China in the Taiwan Strait: February 2025

Military exercises near Taiwan: Taiwan accused the People’s Republic of China (PRC) of violating international norms and undermining stability by carrying out military exercises forty nautical miles off the coast of Taiwan on February 26. The Eastern Theater Command of China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) executed a joint combat readiness drill to the southwest and west of Taiwan, which included fighter jets, other aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles, and warships. Twenty-two PLA aircraft crossed the median line in the Taiwan Strait during the drills. Although Beijing initially claimed the exercise would involve “shooting training,” indicating potential live-fire drills, Taipei ultimately did not detect any such activity. Taiwan deployed naval ships and aircraft to waters near the drill zone to monitor the situation throughout the day. Taiwan condemned the actions as a provocation and a threat to regional security as well as commercial activity; a spokesperson for China’s Defense Ministry responded by alleging that Taiwanese authorities were “playing tricks for . . . attention.” One Taiwanese official told reporters that, despite other Chinese military activity surrounding the island in recent years, the February 26 exercises were extremely rare and exceeded general expectations. The incident also coincided with similar PLA drills carried out with minimal warning in the waters surrounding Australia and New Zealand—both U.S. partners with existing security relationships with Taiwan—in the same week.

On the topic of military drills, the joint commission that organizes the annual Cobra Gold military exercises in Thailand (a multilateral exercise that includes the United States and many of its Asian partners) caused some confusion in late February when it unintentionally posted statements indicating that Taiwan would take part in the 2025 exercises. The commission clarified on February 26 that all mentions of Taiwan were caused by a transcription error and that no Taiwanese forces would be participating in Cobra Gold.

The future of chips: Following multiple indications by U.S. President Donald Trump that he has considered imposing tariffs on foreign semiconductor chips, senior Taiwanese economic officials arrived in Washington, DC, on February 11 to discuss this issue and the broader U.S.-Taiwan economic relationship. The officials’ meetings directly coincided with the first board meeting of the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) to be held in Arizona; TSMC is building chip-production plants in the state partially due to incentives provided under the CHIPS and Science Act, which was signed into law during the Joe Biden administration. Experts consider the U.S.-Taiwan semiconductor trade to be a pillar of the bilateral economic relationship. CFR Fellow David Sacks and Research Associate Seaton Huang outline the importance of Taiwanese chip production to the U.S. economy and American imports of those chips to Taiwan’s national security in their article “Onshoring Semiconductor Production: National Security Versus Economic Efficiency.”

Defense and security: In preparation for potential Chinese targeting of Taiwanese leadership at the outset of a conflict, the island’s sixty-sixth marine brigade will likely transform into a strategic reserve force to support the military police command’s operations to defend Taipei and its airport in the event of a crisis. The brigade’s tanks and artillery vehicles will be eliminated in favor of a new drone unit. As of February 5, one hundred marines were stationed at Taipei’s Songshan Airport to protect the critical facility, which is located near downtown Taipei. In another sign of heightened worries surrounding a potential Chinese invasion, Admiral Samuel Paparo, commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, assessed in a speech at the Honolulu Defense Forum that PLA military exercises around Taiwan have become so extensive that they could soon be used to conceal the early stages of an invasion. He also told attendees that Chinese military demonstrations surrounding Taiwan are “not exercises; they are rehearsals,” and he called for an increase in the production of unmanned systems and for reforms to the U.S. weapons-procurement process to hasten weapons delivery to Taiwan. Speaking at the Halifax Security Forum on February 21 (hosted, for the first time, in Taipei), Taiwanese Vice President Hsiao Bi-khim emphasized Taiwan’s whole-of-society efforts to deter a Chinese invasion, defend its democratic society, build its strength, and sustain peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region. At the same forum, President Lai Ching-te delivered opening remarks in which he emphasized the threat to peace posed by Chinese gray-zone coercion.

The Executive Yuan, which functions as the president’s cabinet and is led by his appointed premier, vetoed the legislature’s proposed 2025 budget on February 27. Among other concerns, Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) leadership disapproved of the opposition coalition’s proposed cuts to defense, diplomatic affairs, and public diplomacy, which would affect the government’s efforts to produce weapons systems such as submarines and drones meant to deter Chinese invasion, improve Taiwan’s diplomatic standing, and counter Chinese information and influence operations, respectively.

On February 20, a Taiwanese military official told the media that the island’s indigenously produced Sea Oryx missile system would soon be entering a new phase of testing and that the government would move to procure the system, provided it passes. The Sea Oryx system, designed to intercept missiles threatening Taiwanese combat vessels and larger warships, will also be produced in a mobile land-based variant to assist in the defense of the island. It failed one round of testing in December 2024 but has undergone revisions over the last few months.

Keep your friends close and your enemies out: On February 5, following the completion of a military drill in coordination with the United States, Australia, and the Philippines, the Japanese maritime destroyer Akizuki sailed through the Taiwan Strait. The event marked the first time a Japanese Self Defense Force vessel has made a solo transit through the strait. Days later, on February 16, the Canadian navy’s frigate HMCS Ottawa made the same trip—the sixth time Canada has sent a warship through the strait since 2022. U.S. Navy vessels passed through the strait on February 12.

A recent report by the Economist indicates that support for China’s position on Taiwan (embodied in its so-called One China principle, which states that there is one China in the world—the PRC—and that Taiwan is a part of the PRC, is growing in popularity among countries in the Global South. Taiwan’s support among its security partners, however, remains steadfast: at the Munich Security Conference, the United States, Japan, and South Korea made a statement in support of Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international organizations—the first time South Korea has made such a statement. Following Chinese criticism over the State Department’s decision to remove the phrase “we do not support Taiwan independence" from the fact sheet on U.S.-Taiwan relations, a State Department spokesperson referred to the change as a “routine” revision. A PRC spokesperson called the change a serious regression and indicated it would cause serious damage to the U.S.-China relationship, while Taiwanese Foreign Minister Lin Chia-lung welcomed the alteration to the fact sheet.

On February 3, Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) Minister Chiu Chui-Cheng announced that the MAC had rejected the visa applications of thirteen officials from Shanghai. The officials represented Shanghai’s Taiwan Affairs Office and had planned to attend the Taipei Lantern Festival. On February 20, the Taiwanese Ministry of Education banned three Chinese educational institutions from participating in exchanges with Taiwanese institutions and students. Huaqiao University, Jinan University Guangzhou, and Beijing Chinese Language and Culture College were determined to be affiliated with aspects of the Chinese government responsible for the United Front strategy, Beijing’s effort to use information operations and other tools to influence the Taiwanese population’s views on national identity and China itself.

Divided front: Taipei is continuing its campaign to counter the United Front strategy specifically when it comes to Chinese efforts to convince Taiwanese citizens to obtain PRC residency and nationality documentation. On February 14, Lai announced that his government would consider amending the Cross-Strait Act to prevent that strategy from threatening Taiwan’s national security. Taiwan is also considering measures such as fines to dissuade its nationals from obtaining PRC residency permits. After a Taiwanese navy sailor was found to be illegally in possession of a PRC identification document, the Ministry of National Defense (MND) announced a new policy that will require new members of the military to sign legal documents stating they do not hold foreign citizenship and inform the MND of any foreign identification documents they possess. This February, Taiwan’s Ministry of the Interior (MOI) announced it would investigate companies accused by online commentators of helping Taiwanese nationals illegally apply for PRC identification cards. On February 20, the MOI canceled the household registrations of ten people possessing Chinese identification documents.

According to Taiwan’s MAC, fifty-two Taiwanese nationals have been detained or gone missing in the PRC since January 2024. Taipei is warning the public that travel to the PRC has become more dangerous since June 2024, when Beijing announced new implementation measures related to a 2023 law that dictates harsh punishments for anyone who supports Taiwan independence or incites secessionist activities, which are broadly defined. For example, an author and publisher known as Fu Cha was sentenced in a closed-door court proceeding this February to three years in prison for inciting secession (on top of an existing nine-year sentence for separatist activities). Fu Cha is editor in chief of a Taipei house responsible for publishing certain PRC-critical original and translated materials. According to Human Rights Watch, Fu Cha renounced his PRC citizenship to become a Taiwanese national in early 2023 and was detained that March on a trip to Shanghai, which he likely took to formally rescind his mainland residency registration. Taipei is especially warning those who work in sensitive sectors and academia to expect scrutiny and searches if they travel to the PRC.

Espionage: On February 12, Taiwanese prosecutors indicted Chang Hsien-yao, a former legislator from the opposition Kuomintang (KMT) Party, on charges that he interfered in the island’s 2024 presidential election at the direction of PRC officials. He allegedly met with Chinese officials and, at their urging and with their financial backing, organized support for presidential and vice-presidential candidates considered more friendly to China than the incumbent DPP leadership. Chang organized in support of PRC-favored Terry Gou of the KMT for president and Ko Wen-je of the Taiwan People’s Party for vice president. Gou flirted with a presidential campaign but never formally entered the race; Ko ran for president as a third-party candidate. According to the indictment, PRC officials passed instructions to Chang throughout the presidential campaign.

Also in February, a prosecutor indicted a man named Huang in connection with an alleged PRC plan to identify members of the Taiwanese armed forces in financial straits and offer them large loans through unregistered banks in exchange for sensitive information, such as the details of Taiwanese military exercises. The banks, one of which was allegedly opened and operated by Huang, would later use debt incurred by targets as leverage to extract further information. Huang has not been located by authorities since the indictment was released.

Eight Taiwanese military officers were sentenced to up to thirteen years each in prison in February for spying. The group members arranged to pass information on Taiwanese military exercises to PRC officials. One member of the group, Lieutenant Colonel Hsieh, was sentenced to nine years in prison by the island’s high court for planning to defect to China by flying a U.S.-made CH-47 Chinook helicopter onto a PLA navy carrier in the Taiwan Strait in exchange for $15 million and safe passage out of Taiwan for his family in the event of a China-Taiwan conflict.

Cable concerns compound: Following last month’s spike in suspicious activity by so-called ghost ships in the waterways surrounding Taiwan, February saw a series of similar incidents. A Mongolian-flagged cargo ship called the Bao Shun, which had been driven out of Taiwanese waters by the Taiwan’s Coast Guard on January 7, was again detected in Taiwanese waters between late January and early February. The Bao Shun is one of several cargo ships Taiwan has been monitoring due to suspicion that their crews have intentionally damaged undersea telecommunications cables that enable internet and telecommunications service for Taiwan at the PRC’s direction. Tension escalated significantly on February 25 when the Taiwanese Coast Guard boarded and detained the Hong Tai, a Chinese-owned freighter carrying Togolese flags. The captain and crew—all Chinese nationals—were taken into custody on accusations of deliberately dropping and dragging the ship’s anchor along the sea floor in the Taiwan Strait, resulting in the severance of a Chunghwa telecommunications cable connecting Taiwan’s main island to Penghu Island. The cable’s rupture interfered with inter-island communications. Tainan courts have launched an investigation, and the Taiwan Coast Guard did not rule out the possibility that the incident was part of a PRC-directed gray-zone intrusion operation.

By air and by sea: In February, 362 PLA aircraft violated Taiwan’s self-declared air defense identification zone, the highest number since October 2024. Of these, fifty-nine aircraft crossed the median line in the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan’s MND spotted six high-altitude balloons flying over Taiwan on February 10, with one passing directly over the main island. Although similar balloons of Chinese origin began to appear in Taiwanese skies in 2023, this was the highest number to appear in a single day since February 2024. The PRC has long asserted that the balloons are used for meteorological purposes. On February 25, four PRC Coast Guard ships entered Taiwanese territorial waters off the coast of the Taiwan-controlled Kinmen islands. The ships left Taiwanese waters three hours later, driven away by Taiwanese Coast Guard vessels deployed to respond.