How the World Is Seeing the United States as 2026 Begins
The White House started 2026 at a sprint, launching an array of surprising policy proposals and actions. The rest of the world is trying to catch up—processing implications and forming responses in real time.
This has proven an especially useful moment for the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) to connect with public- and private-sector leaders from outside the United States. In early January, CFR sought their anonymous perspectives to facilitate frank discussion. Regular dialogues such as these help us predict how international reactions to U.S. policy could influence the global economy, financial markets, and foreign policy in the year (and years) ahead. The latest conversation, held in mid-January, included attendees from Africa, the Americas, Asia, Europe, and the Middle East.
To help others think through an exceptional few weeks for U.S. policy, CFR is sharing key takeaways from the meeting. Perhaps not surprisingly, given Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro’s January 3 capture by the United States, the initial focus of the group was on the Western Hemisphere.
The Latest National Security Strategy and the Western Hemisphere
The December release of the U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) provided backdrop for the conversation around shifting U.S. alliances and policy. The report represented a major departure from previous U.S. national security frameworks and appears to have been in mind during Maduro’s removal.
Initial analysis of the NSS by CFR fellows highlighted its criticism of European allies and pledges to assert U.S. influence in the Western Hemisphere, as well as its abandonment of the 2022 NSS focus on strengthening democracy and preserving peace under the current world order. Foreign leaders are trying to gauge what that strategic reorientation will mean for different parts of the world.
For Venezuela, two scenarios were discussed. The optimistic case includes a relatively quick increase in Venezuelan oil exports (even if they remain a small percentage of global output). That windfall could help the Venezuelan economy and translate to potentially greater political stability. In that case, the United States could be emboldened to pursue other economic goals in Cuba, Greenland, and Panama, among others.
In the less hopeful scenario, the new Venezuelan leadership proves unable to hold on to power, destabilizing the country. American companies would then be hesitant to return to Venezuela, oil revenues would remain extremely limited, and the U.S. Congress could chastise the White House (potentially affecting the midterm elections) for a costly effort that drew resources away from domestic priorities.
Attendees at the meeting, including CFR fellows, agreed that it is too early to know how events on the ground in Venezuela will play out. However, they noted that major U.S. oil firms had other regional production options under stabler political conditions, including in Guyana and Suriname, which could limit near-term interest in Venezuela.
Some attendees separately argued that Venezuela remains a narco-state even with Maduro gone, which will complicate how domestic politics, the economy, and relations with the United States evolve. On a more positive note, regional attendees welcomed a greater U.S. focus on Latin and South America more generally and hoped it would translate into more productive bilateral relationships.
Attendees also wondered if the United States would push for regime change in Cuba (which depends on Venezuelan energy), and if that would in turn trigger social unrest and a wave of immigration to the United States at a time when borders are being tightly enforced. Some noted that Mexico seems to have gotten support from the United States, at least for now, to provide oil to Cuba for humanitarian needs.
Participants also called attention to a number of regional elections this year, including in Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Peru, any of which the United States could try to shape. Most expected that would mean greater bias for right-leaning governments, as was the case in Chile’s December 2025 election. One attendee suggested that Mexico is an exception to this shift, with the left-leaning Morena party firmly in power thanks in part to reforms of the judiciary and electoral law. This person also noted reluctance among Mexican businesses to invest and that drug cartels are diversifying their businesses and getting involved with the public sector at the local level.
Heading north, participants were confused about the White House campaign to acquire Greenland, given that the 1951 U.S.-Denmark agreement already allows the United States to station unlimited defense forces there. (As CFR President Michael Froman noted after a recent trip to Greenland, the United States currently has just one military base in Greenland, compared to a peak of seventeen military facilities in 1945.) Further, Greenlanders, especially miners, have always been receptive to U.S. business.
Greenland presented a dilemma for Europeans during the conversation. The NSS calls for greater U.S. leadership in the Western Hemisphere, which includes Greenland; at the same time, it encourages Europe to develop its own security capabilities, which would include defending Denmark and Greenland.
Beyond the Western Hemisphere: Possible Rapprochement With China
China also figured prominently in the conversation. Some attendees were surprised by the NSS’s softer tone toward China, particularly given the number of China hawks in the administration, the continued growth of China’s trade surplus, and President Donald Trump’s historically aggressive stance toward the country. (To note, the latest NSS focused on economic and technological competition between the United States and China, and highlighted Taiwan’s role in global semiconductor production. It holds out the prospect of a “genuinely mutually advantageous economic relationship with Beijing.”)
China’s dominance in rare earth supply chains was seen as a central reason for this pragmatic shift. The Trump administration likely does not want to risk a supply shortage of those critical imports, especially with midterm elections approaching.
Attendees from Asia said U.S. partners in the region were worried about whether they could still rely on the United States to push back against what some described as Chinese aggression. One attendee flagged China’s decision in early January to restrict dual-use exports to Japan, following Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae’s November 2025 comment that a Chinese attack on Taiwan could create “an existential crisis for Japan.”
Other attendees suggested their countries have begun to reevaluate their relationships with the United States and China following the NSS release and the U.S. military operation in Venezuela. One attendee from India said he felt his country is now “scrambling” to China and Russia for support after assuming strong U.S. ties previously.
(Although not part of this conversation, such a reevaluation was evident when Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney reached a bilateral trade agreement with China this month.)
Ongoing unrest and military conflict in Iran and Ukraine, while not focal points, were also on attendees’ minds. One CFR participant suggested that Iran could become the most dynamic geopolitical issue before the group’s next discussion.
Another attendee voiced a note of hope on Ukraine, suggesting that the war could be in its final stages, “so long as [the U.S.] does not lose interest in the issue.”