Trump Wants to Reset U.S. Space Policy to Assure Dominance. His New Plan Needs Work

Esther Brimmer is the James H. Binger senior fellow in global governance at the Council on Foreign Relations.

The December 18 swearing-in of Jared Isaacman as the new NASA administrator and the announcement of a new national space policy reasserts the Trump administration’s aim to achieve U.S. dominance in space. The stakes of President Donald Trump’s space ambitions are immense for both U.S. national security and economic prosperity. As CFR’s recent Task Force report, Securing Space: A Plan for U.S. Action, explained, Americans have come to heavily depend on thousands of satellites orbiting the globe that affect most of daily life, such as GPS and crop planting.

But the United States is not the only country working in space. China is emerging as a near-peer competitor and others are launching their own satellites at increasing rates. More than ninety countries have assets in space observing Earth or providing information. Countries need to agree on practical rules to manage space traffic and enhance space sustainability. Given the stakes and increasing dependencies on these technologies, leaders must make responsible choices to ensure that space remains a peaceful and predictable environment. 

Bearing the bold title, “Ensuring American Space Superiority,” Trump’s space policy executive order blends a collection of forward-leaning policies, a fulsome support for nuclear power in space, and tight deadlines. But to succeed, space policy must also facilitate setting practical rules-of the-road for space safety supported by all countries.

Goals for a new space age

The document opens with uplifting goals to “extend the reach of human discovery, secure the Nation’s vital economic and security interests, unleash commercial development, and lay the foundation for a new space age.” It sets tight deadlines to “return Americans to the Moon by 2028” and to have “initial elements of a permanent lunar outpost by 2030.” While it mentions actions to “enable the next steps to Mars exploration,” it places a focus on “prioritizing lunar exploration.”

The CFR Task Force called for ideally having White House-based space policy leadership. The first Trump administration revived and used the National Space Council. Some administrations have used the National Security Council. The new policy features a different White House-based leader, the Assistant to the President for Science and Technology (APST) but still supports space policy with presidential leadership.

The document calls for the APST to deliver an interagency plan within 90 days. Of note are the deadlines for additional actions by relevant federal agencies to develop and deepen actions that expedite the rollout of the new space policy. These include a new space security strategy within 180 days that counters “potential adversary placement of nuclear weapons in space” and a report on “industrial capacity gaps.” The policy emphasizes a role for nuclear energy by establishing a National Initiative for American Space Nuclear Power. The document also calls for “developing and demonstrating prototype next-generation missile defense. Curiously, it refers to this as “The Iron Dome for America,” using the name for the Israeli system rather than the “Golden Dome” system the administration is moving to develop.

The report also mentions a diplomatic strategy, charging the Secretary of State to implement “a plan to strengthen ally and partner contributions to United States and collective space security.” This suggests continued support for the Artemis Accords, a set of principles on cooperation and use of space. These accords were first launched at the end of the first Trump administration in 2020, expanded by the Biden administration, and continued by the second Trump administration. As of November 2025, sixty countries have signed the accords.

The executive order removes earlier policy directives. While it authorizes a new space policy, the order also dismantles elements of previous policy mechanisms, including the National Space Council that was originally launched at the end of the first Trump administration. The new policy enhances the role of the Commerce Department in acquisition and prioritizes solutions from commercial entities.

Boosting commercial space efforts

The influence and impact of the dynamic commercial space industry, known as “New Space,” is evident. The new policy integrates commercial entities in many aspects of its policy implementation. Notably, it wants to attract $50 billion of additional investment in U.S. space markets by 2028 and spur “private sector initiative and a commercial pathway to replace the International Space Station by 2030.” The policy further aims to increase the pace of launch and reentry through private sector efforts.

The new policy does not mention existing international rules for managing outer space. This is worrying—though hardly surprising for an administration involved in upending many international norms. In the 1960s and 1970s, the United States, along with other spacefaring countries and more than a hundred countries with some interest in space, ratified four major treaties. The foundational 1967 Outer Space Treaty and the related treaties govern activities in Earth’s orbit, cislunar space between the Earth and the Moon, and around the Moon and beyond. Notwithstanding the administration’s distaste for international agreements, in an era of space competition, the United States should recognize the value of standards that can help keep space orderly.

With the Artemis Accords, the administration has a way to work with other countries, but this is still a subset of like-minded countries. These accords are a worthy initiative which can foster cooperation in space, but they are not enough. In this domain shared by all states, countries need to agree on basic safety norms that apply to all. 

Progress requires cooperation

The new policy is incomplete without a sustained strategy to collaborate with other countries to set up practical rules. In fact, U.S. leadership in space is hampered by the country’s spurning of efforts at cooperation with those otherwise willing to work with Washington. 

A small but illustrative example: Each year, a small technical body known as the United Nations Committee on Peaceful Use of Outer Space meets and reports to the UN General Assembly, where parties review and approve the recommendations. Experts from many countries, including the United States, work toward practical, technical measures that would benefit the United States as the leading space power. Yet, despite U.S. contributions of ideas in this year’s process, Washington opposed the final non-binding resolution, which passed anyway by a 171–1 vote in the General Assembly. In an earlier statement, the administration opposed the draft resolution because it referred to sustainable development and climate change. This is ultimately harmful to U.S. ambitions; to achieve practical good conduct standards in space, the United States needs to work constructively in relevant technical international organizations.

The United States depends on space more than any other country, including exquisite intelligence satellites and precise positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) systems. These PNT systems underpin the U.S. Global Positioning System and its international corollaries, including China’s BeiDou, Europe’s Galileo, Russia’s GLONASS, India’s Indian Regional Navigation satellite system, and Japan’s Quasi-zenith Satellite System.

Oddly, the new policy seems to be at variance with recent U.S. space funding requests. It is not clear if the new policy will be supported by a recommitment to funding a robust space program and the related agencies and officials across the federal government whose expertise support U.S. space leadership. In its fiscal year 2026 budget the administration had proposed large cuts to NASA’s budget (a 24 percent cut to NASA’s overall budget and 47 percent to its science budget). NASA and other science funding is only covered until January 31, 2026, under Congress’s continuing resolution. Gutting of science funding and undermining the independence of universities erodes the ecosystem that has helped create U.S. leadership in space. The new space policy offers a chance for a revitalized approach to U.S. leadership in this vital domain.

This work represents the views and opinions solely of the author. The Council on Foreign Relations is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher, and takes no institutional positions on matters of policy.