Beijing has tightened its grip on Hong Kong in recent years, dimming hopes that the financial center will ever become a full democracy.
Mar 19, 2024
Beijing has tightened its grip on Hong Kong in recent years, dimming hopes that the financial center will ever become a full democracy.
Mar 19, 2024
  • Technology and Innovation
    Cyber Week in Review: January 19, 2024
    OpenAI and TikTok announce election protection initiatives; Google will change products to comply with EU DMA; Turkey blocks VPNs; CISA releases water system cybersecurity guidance; Chinese hackers attack Ivanti VPNs.
  • Democracy
    Political Hurdles on Ukraine’s Way to EU Membership
    After the 2013–14 Revolution of Dignity, which overthrew a deeply corrupt, Russian-backed regime, Ukraine declared its ambition to integrate into the Euro-Atlantic community of free-market democracies. In 2019, Ukraine amended its constitution to state that its strategic objectives included membership in the European Union (EU) and NATO. Ukraine made little progress in realizing those ambitions before Russia’s massive invasion in February 2022. Since then, however, its path to the European Union has become clearer; in December, the EU agreed to start accession negotiations with Ukraine.  The process will likely prove long and arduous, and the outcome is uncertain, no matter what today’s rhetoric implies. The EU has never conducted negotiations with a country that is engaged in a war of national survival against an enemy like Russia, which looms so large in European security. Kyiv will need considerable time to bring its legislation in line with the acquis communautaire, the hundreds of rules and regulations that constitute EU law on a broad range of socioeconomic and political matters. As negotiations drag on, there is always the danger that some EU members will reconsider their support for Ukraine as they seek to form a durable security system that includes Russia. Particularly challenging for Ukraine will be meeting the criterion that calls for “stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities.” Despite its current self-image as a brave defender of the West’s freedom against Russia’s imperialist aggression, Ukraine has in fact made little progress in consolidating democratic rule since it gained independence in 1991: Freedom House has consistently rated it as only “partly free.”  The ongoing war will only deepen the challenge. As a rule, even well-established democracies restrict civil and political liberties during major wars, especially when national survival is at stake. National security takes precedence. During the Second World War, Franklin D. Roosevelt herded Japanese Americans into internment camps, and in 1940 the United Kingdom skipped parliamentary elections. It should then hardly be surprising that Ukraine, which is in the early stages of nation-building and has weak democratic fundamentals, has taken steps to enhance its security at the expense of democratic freedoms as the war against Russia rages. Two matters are critical markers of its democratic progress: elections and minority rights. Even before Russia’s invasion, Ukraine had passed legislation [in Ukrainian] that prohibited conducting elections in regions under martial law. Since then, the entire country has been subjected to martial law. Consequently, the parliamentary elections due in the fall of 2023 were canceled. Barring the unlikely end of martial law in coming months, the presidential elections, which should take place in March 2024, will suffer a similar fate, despite pressure from some Western supporters to hold them. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has ruled them out, arguing that they would be not only illegal but divisive, when the country needs to be united and focused on repelling Russian aggression. Polls indicate that the overwhelming majority of Ukrainians agree. And no one denies the difficulties in holding elections when millions of Ukrainians are displaced, hundreds of thousands of soldiers are at the front, and Russia occupies one-fifth of the country. The absence of elections may not raise questions about the parliament’s and president’s legitimacy in the short term: Constitutional provisions stipulate that both continue to sit until their successors have been duly elected. Nevertheless, the longer the country goes without elections—which could be quite some time given that the war is currently at an impasse—the more questions about Ukraine’s commitment to democracy will mount, in both Ukraine and the West. Ukraine lacks a long-established set of democratic traditions that would instill greater confidence that at war’s end it will return to a democratic path. Rather, the risk is that the suspension of elections becomes self-perpetuating, with Zelenskyy or  future leaders pointing to a continuing massive Russian threat to justify their actions. The situation with minority rights is more complex, and fraught with even greater consequences for Ukraine’s EU membership. The largest, and most problematic, ethnic minority is the Russians, who accounted for about a sixth of Ukraine’s pre-war population and live mostly in regions now under Russian occupation. Even before Russia’s invasion, Kyiv was promoting Ukrainian language and culture as part of its nation-building process, while also restricting the avenues that Russia could exploit to interfere in Ukraine’s domestic affairs.  In February 2021, for example, Kyiv shut down the Russian-language TV stations of a Ukrainian oligarch, Viktor Medvedchuk, which espoused views that aligned with the Kremlin’s. In December 2018, with strong state support, the autocephalous Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) was created as a national church, with the aim of eroding the influence of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC), which was under the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC). The UOC enjoyed by far the greatest support of all religious communities among the Ukrainian population, but it was seen by the government as an insidious avenue for Russian influence inside Ukraine because of its close ties with the ROC and the Kremlin.   Since the invasion, pressure has only increased on Russian-language media and the UOC. Kyiv banned several political parties because of their allegedly pro-Russian sympathies. One of those parties, the Opposition Party for Life, enjoyed widespread support among ethnic Russians, especially in the country’s southern and eastern provinces, which elected forty-four of its members to the national parliament. Kyiv believed it had credible evidence that Moscow was using these institutions as cover for Russian agents, who assisted the Kremlin’s war effort with intelligence, propaganda, or other kinds of support. Pro-Russian entities were also a ready source of collaborators in occupied territories.    Because of the size of the ethnic Russian community, actions to constrain the influence of political and cultural entities embedded in it have far-reaching consequences for the overall state of political and civic freedoms in Ukraine. Unsurprisingly, Kyiv’s policies have raised concerns among Western observers about media, political, and  religious freedoms in Ukraine.    To be sure, Ukraine’s European ambitions and the EU accession process will create pressure and incentives for Kyiv to pull back from its most egregious infringements on civil and political rights—but only as long as Kyiv believes that it is making progress toward membership and the EU is not making unreasonable demands. This will require a delicate balancing act on the EU’s part. It must maintain its standards, while allowing Ukraine to taste some of the benefits of membership as negotiations progress, even if Ukraine will only get the full benefits after it formally joins.  Kyiv might otherwise lose interest and see little reason to check authoritarian impulses as it seeks to maintain national unity and squeeze out Russian influence as part of its nation-building project. Should EU negotiations drag on, it is not difficult to imagine Ukrainians asking why, while they are making such enormous sacrifices to defend their sovereignty against Russia, they should now delegate some of it to a distant Brussels, as EU membership requires, especially if doing so brings few tangible benefits and erodes barriers against Russian meddling. That would be a bad outcome for both the EU and Ukraine. Avoiding it will require flexibility and creativity in Brussels, and a genuine commitment to democracy as the foundation of nationhood in Kyiv. The effort is more than worthwhile. In the end, a free, democratic, and prosperous Ukraine anchored in the West would mark the final defeat of Russia’s aggression. This publication is part of the Diamonstein-Spielvogel Project on the Future of Democracy.
  • U.S. Foreign Policy Program
    What to Do About Coups
    Nothing may seem more obvious to supporters of democracy than the need to oppose, punish, and deter coups. But defining a coup, let alone reacting sensibly to one, is difficult for many democratic governments. The dictionary definition of a coup is reasonably clear. Merriam Webster’s definition is “a sudden decisive exercise of force in politics and especially the violent overthrow or alteration of an existing government by a small group.” Similarly, Cambridge says a coup is “a sudden illegal, often violent, taking of government power, especially by part of an army.” In practice, however, these definitions are trickier. What Is U.S. Law?  For nearly four decades, U.S. law has required that the U.S. government react to coups by immediately cutting off many forms of foreign assistance. In 1985, a provision of law was adopted saying assistance to the government of El Salvador would be stopped if there were a coup, and in the following year Congress expanded that provision to “any country.” While initially the law referred to “military coups,” the provision was broadened to include any form of “coups d’état” in 2010 and broadened again in 2012 to add any “actions in which the military plays a decisive role.” Today, Section 7008 of the State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs (SFOPS) appropriations legislation reads as follows:  Prohibition.--None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available pursuant to titles III through VI of this Act shall be obligated or expended to finance directly any assistance to the government of any country whose duly elected head of government is deposed by military coup d’etat or decree or, after the date of enactment of this Act, a coup d’etat or decree in which the military plays a decisive role….  Under the statute, assistance would be resumed if and when the secretary of state “certifies and reports to the appropriate congressional committees that subsequent to the termination of assistance a democratically elected government has taken office.”     Applying U.S. Law: Calling a Coup a Coup Has Been a Problem  These laws may seem straightforward but putting them into practice has been difficult. There are occasions when the U.S. government acted with dispatch when coups occurred and cut off aid. The Congressional Research Service [PDF] reported in 2023 that “during the past decade, the provision was temporarily in effect for the following countries: Fiji (2006 coup; lifted after 2014 elections), Madagascar (2009 coup; lifted after 2014 elections), Guinea-Bissau (2012 coup; lifted after 2014 elections), Mali (2012 coup; lifted after 2013 elections), and Thailand (2014 coup, lifted after 2019 elections).” But it also noted that the “coup provision” was not applied in these cases: Honduras in 2009, Niger in 2010, Egypt in 2013, Burkina Faso in 2014, Zimbabwe in 2017, Algeria in 2019, and Chad in 2021.  The old legal saying that “hard cases make bad law” seems to apply to the “hard case” of the 2013 coup in Egypt, where, after a period of public unrest, the military overthrew the democratically elected government of Mohammed Morsi. Egypt was suspended from the African Union, which has an anti-coup regulation. The European Union (EU) and France immediately labeled the action a coup. But the United States, which unlike the EU and France actually has a law on the books requiring suspension of aid when there is a coup, nevertheless did not join them. As one news story put it at the time, “U.S. Ducks Decision on Egypt Coup.”   That story quotes State Department Press Secretary Jen Psaki explaining that “the law does not require us to make a formal determination...as to whether a coup took place, and it is not in our national interest to make such a determination.” She also said, when questioned about why the Obama administration was not using the term “coup,” that “each circumstance is different. You can’t compare what’s happening in Egypt with what’s happened in every other country.” She added that, in huge demonstrations against the Morsi government that preceded the coup, “there were millions of people who have expressed legitimate grievances. A democratic process is not just about casting your ballots…There are other factors including how somebody behaves or how they govern.”  This implicit criticism of the Morsi government was almost a defense of the coup, truly a “hard case” pushing the U.S. government into a position difficult to defend. The United Kingdom also refused to label the coup a coup, and British Prime Minister David Cameron explained why: the United Kingdom “never supports” intervention by the military, he said, “but what we need to happen now in Egypt is for democracy to flourish and for a genuine democratic transition to take place.”  In plainer English, Cameron was arguing that once a coup happens, it is spilled milk and governments have to be realistic. The question at that point is how to work with the country (and the coup leaders) and try to get things back on the democratic track. Psaki took a different and much worse line: Morsi had been a bad and increasingly unpopular ruler of Egypt, so a coup was perhaps inevitable and anyway Morsi was no model democrat. Fair enough, but U.S. law was clear: it speaks of a “duly elected government,” and surely Morsi’s was that.  This is one significant flaw in the U.S. law: it is not so rare that a leader is “duly elected” but then subverts the democratic system to stay in power. Morsi was accused of doing it, as was Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua, Father Aristide in Haiti, and Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, to take but three examples. Why should overthrowing a would-be dictator, or an elected president who destroys democracy and makes another free election impossible, be treated exactly like a military coup that ousts a truly democratic government?   What is increasingly clear is that the “coup provision” in U.S. law, instead of strengthening U.S. opposition to coups, has often led the U.S. government to duck even calling a coup by its proper name. The most recent case is the coup in Niger on July 26, 2023. It is a classic case: a democratically elected civilian president was removed and detained by the military. The EU, France, and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) immediately labeled this a coup. But the United States has refused to do so, leading to a Washington Post editorial in August entitled “U.S. Should Call Niger’s Coup What It Is: A Coup.” Why has the United States refused? The Post theorizes that “administration officials [are] hoping that diplomacy might still persuade the soldiers to return to their barracks….” But as the weeks go by, this hope is increasingly unrealistic.  So why not label the coup a coup now—better late than never? Perhaps because the Biden administration wishes to continue some important counterterrorism programs in Niger even under its new military junta. The solution seems obvious: call the coup by its proper name but say that U.S. national security requires continuing the relationship with the Nigerien military.  “National Security” Waivers  The “national security waiver” is a common procedure in the human rights context. For example, U.S. law states that “no security assistance may be provided to any country the government of which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights…unless the President certifies in writing to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate that extraordinary circumstances exist warranting provision of such assistance.” In accordance with this provision of law, the Biden administration has withheld portions of U.S. military assistance to Egypt on human rights grounds but delivered other portions. Another similar provision of law prohibits “any training, equipment, or other assistance for a unit of a foreign security force if the Secretary of Defense has credible information that the unit has committed a gross violation of human rights,” but adds that the provision “shall not apply if the Secretary of Defense, after consultation with the Secretary of State, determines that…the equipment or other assistance is necessary to assist in disaster relief operations or other humanitarian or national security emergencies.”  In 2023, Congress for the first time added a national security waiver to the provisions of law requiring a cut-off of assistance when a coup overthrows a “duly elected head of government.” The new provision states that the secretary of state “may waive the restriction in this section…if the Secretary certifies and reports to the Committees on Appropriations that such waiver is in the national security interest of the United States….”  Thus, the national security waiver is available today in the United States, as it was not after the coup in Egypt in 2013. The Biden administration is able to take the Washington Post’s advice in the case of Niger and in future coup cases. Be honest about what has happened but say that the United States has national security interests that—at that moment and in that case—override its preference for democratically elected governments and against military coups.  Are Anti-Coup Laws Good Policy?  Has the forty-year U.S. experiment with anti-coup laws advanced the cause of democracy? Has the law been honored more in the breach than in the observance? Has the United States now found a happy equilibrium or a poor balance?  It is impossible to say how many coups, if any, were avoided by the prospect of a cut-off in U.S. assistance. Given the uncertainty of whether the United States would call a coup a coup and actually cut off aid, it seems unlikely that there were many. The law surely serves notice from Congress to the executive branch that it takes coups against elected governments seriously and does not expect them to be overlooked or downplayed when the State Department makes decisions about foreign aid. But Congress, which must appropriate foreign aid, always has the ultimate say and can cut off aid to any recipient government whenever it wants. The great advantage of the anti-coup provision is speed, because it can be invoked immediately, while new legislation cutting off aid may take a year to pass. For a new military junta, the prospect of a cut-off next week surely means more than one a year or more away.  But the addition of a national interest waiver to the “coup cut-off provision” after thirty-eight years suggests that Congress has finally acknowledged what history shows: the cut-off provision is a strait jacket for the State Department. Its attempts to escape the law’s provisions may do more harm to democracy than the good the existence of the law accomplishes. At least the waiver provision now allows the State Department to be honest about the fact of a coup, and then decide how to weigh security interests against the desire to protect democracy.   Has a happy medium been reached? Perhaps, but the waiver provision now risks creating two classes of countries: those significant enough to warrant a waiver and those so unimportant to the United States that the waiver is not invoked. And similarly, it may create two classes of coups: those deemed acceptable because the United States did not like the previous (elected) government, and those that overthrew a president the United States supported.  Or perhaps the executive branch’s future waiver decisions will be based on hard realpolitik: where a coup is reversible it will suspend aid, but where it seems the new military government is there to stay aid will be continued, accompanied by a wagging of fingers and more press guidance about the importance of democracy.  Coups occur irregularly but they are an apparently incurable disease, so the new law with its waiver provision will be tested in time. One can think of an addition to the new law—containing now the mandatory cut-off but also the waiver provision—that requires (a) that the State Department report to Congress (in secret testimony if need be) within one week of an apparent coup; (b) that it make a determination: coup or no coup; and (c) that State defend the policy it is following, explaining how it is weighing the value of U.S. support for democracy against what it sees as U.S. national security interests. The current law no doubt expresses opposition to coups, but it has not led to candor in the execution of U.S. foreign policy. That is an ingredient worth adding, and a part of democratic government as well.  This publication is part of the Diamonstein-Spielvogel Project on the Future of Democracy.
  • Elections and Voting
    The State of Democracy Around the World
    Play
    Over four billion people in more than three dozen countries will have the opportunity to vote for new leadership in elections in 2024. Panelists discuss the strength of democracies in the year ahead and the challenges they face, including polarization, nationalism, and curtailed political freedoms. This meeting part of the Diamonstein-Spielvogel Meeting Series on Democracy.
  • Democracy
    Taiwan’s Early Warning for the Future of Tech
    Taiwan faces online threats in the run up to its January 13 election. Companies, governments, and civil society need to work together to defend against the growing influence of digital authoritarianism in Taiwan and worldwide.
  • Democracy
    What a Democratic Russia Would Mean for the United States
    When the Soviet Union collapsed more than thirty years ago, American leaders hoped that Russia would embark on a transition to free-market democracy. Shared democratic values, the thinking went, would beget a “democratic peace” and ease cooperation on a range of critical global issues, including strategic stability and European security. As it integrated into the Euro-Atlantic community of free-market democracies, Russia would become a reliable pillar of the U.S.-led, rules-based international order. Those hopes were irretrievably dashed when Russia seized Crimea and instigated a rebellion in eastern Ukraine in 2014. Its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 only reinforced the U.S. conviction that Russia had become a bitter adversary, caught in a vortex of ever-deepening authoritarian practices and imperialist ambitions. Yet the hope lingers that a democratic breakthrough will occur—perhaps in the near term as a consequence of Russia’s defeat in the war against Ukraine, but more likely in the distant future—and lay the foundation for an enduring U.S.-Russia partnership. The unexamined assumption of most foreign policy experts is that a democratic Russia would be good for the United States. The argument is straightforward: Such a Russia would mark a dramatic break with Russia’s centuries-old authoritarian traditions, which many observers see as the root cause of its antagonistic relations with the United States. Nevertheless, questions would abound. Would a government genuinely accountable to the Russian people conduct a foreign policy that demonstrably breaks away from its historical rivalry with the United States? Would it banish the expansionary impulses that have fueled Russia’s foreign policy for centuries? Would it abandon efforts to dominate the former Soviet space? In short, would it invert the main priorities of Vladimir Putin’s Russia? The answers are necessarily speculative. There is much we don’t know about the formation of public opinion in Russia. We do know that the Kremlin’s views matter, especially as it enjoys a near-monopoly of the information space in Russia. Russian attitudes toward the United States [in Russian] have, for instance, shifted in line with the Kremlin’s changing assessment of the state of relations. But the influence of Kremlin preferences is presumably less direct and immediate on fundamental views about Russia’s identity as a global power, which have taken shape over time and been passed down from generation to generation. Eternal Russia? Being a great power, for example, lies at the core of Russian national identity. In a programmatic document released just before he took over as president in 1999, Putin identifies belief in Russia’s greatness as a key traditional Russian value: “Russia,” he wrote, “was and will remain a great power. It is preconditioned by the inseparable characteristics of its geopolitical, economic, and cultural existence. They determined the mentality of Russians and the policy of the government throughout the history of Russia and they cannot but do so at present.”  Public opinion surveys support that conclusion. Russians want their country to play a large, independent role as a great power on the global stage. A large majority believes [in Russian] that they are a great people and should play a special role in world affairs. But interestingly, when asked what makes a country a great power, Russians place economic prosperity above military prowess. Nothing suggests that they would choose guns over butter in allocating scare budgetary resources, or that they would seek opportunities to expand their country’s international sway through military force.  Yet Russians have generally supported Putin’s assertive foreign policy, especially his effective use of military force abroad. His popularity surged more than fifteen points with his seizure of Crimea in 2014 and his full-scale invasion of Ukraine last year, according to data from Russia’s most reliable, independent polling agency. Despite humiliating military setbacks last fall, steep casualties, and the West’s massive anti-Russian sanctions, Russians in large numbers continue to back Putin’s war against Ukraine. Indeed, contrary to expectations in the West, popular support for the war, if anything, has solidified during the past two years. The explanation for this seeming paradox lies in another attribute of Russian society. As Putin claimed in his programmatic document, another key traditional Russian value is statism: “Our state and its institutes and structures have always played an exceptionally important role in the life of the country and its people. For Russians a strong state is not an anomaly which should be got rid of. Quite the contrary, they see it as a source and guarantor of order and the initiator and main driving force of any change.” Again, public opinion surveys support that assessment. In particular, Russians are inclined to defer to the state’s judgment when it comes to matters of the country’s security, both external and internal.  In that regard, Russian rulers have long viewed preeminence in what is now the former Soviet space as essential to their country’s security and geopolitical heft, and therefore its standing as a great power. One of Putin’s main goals since he assumed power has been to reassert Russia’s influence across the entire region, with the use of force when necessary, as in the cases of Georgia and Ukraine. That goal resonates with Russians. Today, Russians increasingly identify first with the Soviet Union and only second with Russia itself. They may not be interested in seeing Russia’s borders expand, but the vast majority believe that Russia should act as the guarantor [in Russian] of security throughout the former Soviet space.   There is little to suggest that these views would change significantly should the Kremlin ease its increasingly strict control of the country’s information space. Support for Russia as a great power with a strong state and a preeminent role across the former Soviet Union prevailed before Putin rose to power, when official media censorship more or less did not exist. Tellingly, parties that espoused authoritarian and expansionist policies won solid majorities in Duma elections in the 1990s. When he first took over, Putin reflected popular attitudes; he did not shape them.     Gaullist Russia In short, Putin’s foreign policy accords with the wishes of the Russian population. And it is reasonable to assume that those wishes would inform the foreign policy of a democratic Russia. Such a Russia could be much less inclined to use force but would still pursue goals at odds with American interests. In this scenario, it would bear a strong resemblance to Gaullist France. Like Gaullist France, a democratic Russia would likely see a strong state, with a powerful executive, as critical to governing the country and maintaining the unity of a multiethnic population spread across a vast territory. It would almost certainly insist on pursuing an independent foreign policy to advance its national interests, as all great powers do, and on having the instruments to guarantee its security on its own—it would not abandon its large nuclear arsenal, nor would it back away from arms races needed to ensure its global standing. It would doubtlessly prefer a multipolar world to a United States–led international order, where it would play a major role in managing global affairs along with a few other great powers.   U.S. relations with Gaullist France were always prickly, even if in the end the two countries remained allies and came together in meeting the most pressing global challenges. Intergovernmental tensions were moderated to a great degree by the dense network of contacts—commercial, cultural, intellectual, and personal—that provided ballast for relations. That the United States was vastly more powerful than France also helped to temper France’s ambitions, especially because its security ultimately depended on the United States. Relations with a democratic Russia will be even more trying because those moderating forces do not exist. Societal contacts would likely remain negligible compared to those between the United States and France. At the same time, while the asymmetry in power between Russia and the United States is vast, Russia’s large nuclear arsenal—with the capacity to destroy the United States as a functioning society in thirty minutes—would encourage it to press its interests more vigorously in the face of American objections. To be sure, a democratic Russia would be infinitely better for the United States than today’s autocratic state under Putin. Shared values would foster trust and create more opportunities for constructive dialogue and cooperation, especially on global challenges. But the United States must resist the temptation to believe a successful democratic transition in Russia will solve all of the relationship’s challenges. On the contrary, elements of rivalry will remain and will have to be carefully managed.  Dealing with Russia has never been easy. A democratic Russia would not alter that fundamental truth.
  • Asia Program
    Virtual Roundtable: A Conversation on the Hong Kong Legal System and the Case of Jimmy Lai
    Play
    The national security trial of Jimmy Lai, founder of Apple Daily and pro-democracy activist from Hong Kong, is scheduled to take place this December. Please join our speaker, Caoilfhionn Gallagher KC, accomplished human rights lawyer leading the international legal team defending Mr. Lai and an expert in accountability for crimes against journalists, to discuss the case of Jimmy Lai and Apple Daily and the wider ramifications for media freedom and the rule of law in Hong Kong and across the region.