Why the UAE Walked Out on OPEC—and What It Means for the Cartel

The significance of the UAE’s departure

This is a significant geopolitical move. The Emiratis began studying whether to leave OPEC around the time Qatar (not a relatively large oil producer) left the cartel at the beginning of 2019. However, it seems unlikely that Emirati decision will undermine OPEC itself—it still has eleven other members who have not shown any signs of leaving—or global oil flows.

The Emirati leadership clearly believes that OPEC decision-making, which has historically privileged Saudi Arabia, has not served Abu Dhabi’s economic interests. At the same time, the Emirates and the Saudi Kingdom have returned to a period in which their bilateral relationship is fraught. The close coordination between the two governments in recent years around which American policymakers and analysts have developed their assumptions about the region and its trajectory is not the norm.

Like other smaller states in the Gulf, the Emiratis have more often than not resisted Saudi Arabia’s efforts to dominate them and the region.

The effect of the U.S.-Israeli war with Iran

The war has had an impact, but perhaps not in the way people might surmise. Let’s take a step back and look at the months leading up to President Donald Trump’s decision to launch Operation Epic Fury.

In late 2025, the Saudis and Emiratis were in conflict over Yemen. The UAE supported a power grab by the Southern Transitional Council, a Yemeni separatist paramilitary group, at the expense of Saudi partners in the country. The Saudis went so far as to undertake airstrikes on Emirati allies and military equipment at the Port of Mukalla. At the same time, Israel’s recognition of Somaliland contributed further to the mutual distrust between Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The Saudis considered the Israeli move to be destabilizing and perceived Emirati complicity with it. The result was a two-months-long war of words between the two governments through mostly social media along with a campaign in Washington as both governments attempted to convince U.S. officials that the other was to blame for the breakdown of ties.

Then came the war in Iran. With Iran’s initial attacks on the Emirates and Saudi Arabia, Saudi Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman and Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed, the president of the UAE, expressed solidarity with each other as well as the other regional countries under Iranian attack. Yet, the UAE and Saudi Arabia diverged as the war continued as the Saudis joined the Pakistanis, Egyptians, and Turks in seeking a diplomatic solution. For their part, the Emiratis do not oppose a diplomatic solution, but given the fire they have taken from Iran, they want to ensure that in whatever agreement is reached, the regime cannot threaten their security again. They believe the Saudis and others are willing to settle for less. This divergence has led to an erosion of the trust and solidarity that developed in early March.

The Emiratis, who were already considering leaving OPEC, clearly concluded that the deterioration of their bilateral relationship with Saudi Arabia presented an opportunity to end their participation in the cartel.

A deeper threat to OPEC?

So far, other members of the cartel have not signaled an intention to leave. Yet the Qatari move in 2019 and the Emirati decision could conceivably lead other members to consider whether they might be better off without the cartel.

Keep in mind that geopolitics seems to have driven the move, but it seems unlikely that Abu Dhabi would have left if its leaders did not believe there was an economic benefit of doing so. If the UAE can prove that leaving OPEC is not harmful, other countries might consider following suit.

This work represents the views and opinions solely of the author. The Council on Foreign Relations is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher, and takes no institutional positions on matters of policy.