness), and still vivid memories of last summer’s widespread protests, a unified challenger could make the race interesting. That same day Bolivians will also be casting their ballots. Evo Morales is up for his third term, after a constitutional amendment in 2009 allowed for reelection and a 2013 constitutional court decision decided that his first term did not count toward the two term limit (since it began before the new Constitution). With twelve parties and a crowded race, no serious challenger has emerged to take on Morales. Still, questions remain whether the president’s Movement for Socialism (MAS) can gain an absolute majority—potentially frustrating any major policy changes. Uruguay’s famously spartan President Jose Mujica will bid goodbye to a presidential palace in which he never lived. The frontrunner for his position is former president and Broad Front colleague Tabaré Vázquez, who left office in 2010 with an approval rating of over 60 percent. A Vázquez victory would mean continuity for the country and a continuation of Mujica’s policies, such as the country’s marijuana regulation and renewable energy promotion.
  • Americas
    Latin American Integration efforts: will they succeed this time?
    With the formation of ALBA, Unasur, IIRSA, and many others, Latin American nations are pushing towards a new era of economic, political, and social integration. But how innovative are these efforts really? Will they differ from the failed attempts of the past? I recently wrote the following article for World Politics Review on the promise and perils of the region’s integration. The Promise and Perils of South American Integration Shannon O’Neil January 12, 2009 World Politics Review In the 21st century so far, regional integration has been one of the most notable elements of South American foreign relations. Picking up speed in recent years, the continent’s heads of state have enthusiastically met in numerous summits, promising increased political, economic, social, and development cooperation. Across the spectrum, governments are expanding current integration frameworks and entering into new agreements. Expectations are no less grand. As Brazil’s President Luis Inacio "Lula" da Silva recently stated, "South America, united, will move the board game of power in the world, not for its own benefit, but for everyone’s." Read the entire article here.
  • Economics
    Visiting Bolivia (part II)
    Everyone in Bolivia is focusing on the shift toward "participatory democracy," from the previous "representative democracy." Some embrace this change enthusiastically, while others view it warily. What is clear is that the traditional political parties have disintegrated here, as they have in many other countries in the Andean region, including Peru, Ecuador, and Venezuela. It is also clear that new political parties are unlikely to arise anytime soon. Due to exclusion and corruption, the old system has been completely discredited. The MAS, which backs Evo Morales, is proud of its alternative organizational framework, based on linking various social movements and associations rather than forming a political party. So where does this leave representation? Bolivia is institutionalizing a cycle which begins with protest marches, followed by negotiations with the government, and then ends in promises/governmental actions. These cycles are not necessarily new, as they played a key role in demand making in recent years. In fact, the inability of the governments of Sanchez de Lozada and Carlos Mesa to fulfill promises made during the negotiation phase led in large part to their downfall. But with the election of Evo Morales, these dynamics have changed in meaning. Rather than arising from the opposition, these protesters and their organizations are now part of the ruling MAS, institutionalizing this protest cycle as the main means of interest intermediation. And, the nature of demands has changed. And rather than focusing on big issues of political and social inclusion, or of national redistribution of resources, these protests tend to focus on specific group or individual needs. For instance, this week the marches in La Paz involved teachers and sellers of used clothes, each wanting an improvement in their own economic situation. This transformation of interest intermediation - due to the decline in political parties - concentrates power in the Executive branch, and in Evo Morales. Other moves by the government - including the undermining of the judiciary - have added to this effect. What Evo does with this power remains to be seen. It may allow him to address historic injustices and issues by bypassing old elite and interest group issues. But, it may also lead to new patronage networks, inefficiency, corruption, and in the end renewed frustration by those wanting to see real change in Bolivia.
  • Americas
    Bolivia visit (part I)
    I am in Bolivia this week. In my meetings so far in La Paz, one common theme is the general support for Evo Morales. While there is significant frustration with the government, interviews with representatives from indigenous groups, from the middle class, from academic institutions and foundations, and with foreign diplomats (not to mention taxi drivers), show a general support for Morales and for his position as President. Almost all see him as genuine, as representative, and as capable of negotiating with the various interests within Bolivia. Instead, people place blame elsewhere. Significant blame is placed on Morales cabinet and on his closest advisors. Many see them as being too radical in some cases, or not radical enough in others (especially on issues of particular interest to each group). They are also blamed for centralizing power. Instead of following through on Evo´s promise of broad participation, many view his closest advisors as making top-down and closed door decisions, much like governments in the past. Some even see the undue influence of foreign advisors, particularly Venezuelan, on government policies. The continued support for Evo, despite the limits on actual policy changes in the first year and half of his government, questions the alarmist views often seen in the press. While frustrations continue, and marches are frequent through the downtown of the capital, there isn´t a sense here (at least in La Paz), of crisis or real unrest. That said, a few people see this as the lull before the storm, which will occur when the real negotiations happen (or more likely don´t happen in their view) within the Constituent Assembly, which is currently scheduled to conclude their process in August.
  • Bolivia
    Bolivia on the Brink
    Overview Three years ago, the Council on Foreign Relations launched a commission to examine U.S. policy in the Andean region and the Colombian conflict. The result, Andes 2020: A New Strategy for the Challenges of Colombia and the Region, outlined a comprehensive new regional policy designed to move toward a better balance of “guns versus butter.” Unfortunately, violence continues to plague the region to this day, most recently in Bolivia, where the controversial actions of President Evo Morales and the organized opposition have increased polarization and the likelihood of sustained social unrest. This new Council Special Report, sponsored by the Council’s Center for Preventive Action, addresses the ongoing social, political, and economic challenges underway in Bolivia and presents a clear set of recommendations for the U.S. government. Bolivia on the Brink, written by Eduardo A. Gamarra, professor and director, Latin American and Caribbean Center, Florida International University, argues that with ethnic, regional, and political tensions in Bolivia on the rise, Washington’s current “wait and see” approach to the Morales government is no longer adequate.  Instead, Gamarra encourages the U.S.government to redirect its policy toward Bolivia with an emphasis on preservation of democratic process and conflict prevention. In order to do so, the report recommends the use of more carrot than stick in the near term, encouraging Washington to continue to work to develop relations with both the Bolivian government and opposition. Gamarra argues that excluding Bolivia from critical U.S. benefits such as trade, military training, and development assistance would only push the Morales government closer to Cuba and Venezuela, feed anti-American sentiment in the region, and increase the likelihood of sociopolitical turmoil. Calling U.S. leverage too limited to unilaterally influence the direction of the Bolivian government, the report also urges Washington to work with regional states to persuade all Bolivian parties to work within the democratic system to address the nation’s many challenges. The result is a valuable contribution to any consideration of U.S. policy in the region, one that merits attention from regional specialists and foreign policy generalists alike. Download the Spanish translation of this report [PDF].
  • Politics and Government
    Why Venezuela and Bolivia aren't leading a region-wide trend
    Venezuela’s President Hugo Chavez and Bolivia’s President Evo Morales are closely linked, and many fear they represent a new trend away from democracy, open markets, and the United States in Latin America. Overlooked are substantial differences between these two countries  and from their Latin American neighbors. What Venezuela and Bolivia do share is the weakness of their political institutions which results in large part from their history with democracy. Democracy emerged in Venezuela in the late 1950s and Bolivia in the early 1980s after elites joined together to form a "pact" that established the rules for the new governments. These pacts brought stable democracy to both countries no easy feat in Latin America. But, these agreements left many policy issues particularly economic issues permanently off the agenda. They also encouraged the development of cartel-like political parties, more interested in staying in power than truly representing their own populations. These dynamics excluded large percentages of the population in both countries from politics. In the face of economic turmoil, these poorer populations searched for someone to represent their interests and found outsider candidates Hugo Chavez and Evo Morales. Their elections ended the cozy arrangements between the traditional political parties  and challenged the rules of the political game. But here is where the outcomes in each country diverge. Due to Venezuela’s oil wealth, Chavez has vast resources to satisfy his heterogeneous political base - creating new schools, health care clinics, affordable housing, and food subsidies. Morales, in contrast, does not have the public resources to provide so abundantly for his supporters. Instead, divisions within his own coalition are emerging, questioning his ability to balance campaign promises with the country’s economic realities. Politically, Chavez has successfully consolidated power retaining control now over the judiciary, the public bureaucracies, and the Congress. In Bolivia, we see a political standoff between the Morales’ political coalition and his opposition. The opposition including the traditional political parties - retains control of several governorships, and for the last six months has stymied any substantive debate within the Constituent Assembly. These political divisions are now leading to social unrest and violence. In short, the battle between these two sides has yet to be won. These separate outcomes in Venezuela and Bolivia are both worrisome for democracy. But since they result from domestic factors, their spread throughout Latin America is unlikely. It shows that to counter these trends, however, we need to pay more attention domestic institutions, and less to the grandstanding of particular political leaders.