• Climate Change
    Screening and Discussion of PBS Series "Changing Planet: Coral Special"
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    The PBS series Changing Planet embarks on its third year of this seven-year project examining the issues facing the planet’s most threatened ecosystems. The “Coral Special” episode takes us to the Maldives for an in-depth look at coral reefs and the urgent efforts to help them survive climate change. In partnership with PBS and Conservation International, join us for a sneak preview of clips from the episode and a panel discussion with climate experts discussing efforts to save some of the most diverse and valuable ecosystems on Earth. 
  • Military Operations
    Protecting U.S. Waterways, Coastlines, and Maritime Infrastructure
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    Eric Doucette, captain in the U.S. Coast Guard and visiting military fellow at CFR, discusses the primary missions of the coast guard including disaster management, protecting U.S. ports and shorelines, and other areas where the coast guard cooperates with local officials both domestically and internationally. A question-and-answer session follows his opening remarks. TRANSCRIPT FASKIANOS: Welcome to the Council on Foreign Relations State and Local Officials Webinar. I’m Irina Faskianos, vice president for the National Program and Outreach here at CFR. CFR is an independent and nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher focused on U.S. foreign policy. CFR is also the publisher of Foreign Affairs magazine. As always, CFR takes no institutional positions on matters of policy. Through our State and Local Officials Initiative, CFR serves as a resource on international issues affecting the priorities and agendas of state and local governments by providing analysis on a wide range of policy topics. Thank you all for being with us today for this discussion. We’re delighted to have over 400 participants from forty-seven U.S. states and territories. And as a reminder, this webinar is on the record, and the video and transcript will be posted on our website after the fact at CFR.org. Each year, CFR awards five military fellowships to outstanding officers from each branch of the U.S. armed services. The Visiting Fellowship Program enables selected officers to broaden their understanding of International Relations while on active duty by spending a year in residence at CFR’s headquarters in New York. Our military fellows conduct individual research, contribute their knowledge and experience of their military service, and participate extensively in CFR meetings and events. So with that, we are pleased to have Captain Eric Doucette from the U.S. Coast Guard with us today. He is CFR’s 2024 U.S. Coast Guard military fellow. Prior to this role, he served as the chief of staff for the Coast Guard’s Ninth Coast District, which encompasses the Great Lakes, the St. Lawrence Seaway, eight states, and a 1,500-mile international border with Canada. Captain Doucette also previously served in the White House as special advisor to both Vice President Joe Biden and Vice President Mike Pence from 2016 to 2018. So, Captain Doucette, thanks very much for being with us today for this conversation on the Coast Guard’s cooperation with state and local officials to protect U.S. coastlines, waterways, and maritime infrastructure. The U.S. Coast Guard obviously serves many functions. I thought it would be great if you could begin by talking about your—or, the Coast Guard’s primary missions, and discuss the areas where the Coast Guard is cooperating with local officials both domestically and internationally, and where there are areas of opportunity for further growth. DOUCETTE: Well, thank you. Thank you, Irina. The Coast Guard, we’re a 50,000-plus person organization. And we’re spread all around the country. So we’re embedded with local communities within the states. And most other first responders think of the Coast Guard as part of their local team, because we happen to be there. So search and rescue operations is one of those areas, rescue mariners in distress or people that are out for recreational boating. And law enforcement goes hand in glove with that mission. Working with state police or other maritime or harbormasters. So the Coast Guard finds itself work law enforcement issues domestically in all the small communities around the country. Environmental protection, that’s a big area that not only do we work with the EPA on the federal side, we work with the state arms that do environmental protection. We work with industry and private sector to address spill response plans or hazardous material response plans. We support FEMA during natural disasters with dealing with hazardous materials. But port security and safety, looking at the overall port operations that happen in our major ports and in our smaller ports, the Coast Guard worked closely with the Army Corps and also with state port authorities to make sure that the waterways operate just as safely as the highways and the byways of our country. And then training and exercise. The Coast Guard is another force multiplier with local agencies, state agencies, and other federal agencies. They all do a great job shoreside, but also you have to do that operation in the maritime. The Coast Guard expertise with small boat operations, working in a maritime environment, we can help local hazmat teams, firefighters, in how to address issues that may be offshore. And then maritime planning and regulations. Working with development plans with port authorities or working with expansion or changes in how ports may operate. We are heavily involved, with our captain, the port authorities, working with state regulators and managing, again, those waterways. Just like similar to how the FAA would work with airports, and how to manage that type of change over the years. And we do a lot of public outreach and education. We do partnerships in education. We do events with the local community. We try to get involved as much as we can, so that the community has free access to the Coast Guard in their community. On the international cooperation side, counter-narcotics and antipiracy operations. Capacity building with other nations. Most navies in the world look like a U.S. Coast Guard. And they don’t look—they don’t have aircraft carriers and destroyers, but enforcing fishery regulations, enforcing environmental regulations, boat and safety for their—or helping their fishermen of their—of their nation-state is an area that the Coast Guard has unique skills where we can help other nations trying to build their capacity. Environmental protection. We definitely have a lot of expertise in that area that we can go around the world and help other nations that may have oil spills or their environmental disasters from ships. And then search and rescue, which is, again, our—one of our bread-and-butter pillars of what we do with domestically. It’s something that we can bring overseas and help develop capacities for other countries if they want to have a twenty-five mile—nautical mile offshore capacity for search and rescue. And you do that with helicopters. You do that with small boats. You do it with cutters and other—when I say cutters, that ship—that’s the Coast Guard term for a ship. And so, it’s a global Coast Guard. Again, we’re everywhere in the country, even on inland rivers. So, if some of the listeners are of a landlocked state, you might not think that the Coast Guard’s part—we operate our ship inspectors and work with your local agencies along a lot of the byways where barges are—up and down the Mississippi, or in other—the Ohio River, and other locations throughout the country. FASKIANOS: Fantastic. That’s great. And are you—what are you doing to enforce illegal fishing regulations? DOUCETTE: Well, I mean, so domestically we work, again, with the state wildlife officials, enforcement officials, that making sure that fishery—the state fishery laws, and the Federal fishery laws are enforced. International, one of the terms out there is IUU—illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing. So, in fact, just this week, an agreement was signed with Samoa—the country of Samoa, not American Samoa—but where the U.S. Coast Guard could help enforce regulations within their exclusive economic zone. So, we can look for other state actors, or sometimes vessels that are stateless, that are they’re trying to fish in their EEZ. And no one’s regulating them, or inspecting what they’re catching, or how much they’re catching, or if they’re catching juvenile species, or protected species. So, we can board those vessels. And we have those cooperative agreements with a number of countries. But now, in this day and age, you know, we’re using a lot of satellite technology and working with other partners to help target some of these actors that are out there, because those fish resources are protein sources for a lot of these countries that don’t have a robust coast guard, or a way to protect what they need for their fishermen and for their own populations. FASKIANOS: Mmm hmm. Fascinating. I can continue on with questions, but I want to give people the opportunity to raise their hand. You can click on the raise-hand icon. And I will call on you to ask your question. Or you can type your question in the Q&A box. And we’d love to hear—for you to also share best practices or your experience, because this is a forum where you can exchange, and we hope that you’ll exchange, ideas and resources. So, we’re going to see if anybody has raised their hand. We have one raised hand. If you could identify yourself too, that would be fantastic. Going first to Kelly Bartlett. Q: Kelly Bartlett, Michigan Department of Transportation. Thank you for putting this out. Thank you for taking your time. I have two questions, one kind of immediate and one farther out there. The first, the immediate question, been on everyone’s mind lately with the—you know, the tragic incident in Baltimore with the Francis Scott Key Bridge. I’m just wondering, what’s the role of the Coast Guard in a situation like that? You know, where there’s a critical waterway that all of a sudden has this event and it affects, you know, all sorts of shipping and land-based movements. So just wondering if you could walk through what your role in that would be. And then, more abstract, farther out, Michigan Tech University is doing some work on leading to, we hope, autonomous freighters around the Great Lakes. And I’m just wondering if you have any thoughts on what pops first in your mind in terms of, whoa—we’d be really anxious about that or, you know, bring it on. So two wildly different questions, if I could. DOUCETTE: Great. No, thank you for asking both those questions. So just to, you know, step back, before the event in Baltimore happened, in all the ports around the country there’s—you know, there are port authorities, to varying degree, that are regulated, managed by the state. There’s pilots. And then the Coast Guard itself, we have a number of committees, going back to our planning function, that we involve. And we bring all private and public sector together to discuss issues like safety of the port. And so there are harbor safety committees. There’s area maritime security committees. And there’s area committees. The area committee deals more with environmental issues and threats, air and maritime security, that came out of the post-9/11 environment, brings a lot of law enforcement community together. And then the harbor safety committees, again, that’s the pilots, the operators, you know, the people that are operating that waterway to make the port safe, to make sure that dinner boat cruises can operate, that container ships or oil tankers or other ships that may carry hazardous materials, or if there’s visiting U.S. Navy ships, or even ships from other countries, that everyone is aware of how the port is operated. And in some ports that are busier, they have these vessel traffic services just like air traffic control. So those committees would have said things like under-keel clearance, they would have set things—what that means is that when a ship comes in, it can’t touch the bottom of the harbor. And that might sound funny, but a lot of our harbors are silted. They require the Army Corps to dredge them. And so it—sometimes the ships actually do touch bottom when they come in. But most ports, it’s set at two feet below those vessels when they come in. And there’s tidal differences. So these are some of the safety things that get discussed. Other things that get discussed in different ports where there may be some infrastructure at risk, maybe there’s a requirement. And, again, the Coast Guard Captain of the port in those different ports would help enforce those regulations or set those regulations through a rulemaking. But it would be a tug assist. So I was the captain of the port in Boston, prior to my time in the Great Lakes. And there—were there were liquefied natural gas ships would come in. And they had a big security footprint around them, with all sorts of states and local agencies. But at the same time, we had safety assist tugs that would help navigate them under the Mystic River Bridge and under some other some other tight spaces that they would operate. Now, jumping to your other question—or, actually, before I do that, and so then, when you see the event that happened in Baltimore, there’s a number of other plans—the National Response Plan, the National Contingency Plan. And I would—my best guess is that those are the type of plans that help provide the framework for all the agencies to work together down there in Baltimore. And when that actual incident happened, you saw the Coast Guard performing search and rescue. But we don’t do that by ourselves. The state of Maryland, the local harbormaster, and other local police forces and fire departments were all involved in that effort. And then one point is the dive teams. So those are integrated dive teams with state police, local fire departments, and then there’s the broader operation of working with the Department of—I mean, excuse me—Department of Transportation and FEMA to help get funding and assets. I think there was a presidential declaration. And I think at least the initial $60 million that helped get some of the operations funded. But—and then bringing in large cranes and other apparatus. That is a whole East Coast, you know, nation effort to bring the right equipment there. And when you see the pictures of the people cutting steel, and you think about how big that steel girder is, or if you drive over any large bridge, just how big that structure is. It may seem like it’s taken a lot of time to open that port up again, but it is a big structure and it takes time to lift each piece out, and to do it the right way. And they’re also doing it when there’s a natural high-pressure gas pipeline that’s right underneath a lot of that debris. So I know that a lot of care and effort’s going there to try to get that open quickly, but open safely. On your question of autonomous vessels, that has come up. Again, back when I was captain of the port in Boston, I approved a small vessel—it was called a Datamaran. It was a catamaran, but someone mistyped D, and it stuck. And it operated—MIT was operating it. And collected data for offshore wind. But this little vessel could tack like a small sailboat. And it didn’t require any people on board. And we also had the Mayflower II that was coming—it was before COVID. It was supposed to be here for the 400th anniversary of the Mayflower coming. And that vessel too had—it was a larger vessel. Didn’t have anybody on it. But even when it got close to shore, there was still—it was big enough that we would have to have some requirement that would have an assist vessel or someone that was with it. But throughout the country, there’s all these efforts for autonomous vessels. Elon Musk’s SpaceX, they have offshore—large, autonomous vessels that go offshore for the space launch. And they would love for those to operate without people on board, or assist people. And we know it’s—we know that it’s coming. But it’s still—the rules of the road still require a human eye to be there, to intervene given any type of situation that could happen at a moment’s notice, and alert. And going back to Baltimore, though there will be an investigation to why that took place, but it appears that there was some sort of power outage. The pilot on board taking quick action, notifying their response network to stop other vehicles from coming on board that bridge, you know, saved lives. And so that human operator being involved, I think that’s going to be the trick with autonomous vessels, is how do we ensure that there’s still someone that can make quick action. They may or may not be on the vessel, but they’re going to need to be able to react quickly and operate with people in that local environment. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I’m going to go next—we have lots of hands raised—going next to Linda Grisby. Q: There we go. Can you hear me? FASKIANOS: Yes. DOUCETTE: Yes. Q: Good afternoon, everybody. I’m curious about the invasive species in— FASKIANOS: Linda, can you identify yourself? Q: Oh, yes. I’m Linda Grigsby town of La Plata. FASKIANOS: Thank you. Q: You’re welcome. But I’m curious about the invasive species within the rivers. What are we doing to—what can we do to get rid of those more on a local level? DOUCETTE: Yeah. So I just came from the Great Lakes. And invasive species are a big issue. And so there’s different places that we work in partnership. Again, a lot of it will be, like, U.S. Fish and Wildlife and the state and local fish and wildlife entities. But there’s places where we will help with monitoring. We also do a ballast water program. So when foreign vessels come from other countries, they have to shift their ballast water, because sometimes that’s how invasive species came to our country in the past. And we test for salinity, to make sure that they shift—they shifted that water, so they’re not taking port water from a foreign country and bringing it to our country. That they’re actually shifting that at sea. Excuse me, one second. And then there’s also a number of other devices, especially up in the Great Lakes, in the rivers where they have the invasive carp. Excuse me. And they have electric fences, and have other detection crews that will go out and try to harvest those invasive species so they don’t get into the Great Lakes. And we—again, we will work with any agency. One of one of the agencies we work with the most is NOAA. And they will help us with a lot of scientific support coordination with other species that we’re trying to protect. But invasive species is a big issue. I think if anyone is a recreational boater on domestic lakes a lot, there’ll be a lot of invasive plants, other issues, that they try to control going from lake to lake. But in the coastal environment, there are different species—green crab, a number of other—zebra mussels, that we’ll work with water authorities and other entities, in any capacity to help, you know, retard or slow down the growth of these invasive species. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I’m going to take the next question, a written question from Massachusetts Representative David Biele: Is the U.S. Coast Guard involved in any fisheries enforcement with foreign nations in the North Atlantic, like that in the Pacific? DOUCETTE: Yes. We have ship rider programs. And so, you know, Canada being our closest partner, we will, in that neck of the woods, a lot of times U.S. Coast Guard vessels will be patrolling Canadian waters, and a lot of times apprehending U.S. fishermen that are operating in Canadian waters, to bring them back because. And it’s usually not the other way around, where the Canadians are coming into our waters. So we work—we have an agreement with Canada. And then we also have ship rider programs in the Caribbean and other locations, other countries. And we’ll bring their officers on board our vessels. they can see how our folks operate, to provide some education. We’ll take some of our best practices, like—things like fisherman’s nets, where they may be catching fish that have, like, turtle exclusion devices. So if the turtle gets caught in the net, the turtle can get out—has a way to get out. And then also, we’ll inspect the hulls of the catch to make sure they’re not catching any species that are—that are protected or undersized. A lot of times we’ll do those fishery boardings at sea, but we can also work with other agencies to do those boardings at the pier as they’re offloading or trying to sell the fish. And then a number of the vessels also have beacons or—that they have to display. And, you know, we can track those by satellite, and make sure that they’re fishing in the right zones, in the right areas, that are open for fishing, versus the regulated or closed areas. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I’m going to go next to James Murley with a raised hand. If you could identify yourself. Unmute yourself. There you go. Q: Thank you, Irina. My name is Jim Murley. I’m the chief resilience officer in Miami-Dade County, where we have a deep water port. The largest cruise ship port. And we also have a shallow Miami River Port. I would like to start by saying Sector Miami is a fantastic organization, the Coast Guard are professionals. We are a maritime border state and the interdiction responsibilities they carry out in multiple ways keep our citizens safe. So thank you, sir, for that service. My question has to do with derelict vessels. I’m charged along the Miami River right as we speak with a vessel that the Coast Guard interdicted, and brought on, and found a place to tie it up. And, you know, if there’s a car on the street, I can get rid of that car. Because the derelict vessel’s tied up to—it’s a headache. You got any good practices we can do to deal with derelict vessels? Thank you, sir. DOUCETTE: Absolutely. And I’ve come across that that conundrum and problem throughout the country. Even here in New York during Hurricane Sandy, we had a similar situation. A lot of the local laws on the books can be helpful about derelict property. And, again, it does get involved with the courts. And sometimes that can be sped up. But the biggest thing, if this vessel is in the water and it’s tied up, the biggest thing is we want to make sure that it’s not causing any type of environmental harm, you know, leaking oil or discharging. At the same time that it’s safe, that it’s being tied up, and that’s it’s being maintained and checked. Because in a way this sounds like this vessel—I don’t know the particular case of it—but it sounds like there’s no owner or operator. It was seized. And it was probably used for some nefarious activity. So it does become a conundrum on that part. The particular case I had here in New York that I worked with, it was a large vessel, about a 300-foot vessel, very similar with some owners that just did not have the wherewithal to follow through. And when Hurricane Sandy caused that vessel to wash up on a—almost on a—on a street in Staten Island, we were able to, because of the pollution threat, remove it and lift it. That actually, one of the same cranes that’s down there in Baltimore now, it’s one of the Donjon cranes, lifted it up. In that case, we put the—we put this ship up on land, where it could be scrapped and cut up into steel. But that took a lot of time working with the City of New York. And they used one of their abandoned property laws, similar to what you’re talking about with vehicles. We were able to use that as a way to get into the courts, and then have that vessel salvaged. And in the end, the city got a check back for like $75,000 for the worth of the steel from the scrap yard. But it is not always a successful solution, like, in that case. There’s a number of the cases that, you know, we’ve had to come in and, you know, clamshell or kind of dig the vessel out after it’s sank, in different situations. But I would definitely pursue the courts, and the property, and then the disposal method. And usually that’s going to involve hauling it up or putting it on land where it can be cut up. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I’m going to go next to a written question from Trustee Wayne Domke of Roselle Village in Illinois: Do you work with Homeland Security on immigration? And if so, how? DOUCETTE: Yes. So a number of times we’ll have encounters. One, the Coast Guard is part of Homeland Security, so we work with our cousin agencies on a day-to-day basis. So there’s some at the planning level, but if it’s a situation where we encounter a vessel, and it may be in the maritime in the offshore of the East Coast, if it’s a fishing vessel with either folks without documentation that are here—sometimes they’ll end up—as a job of last resort, they’ll end up as a fisherman. There are some rules in place that there’s a certain percentage—I think it’s 25/75—like 25 percent of the crew has to be a U.S. citizen if it’s a U.S. vessel, on these fishing vessels. And if they have documentation, it’ll be fine and they’ll just continue working. But a lot of times, we’ll find folks that just do not have the proper documentation. Then we’ll work with the other Homeland Security, Immigration, and other agencies to determine whether or not they have a desire to have these people be brought in and processed. And that can take some time. But to say that we may also encounter people on a regular recreational boat and law enforcement activity. Up in the Great Lakes, it wouldn’t be unusual for us to come across people doing human smuggling as well, just trying to enter our country via recreational boat, coming from Canada. They found some way to get to Canada, and they wanted to get to the United States. And we also see people going the other way, leaving the United States trying to go to Canada. And so we’ll work with both countries’ the immigration services to try to process the people, make sure that at least they’re documented and known to be present in either country. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I’m going to go next to Andrew Parks, who has raised his hand. You can accept the unmute and tell us who you are. Q: Can you hear me? FASKIANOS: We can. Q: Andrew Parks, director, Texas Senate Committee on Water, Agricultural and Rural Affairs. Thanks for taking the time to talk to us today. And I’ll echo the earlier sentiment, all of my interactions with the Coast Guard to date have been very professional. Really respect the guys you’ve got working for you. So all of my interactions with the Coast Guard up to this point have centered on disaster response. We’ve had several hurricanes in Texas over the last twenty years—Rita, Ike, Harvey, and others. Can you walk me through, first of all, how you plan for hurricanes and other natural disasters in abstract, and then in the—in the run-up to an actual hurricane, when you’ve got one off the coast, the kind of staging you do, the resources that you do, how you deploy them, et cetera? DOUCETTE: Absolutely. Every year we’ll—because the Coast Guard, we’re the military, we move our people around. So every year, prior to hurricane season, we’ll have a national exercise which tests our Coast Guard internal capacity to communicate up and down the chain of command, all the way back to Washington. And we also test our ability for the different captain report zones—the different—like, the Port of Houston or the Port of Miami—that they can set hurricane conditions. And what’s meant by that, is it’s a way that we communicate with the port authority and industry that we’re forty-eight hours, or ninety-six hours out from a hurricane. You know, if your vessel can get underway and avoid the hurricane, we want them out of the harbor. If they can’t get underway because they’re in the middle of some sort of repair or fixing the engine, then we’re going to have to—you have to double up lines. We want you to remove any type of debris that can be washed over shore. And so, we try to tighten up the port so it’s more resilient, given the nature—especially in the Gulf Coast, where you have these very large hurricanes. And then, going back to some of that planning that I mentioned before that we do with oil pollution, and we work with FEMA, this umbrella of plans that’s out there. Our National Contingency Plan, which deals with—you know, anyone can have a spill or hazmat release any day. That same skillset that we practice day in and day out with local, and state, and the commercial industry, we can use that during a hurricane. It’s the same people, we just fall under different plans, the National Response Framework. And that’s the FEMA plan, where all the different federal agencies line up. Like, the first thing in disaster would be transportation, get people out of there. So, the Department of Transportation takes the lead. But with Coast Guard, we’ll jump and do Department of Transportation support, because you can move a lot of people on cruise ships, you can move a lot of people on barges, or use our maritime highways to move folks. At Coast Guard, EPA, we’ll do ESF 10, which is hazard material and oil spills, a lot of times household hazardous waste, industrial wastes after a big hurricane, and ESF 9, search and rescue. So, again, we’re using a lot of skills that we use every day, but we are underneath this National Response Framework. And then the states, we work hand-in-glove with them with their emergency operations centers. But I think where the Coast Guard really adds a value is that we’re working with industry every day, inspecting their ships, inspecting their facilities. We know each other on a—we’re probably on our rolodex or on our cellphones, and we call each other when other events happen throughout the year. So, when the big event happens, like a big disaster, there’s a lot of commonalities where they would have been in the same committee meetings that I talked about before. And one other thing, just to add, we have another group. It’s not as well known. It’s more of an economic group. But they prioritize when the—when the harbors get back open, what ships have the priority to come back in. And industry gets together and works with us. And it may be that this particular industry, certain name, they’re low on gasoline. So, the first ship coming in is going to have to be gasoline. And so there’s a lot of work going on behind the scenes when we do get the port restored. And I’m sure that they’re doing that in Baltimore, too. What are the first—what’s the first vessel coming in and what’s the first vessel going out. And so there’s a lot of collaboration that helps prioritize—even though these industries may be competing with each other, when it comes to disaster we find that they all work hand-in-glove with each other, to try to take care of each other’s needs, even though they’re competitors. FASKIANOS: Great. Thank you. I’m going to go next to a written question from Paul Brierley, who is with the Arizona Department of Agriculture: My son serves in the Coast Guard as part of a deployable strike force created after 9/11. I describe some of the unexpected roles the Coast Guard plays as giving us a military presence where we aren’t allowed to have a military presence. Can you talk about some of the joint and support roles that the Coast Guard plays to our other military services? DOUCETTE: Absolutely. In fact, I was part of the deployable support forces. And we brought the team here from New York, CFR, down to visit the Atlantic strike team. Sounds like your son, and thank you for raising a great American servant, and it sounds like he might be with the MSRT, or one of the MSSTs, which are these—it’s probably one of our—the MSRT’s closest to what we have to special forces. They deploy around the world. They deal with piracy issues. They can deal with a vessel that’s been hijacked, just like an aircraft. They can do what they call an opposed boarding, and they can board these ships via helicopter or other means and neutralize any threat or risk that might be on that vessel and take the vessel back under control. Those teams, when they’re not doing actual operations to respond, they train other nations. You know, their SWAT teams, or their specialized force teams that exist. And, again you can take one from shore and try to put them out in the maritime, but there’s a lot of different skills that are involved, and the equipment that—oh, did we lock up? Oh there we go. But then the equipment that you carry, you have to have buoyancy too. If you end up in the water, it’s not the time to find out that you have too much gear weighing you down. So there’s special equipment or kit that that they train with and that they use during those operations. You mentioned about how we work with other countries. One of my jobs was out at U.S. Pacific Command. And I worked in Southeast Asia. And Vietnam has some—back a decade or so ago—had some really strict controls about foreign navies coming to their country. But when the Coast Guard would show up they’re, like, oh, you guys, you can come too. And you can even come back again, because the white ships, or even our C-130s are white with an orange stripe. So it doesn’t really give that warfighter impression to a lot of countries that may not allow the military to be present, or other agencies of our government present. They see the Coast Guard as a humanitarian organization. We’re lifesavers, and that’s—they resonate with that, and they invite us back. And that goes back to my statement about where most navies and other type of maritime forces in the world resemble a U.S. Coast Guard than an armed service that just is a warfighting machine. FASKIANOS: Great. Raised hand from John Jaszewski. If you could unmute yourself and identify yourself. We’re still waiting for unmute. I don’t know if there’s anything we can do on our end. Probably not. All right. Q: Can you hear me now? FASKIANOS: Oh, we can. It worked. Q: OK. I’m John Jaszewski, calling from Mason City, Iowa. I’m curious about flood control and mitigation. How does the Coast Guard interact, especially, you know, here in Iowa, we’re too far from the coast to be—you know, see much of Coast Guard. But I know you’re on the Mississippi. And what are things that you help local governments do to plan or mitigate the flood situations? DOUCETTE: Yeah. Thanks for the question. And we—I mentioned before these strike teams that we’re on. And a lot of the Coast Guard on the rivers too, they have deployable teams that can go up normally—to places normally where the Coast Guard would not be, but now it’s a flood environment. And you have folks trapped in homes, trapped up in attics. Sometimes that happens, people climbing to the higher levels to get out of a flood, but they get trapped in their attics. So, we can—with FEMA and with state agencies—they can request the mission assignment. And, in fact, there’s not too much bureaucracy involved. If there’s lives at hand, the Coast Guard’s going to get there, and work, and figure out how to get there and save people. But we’ll work, you know, hand-in-glove with your local sheriffs, your fire departments. And if they need, you know, flood response capacity, we have some deployable capacity. I mentioned before about hazardous materials. When I was on the Pacific Strike Team, Atlantic Strike Team, we would deploy teams to all sorts of landlocked states that had these floods. And the household hazardous waste would pile up wherever that kind of floods tsunami would end. And we would work with environmental arms to help recover all that material so it’s not sitting there seeping into the ground or the groundwater after the event. But, yeah, the Coast Guard does deploy. There’s a lot of places I’ve had my Coast Guard jacket on or coveralls and be up in the high mountains of Colorado helping with a wildfire or helping with other disasters. And people would never think that they would have saw the Coast Guard present there, but—and we also have these incident management assist teams. And they can help out during the disaster. They were there in Baltimore. But they can also help our before the disaster with incident command system training and other planning and exercises ahead of an event. FASKIANOS: I’m going to take the next question from Pam Wetherbee, city councilman from the city of Beacon, New York: What is the status of adding anchorages for barges on the Hudson River, and why is this needed? DOUCETTE: Yeah. I do know that there’s an effort underway, rulemaking. And I don’t have the particulars. So the captain of the port in New York will have the final details on anchorages. But from time to time, it’s—from my experience, whenever we determine anchorage locations it’s for safety, so that these barges—whether it’s the port of Boston or port San Francisco—it’s a place that’s designated where—whether it’s a fuel barge or it’s a gravel barge, a hopper barge that is there, we want industry to put them in a certain place that when they put the anchor down has the chain that goes to it, that barge will swing, around based on the winds or the current—in a river should be going in one direction but might not be as tidal up there like a harbor. But by defining that anchorage, what you don’t want is someone with their sailboat or recreational boat anchoring their boat, fish or go to sleep, and then, without having designated anchorage, that barge swings around and hits that vessel, from a safety standpoint. So having it designated, be on a chart, people would be—you’d be able to notify people or ask people to leave that area where the barge is anchored for safety or during some sort of construction operation, or other event. So that way the barges aren’t just being put anywhere. There’s a designated spot for them to be, that’s safe for the—for all people that use the waterway. And protects the ship channel. FASKIANOS: Great. I’m going next to Leslie Brosnan, who has a raised hand. Q: Yes. This is Leslie Brosnan. I’m Titus County clerk for Mount Pleasant, Texas. And with the power plants that have been shutting down in the last few years, does the Coast Guard work with the areas that have the lakes they will now need to be returned back to a natural state, on the EPA part of it? DOUCETTE: Yeah, so early in my career I had some—there were a lot of coal-fired plants. And as those were torn down, we would put a lot of safety or security—safety zones around them while they were imploding them and protected them. But when that site becomes, like, a remediation site or, like, a brownfield site, that will usually switch from the emergency response side of what the Coast Guard would do, and it’s more of a remediation. And our authorities are limited there. We would rely on the EPA. We would rely on the state environmental arm that’s dealing with that remediation work. But we do pay attention to those facilities that are in the maritime environment, especially the ones that do—that operate with vessels, foreign vessels, or any U.S. vessels. But there are a number of power plants that are now fed by pipelines, by LNG or direct fuel. And so then are—they’re not so much a regulated facility anymore, that the Coast Guard has authority over, per say, unless they have something that affects the waterway, like a spill or another event. FASKIANOS: I’m going to take the next written question from Councilmember Alan Mitchell, who’s in Greenville County, South Carolina: Thank you for your presentation today. Understanding that invasive species and waterways is a very important issue to tackle, does the U.S. Coast Guard ideally take the lead in identification and control? Or does Coast Guard take more of a cooperative support role? And what’s the best way for local government entities to support your efforts? DOUCETTE: Yeah. I would—I would describe our role in that as support, because we’re not setting the laws or the regulations about the species. But when it gets into an operational, like, we’re going to go out—like a task force, and we’re going to pursue—we want to be aware of it, and then we would publicize—help publicize that, and help make sure that the operators who are out there can do their work without being impeded by recreational boating traffic, or whatever it may be. And, again, the Coast Guard work would tend to be in the offshore maritime environment. Inland rivers or waterways, in a lake environment, we may not have a jurisdiction there, unless there’s some sort of vessels operated there. But again, our limitations would be the vessels that are carrying passengers for hire. You know, if it was a lake that bordered two states, or some like that. But one of the areas that we could certainly help is if you’re standing up teams, and it’s just—they’re going to be on boats, and you want to look at safety and what type of safety equipment—that’s a place that our Coast Guard Auxiliary, and I’m sure there are local Coast Guard stations, would be more than happy to help to make sure that your boat operators and the folks that you may be sending out in the field, that may be college students, that they have some awareness of the environment they’re going to operate in, so it’s safe for them to do the work that they have to do to tackle invasive species. FASKIANOS: Thank you. And I’ll take the next written question from Rob Cole, who’s in the Florida Keys, I believe: I’m curious to know what the staffing trend has been in the Florida Keys. We note, and are thankful for, what appears to be an appropriately increased level of support for open water surveillance and interdiction efforts. And are curious if nearshore routine safety missions involving recreational boaters and the like have experienced reduced coverage due to other resource redeployment or staffing reductions/unfilled vacancies. DOUCETTE: Yeah. So, the Florida region, just similar to the southwest border, but there’s a migration—we always, over the decades, have had maritime migration that happens from a number of the Caribbean islands. And so as those—the weather environment is suitable for people to transport to the United States via maritime means, we will surge staff from around the country. So when I was up in the Great Lakes, we would donate a lot of our resources, look for volunteers, but it was very common. I would send a pretty high percentage of our staff. And not just the Great Lakes. Throughout the country, we would send resources down to support the district in Florida, in the Florida Keys area. And these folks would be down there for a number of months to help support those operations. And then when the maritime migration would slow, we’d obviously bring those folks back. We are nationwide, like a number of the services. And encounter a period of time where—there used to be a time that 90 percent of people that joined the Coast Guard would just walk into the recruiting office, and we had a constant supply of Coast Guard personnel. We’re a small service. As I said, we’re 50,000 people. We recruit about 3,000 people a year. That doesn’t sound like a big number, but we—our people are ambidextrous, and they do a lot of different missions. So once we get them trained up with a four, five, or six year, to have that type of person lead the organization, most people in the Coast Guard, about 40 percent, stay in for twenty years. So when we start losing with retention, it does hurt us. We’re not used to—like I said, we recruit 3,000 people a year. The Department of Defense, big Army, big Navy, they recruit 3,000 people a day. And we just don’t have that type of throughput. So we are experiencing a challenging period right now. The way that we’re managing that is we have a number of seasonal stations. And that we may not open that seasonal station and put the staff there, but we’ll concentrate the staff at the main station nearby and provide the same amount of coverage by keeping the boats offshore patrolling that area. We may add additional cutter, larger ships, offshore, or helicopter patrols to make sure that we’re providing that same surveillance and mitigating any type of search and rescue or law enforcement event that may appear throughout the day. FASKIANOS: Great. Thank you. We are coming near the end of our time. So if you have final questions, please raise your hand or write your question. And I do have one: How does the Coast Guard coordinate with other federal and international agencies to stop illegal drug trafficking? DOUCETTE: Yeah. So actually not too far from our where our last questioner was is SOUTHCOM, and also at U.S. Pacific Command. And they have these joint interagency task forces. So there’s Joint Interagency Task Force South. And there’s an office within that command. And there’s probably seventy to 100 different agents and representatives, not just from the United States but from all the other countries. They’ll have other representatives, foreign representatives there. And they are from their version of the DEA or their customs agencies. And they work as a joint interagency team to address counternarcotics. And then the same thing goes out in the Pacific too. There’s a Pacific task force. So there’s Australian DEA agents that are right there in Hawaii working to help break down any type of bureaucracy between agencies. And one of the interesting facts that years ago our ships would go offshore, and they would do patrols, and maybe they would come across drug runners, and they’d have a big capture. But now, all our ships when they go offshore they’re informed by intelligence. We were tracking the information. And so we’re having large hauls of drugs and contraband. And if you added up all the drugs and contraband that’s seized by domestic law enforcement, the U.S. Coast Guard seizes is more of drugs and contraband at sea than all of the domestic agencies combined. FASKIANOS: I was curious, I think we touched upon this earlier, but if you could talk about the role that surveillance technology plays in U.S. Coast Guard missions? And also, how is the Coast Guard now thinking about and repositioning—and thinking about the use of artificial intelligence? DOUCETTE: So I’ve had the opportunity to be here at CFR and attend a number of artificial—so that’s where my thoughts have been this year, is how that can transform our service. So surveillance, to answer that question, the first part, satellite technology and being able to monitor offshore fishing in the Pacific, where maybe it takes weeks to get a vessel to, the fact that we can do that by satellite every day, or constant surveillance, or by having cameras or other radar arrays set up in different ports as ships come in and out to sell those catches of fish, or to take all the data and analyze that, again, AI’s ability to look at a mountain of data, whether it’s imagery, whether it’s sonar images, whether it’s audio—whatever that is out there that can be brought to the attention of the human, because the AI algorithm can be built to sift through and filter through that information to provide operators with better decision-making intelligence or information that this particular vessel may be operated in a shady way. And, again, sometimes we do this analysis by what fuel vessels consume, and what parts they’re not consuming, might give us indicators to investigate further. But I see AI being very instrumental, even in our bread-and-butter mission of search and rescue. You know, right now throughout the country there’s a young Coast Guard third-class petty officer, with a headset that looks like this, listening for that mayday call. And we’re still mandate to listen to mayday calls. Which is—and it’s through audio. And they’re listening to everyone talk in that Marine band radio. But if you had an AI device that could pick up: I’m in distress, I need help, or calling out for the Coast Guard. We do have some other technology where they just click their mic and we know where they’re at, and it takes the search out of rescue. But I can see where AI could get involved and, again, provide that information to the operator in a quicker way, and go through reams of photos and satellite images and make those vessels that we send offshore more effective in the missions that they’re pursuing. FASKIANOS: Fantastic. There’s a written question from Chris Cho, who’s a councilman in Closter, New Jersey: I just recently joined Flotilla 10-8, Bergen County, as an auxiliary member. I’m involved with an environmental group called Paddle World. It’s mainly a high school student volunteer group. Are there any programs with the U.S. Coast Guard that these high schoolers can donate their time doing volunteer work? And I thank you for your service. DOUCETTE: Yeah. Well, one, thank you for being part of the Coast Guard, part of the auxiliary. So, for everyone else on the line, we have a—similar to the Civil Air Patrol—but we have a volunteer force. And they’re almost just as big as the Coast Guard that we pay. And there’s a lot of works that we’re—like, safety, recreational boater safety, that we’re not funded for but it’s one of the missions we do. And the Coast Guard Auxiliary does that by visiting marinas, and when people buy their boats, to educate them on what life jackets and how to outfit their boat properly, how to—how to read a chart, and all that. So the auxiliary does a ton of work to help basically do preventative search and rescue, make sure that people don’t get into a situation offshore where there’s a problem. I forget the age, though, that people can join the auxiliary, but I have seen high school kids involved with the auxiliary. We also are starting—we were a little bit later than other services—but we have JROTC programs. And our goal is to have multiple JROTC programs in every district. There’s nine districts in the Coast Guard. And especially at inner city schools and other environments there. But that’s a way that we’re getting high school aged kids acclimated or aware of the Coast Guard mission. And I think you mentioned a paddle craft. So, again, that there’s been a growth in these paddle boards, kayaks, you know, other types of—that aren’t your traditional recreational boat, like, a motorboat, or a canoe, or a rowboat. Those things are regulated, and in some places they’re not regulated, and they’re not a requirement for people to wear life jackets. And I have pictures of people paddle boarding up in the Great Lakes and there’s a floe of ice next to them. And they fell in that water, they would not have a long survival time without either a wetsuit or a proper life jacket. So, again, the auxiliary can get out there. And the other message, to everyone that’s on the line, you may think that you’re too old, or it might be, to join the Coast Guard. Or you can join the auxiliary. You can be part of the Coast Guard. And it’s a lot of fun. And there’s—and if you’re into boating or the paddle craft, there’s an opportunity to get involved. So that’s a good point to bring up. FASKIANOS: I’m going to go— back to John Dizuki—Jaszewski. Excuse me. Q: Can you hear me now? FASKIANOS: Yes. Q: OK. I’m John Jaszewski, calling from Mason City, Iowa. Talk about recruitment. What kind of young men and women are you looking for? And what kind of requirements would they need to join the regular Coast Guard? DOUCETTE: Yeah. That’s a great question. Thanks for bringing it up. I tell you—you know, and I’m biased because I’ve been in Coast Guard thirty-five years, and I just wore my son into the Coast Guard last week. So it’s the high point of my career. And, you know, I would tell you that if you have access and know a lot of young, talented kids, whether they’re going to be high school graduates, they’re in college, and if they don’t know what they want to do, and they’re remotely interested in service to their country, environmental issues. I mean, we’ll take everyone. I think there’s—I think there’s a carve-out or there’s a mission in the Coast Guard, you can find something to do. And it maybe it’s—like, even with my son, it was let’s get in the Coast Guard. And maybe he’ll get exposed to cybersecurity, something that he wasn’t planning to do. But by joining the Coast Guard he’ll get a security clearance. That’s going to help him with other jobs—he’s going to join the reserves. And I joined the reserves when I was in college. And that’s how—and now I’ve been in for thirty-five years. But, again, I think it’s a great—if you’re an interested in law enforcement, you know, we’re a law enforcement agency. If you’re interested in environmental oil spill response, working with the EPA one day, there’s a lot of skills you will acquire with the Coast Guard. We have medical professionals. There are so many different ways that we’re bringing people into the Coast Guard. We have an electrician mate. So, we—and if someone’s already a qualified electrician, we’ll look at what credentials they have and say, you don’t need to go to our ten-week school, but maybe go to this week and this week, that gives you the marine portion of all the things you already know. And if someone has a medical background, we have medical professionals, and we’ll look at their credentials. And we’ll kind of—we’ll now custom to—this is very new. It wasn’t this way until recently. But—and they’ll even bring people in at advanced rate or rank based on their skills. So, if people were remotely interested, they should talk to recruiters. They should look at the Coast Guard website. I’m happy to take any calls any day for anyone that’s interested in joining the Coast Guard. And, again, you don’t have to do it for life, like me. You can just come in for a couple years and be in the reserves or be on active duty and call that good and move on with your life. But I joined the Coast Guard, you know, I was either going to be a state trooper or I was going to be in the Coast Guard. And now I’ve traveled to seventy countries, I’ve had twenty moves, lived all over the country. And it’s been a phenomenal career of opportunity. So, I would encourage anyone that wants to have an opportunity, look at the Coast Guard, consider the Coast Guard. FASKIANOS: Wonderful. We are at the end of our time. And I think that’s the perfect note on which to end. So, Captain Eric Doucette, thank you very much for your time today and for your service to our country. And, of course, we have really enjoyed having you at the Council this year. You have a few more months left before your fellowship comes to an end here. Thanks to all of you for your terrific questions. We will send out a link to this webinar recording and transcript. And you can learn more about CFR’s military fellows and browse their work by going to CFR.org and, as always, for other research and analysis on many issues and topics. Please also go to ForeignAffairs.com and ThinkGlobalHealth.org for other developments and analysis on international trends and how they’re affecting the United States. And, of course, do share your suggestions for future webinars by emailing [email protected]. So, again, thank you. And we hope you enjoy the rest of your day. END
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She’s served in multiple senior policymaking roles and has advised national security officials in both Republican and Democratic administrations. Between 2004 and 2007, Dr. O’Sullivan was special assistant to President George W. Bush, and was deputy national security adviser for Iraq and Afghanistan during the last few years of her tenure. In 2013, she was the vice chair of All-Party Talks in Northern Ireland. And Dr. O’Sullivan is a member of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s foreign policy advisory board. And she serves on the board of directors at CFR. So, Meghan, thanks very much for being with us today. I thought we could begin by having you define energy security, and how the environment has changed over the years as you have worked on this issue, taught it, and made policy, in fact. O’SULLIVAN: Sure. Thank you, Irina. And thanks to you and all of your colleagues for inviting me to do this webinar. And I’m really looking forward to it. I spend a lot of time here at Harvard talking to my students about these issues, and I’m looking forward to talking to an even broader audience of students and professors. And it’s interesting. I’m glad to see we have a good group. When I saw the title of “Energy Security,” I thought, like, oh, well, that’s interesting, because usually we don’t talk just about energy security anymore. We talk about it in a broader context. And so what I thought I would do, just in response to your question, is to talk a little bit about how I’ve seen these concepts evolve. And it actually is reflective of the way that I have taught these issues. I’ve been teaching a class here at Harvard that was originally called “Energy and Geopolitics.” And it has evolved. That was back in 2007, I think, was the first time I taught it—maybe 2008. And over this period of time, it’s become probably unrecognizable to my 2008 students. In 2024 I’m teaching it, but it’s really much more about the energy transition and geopolitics. So, you know, there’s still a very big idea around the whole notion of energy and geopolitics. This whole idea that energy and the international system—kind of the distribution of power, alliances, the impetus for conflict or peace—that all of these things are often wrapped up in energy. And I think we can go through and be happy to talk about many historical examples. I can’t really say exactly where they begin, but certainly we start to really notice them in the historical record around the time that oil becomes a major driver of the global economy. But, of course, this was probably true long before that, where you have big changes in the energy system really influencing the state of relationships among states. And certainly the histories of World War I and World War II are full of examples of how commanders and leaders made decisions around oil—either strategic decisions or tactical decisions that ended up ultimately feeding into how wars played out. We think about the bombing of Pearl Harbor, which was so consequential to World War II, had a lot to do with the oil embargo that the United States had placed on Japan, and on the Japanese really thinking that they needed to neutralize the American force in Pearl Harbor before it made an effort to take over—they made an effort to take over the oil-rich areas in today’s Indonesia. So, that entanglement of energy and geopolitics has been with us a long time. And I would say fifteen years ago in highlighting what really is a history of international relations, that is about a fight for resources energy is a piece that I often was trying to expose as being a driver of international affairs. And I used a concept, and I still use a concept, which I think is really relevant today. And that is thinking about energy as a means in grand strategy, and energy is an ends in grand strategy. So if you think about energy as a means, is usually we think about producing countries—producing any form of energy, but maybe oil and gas in particular if we’re looking at the last decades. Countries that have this ability to produce large quantities of this energy have used this energy to try to advance non-energy interests. So, the most obvious example may be the 1973 embargo of the Arab members of OPEC. You know, using their prowess in the energy field to try to advance political objectives. And there are many, many examples of this around the world. We could look at Venezuela, how it used its oil wealth to try to buy the acquiescence of neighboring states and Caribbean states. There are many, many examples. But there’s also another frame to look at it and think about energy as a means of geopolitical ends, which is the flip side of this idea. That there are countries—and the United States is probably the best and most obvious example—that have historically used non-energy power—so economic, political, and military power—to try to ensure that they have sufficient energy. Their goal is to have energy—either to acquire the energy resources, if you think about some countries have looked at it that way, or to ensure that they have access to energy resources, which has been traditionally the view of the United States. And so there we get a lot into the Middle East and American strategy vis-à-vis that part of the world, where energy was a big part of the end goal. So, again, that was the frame that I had looking at this over a long period of time. Five years ago, I wrote a book called Windfall, which was really focused on how, when you get a big change in the energy system, you should expect a big change in geopolitics. And that book was specifically looking at the energy revolution that came from the fracking boom in the United States, and in some other parts of the world. And just the move of the United States from being a major draw on global energy resources to a major contributor toward it. And how that changed America’s role in the world, how that recreated a global atmosphere that on the whole was more conducive to America’s interests and the interests of its allies, and really moved the world into an age of energy abundance. So that has been a consistent focus. And energy security obviously fits right in there. I’m now spending more time—a lot more time, maybe all of my kind of intellectual time—or, not all of it. A good portion of it thinking about the energy transition, as both an ends and a means of foreign policy. And the energy transition I define really quite broadly. And to me, the energy transition and companies encompasses energy security and climate action, because the energy transition—some people think, oh, I’m just talking about substituting solar power for coal. And certainly, that’s a component of the energy transition. But when I conceptualize the energy transition, I am thinking about the huge societal movement to get to a net zero economy, to decarbonize the global economy. And all of the social, political, and in some cases even military, actions that different countries, and companies, and other actors are taking in their quest to get to net zero. And so while I think it, of course, matters a lot from the perspective of a human, the human race, a planetary matter. It matters if the world gets to net zero. The impact of the effort to get to net zero—regardless of whether that goal is reached—the impact of that has already started to really dramatically transform global politics and the basis of power in the international system. And here, I’m developing this idea—actually, working on a Foreign Affairs article on it with my friend and colleague Jason Bordoff—about the energy transition as both an ends and a means. But for the purposes of this call, I thought I’d just say a couple more things about the energy transition and geopolitics. And this is also reflected in three pieces that Jason Bordoff and I have written for Foreign Affairs over the last two years, which talk about the energy transition as a big driver of geopolitics, and geopolitics a big driver of the energy transition. So that first piece, I think of it as a cycle. And the first piece is how the energy transition is shaping geopolitics because, again, going back to this idea, this is an enormous change in how we generate, use, transport, store energy. We’re remaking the backbone of the global economy. Not just switching from coal to solar. Remaking the backbone of the global economy. And this has all kinds of implications for the way that our global system is organized, and political power, and diplomatic power, and otherwise. And there’s lots of examples of this. And I imagine that much of our conversation will be talking about this. One example is just looking at how China’s big investments in clean energy technologies are giving it a claim to geopolitical power. So that’s one way we see the energy transition shaping geopolitics. We could look at the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These are all things I’d love to talk about in greater detail if there’s interest. I wouldn’t argue that the Russian invasion of Ukraine was about the energy transition. I think it was about a lot of things, but primarily Putin’s kind of disillusionment and his fixation on Ukraine. But certainly there are real elements of how the energy transition played into that, played into the timing, and even empowered Vladimir Putin in this particular moment. And then we can look at the energy transition as a driver for trade routes and a whole variety of other things, depending on what energy sources end up being dominant. And finally, I would say there’s also this flip side. So we have the energy transition shaping geopolitics, but—and I think this is something we feel very acutely in the last year, year and a half, is how the geopolitical environment is actually shaping the energy transition. And again, lots and lots of good examples of this. The most obvious one, I think, is just the relationship between the United States and China. And this relationship, you know, going from one of some elements or dominant elements of cooperation to being the most highly competitive bilateral relationship in the world and the most consequential bilateral relationship in the world. So, looking at how that shift from cooperative to competitive has had an impact on a whole range of things, one of them is definitely the energy transition. And we could talk about a variety of ways in which that has played out. Some of it has been, I would say, detrimental in the sense that some of the international bodies, which are the obvious things to deal with global problems, are hamstrung a bit by an environment of geopolitical competition and great-power rivalry. On the other hand, I think the world is adjusting to the fact that this competitive relationship is the one that’s infusing competition into the global environment. And some of our efforts to pursue the energy transition have shifted to be more competitive. And the Inflation Reduction Act, that was partially in the reading people had for today, that’s evidence of a competitive approach to the energy transition rather than a cooperative one. There’s also, of course, the Russian invasion of Ukraine. That has had an impact. That geopolitical reality has had a big impact on the energy transition, which we could discuss. I think there are strong arguments that it expedited the transition, and also strong arguments that it has impeded the transition. So with that, I think I will stop there. Hopefully, I put enough on the table to define our topic in a fairly broad way. And I’m really looking forward to people’s thoughts and insights, and any questions they may have. FASKIANOS: Fantastic. Thank you, Meghan. That was terrific. Let’s go to all of you. (Gives queuing instructions.) So the first question we have we can take from King Fahd University, our international participants. O’SULLIVAN: Great. FASKIANOS: And you need to unmute yourself. Still muted. There we go. Please say your name— Q: So my name is Ahmed Hazmi. FASKIANOS: Good. Q: My name is Ahmed Hazmi. I am from King Fahd University. Before I ask the question, I have to let you know that we have multiple students with their own questions. So my question is, what are the recent effects of the energy crisis on the global efforts to move towards clean energy? That’s my question. O’SULLIVAN: Sure. It’s a great question. And I have some good memories of visiting King Fahd University. So nice to see you on the call and know there are several of you. This is obviously a central question and a really big question. And I can give you examples of how this geopolitical—this environment of geopolitical crises have moved the energy transition in both ways. As I mentioned very briefly, I think there’s are quite a strong argument to say that the crisis with Russia and the war in Ukraine has expedited the drive, and the commitment, and the ambition of Europeans in particular to try to get to net zero more quickly. So many of the already ambitious European goals have been made even more ambitious because the Europeans now not only have an environmental drive for meeting their energy—their climate goals, but now they have a very, very real kind of a national security, economic security argument as well. So you could—there’s, I think, a reasonable debate. You know, having more ambitious goals doesn’t necessarily mean that you meet them, but I think there’s a genuine and very authentic desire on the part of the Europeans to move more quickly. Now, that said, it can also be true that on the whole, if we take a global perspective, that if we just look at that one war, which has had ripple effects throughout the world, that it’s possible that that could slow down the energy transition in other parts of the world. And of course, if we look at the anticipated carbon emissions over time, going forward in the future, I don’t know what the numbers are for Europe but when I look at those numbers and I think of it from an American perspective, 88 percent of future carbon emissions are going to happen outside of the United States. So it’s absolutely essential that the rest of the world actually is bought into, sees value in, is then supported in an energy transition. Otherwise, it’s not going to happen. So Europe could end up being a carbon-free zone or a net zero zone, but if the rest of the world isn’t there—and I think in a lot of ways the war in Ukraine has by stoking inflation, creating a food crisis, raising the cost of energy, and really deepening the divide between the developed world and the developing world—all of these things, I think, work against the energy transition. And that’s just one conflict. So, the other geopolitical environment, I could do the net-net when it came to the U.S.-China relationship, or even the war in the Middle East is having an impact on all of this. I would say, just to wrap up, if you asked me on the whole how do I see it, I’m concerned that this deteriorating geopolitical environment is impeding our ability to get to net zero in some significant ways. It’s not the only obstacle. We need policy. We need new technologies. We need big investments. There’s all of that. But I think what’s often overlooked from the conversation about climate is the fact that the geopolitical environment is really an enabler of a successful transition as well. And right now, the geopolitical environment doesn’t look so good. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I’m going to take the next written question from Michael Strmiska, who’s a professor of world history from SUNY-Orange in Middletown, New York: I’m concerned about how right-wing political movements worldwide are converting energy issues into identity politics. I refer to those who denounce green energy transition as a globalist plot and promote continuation of carbon fuel production and consumption as a badge of identity. The “drill, baby, drill” kind of rhetoric. How can those on the side of a green future combat this effort by the right wing to demonize green energy and environmentalism? O’SULLIVAN: Yeah. This is a great—it’s a great question and a great issue. And I hope that you are writing something on this because I think it’s a relatively new phenomenon in the whole energy transition landscape, but is one that can be very consequential. So I’ll just say one example of where I’ve seen this, and then your real question is, how do we combat it? I was just ten days ago, I guess, in Germany for the Munich Security Conference, which is a very large gathering of people working on national security issues. And being in Germany was an opportunity to talk to some German colleagues and friends about just, like, the political landscape, and just the general feeling among Germans about a variety of things, including the energy transition. And right now, there’s a movement on the part of the German government to require people to make certain investments in their home, which are costly—or people perceive them to be too costly. And this is in a context of a real weakening economy in the wake of the war against Ukraine and what many people often refer to, like, the deindustrialization of Germany in particular, because of such high energy prices in the wake of the efforts to get off of Russian gas. And so, there’s a sense among many Germans—not all—but a sense, like, that these requirements are just getting very expensive in an incredibly tough time. And it’s building political opposition to it. That is not just among the right wing. And I think that the question had to do with, like, the right wing and people kind of consciously taking these issues and trying to stoke right-wing ideological agendas. That is certainly happening as well. But I think it’s broader than that. I think it’s leading to—it’s contributing to the rise in populism, which I think we’re going to see most consequentially in Europe with the European Commission elections coming forward. In terms of what can be done, I mean this is where we get into the piece about energy security and how literally, like, three years ago if we titled a webinar “Energy Security,” nobody would show up because people thought, like, that’s a concept—that kind of puts you in the caveman category, right, or cavewoman category. Like, we don’t talk about energy transition. We just talk about—or, energy security. We talk about climate action. The reality is these two things are not opposite. They are absolutely two sides of the same coin. And so recognizing that energy security is—meeting energy security needs is part of almost, like, a prerequisite for a successful energy transition I think is a very different way of thinking about it than many have in the past. And I think that is part of what’s required. And the challenge is that, like, that is going to be hard to do and to keep the speed at which we need to go. And the real answer there is just more and more investment into clean energy because there’s the need to meet the energy needs, but to do so with a different kind of energy. And we’ve seen huge increases in investment into clean energy, but those investments are still far short of what is needed not only to meet additional energy demand but to start to displace the demand for coal and then, eventually, other sources of fossil fuels—or, other fossil fuels. FASKIANOS: Great. Next question from Benedetta Luccone If you can—there you go. And state your affiliation. Q: I am Benedetta Luccone, from Lewis University. And my question is, how can advances in renewable energy technology contribute to changing energy security, particularly in regions vulnerable to geopolitical instability or resource scarcity? O’SULLIVAN: OK. So, Irina, would you repeat for all of us? FASKIANOS: Maybe—yeah. If you could—you’re breaking up a little bit, Benedetta. Can you just repeat it again? Q: Yes. So how can advances in renewable energy technology contribute in changing energy security, particularly in regions vulnerable to geopolitical instability or resource scarcity? O’SULLIVAN: Sure. OK. How can renewable energy contribute to energy security, particularly in vulnerable areas? So I think there’s enormous capacity for this to prove true. A couple of things I would say about it. So, first, energy security is in its most traditional definition, it is simply having adequate supplies of energy to meet one’s economic needs and to satisfy certain levels of growth, and prosperity, and human welfare. Energy underpins almost everything that humans do on the planet. So energy security is having sufficient energy. And in some of these very vulnerable parts of the world that you talk about, one of the biggest constraints, in many cases the biggest constraint, on growth and human flourishing is the lack of energy. And so to the extent that we can have more energy meeting the energy needs of a wider swath of the globe, that is going to be beneficial. And if that—particularly if that energy is renewable. If it’s not renewable, then it brings with it a whole new set of problems related to the climate. But the basis of your question is how can renewable energy assist in these countries? And I think there’s a very real sense that if the world could meet the energy needs of these populations with renewable sources, that it would be very beneficial. A couple of—a couple of just nuances here, or smaller points from that very high-level point. I would say, you mentioned countries that were geopolitically vulnerable. And I think there’s probably a lot of different ways to define that. One of the things about renewable energy—it’s not true for every form. But if you’re thinking about really renewable energy—solar, wind, and a variety of other types of energy—a lot of that energy is produced where it’s consumed, for the most part. So that has the benefit of diminishing the requirement to be dependent on outsiders in the way that importation of natural gas through big pipelines has been an issue. That just trade and oil flowing through choke points, all of these things. If you’re producing the energy where you’re consuming it in your own country, then I think it does kind of enhance self-sufficiency and energy security. The downside, I would say, and then I’ll stop here—not the downside, but one of the things—or, a couple of things that we have to be cognizant of. And one is the fact—this is known to everybody on this call, probably—but renewable energy is still intermittent. There’s a variety of ways to address it. We’re much better at it than we were before. But it is still very hard to have renewable energy as, like, a baseload for industrial development. So, if you have a source of energy that comes in and out over the course of the day, either when the sun is shining or the wind is blowing, it’s much harder to build a factory and expect that you’re going to get that kind of development. Sure, you can charge your cell phone, you can watch television, and there are—there are enhancements to the quality of life. But in terms of, like, the kinds of development that a lot of these countries want, we either need to make—continue to make big advances in battery storage, or we need backup, which tends to be natural gas and coal. Or we need new sources of green energy, like green hydrogen. So there’s still some technology that is required in order for the benefits to be realized in the way that many of us envision. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I’m going to take the next written question from Genevieve Connell at Fordham IPED: Given that new technologies can be quite expensive to develop and distribute to emerging economies, what political strategies would it take to allow for developing countries to be able to sustain economic growth while adapting to energy transitions? O’SULLIVAN: OK. So, I think the answer to this question really gets into the whole question of climate finance and how to help ensure that countries around the world, not just wealthy Western countries, are able to benefit from clean energy technologies. And this, of course, has been an issue that has gotten a lot of attention in recent years. And that attention is almost—I don’t know that it’s crescendoed. because I think it’s still building, but it certainly was one of the really big foci of COP-28 in Dubai, which I had the privilege of attending. So, really seeing the focus on getting that clean energy finance not just to different parts of the United States, or Europe, or even Japan, but how can—how can that money go and flow into countries that are developing? And here, the need is clear. The volume of investment that has to be found and facilitated is enormous. I’d say the last annual numbers we have for clean energy investment globally is about 1.1 trillion dollars. And the sense is that that has to grow to about 4 trillion dollars a year to kind of put the world on track. You know, 4 trillion dollars per year for decades, on track. And that the majority of that needs to go to the developing world. And so when the—when the person with a question mentioned the high cost of these renewable energy, I would say there’s been enormous advantages—or, not advantages—enormous strides made in bringing down the costs of many of these clean energy technologies. Some of them are cheaper depending on their location than certain kinds of fossil fuels. The challenge is in many developing countries there are other things that make it costly to develop these clean energy projects, political risk being one of them. So, again, you have money. You want to invest in clean energy. It tends to flow to Europe or the United States rather than to Africa. And there are reasons for that that people are trying to figure out how to minimize those risks, how to create new mechanisms of political insurance, how to have blended finance where you have a big loan, part of it is from a government or government public sector entity that kind of de-risks the rest of the loan for the private sector. And then the last thing I would say, which is really important and maybe it’ll come up, again, is just this whole idea that that finance ideally will flow to these countries to help them build the capacity to be part of the clean energy supply chain, rather than just give them finance so that they can buy solar panels from China or electrolyzers from the United States. You know, not just to buy products that are made elsewhere, but to create investments in places in the supply chain, which makes them part of the green energy transition in a way that their economies and their people can really benefit. FASKIANOS: Thank you. Next question from Wilson Wameyo. There you go. Q: Hello. Thank you for talking here. I wanted to ask some question—OK, I’m going to introduce myself— FASKIANOS: Wilson, can you identify yourself? Q: Yes, I’m Wilson. I come from—I come from Poland—Jagiellonian University in Poland, but I come from Kenya originally. My question is, how is rivalry between China and the U.S. affecting energy transitions? And how can we overcome it? FASKIANOS: Can you repeat it again? Because I think you broke up, Wilson. I don’t know, did you hear it, Meghan? O’SULLIVAN: No, I didn’t. FASKIANOS: OK. (Laughs.) Q: OK. My question is, how is rivalry between China and the U.S. affecting energy transition, and how can we overcome it? O’SULLIVAN: I’m sorry, Irina, were you able—do you think Wilson could put it in writing, just so that—because I wasn’t able to discern that. FASKIANOS: Right. We heard your name clearly. And then all of a sudden it muffled when you started asking your question. So I don’t know if you change positions, or— Q: Can you hear me now? FASKIANOS: Yes. Q: OK. So my question is, how is rivalry between China and the U.S. affecting energy transition? And how can we overcome it? O’SULLIVAN: Yeah. OK. Thank you, Wilson. And thank you for persisting. This is a really great question. So, I think there’s a number of ways. As I referenced earlier but I’ll say a little bit more about, we have this global challenge. I think everyone appreciates it’s a global challenge. That this is not something that one country can solve, but is a challenge that needs to be met by many countries, adopting—and, in many cases, fundamentally changing their behavior. So when you have a global problem, the ideal way for dealing with it would be through global cooperation, because, again, we need multiple actors to bring about a solution. And I think that the COP, the Conference of the Party, mechanisms that have been in place for almost thirty years were reflective of that analysis. You know, basically we’ve got a global problem. We need a global solution. And we’re going to cooperate until we find one. And so over nearly thirty years, that has been—not the only approach, but that’s been a center point of the approach. Where that has worked the best I think is when we’ve seen the U.S. and China cooperating together. So probably the most consequential COP—I think we could debate this, but that’s not the point—I think one of the most consequential COPs was Paris—the Paris COP in 2015. And a large part of that success was that a big agreement between China and the U.S. on climate kind of greased the wheels for the rest of countries to come forward. So this was the COP in which countries decided that they would—almost all of them—would come forward with a nationally determined contribution. That they would assess their own economic situation, they would assess their own carbon emissions, they’d make goals, that ideally would be consistent with keeping global temperatures, at that that time, under two degrees. And they would present those ambitions to the global mechanisms. And the idea was that every few years or so the world would reevaluate these goals and make them more and more ambitious. And really, the fact that President Obama and President Xi got together in 2014 and came up with a bilateral agreement where both countries really advanced their ambitions, made them clear, made them public, set the stage for a lot of other countries coming forward and doing the same. So, you had meaningful U.S.-China cooperation, which helped catalyze greater global cooperation. And that U.S.-China deal in 2014 wasn’t just the product of Presidents Obama and Xi sitting down and talking. It was months of negotiation at multiple levels of government. So that’s an example of how cooperation can really be helpful. And if you look at a map of global emissions, the U.S. and China really stand out as the countries that are putting the most carbon emissions in the in the air. China more so than the United States, but the United States, historically probably a larger amount than China. So now that kind of cooperation is hard to imagine. I think our diplomats—you look at Secretary Kerry and others—continue to pursue it, continue to hope that persistent efforts to get climate cooperation between the U.S. and China have continued. And certainly that is a noble pursuit, and one that should continue. But the overall relationship is one that is so sour that it’s very hard to imagine that both countries are going to put aside all of the issues that they have on completely other issues—non-climate issues—and come up with some kind of joint strategy. In fact, the Biden administration, that was its approach for the first couple of years, was simply saying: we’re going to disagree about all these things. We’re going to argue about all these things. But we’re going to cooperate on climate because it matters to the whole world. And the Chinese approach was, well, we understand why you want to do that, but we also understand how important climate is to you. And why would we give you something without getting something in return? And, why would we divorce this issue from the rest of the relationship? So if you want to come to Beijing and talk about climate, we want to talk about Taiwan. So, there was this real block. There’s been some progress. Saw a little bit of a joint statement on methane, something about some progress over the last year or so. But in general, what has happened is that in the United States the real impetus for climate action has shifted away from thinking we’re going to get these big cooperative mechanisms to competitive approaches, like the Inflation Reduction Act, which is this very large piece of American legislation—the biggest action on the part of the United States ever taken in the climate space. And I can tell you, that that would have not happened in the absence of U.S.-China cooperation because members of Congress and of the political establishment are now so concerned about China having a competitive edge in a number of technologies that it decided, hey, it’s worth us putting hundreds of billions of dollars into American capacity to develop these technologies. And if China wasn’t on this planet, I don’t think we would have at all seen a consensus for such an enormous investment in climate, but really that investment was also in American competitiveness in the face of this very, very competitive bilateral relationship. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I’m going to go next to a written question by Gavin Rolle, who is a senior international business major at Howard University: Could you talk more about how large multinational corporations play a part in the geopolitical implications of the energy transition? O’SULLIVAN: OK. So large multinational corporations—I mean, that could mean so many different things. So I’ll make a general point and then maybe put forward a few examples. I think there’s no question that corporations in the private sector are now a big part of what is perceived as the solution. They’re also, of course, if you think about corporations as oil and gas companies, they’re part of the problem. So I think there’s that dual component of it. First, let me just talk about part of the solution. So multinational corporations, we think about all kinds of things. But the ways in which they’re going to be central to a solution is manifold. So, one, I would say think about big global mining companies and the role that they have in trying to meet this really, really staggering growth in demand that is anticipated for critical minerals which are needed for clean energy technologies, particularly batteries and large, offshore and onshore wind. So on the one hand, those companies, some of them, might be state owned—or, are state owned, from China and other places. But a lot of them are big, multinational companies that have mining operations all over the world. And so suddenly the energy transition rests to some extent on these companies being able to produce a lot more critical minerals than it was anticipated in the past. On the solution side, think about corporations, the private sector more generally, I mentioned about the need for more climate finance. Most of that new climate finance is going to have to come from the private sector. And so, again, there the question is how to mobilize that finance. But it’s not going to come from governments. The gap is just too large to be met by governments alone. And then on the contribution side, I think shifting to oil and gas companies here, you do have companies that have the ability to make very big investments in new technologies. And so, what you do see is some companies investing heavily in carbon capture and storage technologies, trying to see if those technologies can—the costs of them can be brought down and the scale that they can be exercised at can be increased. There’s some controversy around those technologies, and the idea of oil and gas companies being the funders of it. But I think on the whole, if you look at any of the scenarios of what the global energy mix looks like in a net zero global economy, there’s a big element of carbon capture, right, that we really can’t get to those goals without having that technology play a bigger role than it is today. Now, in terms of multinational companies, on the downside there is—I would say there’s this intense focus on the role that these companies play in producing oil and gas, and the role that those energy sources play in creating carbon emissions. And that—I mean, those links are very well known to all. And here, I think what I would say—this is obviously a long and complex situation—but I think we need to look at the entire energy system and see the role of energy companies in the global energy system, and to think about their supply, and think about their investments, and moving those investments into more renewable energy areas, which some of them are doing. And we also need to think about demand. That as long as global demand for oil and natural gas are rising, as they are today, you have companies that are going to be interested in meeting those goals. And when the supply falls short of the demand, what also happens is that prices go up and you have politicians trying to get companies to produce more oil. So I think it needs to be tackled from both the supply side and from the demand side. And we rightly focus on supply, but we often overlook demand. So I think whenever we’re thinking about that, we should keep both in mind. FASKIANOS: Thank you. Next question from Benjamin Schmitt, who has a raised hand. Q: Hi. Benjamin Schmitt. I’m an affiliate at the Harvard Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics and Harvard Ukraine Research Institute. One of the questions I have is, there’s been a—first of all, Meghan, thank you for doing the, quote/unquote, caveman energy security discussion today, because it’s really been lost, as you said, in some of the good—very good discussion over the energy transition. What I want to ask about is the extent to which physical energy infrastructure attacks that we’ve seen across Northern Europe in particular, but more broadly, whether it be Nord Stream, or Baltic Connector, or some of the telecommunications cables, including that in the Red Sea that we’ve seen. How does this impact the thinking of the global energy transition? Because when I was at COP-28, I tried to talk to folks as much as possible about the need to have physical infrastructure as a part of an energy security strategy. But it’s oftentimes overlooked as a key element of this, because if you don’t have energy security of the physical infrastructure, you might end up with energy poverty. And that would reduce the support for electorates to support the energy transition, which we obviously need. So want your thoughts on that. And thanks, again, for doing this great event. O’SULLIVAN: Thank you very much. And it’s always great to meet a colleague over a webinar of another institution. So nice to meet you. And I hope I’ll get to benefit from your work. You know, I think you’re hitting on an extremely important point. And it is one that I do think is very much underweighted in the conversation around climate. And that is the security of energy infrastructure. And, of course, we had some of those—some of those failures of energy infrastructure here in the United States a couple of years ago, that really made people nervous, woke people up to the importance of pipelines and energy security infrastructure. But seemingly not as much attention sustained over a long period of time. There’s no question that this is going to be part of the vulnerability of an energy transition. So it’s not just a fact today. You mentioned Nord Stream and some other pieces of infrastructure in place now which have been or were vulnerable. But this vulnerability is going to intensify dramatically as the energy transition progresses. And, again, just make more vulnerabilities with energy transition around things like electric grids, and other transmission modes, and storage. So one of the big things about the energy transition is that in a successful energy transition world, so much of what we do on a daily basis will be electrified. So I think now 20 percent of global economic activity is electrified. That number will be more like 50 percent. And so at first you think of all the additional infrastructure that is going to be needed to support the electrification, not just of the transport sector but of many, many other places. And that that electricity is going to need to be almost fully decarbonized, which is a big step up. I think, now it’s about—globally, about 38 percent of the energy flowing through to electricity is of a decarbonize nature. So you’re going to have a lot more infrastructure that is going to be sustaining a much greater proportion of global economic activity. And with that is going to come all kinds of vulnerabilities. Now, some of the vulnerabilities will be, as we’ve just been discussing, kind of like attacks, cyberattacks, physical attacks, like we saw on Nord Stream. But some of them will come from other sources. So if you think about climate change and look at just how climate change has affected the generation of clean energy in the last few years, whether it’s in France, where a very hot summer made it hard to cool the nuclear reactors of France, or in Brazil where droughts have made hydropower very hard to sustain. But then we think about increasing vicious weather systems and the impact that that’s going to have on energy infrastructure. So you have kind of manmade threats, but you also will have climate change—all of these things making this infrastructure more vulnerable. And then finally, I’d just point out, if you look at the government’s assessment of kind of cybersecurity vulnerabilities, one of the areas where I’ve had friends and colleagues who are in government kind of point out to me—this is public information, but public information that they feel nobody has focused on—is just how concerned the U.S. government is about the Chinese penetration of energy infrastructure in the United States, and presumably other parts of the world. Which is just a dormant capacity, but the sense is that if the United States and China were to get into any kind of conflict, that there’s actually a latent Chinese capacity to do some significant damage to our energy infrastructure. FASKIANOS: Thank you. Next question from John Francis, who’s at the University of Utah: Regardless of the outcome of the war in Ukraine, do you think that lasting impact on Europe will be an increased and sustained commitment to renewable energy? O’SULLIVAN: Great question. I touched on it a little bit at the beginning. Since it’s asking for my opinion, I’ll give my opinion. And as I said, I think there are some reasons why this is a good source of debate. In fact, I had this as a debate in my class not too long ago, a few weeks ago. I do think, on the whole, if you’re just talking about Europe—and I understand the question was directed towards Europe—on the whole, I do think that this is probably going to lead—not probably. I think we’re already seeing it, and I believe it will continue, which is this enhanced commitment to energy transition. So keep in mind that Europe was already there. Europe was already the most advanced in terms of reining in its carbon emissions to any other region in the world. So it already had that commitment. And this goes back to the whole caveman question. And it generally was not focusing so much on energy security, because it saw Russia as a reliable supplier over the course of decades. And so there was a desire to transition away from natural gas and fossil fuels, but there wasn’t seen to be a national security imperative at all. And that has changed. And I think that has really meant that you’re going to have this intense, intense commitment to it. Some people have asked me—I think this question was prefaced with “regardless of the outcome in Ukraine.” Some people have asked, well what happens if, when Putin is no longer in power in Russia? Are the Europeans going to go back to importing Russian natural gas? And my answer there would be, I don’t really see that happening even remotely to the scale of European dependence before the war. Even in the face of a different kind of Russia. I think the effort that the Europeans are taking to move away from Russian natural gas is not going to be easily reversed, even in the face of a different kind of government in Russia—which I’m quite skeptical about happening in the short term in any case. So I think we could certainly imagine a future in which Europe is importing more Russian gas than it’s importing now—and it still is importing Russian gas, a lot of it liquefied natural gas. But I don’t see it reverting back to the volumes in which the Europeans were importing Russian natural gas before the war. I see more of this commitment to meeting energy needs through renewable energy. What I see is really slowing it down, to some extent, is what we talked about earlier, which is the rise of populism and that, again, if energy security becomes a rallying factor for European politics, I think it could influence some of the initiative and energy and resources that exists to go into it. But I don’t think the political commitment is going to disappear. FASKIANOS: Great. I’d like to go to Ken Bernier at Central New Mexico Community College, with a raised hand. Q: Yes. Thank you, Irina and Dr. O’Sullivan. I am with Central New Mexico Community College, in the political science department. I had a relatively simple question, and it’s a follow on to Nord Stream. I’ve read Seymour Hersh’s article and I’m trying to figure out, was this an attempt to convert Europe to green energy quicker or was it an attempt to stymie Russia’s influence on providing natural gas and reaping the benefits of all that money? Thank you. O’SULLIVAN: So I haven’t read Seymour Hersh’s article, so I’m at a disadvantage. And when somebody says, I’m asking a relatively simple question, I always think, Ken, hmm, that’s not going to be simple. So it’s hard. I haven’t read the article. And to be honest, I think there’s a lot of uncertainty around the motives and the particular actors, and who ordered it, and all of that. So I think it’s a little bit hard to answer your question in a very specific sense. I think what was happening—if you look at the graph of how Europe was getting off of Russian energy before the explosions in the Nord Stream pipelines, it was moving pretty rapidly away from Russian natural gas. And the flows through the Nord Stream pipelines had diminished greatly but were still substantial in some way. I suppose—again, I could speculate on the motives of potentially various actors, but I think that the trend line away from Russian energy was very, very clear. And if we keep in mind—we kind of go back to—the IEA had this report that came out. I think it came out in March 2022. And it basically was an assessment. This is the International Energy Agency in Paris. It had this assessment of what does Europe need to do to get off of Russian energy by the end of the year? I think that was their timeframe. And they had ten steps. And these were really hard steps. They had to do with curbing European demand for Russian energy, or energy generally. Had to do with diversifying supply. Had to do with reigniting politically controversial nuclear power plants. Had to do with building new LNG capacity. All of these things, to get away from Russia natural gas. And I looked at that plan and I thought, like, well, that’s great. It’s good that there’s a path forward. But I was deeply skeptical that it would be able to be achieved. And I think for the most part the Europeans outperformed even their own expectations. And I think that would have happened regardless of whether that pipeline had been destroyed or not. So I don’t know that that particular act had a fundamental effect on the direction of Europe weaning itself away from Russian gas. FASKIANOS: So thank you, Meghan. I’m going to take—there are lots of written questions and raised hands, and I’m sorry that we can’t get to them all. But I wanted to take the opportunity. If you could just give us a little bit—we have professors and students on the call. You’ve worked in—you’ve worked in the government. You’re now heading up the Belfer Center. And just talk a little bit about your career choices and encouraging students, what you would like to say to students and professors who are teaching students, what you would like to leave with them about career opportunities. O’SULLIVAN: Sure. So, first of all, I’ve really enjoyed speaking with you all, and wish we had more time to go through your questions and hear from you. I’ve been at Harvard now for about sixteen years. And before that, as Irina mentioned when she was introducing me, I served in the U.S. government. And I served at the State Department. And I served at the Pentagon, and overseas. And most of my time at the White House. And I sort of feel like there are different stages in life and different delights out of different career paths. And I think that many of the professors on this call will share with me the real sense of privilege to be able to teach young people, and inspire young people, and to learn from young people. It’s a great thing to be in an environment that is filled with people with lots of energy to change the world. But being in government was a certain kind of extraordinary privilege as well. And in many respects, the ability to combine both of those things I feel has been a true professional gift, but one that that many people are able to create because there’s a real synthesis between thinking deeply about things and then deciding that you’re going to take the deep thought that you have had the opportunity to indulge in and try to turn it into action. And to me, that’s just been one of the greatest satisfactions of my career, is to have an idea and work with others in a government setting to try to put it into action. Of course, there are other settings where you can put ideas into action—the private sector, that world of philanthropy. There’s lots of places to do that. In government, the beauty and challenge of it is, one, you can never do it on your own. So it’s inherently a collaborative effort. And two, the government can be very hard to maneuver, very hard to get an aircraft carrier to shift course. But when it does, it’s so powerful and your impact is magnified. So, I would say that if you’re interested in public service it is still a very noble career. And it is one that I think you’ll find enlists every part of you. You’ve got to be smart, but you also have to know how to cajole people and convince people. You have to be persuasive. You have to have a certain amount of stamina. You have to be able to look at the long term, but also not lose track of the details. So, if you like to challenge yourself and you’d like to wake up and never ask yourself the question, what am I doing, then I definitely would consider a career in public service. FASKIANOS: Thank you very much, Meghan. That was terrific. Again, Meghan O’Sullivan. If you haven’t read her book, Windfall, you should, as well as go back to those articles that she mentioned coauthoring with Jason Bordoff in Foreign Affairs. We have already sent out—shared at least one with you, but you should go back and look at those. And thank you for serving on our board. We look forward to seeing how you’re shaping the Belfer Center as the new leader of it. To all of you, thank you for your questions and written questions. I’m sorry, if we could not get to you. We will just have to have another webinar on this topic. The next one will be on Wednesday, March 6, at 1:00 p.m. with David Scheffer, who is a senior fellow at CFR. And he’ll talk about complex humanitarian emergencies. In the meantime, I encourage you to learn about CFR paid internships for students and fellowships for professors at CFR.org/careers. You can follow us at @CFR_academic on X, and visit CFR.org, ForeignAffairs.com, and ThinkGlobalHealth.org for research and analysis on global issues. So, again, thank you all, and thank you, Meghan O’Sullivan. O’SULLIVAN: Thank you. (END)
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