Gauging the Impact of Massive U.S.-Israeli Strikes on Iran

“We are certainly interested [in] de-escalation,” Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi told NBC News after the strikes. “This is a war of choice by the United States, and they have to pay for that.”

To better understand the potential fallout, CFR experts provide assessments of the brewing conflict. 

Iran Strikes Highlight Exceptional U.S.-Israeli Coordination

Elliott Abrams is senior fellow for Middle Eastern studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. He previously served as a special representative for Iran and Venezuela in the first Trump administration.

Israelis are spending another day in bomb shelters to protect themselves from Iranian attacks, but this time is different.

First, the Iranian salvos follow a carefully planned, simultaneous U.S.-Israeli operation. Israeli sources have said that the date of the attack was agreed upon two weeks ago. The ongoing and exceptionally close cooperation between the U.S. military and the Israeli Defense Forces—and between President Donald Trump and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu—has reached a new high. The safest assumption is that the joint Trump-Netanyahu decision to attack Iran was made during Netanyahu’s visit to Washington two weeks ago.

Second, the objective is not to merely degrade the Iranian nuclear weapons sites or hit its missile launchers, but force regime change. Trump was clear about that in his first statement. This marks a profound change in stated Israeli and U.S. goals: while the fall of the regime has long been wished for, it has never been the objective of a joint military campaign, nor has any U.S. president so directly called upon Iranians to rise up. Iran is the greatest security threat to Israel, so this change in U.S. objectives will be warmly welcomed.

Third, this is a campaign, not a one-off strike. No end date has been set, so Israel can likely count on U.S. involvement until hostilities cease.

For Netanyahu, the joint campaign is another display of his close relationship with Trump, and it will strengthen the Israeli leader politically. This is an election year in Israel, and a successful joint operation against Iran will help Netanyahu maintain the sense, for many Israeli voters, that he is uniquely positioned to deal with Israel’s enemies.

Israel is being hit with everything Iran can throw at it, including waves of missiles and drones, and there will be damage and casualties. Israelis know that their much-vaunted and highly effective air defenses are not impenetrable. Given Iran’s strikes on U.S. military targets based in neighboring Gulf countries, Israelis will assume that no targets in their country are off-limits, including purely civilian sites such as office buildings or hospitals. They know the coming week will be extremely difficult, and already their country is isolated by the closure of its air space and airports.

In a deeper sense, however, Israel is not alone. Not only is it in a close partnership with the United States, but also with several of their Arab neighbors—including Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates—who are also under attack by Iran. Together, these countries share a common adversary and will have much to discuss through in diplomatic, intelligence, and military channels about Iran’s attacks and its postwar future. Israelis will wonder today whether, after decades hearing the Iranian regime shout “Death to Israel,” a new era is coming in the Middle East.

Iran’s Arab Neighbors, Targeted in Reprisals, Brace for Iranian Instability

Steven A. Cook is Eni Enrico Mattei senior fellow for Middle East and Africa studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.

Unlike the U.S. strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities in June 2025, President Donald Trump’s Operation Epic Fury seeks to topple the Islamic Republic. It is a risky strategy given the enormous challenges of trying to engineer regime change from thousands of miles away. The president clearly hopes that the large numbers of Iranians who have been in revolt against their government for some time will take matters into their own hands and bring an end to clerical rule.

The uncertainty of both military operations and regime change has left governments in the region on edge. Ahead of U.S. military operations, Gulf states made clear they would not participate in any attack on Iran, though they are likely providing technical assistance to the United States given their responsibilities as U.S. Central Command partners.

As is often the case, regional governments’ positions are more nuanced than their public pronouncements would suggest. The leadership of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) do not want to get dragged into a conflict and are concerned that potential chaos in Iran will affect the trillion-dollar bets they are making on their domestic transformations. Yet they are hardly supporters of the Iranian regime. After the Iranians retaliated this morning with attacks on Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE—which all host U.S. military personnel—the Saudis condemned Iran and offered to put their “capabilities at the disposal in support of any measures [the Arab states] may undertake.” The Emiratis intercepted Iranian ballistic missiles and have reserved the right to respond. No one in any leadership position in Abu Dhabi or Riyadh will lament the passing of the Iranian regime should the Islamic Republic fall. 

Doha has had better relations with Iran than other Gulf states, but Qatar issued a strong condemnation of Iran’s retaliatory strikes on its territory. Relations between the two countries were already strained after Iran fired on Al Udeid Air Base (near Doha) last summer. Still, Qatar will continue to share a massive gas field with Iran and thus must manage the bilateral relationship. For its part, Oman’s government condemned the U.S. military operations. Its foreign minister, Badr bin Hamad al-Busaidi, was in the United States on the eve of military operations lobbying the Trump administration against an attack.

Uncertainty will be the watchword for Gulf leaders in the coming days, weeks, and months. Now that military action has begun, their greatest fear is likely the survival of the Iranian regime. They do not want a weakened, vengeful regime as a neighbor.

This work represents the views and opinions solely of the authors. The Council on Foreign Relations is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher, and takes no institutional positions on matters of policy.