“Banditry” and the Folly of Appeasement

Authorities in the northwestern state of Katsina have come under fire in the Nigerian media following revelations by an online publication, Sahara Reporters, of a secret plan by the government to release seventy suspected terrorists, some of whom are currently standing trial for serious crimes across the state’s court system. The planned release follows a “peace deal” apparently reached with various armed groups operating in the state whereby the government committed to freeing “repentant bandits” in exchange for peace in frontline local governments and communities. While critics have warned that releasing suspects accused of serious crimes “could undermine the rule of law, deny justice to victims, and embolden criminal networks,” the plan has been defended by the state’s Commissioner for Internal Security and Home Affairs Nasir Muazu, who has compared it to “what happens during wartime, where warring parties exchange prisoners.”

On the surface, this appears to be little more than a basic disagreement over how to bring about peace in Katsina state and by inference other parts of the northern region ravaged by extremist violence. Seen in this way, critics of the plan have every reason to object to a plan that, as one commentator rightly notes, blurs the distinction between “criminals who should face the full weight of the law” or “legitimate actors in a conflict who deserve negotiated settlement.“ At the same time, Mr. Muazu can plead, never mind how implausible it may sound, that the state government was merely exploring every possible avenue to secure peace, and that “the issue is not whether an offense was committed or not, but ensuring peace.”

The issue, of course, boils down to what kind of “offense” is being committed, a question that cannot be answered without asking who or what the “offenders” are. Are the various violent non-state actors who have held the entire northern region and Middle Belt parts of Nigeria hostage for the better part of two decades mere “bandits” with understandable socioeconomic and political grievances, or are they extremists whose violence is calculated to disembowel the current order in Nigeria and replace it with a theological alternative? The way one answers this question logically commits one to a set of policy responses at the expense of another.

As is evident with Mr. Muazu and the entire Katsina state government apparatus, the theory that social breakdown across northern Nigeria is an outcome of the operations of “bandits” with a coherent political grievance has no shortage of advocates. In recent times, two of the most consistent arguers for the perspective have been prominent Islamic cleric Sheikh Ahmad Abubakar Gumi and former Executive Secretary of the Nigerian National Health Insurance Scheme Professor Usman Yusuf. Not only have the two claimed that “banditry” in northern Nigeria is a function of “systemic marginalization, poverty, and historical grievances,” hence not susceptible to “a military solution”; they have put their monies where their mouths are by visiting with the bandits in their hideouts and, in the case of Mr. Gumi, directly preaching to them to repent their violent ways. Even more controversially, both have called for amnesty for the bandits “the same way that it was granted to Niger Delta militants.”

The appeal of the idea that “bandits” are “victims driven to violence by government neglect” is partly understandable. Banditry, characterized by various forms of criminal violence, including cattle rustling, abductions for ransom, rape, armed robbery, and village raids, has a long history in northern Nigeria, especially across the northwestern corridor of the country. At the same time, there is no question about the poverty of the northern region, especially in relation to the south. According to the National Bureau of Statistics, “65 percent of the poor and less educated” live in the northern region. The question is (1) whether bandit violence is motivated by political grievance and, ipso facto, (2) whether an amnesty program similar to the one largely successfully implemented in the Niger Delta is applicable to the north.

The ardor and apparent sincerity of its advocates notwithstanding, there seems to be scant evidence that the so-called bandits have a genuine political grievance. In the first place, if they do, it is yet to be clearly and openly articulated. Other than the remonstrations of Messrs. Gumi and Yusuf on behalf of the bandits, a sincere observer of the situation across northwestern Nigeria has nothing to go by in terms of a systematic case for political disenfranchisement. For ostensible subalterns who have had various opportunities to speak up, the silence from the bandits is striking.

This is what makes the analogy with the Niger Delta situation—that, and the subsequent recommendation of an amnesty for the bandits—so fundamentally misjudged. Beyond the fact that there was an outbreak of violence in both cases, there is no basis for comparison between banditry in northern Nigeria and agitation for equitable allocation of oil proceeds in the Niger Delta. For instance, so far as we know, there is no northern equivalent for Ken Saro-Wiwa, the writer and environmental rights activist who paid the supreme sacrifice after a farce of a trial in 1995. For any comparison between northern Nigeria and the Niger Delta to be plausible, we need to see proof of legitimate political grievance in the northwest. Part of the reason why it was possible for the administration of Umaru Musa Yar’Adua (2007–2010) to initiate amnesty for Niger Delta militants, and why violence across the region has subsequently subsided, is that, even when the violence was extreme, the underlying political grievance was never far from view.

The contrast with the Niger Delta does not end there. The Niger Delta militants never engaged in mass atrocities/killing of civilians the way the bandits have done in the north. Nor did they (i.e., Niger Delta militants) ever say anything about wanting to institute or impose any religious ideology on the rest of the country.

Overall, not only have northern bandits failed to show cause, there is little evidence that negotiations with them have yielded the touted peace dividend. On the contrary, the entire spectacle, conducted largely in a cloak-and-dagger manner by agents who seem to have an ideological dog in the fight, appears to have turned into a bureaucratic and financial boondoggle. The political contentiousness of the issue forms the immediate backdrop to the comment by Nigerian Defense Minister General Christopher Gwabin Musa during a recent BBC interview to the effect that any state governor found to be negotiating with terrorists will be assumed to be a supporter of terrorism.

As if to avoid any misunderstanding, General Musa went on to add: “Peace deals with terrorists are never one of our non-kinetic means. The terrorists don’t respect peace deals. It is a camouflage. It is only when they are looking for something, and if you trust them, they will renege and later attack you. The bandits don’t believe in a peace deal, they are lying.”

If (1) bandits do not respect peace deals (something, incidentally, that they themselves have made abundantly clear) and (2) many indeed continue to reject their characterization as criminals, why do northern leaders continue to swear by a policy of appeasement?

The obvious deduction is that an emphasis on banditry, which also implies a quest for a non-military means of placating bandit violence, is a stratagem to avoid a conversation about the undeniable religious dimension to the security crisis in northern Nigeria. Unfortunately, a cross section of the Western media has wholeheartedly adopted this framing, forgetting that it is impossible to understand the situation without reference to its all-important religious dimension, in particular the various terrorist groups’ theological avowals.

No matter how strong the desire for peace in northern Nigeria, it is destined to come to naught if not grounded in reality and informed by an unflinching recognition of the ideological drivers of terrorism.

No amount of wishing Islamism away will make it disappear.