Best Decision

9

Monroe Doctrine

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Introduction

On December 2, 1823, President James Monroe delivered in writing his seventh annual address to Congress—the equivalent of today’s State of the Union address. In the middle of an otherwise forgettable summary of national issues, Monroe presented what would become a classic statement of U.S. foreign policy—the Monroe Doctrine. Monroe asserted that the Western Hemisphere was off limits to further European colonization and claimed the right for the United States to protect the sovereignty of the independent republics in the Western Hemisphere. Both claims were bold statements that the country had no way of backing up. But these bluffs were based on a shrewd diplomatic analysis that signaled to the world the far-reaching ambitions of the young country. SHAFR historians ranked the Monroe Doctrine as the ninth-best U.S. foreign policy decision.

Independence in Latin America

A revolutionary fervor swept Latin America between 1810 and 1823. The Napoleonic Wars in Europe had weakened Spain’s control over its colonies in the region, and fifteen countries declared their independence. Americans cheered these revolutions, seeing them as vindicating their break with Great Britain. (The United States was slow, however, to recognize the new governments, partly because it was negotiating with Spain over their competing claims to the land west of the Mississippi River.) Latin American independence also created economic possibilities for the United States. Ports that Spain had kept closed to American (and British) merchants were suddenly open to trade.

The question was whether the new countries in Latin America could keep their independence. Following Napoleon’s final defeat in 1815, conservative monarchies dominated Europe. They sought to restore pre-war borders on the continent and to crush revolutionary movements. In 1822, France invaded Spain and returned its deposed monarch to the throne. Talk grew that France would next attempt to reclaim Spain’s colonies in the New World, either for Madrid or for itself.

A map in Dixon Ryan Fox’s Harper’s Atlas of American History showing the newly independent countries in Latin America in 1823. Courtesy of the Collection of Roy Winkelman.

A British Offer

Great Britain viewed French ambitions with alarm. French control of Spain’s former colonies would strengthen France’s economy and make it a more formidable rival. At the same time, the collapse of Spanish rule in Latin America had given British merchants access to new trade markets. Those commercial opportunities could be at risk.

Seeking to blunt the French challenge, the British foreign secretary, George Canning, turned to the United States. Although Britain and the United States had fought a war just eight years earlier, Canning knew that both countries had an interest in preventing the recolonization of Latin America. He also calculated that a joint diplomatic effort would improve relations with the United States, which was one of the largest markets for British goods. In August 1823, Canning put his proposal to Richard Rush, the U.S. minister in London: Britain and the United States should issue a joint declaration opposing further European intervention in the Americas. Rush forwarded the offer to Washington.

Monroe Consults His Mentors

Monroe initially leaned toward accepting the British offer. He thought that the French threat to the Americas was real and would endanger U.S. security. He also worried about Russian designs on the Pacific Northwest, where both Britain and the United States had claims. Two years earlier, the czar had declared that present-day Alaska and the lands running south of it to the fifty-first parallel belonged to Russia.

Monroe consulted his two political mentors, former presidents Thomas Jefferson and James Madison. Both urged him to work with Britain, with Jefferson calling the decision “the most momentous which has ever been offered to my contemplation since that of independence.”  They knew that the United States lacked the means to prevent European intrusions in the Americas. However, they calculated that an informal alliance with Britain would make the United States more secure—no European power would dare challenge the British navy, which was by far the most formidable in the world.

White House Historical Association (White House Collection)

President James Monroe. Courtesy of the White House Historical Association.

John Quincy Adams Objects

Monroe informed his cabinet that he planned to accept Canning’s offer. Secretary of State John Quincy Adams immediately objected. He argued that any joint declaration would be a mistake, and instead recommended that the United States issue its own, unilateral declaration. Adams staked out his position even though he knew that the United States could not back up its words with deeds. As he put it, the United States would be better off acting alone than “to come in as a cockboat in the wake of the British man-of-war.”

Adams’s recommendation rested on three hard-nosed geopolitical calculations. First, France lacked the ability to retake Spain’s former colonies. (Unbeknownst to Adams, the French government had just reached the same conclusion.) Because European intervention was unlikely, any U.S. action would be symbolic with no practical downside. Second, if any European power called the United States’ bluff, Britain would come to its aid. London had too much at stake in Latin America to let France or any other European power reestablish colonial rule. Third, a joint declaration would not help the United States. Great Britain would get all the credit; Britain, not the United States, was the great power.

The Birth of the Monroe Doctrine, 1823. Courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration.

Monroe’s Doctrine

Adams’s arguments won the day. Monroe chose to communicate the new U.S. policy in his December 1823 annual message to Congress. Using language drafted by Adams, Monroe announced three principles for U.S. foreign policy. First, the Americas “are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers.” Second, the United States would not interfere “with the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power.” In other words, the United States would not contest Spain’s remaining colonies or Great Britain’s claim to Canada. However, the United States would regard any European effort to reimpose colonial rule or to interfere in the newly independent countries of the Americas “as dangerous to our peace and safety” and as “the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States.”

Third, Monroe pledged a policy of non-interference in the affairs of the Old World: “Our policy in regard to Europe…remains the same, which is, not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers.” This pledge restated what was by then a well-established U.S. diplomatic practice. President George Washington in his Farewell Address, Jefferson in his first inaugural address, and Madison in his 1812 call to Congress to declare war on Britain had all argued that the United States should stand apart from the affairs of Europe.

President James Monroe’s written speech delivered at the commencement of the first session of the 18th Congress, December 2, 1823. Curtesy of the National Archives.

Europe Reacts

Britain took Monroe’s declaration in stride. Canning had already privately communicated to the French government Britain’s opposition to the reestablishment of Spain’s colonies in Latin America. Leaders elsewhere in Europe took less kindly to what they saw as Monroe’s audacity. Austria dismissed his message as “an indecent declaration.” Russia said the U.S. position “merits only the most profound contempt.” But in the end, Adams was right. No European power intervened in Latin America. Although that had everything to do with politics in Europe and nothing to do with Monroe’s words, the Americans could still claim victory.

A political cartoon depicts Uncle Sam as a rooster protecting Latin American countries depicted as free-range chicks from European roosters. Courtesy of the Library of Congress/J.S. Pughe.

The Legacy of the Monroe Doctrine

The Monroe Doctrine had little immediate practical impact. No one called it a “doctrine” until 1852, and it was invoked only intermittently over the course of the nineteenth century in response to European efforts to claim territory or interfere in the politics of the Western Hemisphere. In 1904, President Theodore Roosevelt turned the Monroe Doctrine on its head with the so-called Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, which asserted that the United States had both a right and duty to intervene in Latin America to preserve order and prevent European intervention. Nonetheless, the Monroe Doctrine was a watershed in American diplomacy, contesting Europe’s involvement in the Americas and claiming a leadership role for the United States in protecting the sovereignty of independent countries in the Western Hemisphere. It is a claim that presidents continue to make to this day.

What Historians Say

  • Jared Pack

    Jared Pack

    The Monroe Doctrine is the single most important pronouncement in the history of American foreign policy. It is expansionist, imperialist, and isolationist all at once. It establishes more precedent for action and becomes one of the guiding premises of American foreign policy from 1823 onward.
    Associate Professor and Chair of the Department of History, York University

  • Adam Stone

    The Monroe Doctrine staked a claim on hegemonic status for the United States and helped develop the security it has long held against threats in the Western Hemisphere.
    Associate Professor of Political Science Emeritus, Perimeter College at Georgia State University

  • Emily Conroy-Krutz

    The Monroe Doctrine articulated a vision of what the U.S. role in the world would be, with an emphasis on noninterference unless its own interests were violated. In its own time, this strikes me as a practical resolution to the calls from various parts of the population to take a more active role in various (and competing) concerns abroad.
    Professor of History, Michigan State University
  • Joseph Steib

    Joseph Stieb

    The Monroe Doctrine is arguably the longest-standing and most consistent principle of U.S. national security policy. It enabled the expansion that set the conditions for the U.S. becoming a global power. Its benefits for Central and Latin America were mixed (trading European for U.S. interference/empire), but overall it advanced the decolonization of the Americas and the power of the United States.
    Assistant Professor of History, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hil

National Security Archive, GWU

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