The Iran War Is a Boon for Russia. Putin Should Still Worry.

Thomas Graham is a distinguished fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.

Russia has emerged as an early beneficiary of the U.S.-Israeli war on Iran, aided by higher oil revenues, rising demand for other products it produces like fertilizers, and the prospect of air defense resources for Ukraine being diverted to the Middle East.

It may take some time for these benefits to help Russia on the battlefield in Ukraine, where a new Russian offensive appears to be underway. In the meantime, U.S.-led diplomatic efforts on ending the war in Ukraine are stalled and the U.S. assault on Iran, a Russian military partner, adds to growing unease among Russian elites about the Donald Trump administration. CFR.org turned to Distinguished Fellow Thomas Graham to discuss the Russian perspective on the Iran conflict.

Why has the narrative developed that Russia is among the “winners” of the Iran war so far? Is that accurate?

The Iran war has supposedly benefited Russia’s military campaign against Ukraine in two ways.  First, the war in the Gulf has at least temporarily alleviated a severe budget crisis. An unsustainable deficit was looming as the costs of the war mounted and oil revenues declined sharply as a consequence of falling global prices and more robust U.S. efforts to limit the amount of oil Russia exported. Oil prices have surged as Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz has taken roughly 20 percent of the world’s oil supply off the market, and the United States—at least temporarily—lifted sanctions and tariffs that limited the volume of oil Russia could export. As a result, Russia’s oil revenue doubled during the first three weeks of the conflict. That, many observers believe, should ease the Kremlin’s concerns about funding their Ukraine war effort.  

Second, the Trump administration’s focus on the Iran war inevitably distracts its attention from Ukraine. The rapid depletion of munitions, especially for air defensive systems, in high-tempo warfare limits the material assistance the United States is willing to supply Ukraine amid rising concerns about the stockpiles Washington would need for the Iran war and other contingencies. That would only improve Russia’s position on the battlefield and make its aerial assaults more deadly.

There is, however, a counternarrative that paints a more troubling picture for Russia. Its image as a great power has suffered, as it has become apparent how little support it can provide its allies in Iran or even in Venezuela, where U.S. forces captured leader Nicolás Maduro at the start of the year. The demonstration of U.S. military might in the Middle East—following the near flawless and complex operation to capture Maduro—against the backdrop of Russia’s struggling campaign in Ukraine only underscores Russia’s military inadequacies. Moreover, Russia has been effectively cut out of the diplomacy to end the Iran conflict, as the Gulf states, Pakistan, and Turkey take the lead.

More importantly, continuing the war against Ukraine does not benefit Russia strategically. Rather, it compounds Russia’s demographic and economic problems. The ongoing war starves technological innovation of the resources it needs to be competitive in the years ahead as the United States, China, and other countries pour resources into artificial intelligence (AI), quantum computing, and bioengineering. Russia, for example, does not make the top ten countries for AI investment as of 2025, and it ranked sixtieth in the World Intellectual Property Organization’s 2025 Global Innovation Index [PDF]. Each day the war continues, Russia falls farther behind in the great-power competition that will dominate global geopolitics in the years ahead. In short, Russia does not need resources to continue the war against Ukraine; it needs incentives to end it.

Is Russia poised to launch new attacks or an offensive in Ukraine?

Russia was planning a spring offensive in Ukraine well before the United States and Israel launched their assault on Iran. That offensive has probably just begun. Whatever new revenue flows the Kremlin might be receiving will not have an appreciable impact on the course of the offensive in the short term—the men and materiel that will be engaged are already on the battlefield or in the pipeline. Similarly, the United States’ focus on the Gulf will not have an immediate impact on the weapons and intelligence it has been providing Ukraine in its defensive effort. 

That said, the longer the conflict in the Gulf lasts, the greater the likelihood that serious effects will be seen in the Russia-Ukraine war. Russia will gain a steady flow of funds to cover the rising costs of military production and recruitment, while the United States depletes munitions that it might have otherwise sold to European countries for transfer to Ukraine.

What’s the status of Kremlin contacts with the Islamic regime in the wake of multiple leadership assassinations?

Ties between Russia and Iran have been deepening for the past decade. The pace accelerated after Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, culminating in the signing of the Iranian-Russian Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in January 2025. Undoubtedly, many of the high-level Iranian leaders the Kremlin has dealt with have already been killed in targeted U.S. and Israeli strikes. But many remain, including those who have met with Russian President Vladimir Putin personally, such as Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, whom the Trump administration is reportedly eyeing as a potential partner in peace talks. 

Moreover, the partnership encompasses close working relations on political, military, and economic matters. Iran has provided Shahed drones to Russia and helped it localize production, while Russia is now reportedly sending advanced drones to Iran to bolster its capabilities. The two countries routinely cooperate in evading Western sanctions, and bilateral trade has more than doubled since the start of the Russia-Ukraine war. These and other activities have almost certainly created personal ties at various levels across Russian and Iranian government agencies, especially the security ministries. These ties in the second and third echelons of power guarantee continuing close contacts, as lower-level officials rise to take the place of top leaders who have been assassinated.  

How has the war and other U.S. interventions affected the U.S.-Russia relationship?

The hopes for more constructive relations that reigned in the initial months of the new Trump administration have taken a serious blow. The administration’s decision to join Israel in an assault on Iran has crystalized a new consensus about the United States within the Russian elites: Washington is not serious about normalizing relations, it does not see Russia as a priority, and it will throw its weight around in the world with no regard for Russia’s interests—as it had done in Venezuela and is now doing in Iran. 

Most immediately, as long as the Iran war continues, the United States will not be actively involved in trilateral talks with Russia and Ukraine that were beginning to show promise just four to six weeks ago, especially in working out the military-technical aspects of monitoring a ceasefire. The Kremlin has already announced that trilateral negotiations on ending the war have been “paused” for an indefinite period, though talks with Washington on commercial matters will continue.

However, this negative assessment of the United States does not necessarily lead to more contentious relations. Putin has been noticeably reluctant to criticize Trump personally for his actions in Iran, Venezuela, and elsewhere that have undermined Russian interests. Putin remains obsessed with Ukraine and, rightly or wrongly, he still believes Trump will help him achieve his goals in the ongoing war. A sharp deterioration in U.S.-Russia relations is unlikely as long as Putin retains that confidence.

This work represents the views and opinions solely of the author. The Council on Foreign Relations is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher, and takes no institutional positions on matters of policy.