Accession Number 73-3193

Best Decision

6

Creation of NATO

Scroll to begin

Introduction

For much of its history, the United States shunned what Thomas Jefferson in his first inaugural address called “entangling alliances” with other countries. This meant, above all, standing apart from the political affairs of Europe. The United States broke with that tradition when it entered World War I, though President Woodrow Wilson insisted that the United States fought beside France and Great Britain as an “associated power” and not an allied one. After the war ended, the United States again turned its back on Europe. That pattern looked set to repeat when Germany surrendered at the end of World War II. However, Soviet efforts to dominate Europe changed U.S. calculations. Rather than returning home, the United States committed itself to the defense of Europe with the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). It became the most successful military alliance in history, deterring the Soviet Union and ushering in what has been called the “Long Peace” in Europe. SHAFR historians ranked the creation of NATO as the sixth-best U.S. foreign policy decision.

Return to Normalcy

The United States entered World War II reluctantly, and only after the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. By that point, Europe had been at war for more than two years. Not surprisingly, once the war ended, most Americans expected things to return to a prewar normal. They supported the effort President Franklin D. Roosevelt had initiated and President Harry S. Truman concluded to create the United Nations, but they expected the United Nations to ensure peace and save the United States from going to war again. Americans did not expect to make a long-term commitment to the defense of Europe.

Truman initially fulfilled the public’s expectations. After the war’s end, he approved a rapid demobilization of U.S. military forces. The United States had 12 million men in uniform in 1945, 3 million a year later, and only 1.5 million by mid-1947. None of the other victorious powers reduced their military forces as much or as quickly. The United States once again looked to be returning to a limited view of its national interests. Events in Europe, however, fundamentally changed how Washington, and the country more broadly, thought about its role in the world.

US troops returning home aboard the USS General Harry Taylor in August 1945

U.S. troops returning home aboard the USS General Harry Taylor, August 1945. Courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration.

The Iron Curtain Descends

The United States won the war in Europe with the help of the Soviet Union. The Soviets began World War II allied with Nazi Germany. However, in June 1941, more than five months before the United States entered the war, Adolf Hitler ordered German forces to attack the Soviet Union. That led the so-called Big Three—Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States—to work together to defeat Germany.

The cooperation that won World War II ended almost as soon as the war did. Soviet leader Joseph Stalin moved quickly to establish Soviet influence over Eastern Europe. In February 1946, less than a year after Germany surrendered, U.S. diplomat George Kennan sent a cable from Moscow known as the “Long Telegram.” It argued that “the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.” Just weeks later, former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill used a commencement address at tiny Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri, to warn that “from Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the Continent.”

George Kennan’s “Long Telegram,” February 22, 1946. Courtesy of the Truman Library.

Winston Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” Speech, March 5, 1946

The Truman Doctrine

Kennan’s cable remained unknown to the American public. Churchill’s speech, however, triggered a backlash; newspapers across the United States criticized him for antagonizing Moscow. But Kennan’s and Churchill’s assessments proved prophetic. Moscow blocked free and fair elections in eastern Europe. Soviet support for a civil war in Greece prompted Truman to tell a joint session of Congress in March 1947 that “it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.”

The Truman Doctrine, as it came to be known, marked a major change in U.S. foreign policy as the United States for the first time in its history embraced the role of global defender of democracy against communism. Truman’s words, however, did not change Soviet behavior. In February 1948, Moscow engineered a coup that ousted Czechoslovakia’s democratically elected government and brought the Communist party to power. Four months later, the Soviet Union blockaded West Berlin. Only a round-the-clock airlift that lasted for more than a year prevented the city’s collapse.

A U.S. C-64 Skymaster plane lands at Templehof airport in West Berlin to deliver aid supplies during the Soviet Union's blockade of Berlin, 1948. Curtesy of the Library of Congress.

Toward Collective Security

Growing Soviet domination of Eastern Europe alarmed Western European capitals as well as Washington and prompted the first moves toward collective security. In March 1948, Belgium, France, Great Britain, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands signed the Treaty of Brussels, pledging to defend each other if they were attacked. While the United States was not a party to the treaty, it had encouraged the five countries to join forces. As with the Marshall Plan, which Congress approved that same month, the Truman administration saw European cooperation and collective action as critical to facing down the Soviet threat.

The military significance of the Treaty of Brussels was modest. All five countries were struggling to recover from the devastation of World War II, and their military forces were depleted and incapable of matching the Soviet Red Army. Western Europeans wanted a U.S. security guarantee, and they pressed Washington for a regional alliance. They knew, however, that military alliances were anathema to many Americans.

The signing ceremony for the Treaty of Brussels, March 17, 1948. Courtesy of the National Archive of the Netherlands.

The Vandenberg Resolution

After the signing of the Treaty of Brussels, Truman administration officials consulted extensively with the Republican congressional leadership in a bid to build bipartisan support for helping preserve Western Europe’s security. Their main partner was Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, the chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. During the 1930s, Vandenberg had championed neutrality laws designed to keep the United States out of war in Europe, and he opposed what he saw as Roosevelt’s efforts to entangle the United States in the continent’s affairs. But World War II changed Vandenberg’s mind. In January 1945, he gave a major speech urging the country to embrace internationalism and strong presidential leadership in foreign policy.

Vandenberg introduced a Senate resolution based on his discussions with administration officials. It called for “the Association of the United States, by constitutional process, with such regional and other collective arrangements as are based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid.” The phrase “by constitutional process” was critical. It assured senators that they, not the president, would have the ultimate say over any collective-defense agreement. The Senate endorsed the Vandenberg Resolution on June 11, 1948, by a vote of 64 to 6. The door was open to what had once been unthinkable—a lasting U.S. military alliance.

sen

Senator Arthur Vandenberg. Courtesy of the United States Senate Historical Office.

Negotiating the North Atlantic Treaty

With domestic backing in hand, U.S. diplomats began negotiating a collective security agreement with Canada and ten European countries. The negotiators confronted multiple issues, but two stood out. One was whether a treaty’s mutual defense guarantee would extend beyond North America and Europe, and specifically, to the overseas colonies that Britain, France, and several other European countries maintained. The other was whether the United States would automatically come to the defense of other treaty members should they be attacked.

Article 5 of what became the NATO Treaty answered both questions. It holds that all “Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.” That formulation excluded overseas colonies. Article 5 also says that in the event of an attack on any treaty country or countries, each treaty signatory is empowered to take “such action as it deems necessary.” No country was committed automatically to going to war. Article 11 provided that the parties to the treaty would carry out its provisions “in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.”

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

Artivle V of the NATO Charter

Treaty Signing and Ratification

On April 4, 1949, representatives of the United States, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and the United Kingdom met in Washington, DC, to sign the North Atlantic Treaty. Truman hailed it for creating “a shield against aggression and the fear of aggression.”

The U.S. Senate began consideration of the North Atlantic Treaty in July 1949. Thirteen days of sometimes bitter debate followed. Senator Robert H. Taft of Ohio, the leader of the isolationist wing of the Republican Party, pushed to limit the United States’ obligations under the treaty. Large majorities rejected his efforts. On July 21, the Senate approved the treaty by a vote of 82 to 13. The other treaty signatories completed their ratification procedures by August 24. At that point, the North Atlantic Treaty formally entered into force and NATO was established.

Signing Ceremony of the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington, DC, April 4, 1949.

The Legacy of the Creation of NATO

NATO became the most successful defensive military alliance in history. It deterred a Soviet military attack on Western Europe and ushered in what has been called the Long Peace in Europe. Just as important, in combination with the Marshall Plan, it fostered a stable democratic order in Western Europe, blunted the resurgence of militant nationalism, and facilitated European economic integration that advanced economic prosperity on both sides of the Atlantic. The alliance also deepened U.S.-European cooperation on a range of fronts and enhanced U.S. global leadership. In the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO membership helped stabilize and democratize post-Communist Europe. NATO today has thirty-two member countries, and it remains a pillar of U.S. foreign policy.

NATO was created to keep the Soviet Union out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.

Lord Ismay, the first secretary-general of NATO, 1949

National Security Archive, GWU

Learn More

Primary documents, books, articles, and more on the creation of NATO.

Primary Documents

Books

Articles

Lectures and Podcasts

Documentaries and Short Videos