The Future of the Israel-Hamas War, With Linda Robinson

LINDSAY:
Welcome to The President's Inbox, a CFR podcast about the foreign policy challenges facing the United States. I'm Jim Lindsay, director of Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. This week's topic is the future of the Israel-Hamas war. 

With me to discuss the diplomatic and political challenges touched off by Hamas's attack on Israel is Linda Robinson, a senior fellow for women in foreign policy here at the Council. Linda is a distinguished author, analyst, and prize-winning foreign correspondent. She wrote for many years for U.S. News and World Report. She has written numerous books, articles, and op-eds, including One Hundred Victories: Special Ops and the Future of American Warfare. Linda was a senior policy researcher at the Rand Corporation from 2013 to 2022, where she also directed the Center for Middle East Public Policy from 2020 to 2022. She has advised the U.S. government in several capacities, most recently as a senior advisor at the U.S. State Department on the U.S. strategy to prevent conflict and promote stability. Linda, thank you for coming on The President's Inbox.

ROBINSON:
Thanks so much, Jim. Happy to be with you.

LINDSAY:
I'd like to begin with what is happening on the ground before we shift to the diplomatic and political aspects of the crisis. Obviously, we're facing a volatile and fluid situation. Things could change before this episode airs. But as of the time we're talking, Linda, Israel has yet to respond with the long talked about ground invasion. Instead, Israel, so far, has limited itself to airstrikes and missile strikes against Gaza. Can you help me understand why the ground invasion has yet to begin?

ROBINSON:
The United States government has been discussing intensively with the Israeli government its view that a pause in the ground operation will allow more time for additional hostage release. The good news, of course, is two Americans were released already, but there are ten Americans still unaccounted for and some of them presumed to be hostages.

LINDSAY:
And many more Israeli hostages.

ROBINSON:
Yes, some two hundred hostages in all. So this is a critical argument in favor of giving this more time, but it's also a way to encourage more deliberate consideration of the way ahead. Because the big picture here is just there are so many risks involved in not just a ground operation but the cascading kind of political fallout we're beginning to see—and, of course, a very dire humanitarian situation—which is, I think, causing, driving now some of the news cycle. And I think the initial efforts are really far short of what's going to be needed to avert a continuing dire loss of civilian life there.

LINDSAY:
Okay. Let's talk about that humanitarian crisis, Linda. I mentioned that Israel has not, so far, launched its ground invasion, but its airstrikes and missile strikes on Gaza have been significant. Israel also has, in essence, closed the borders to Gaza. Now, in the last day or two, there have been some relief supplies coming from Egypt into Gaza, but we're talking about dozens of trucks for a population of two million. So sort of talk me through the humanitarian aspect of the crisis that's now unfolding.

ROBINSON:
Yes. So first, let's go to the current estimated casualties, or claimed casualties. As of day sixteen, they're up to five thousand Gazans dead, fifteen thousand wounded, and those reports have been verified, in part, by UN officials. Sixty some percent of those are women and children. And one point four million Gazans have been displaced. Israel, of course, has called for Gazans to evacuate from the north of Gaza into the south, but there isn't enough food, fuel, water, medicine for these people. And the critical issue, there has been one pipeline that runs from Israel that has been reopened. There have been, as you say, two convoys of trucks going in, but that's just four percent of what used to come across the borders to help support the Gaza population. Right now, I would say fuel is the critical issue because Israel is unwilling to allow fuel to come in because it can be repurposed by Hamas for its war purposes. But it's critical to power the generators of the hospitals, and also to power the desalination plants, which is really necessary to provide adequate clean water.

LINDSAY:
So is the Israeli siege, border closure, sustainable for weeks and months? Or do you think international pressure, American pressure, whether overt or behind the scenes, going to be sufficient to force the Israelis to change course?

ROBINSON:
So the Secretary of State, Tony Blinken, spoke on the Sunday news show on October 22nd to say, "We are not going to dictate a course of action; we support Israel's right to defend itself." But there is, I think, a lot of intensive background talk about the consequences of a full fledged and prolonged ground invasion and just as you're asking about the humanitarian toll. It's dire now. It is going to go up dramatically. And you're already seeing there was, in Cairo, a gathering of King Abdullah of Jordan, Egyptian President al-Sisi, and Iraq's al-Sudani. They all denounced the idea of a ground invasion. So there's intensive pressure growing. And ultimately, I think Israel, of course, is going to have to take into account some of this worldwide reaction. And that means, I think, ensuring a greater flow of the humanitarian aid, but maybe also beginning to reconsider some of the magnitude of the ground operation.

And I think this might be a good moment to really go into how difficult this is going to be and what the consequences will be. And my talking point here has been there's really no clear path to a military victory here. There've been any number of officials saying, "We're going to root out Hamas. We're going to excise Hamas. We're going to defeat this political military organization." But I think in practice, this is going to prove extremely difficult.

LINDSAY:
Why do you say that, Linda? And I should note, you spent a fair number of years covering U.S. operations in the so-called "Global War on Terror." I know you've written about special ops. So sort help me understand why an Israeli ground incursion or invasion into Gaza won't break Hamas.

ROBINSON:
Yes, there are two facets of this. There's the military difficulty. I'll just summarize briefly that this small pouch of land is really honeycombed with three hundred miles of tunnels, some of them very deep, very hard to reach through the bombing campaign. There are mouse holes cut in between these buildings. Mouse holes are the way fighters can move around without being seen from the air. And this was seen... As you mentioned, I've been covering many of these wars over the years. And just to take Mosul in Iraq, this was extensively the way the Islamic state, the ISIS fighters, moved around. And that was also a densely built and densely inhabited area.

LINDSAY:
And I would imagine urban street fighting negates many of the advantages of superior technology because things simply don't work inside a building, inside tunnels, underground the way they might work on an open field of battle.

ROBINSON:
Absolutely. That connectivity issue, especially in these deep tunnels, is going to be huge. And this, of course, is where many of these hostages are deemed to be hidden and precisely to cause that collateral damage and cause the deaths. Even if they're not executed, they can be inadvertently killed because they will be blind, even if they're sending robots in to try to do the surveillance. So the technical difficulties here cannot be overstated. But there is also the aspect that this is an organization that's deeply entwined, not just physically embedded with the population, but it's a political, military, social organization.

And the other dynamic that comes into play here that I think really needs to be understood is what the U.S. military adopted this saying called "COIN math," counterinsurgency math. And what that phrase means is you kill one fighter, you have now made enemies of his entire family and clan. So that this idea of decapitating or eradicating, or just killing the military part of this—by those actions, you are really just creating an engine for further recruits and people coming into the fight that were not before. As far as how we have succeeded, the U.S., with its Iraqi and Syrian partners, succeeded, ultimately, in a military campaign in Iraq and Syria against ISIS was really heavily dependent on the partner force. So to go in and establish presence and security and stability, that requires people on the ground. And the Israelis are not going to be able to perform that function within the Palestinian population of Gaza and, certainly, we've seen also in the West Bank. So there is no partner force in Gaza. And that is why, ultimately, I say there is no military solution. They can go in and kill a lot of people and cause a lot of damage, but the nightmare scenario is they simply have propagated a new wave of resistance. And that would be so tragic, to have a bloody, bloody war, many casualties on both sides, and not come out of it with anything approximating a way ahead.

LINDSAY:
I want to pursue that line of inquiry in a moment, Linda, but first, I want to shift the geographical focus and talk about Israel's northern border. There has been a lot of talk about a potential second front involving Hezbollah, a separate organization based in Lebanon, and that Israel, by going into Gaza, the sort of manpower, womanpower it's going to take to do that is going to weaken Israel's defenses on the north, making it a more tempting target for Hezbollah, which I should note has tens of thousands of rockets and missiles. My understanding is that those rockets and missiles are more sophisticated than anything Gaza has launched against Israel, raising fears that Israel's defensive system, the Iron Dome system, simply will be overwhelmed by attacks from Hezbollah. Give me your assessment of whether this concern about a northern front is real or whether it's the case that Hezbollah is more likely to bark than to bite, because Hezbollah did fight a war fifteen years ago, seventeen years ago with Israel that came out very badly for Hezbollah.

ROBINSON:
Yes, I agree. This is really the... However dire the situation we just talked about and the prospects of a ground war in Gaza, another front, a two front war, is an enormously more dire scenario. The extreme risk is this scenario. And I would note both Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin and Secretary of State Blinken have been signaling what they view as significant chance of this escalation. And so, everyone should be quite concerned about this really catastrophic scenario. And it is, as you say, because Lebanese Hezbollah is not only much better armed... And the estimates, I believe, that are used are one hundred fifty thousand rockets, which are-

LINDSAY:
That's the number I've heard.

ROBINSON:
... much more advanced. And the second point is, Hezbollah is now very experienced. They fought a lot of the ground war in Syria, and frankly, they have more experience in ground warfare than the Israeli forces at this point in time. And I would also note, the 2006 war—the Second Lebanon War, as it's called—between Israel and Lebanese Hezbollah went very poorly, was very catastrophic for the Israelis to not come away achieving their military objectives. And so what's happening now is there have been exchanges of fire, missile strikes by both sides across the border.

And what I'm concerned about are some reports that the Israeli defense minister, Yoav Gallant, has been actually in favor of trying to wipe out Lebanese Hezbollah as well. And if that is the case, and you've got a major figure within the war cabinet arguing that it is better to go for broke, as it were, I think we're on a dangerous course. But I do read that Netanyahu, Prime Minister Netanyahu, is not in favor of a two front war, and all the signals are the U.S. officials are trying to argue against that. But, that's only one side of the equation, of course. And it's not only decisions made by Lebanese Hezbollah. It is decisions made by Iran, it's closest partner.

LINDSAY:
I was just about to ask you about decision making in Tehran.

ROBINSON:
Yes. So that is, I think, really the risk that is growing. And I would say, we must note that, already, escalation is occurring. These are actions taken by Iran activating its proxies around the region. You've already had Iranian proxy groups launch attacks, with minor consequence right now, but against U.S. forces. There are 2,500 U.S. troops in Iraq, 900 in Syria. And in recent days, attacks by those proxy forces have been launched. And Yemen has also launched rockets which were intercepted by the U.S. battleships. The two carrier groups that are now in the Mediterranean, they have shot down those rockets.

LINDSAY:
This is the U.S.S Carney?

ROBINSON:
The U.S.S Carney is one of them, yes, but we have two full carrier battle groups, plus a marine amphibious task force.

LINDSAY:
Yes. So we have the U.S.S. Gerald Ford and the U.S.S. Dwight D. Eisenhower ordered by President Biden to head to the region, which leads to the question, Linda, is the United States at risk of being drawn into this conflict or joining the conflict?

ROBINSON:
Yes. I'm very concerned that it is on a path whereby, certainly if Iran were to become directly involved, that would drag the U.S. in. It is also a consequence of the really strong statements of support that the administration has made. I don't say unwarranted, but it is a consequence of pledging unequivocal support for Israel that if things begin to go badly and it appears that Israel is not able to achieve its objectives or there is some catastrophic failure, that could bring the U.S. in. There also are... And technically the statements given about the marine, it's the Marine Expeditionary Unit afloat with this amphibious task force, those forces ... It's four thousand in all; two thousand would be kind of the rescue force. And what their planned use right now is simply emergency evacuations that might need to take place in any of these countries. But that is ... And unfortunately, that could be read as an escalatory signal by the others, Iran and others, in the region. And so I do think there are scenarios by which the U.S. could be dragged in.

LINDSAY:
Is that a fair phrase, "dragged in," or "choose to enter"?

ROBINSON:
I think if you were to ask any of our principals or President Biden, he would say, absolutely, there's no scenario for the U.S. to become involved in combat operations. His entire administration's claim for the Middle East is to have ended the long wars, to make a pivot to the geopolitical competition with Russia and China.

LINDSAY:
The third president I can recall pledging to do that, and for some reason, the Middle East keeps calling America back.

ROBINSON:
Yes. So this leads us then, really, I think, considering all of these risks and the fact that it's not just the Arab world, but certainly key partners in the Middle East where the U.S. had been, for example, brokering a normalization accord between Saudi Arabia and Israel, the entire diplomatic project of the Biden administration, and the attempt to move the region from a state of war to a state of peace, and the many, many benefits that will flow for everyone for those ... It will just see its entire policy go up in flames if this scenario comes to pass. I mean, Sisi made a very strong statement in Cairo at the summit.

LINDSAY:
The president of Egypt.

ROBINSON:
The president, Sisi, he said, "We could see the Arab-Israeli piece, that essential foundational block, go up in smoke." And I paraphrase. That's not his exact words. But he literally stated that this could cause the collapse of that foundation.

LINDSAY:
Well the so-called Arab Street has always been in a different place than the Arab elites that have been solely moving toward reconciliation with Israel.

ROBINSON:
Yes, that is certainly true. Normalization hasn't been a popular policy with the Arab populations, even as Arab governments have moved sequentially to normalize with Israel. I would say it has more popularity in the United Arab Emirates than anywhere, but that's a tiny population, as you know. But I think what is concerning here was, first, the cancellation of the summit meeting with President Biden when he went to the Middle East. That was happening while he was on the plane. And it was not only an embarrassing collapse, but it removed the opportunity to begin speaking seriously about the political track and the diplomatic track that must be activated while this war is going on.

LINDSAY:
I will note, Linda, that that decision by King Abdullah also created a lot of anger here in the United States, a number of people pointing out the United States provides ample foreign aid to Jordan and took it as an offense that the king of Jordan would not meet with the President of the United States. But I want to talk about this issue of where we go from here, sort of where the diplomacy may take us. But I want you to help me understand what seems to be a strategic dilemma for the government of Israel. Israel was attacked. It was heinous attack. Everyone agrees that it was horrible. But as you describe it, Israel's in a position in which it legitimately wants to reestablish deterrence with Hamas, at a minimum, or cripple Hamas as a military organization as the ideal goal, but that doing so is likely to erode the political and diplomatic support it has from other governments, particularly, I think, in Western Europe. And there is the question of the challenges it faces or poses for the United States government.

How does Israel square that circle, given... I have to imagine for Israelis, having lived through their 9/11—in many ways worse than 9/11, given the much smaller size of the Israeli population and the death toll—the notion that Israel should sort of stand down is going to be very tough to swallow.

ROBINSON:
Yes, I think that it is unrealistic to expect with hundreds of tanks lined up, armored vehicles lined up ready to go into Gaza, repeated statements that that would happen, I think that it's unlikely that the Netanyahu government would back down. I think it's really a question of the breadth and duration of this ground operation. But I think what has happened ... And I think that the U.S. administration, the calculus was perhaps not erroneous to give full-throated support to Israel while talking behind the scenes to try to say, "Okay, let's talk about the end game and where this is going, how you achieve the objectives." 

The world read unstinting support in those public statements. And I think that, coupled with the humanitarian fallout we're seeing, has created not just great opposition and anger in the Middle East, but Europe and other ... Around the world, I think there are concerns being expressed. And I think Israel has to maybe trim the scope of the military operation. They have, of course, they've been very experienced at decapitation. They've coined all the key phrases: mowing the grass. They ... last year when Palestinian Islamic Jihad ... The leader was captured in the West Bank. They set off rockets. Israel quickly went in and targeted and killed the leaders of the northern and southern Gaza, commanders of Palestinian Islamic jihad. Harder to find the Hamas leaders.

LINDSAY:
That's a more retail strategy, if I could use that term.

ROBINSON:
Right. And they call it "mow the grass," right? So mow the grass means go and get the leaders that you can find, inflict some punishing blows on their war infrastructure. But the magnitude of the atrocities and the war crimes perpetrated against Israel has really generated a lot of, not just emotion, but kind of a moral demand for a larger operation. The problem is, I think, as it becomes clear that that larger operation is going to cause diplomatic fallout around the world, it is going to cause enormous casualties, and most importantly, the military objectives may not be seen to be achieved. So there will come a point that they have got to make a strategic decision about how much is enough. And my view is that if the world begins discussing the political and diplomatic track and, as has been said, appoint a UN envoy ... The U.S. position has been for years support for a two-state solution. But in recognition of the fact that there's been no real appetite for that, they have not pursued any measures to get that back on track.

And I think the magnitude of this crisis suggests that the political way ahead is really the only way ahead, and to begin to talk about that. And it will mean not Hamas at the table but the recognized party, the Palestinian Authority, and that implies that a sequence of steps that need to be discussed and undertaken. But at least to begin discussing that, I think, would be a useful compliment to what is going on right now, which is much more a bandaid approach.

LINDSAY:
Linda, I understand the call for a two-state solution. I understand its appeal. But I'm left wondering how feasible it is. And not simply because of the issues of ripeness and the rest of it. But from an Israeli point of view, Hamas has clearly signaled that it is not interested in striking a deal with Israel. It's opposed to Israel's existence. You say that Israel should sit down with other Palestinian groups. Well, number one, I think Hamas, even if it is badly wounded by Israeli reprisals that are happening now and likely to continue, is still going to exist in some shape or form and is going to continue to oppose those diplomatic efforts. And then there's the real question as to what extent the Palestinian authority is in a position to make concessions or agree to a deal.

And then you have the very reality of Israeli domestic politics and the political power of Israeli settlers. Number of people I talk to are quite skeptical that you can sort of square that circle, that there is going to be difficult, great difficulty in sort of bringing the parties together. It's not just a matter that some outsider can draw a map and say this is how it should look, but getting all of the parties, including the Israelis, to agree to it. How do you react to what I just described and, I think, sort of a more general sense of pessimism that the two-state solution is still feasible as an option?

ROBINSON:
Yes. We're at the vanishing point, I think, where if some of the key settlements planned, the E1 block in particular, is in fact built, that will make it physically impossible to have a contiguous Palestinian state. So I don't deny that any of the difficulties that you have outlined, and that is in fact why it's become commonplace to say there is no, not only no appetite, but no clear path forward for that. And I just have to say the reason why a number of us are beginning to say this at this juncture is it's the only way out unless you are going to permanently consign this conflict between these peoples to just actually permanent war or the extinguishing of or a mass displacement. As you know, we had, in the Trump administration, many sort of blithe statements about, "There's a Palestinian state, it's Jordan," you know, all kinds of things like this.

LINDSAY:
Why do you think that statement is wrong? I think it's important to put that on the table.

ROBINSON:
Well, Jordan, as you mentioned, is the recipient of a lot of aid from the U.S., but it's also been one of our longest partners across the board in many respects and considered an ally. And that is something that's just anathema to them, and it would... Just as Lebanon is reeling from the refugee populations, you know, it would just really upend the Arab world in practical and political ways. 

I think what I'd like to just outline here briefly is this is a long road. It's not an easy road. We fought many over these last twenty years—aspirational wars of nation building, Iraq, Afghanistan. I think that talking about aspirational peace building is not out of place when we have seen how the military path has really not led us to any kind of lasting solutions. Now, there is certainly a very strong contingent of the Israeli population that endorses annexation, and that is Netanyahu's answer.

LINDSAY:
Well, let's talk about it, because you've spent a fair amount of time in Israel in recent years. You've gotten a lay of the land. Again, do you see the ground, the fertile ground, in which you could pursue a two-state solution, particularly after this attack, which again, I think has to have cut a deep wound in the Israeli public?

ROBINSON:
Yes. I just would say the path that is before Israel is endless war if they don't consider other options. And I was there working intensively in 2020, 2021 into July, 2022 was my last visit. And it included discussions not only with senior Israeli officials but Prime Minister Shtayyeh of the Palestinian Authority and all of the chiefs of the Palestinian security forces, and they just felt completely hamstrung in their ability to conduct their activities. The Israeli Defense Forces have come in repeatedly in incursions, often with no notice, into what's called Area C, the largest part of the occupied territories. The ability of the Palestinian Authority to do its job ... And I do not deny, having not had elections, Mahmoud Abbas holding on, the disaster of that government is something that would have to be dealt with.

But there has been a delegitimation of the Palestinians' efforts to govern and secure their own territory. And Israeli settler violence is enormous. The attacks by Israeli settlers have reached record highs. The area, not just in settlements, but the settlement regional councils now have purview over 42 percent of the West Bank. So what we've had is creeping annexation and an undermining of the two-state solution blueprint without anyone official saying it's dead. But I think that you have to walk this back step by step. And it is going to be difficult. And it may not come until there's just a horrific war with an inconclusive outcome. It is just simply by analysis of the alternative paths that one arrives at this is the only way to find coexistent between these two peoples unless you're willing to countenance the complete removal or extinction of one of the parties.

LINDSAY:
Well, I certainly hope we can avoid a catastrophic war in the way you discuss, to sort of force everyone to recalculate. The more desirable way is to find some diplomatic process to get people to recalibrate. So let me just ask you one final question, Linda. Do you think the United States, the Biden administration, is in a position in which it can push Israel to rethink its approach to the two-state solution? I think you're quite right about the notion of creeping annexation. And if the United States can do that, is now the time to do it?

ROBINSON:
It is certainly not something that was on the Biden administration's agenda, far from it. This was made quite clear, actually, in Blinken's confirmation testimony, that this was not an option they were pursuing. But I think in light of what is potentially the worst war that Israel's engaged in, and the region, potentially, if any of these escalation scenarios do play out, I think that it is... You know, President Biden is very committed, deeply committed to Israel. And I think seeing the country descend into the type of war that it's about to descend into could galvanize him to reach out and seek a very prominent individual to try to raise these questions again about, what is the political end game? And what kind of diplomacy is needed to try to begin a very difficult process? But without that, I'm afraid the fallout from this war is going to be catastrophic for the administration and the opportunity costs where many of its foreign policy objectives are not going to be achieved because we're going to see, day in and day out, this is going to suck the time of the top officials.

LINDSAY:
On that note, I'll close up The President's Inbox for this week. My guest has been Linda Robinson, a senior fellow for women in foreign policy here at the Council on Foreign Relations. Linda, thank you for joining me.

ROBINSON:
Thank you, Jim.

LINDSAY:
Please subscribe to The President's Inbox on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or wherever you listen, and leave us a review. We love the feedback. If you want to share your thoughts with me on this or other episodes of The President's Inbox, please email me at [email protected]. That's [email protected]. The publications mentioned this episode and a transcript is available on the podcast page for The President's Inbox on CFR.org. As always, opinions expressed in The President's Inbox are solely those are the hosts or our guests, not of CFR, which takes no institutional positions on matters of policy. 

Today's episode was produced by Ester Fang, with Director of Podcasting Gabrielle Sierra. Special thanks go out to Michelle Kurilla. This is Jim Lindsay. Thanks for listening.