Strategic Crossroads: NATO’s Agenda for The Hague Summit

Panelists discuss what to expect from the upcoming NATO Summit at The Hague amid an uncertain geopolitical and political environment.

Video Highlights

FIX: Good evening, everyone, and welcome from my side to the Council on Foreign Relations meeting “Strategic Crossroads: NATO’s Agenda for The Hague Summit.” Can you hear me all well? Yeah, I think it might be a little bit—let’s see if we can get closer.

ROUGH: Now it’s on. Try again.

FIX: Now it’s on.

ROUGH: One more time. Now you’re—

FIX: (Comes on mic.) That do? OK, perfect. Excellent. Good.

So my name is Liana Fix. I’m the fellow for Europe here at the Council on Foreign Relations. I am delighted to preside over this meeting today, which is on the record for this conversation.

And as you all know, we are about one week away from the summit in The Hague, which will perhaps go down as one of the shortest summits in NATO history. We will have—probably have a dinner with the king, then we will have a short working session the next day. And obviously, there are some reasons why this is going to be such a short summit in The Hague. There are concerns by NATO allies, European NATO allies but also non-U.S. NATO allies, that anything that might be a longer summit can just end up derailing U.S.—the U.S. relationship with its allies from Ukraine-Russia talks to tariff and trade relationships, but also the Israel-Iran agenda. So we will discuss today what are we going to expect from the NATO agenda, what is probably going to be the outcome. Will we have a communique at the end that we can all agree on?

And I’m more than delighted to have a fantastic set of speakers here with me onstage. I will first introduce Kay Bailey Hutchison, who is joining us virtually. Senator, thanks so much for your time. Kay is the former U.S. senator from Texas. She’s also the former NATO ambassador until 2021. And she’s now senior advisor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Thanks so much for joining us virtually.

HUTCHISON: Thank you.

FIX: I will proceed here onstage. Thank you, Kay.

I will proceed here onstage with Julianne C. Smith. She is also a former U.S. ambassador to NATO, the latest NATO ambassador that we have here, until 2024. She’s also the president of Clarion Strategies.

And we have the predecessor of Kay. We have Doug Lute with us, who was NATO ambassador until 2017, is now the chairman of international and defense practices at BGR and also a CFR member.

Then you have to my right my colleague Peter Rough, senior fellow and director of the Center on Europe and Eurasia from the Hudson Institute. Delighted to have you, Peter.

And our very own Charles Kupchan, senior fellow here at CFR, Georgetown professor, and also special assistant and former senior director for Europe at the National Security Council.

Let me also say here that tomorrow the Council will publish a new policy paper on NATO by my colleague Rebecca Lissner and myself. So if you want to catch up with some reading, look out on the website. You’ll find a report from the discussions and the conversations.

So I will kick us off with a few questions before we open up for questions from the audience. We will have enough time, until 7:15.

So let me just start with you, Ambassador Hutchison, since you are joining us virtually, and also since you have been ambassador at the famous Brussels Summit in 2018, the one summit when the president in his first term berated NATO allies, threw protocol out of the window, and the allies were concerned about threats that he would leave NATO if defense spending would not be increased. This is, obviously, everything that NATO allies don’t want to see at the Hague Summit. So how do you see the chances? Will this be a business-as-usual summit, as some optimistic Europeans hope? Or should the Europeans still prepare for some worst-case contingencies in The Hague? What is—what is your bet for the Hague Summit?

HUTCHISON: Well, thank you. I am so glad to be a part of this. And I appreciate the Council on Foreign Relations putting it together in a very opportune time, an important time, because next week I think is going to be a very strong and productive summit.

I do—and I am optimistic that there is going to be a total support of more spending on all of our efforts, and that the Europeans now are ready to do the things that we’ve talked about. And when I was there, we did talk about the infrastructure which now is part of the 1.5 percent that they will be discussing as a way to make Europe really able to be interoperable with the assets—to make the highways able to take the heavy equipment that would be needed in the corridors if we ever did see an attack on one of our NATO allies. And I think that is an important and new creative commitment that the allies are going to consider, and I think they seem to be on the road to accepting unanimously the 3.5 (percent) increase in the commitments for our military and our arms, but also the 1.5 percent for hardening our infrastructure. So I’m very optimistic about it, and I think that it’s going to be successful.

FIX: Great. Thank you so much. This optimism is, as I said, shared by some Europeans.

Ambassador Smith—Julie—let me ask you next. So this creative solution to the 5 percent—the 3.5 percent, the 1.5 percent—isn’t that—regardless of how it has been achieved with how much pressure it has been achieved, isn’t that a big success? And looking back, previous administrations have worked and put a lot of effort into trying to convince the European allies to spend more, often unsuccessfully. So should past U.S. administrations have taken off the gloves more? Should they have been, you know, more forceful towards the European allies to get where Trump is now and what he might achieve now?

SMITH: I think this is on. Well, thank you for the invitation. Great to see Kay on the screen and be up here with all my friends, and glad everyone could join us tonight.

So, look, U.S. presidents for many decades have asked the Europeans to spend more, and we haven’t really seen the needle move until the last couple of years. In the last administration, the administration in which I served, we were proud to see the allies move from nine when President Biden arrived in the Oval Office to twenty-three, so we were able to leave office with two-thirds of the alliance spending 2 percent of GDP.

But what’s going to happen in a week is a completely different kettle of fish. We’re going to have allies ready to commit to this 5 percent—3.5 (percent) on hard defense and 1.5 (percent) on defense-adjacent spending, whether it’s cybersecurity or infrastructure. But this is good news, and we should celebrate the fact that the allies are willing to jump to that number. I will say I have a couple of issues with the whole plan, however, and let me just name three of them quickly.

One, Europe still suffers from tremendous fragmentation across the continent. And unless either the NATO alliance or the European Union or a group of allies take on the fragmentation, I do fear that the additional resources that Europeans are about to spend—estimates say about a trillion euros over the next decade—may just continue to fall into these siloed efforts and actually continue the bad habits of fragmentation that actually won’t, at the end of the day, produce as much capacity as we desire.

Number two, it’s good when you’re spending money to have a strategy. Allies agreed last year at the summit here in this city to create a new Russia strategy. The alliance has delayed drafting that strategy for fear that right now they couldn’t reach consensus on drafting it. And I do worry that without such a strategy some allies will scratch their heads and say, why are we making these added investments if we can’t agree on some sort of Russia strategy? So I hope that post-summit the allies can kind of roll their sleeves up and get to work on that.

Lastly, I will say that because of the tension in the transatlantic relationship over tariffs and a number of other things—Greenland, you know the list—we now have a situation where some European countries are stressing the need to take those added resources that will come from the new commitment to 5 percent and only spend those resources on European capabilities. I am of the—I am of the mind that we have to do this together, that co-production and co-development between American companies and European companies is probably the best way to build capacity and build it quickly. And so I hope that that view, that’s represented by some but not all, doesn’t really take root and move the alliance away from those types of transatlantic defense industrial joint ventures.

FIX: Thanks, Julie.

LUTE: So, Liana, every panel breaks down at some point, OK? (Laughter.) So I’d like—

FIX: That’s too early for me, Doug. Let me—let me just—

SMITH: (Inaudible)—takeover. (Laughs.)

LUTE: All right, you can ask your question, but I—

FIX: Let me—let me try to put one thing to you, which I think it’s relevant.

LUTE: OK.

FIX: And then—and then you can come in with what you want to say. And I will also come back to the Russia question because I think it’s an important one.

But, Doug, because you have served as NATO ambassador under Obama, right—the whole pivot to Asia strategy, and so on—you know how long this has taken. But one of the big concerns that the Europeans had ahead of the summit and still have for after the summit is the U.S. troop presence in Europe. So I want to ask you, what if there is a troop withdrawal? Let’s say the 20K troops that have been stationed after 2022. How bad would that be? Is it reasonable in terms of U.S. force posture in Europe? Would the political signal be too damaging? There have been promises that this will be a phased process by the U.S. NATO ambassador without strategic gaps for Europe. How do you—how do you look at that? Because it is the main concern by European allies. And come in with what you wanted to say anyway. (Laughter.)

LUTE: OK. So—

SMITH: Your real answer. (Laughter.)

LUTE: So, first, I want to challenge the premise of your previous question, which is that somehow, as good Americans, we imagine that the increased defense spending—which is now more than ten consecutive years of real increases among NATO allies, right, resulting in twenty-three of thirty-two being at or above 2 percent—that it all has something to do with us. It does not have to do with us, right? Was it Obama, who signed the pledge in 2014, who’s more responsible than President Trump, who yelled at allies in public to get them? No. You got the wrong president. Putin is the guy who’s responsible for ten consecutive years of real defense spending, OK? So we should be—so just a touch of humility here about who’s responsible for what. In fact, in the period 2017 to 2021 the rate of increases among European allies actually decreased. So for those who abide by the model of, you know, what you have to do is blame and shame in public, actually the data doesn’t show that, OK? But the good news is that we do have an impetus and we do have consensus on the challenge from our largest eastern neighbor, Russia. And I think that’s the core reason, first in 2014 and then, obviously, after 2022, that we’ve seen the spike that we’ve had.

Now, U.S. troops. There’s no question that for the seventy-six years of NATO history the presence of U.S. troops has cemented in the perception of U.S. commitment to the defense of Europe. There’s no question about that. I mean, I served initially as a lieutenant fifty years ago in the inter-German border, and from those days all the way through today I think that’s important.

Rather than the number of troops, though—is it 20,000, is it 30,000, does it drop—the capabilities is what we should be measuring here, right? And we should be measuring the high-end capabilities that only the U.S. in some instances can provide. Nobody provides an equivalent to the Patriot missile system. If you withdraw Patriots from Western Europe, that’s a big deal. If you withdraw U.S. intelligence, some of the high-end intelligence capabilities, that’s a big deal. Precision strike, deep precision strike, which could hold at risk any Russian intentions—as we’re seeing, by the way, today in Ukraine, right, this notion of striking in depth—U.S. has precise, accurate, and quantities of precision strike—deep precision strike that are not—they’re not attributable to anybody else in the alliance. So I think you really have to parse this—not just numbers of troops, right, where it’s a bit of a shiny object—you know, it’s 20,000 or otherwise—but rather get into the capabilities.

The last thing we should take from the Cold War experience, right, another lesson, is that the presence of some U.S. troops, however, is also a piece of the nuclear deterrent equation, right? So extended deterrence to our European allies by our strategic nuclear forces, it begins with U.S. troops on the ground, which makes extended deterrence credible. And we learned this lesson hard in the Cold War several times, when we began to reduce troops and so forth. And we settled on this notion of U.S. troop presence is a vital link to the ultimate guarantee of NATO security, and that’s the U.S. nuclear deterrent.

FIX: Yeah, which is why Europeans are so panicky about this, right?

LUTE: Right.

FIX: Because for them, U.S. boots on the ground, from Helmut Schmidt to others, has also been this guarantee.

Just to—I think we will not be able to solve this, but there’s also an argument that you could say that fear of U.S. abandonment is also driving some of those defense-spending spikes that we see, in addition, of course—you’re absolutely right—of Vladimir Putin.

Let me turn to the—to the Russia question again that you raised, Julie. Peter, I want to throw this to you. What we hear—what you can read in the press is that we will have a very short communique—a very short summit, a very short communique, that will mostly focus on defense spending, that might not call out Russia for its aggression against Ukraine, that will not repeat the pledge for Ukraine to become a NATO member at some point, that will not present a Russia strategy. And we have that, coupled with Ukraine-Russia talks where there has been repeated criticism towards the president that he’s not putting as much pressure on Russia as he is doing it with Ukraine. If we see that whole picture, is the summit then really a sign of strength towards Russia? Wouldn’t more pressure on Russia in the communique among allies be the right direction for the summit?

ROUGH: Well, first of all, thanks. It’s great to be at the august Council on Foreign Relations. And speaking after three NATO ambassadors I hope foreshadow my own professional direction in the years to come. (Laughter.) So it’s great to be here with all of you. I would just begin by saying, yes, I think Ukraine will receive nary a mention in the summit declaration, which is expected to be short and to the point. But there are a few areas, I think, that merit attention that deserves some discussion, if not there, then on the sidelines.

And here, perhaps, as a brief parenthetical, I was saying before the event in the green room I’m not sure why we have to have a NATO summit annually. I’d much rather see a finance ministerial stood up to complement the defense ministerial, since it’s easy to make a defense spending pledge but, in the end, in a lot of parliamentary democracies, it’s the finance ministers or the chancellors of the exchequer who take a lot of these spending and funding and budgeting decisions.

So I think the communique or the declaration won’t have much Ukraine in it. But at basically every ministerial in recent years Russia’s increased, upticked use of hybrid warfare to go after the alliance has been heavily discussed. There have been dozens—I’ve seen a NATO official talked about almost in the hundreds of these incidents over the years. And to date, while there was a hybrid strategy discussed at the defense ministerial in Brussels I think now a week ago, the alliance has been rather, I’d say, conservative, bordering on the tepid, in responding to these hybrid attacks.

There’s been information sharing. There’s a new operation now in the Baltic Sea, Baltic Sentinel. And there has been an attempt to impose costs on Russia, but really the political economics of this run against the alliance. And so I’d like to see the alliance think more about if it’s necessary to undertake, I don’t know, offensive cyber operations, for example, to reset deterrence in a domain where the cost of repairing a cable outage on the floor of the Baltic Sea vastly exceed the cost of dragging an anchor across that seabed.

Another area that I think probably merits discussion, and I hope—I hope it comes up, is how the 5 percent actually come to pass. To speak softly and carry a big stick I think is enough of an outcome, to answer your—to answer your question. But this 5 percent of defense, 3.5 (percent) for hard power and 1.5 (percent) for adjacent expenditures, has to, I think, be time limited. So is it a five-year, is it a ten-year time horizon? What is the plan to incrementally get to 5 percent in the coming years? How do we hold allies’ feet to the fire? And then, what categories actually count? Do bridges from, say, Sicily to the mainland count? Cyber certainly does. Does climate spending? I’d urge a pretty tight definition of what adjacent 1.5 (percent) costs actually entail.

And then I think there are a number of other—there are a number of other debates around Ukraine that are important. I don’t think we’re learning fast enough some of the lessons of modern unmanned vehicle warfare that Ukraine is so eager to share with us in return for the enormous generosity that the West has shown Ukraine. And I’m afraid that the NATO operation set up in Poland is still too far away from the Ukrainian front lines to learn the lessons quickly enough for industry and policymakers. I think that should be something up for consideration.

So there are a whole host of, I think, technical and military—after all, it’s a military alliance—areas that I think maybe fly below the political radar which are worthy of discussion at the NATO summit during the defense ministerial process. And I’d hope the alliance would pick those up, even if the kind of visceral political question of Ukraine’s future relationship with NATO isn’t settled.

FIX: Mmm hmm. But you would say there’s still the same threat perception on both sides of the Atlantic about Russia?

ROUGH: Well, yeah. I mean, I think that if you read all of these publicly made available intelligence assessments across the alliance, including our own most recent national defense estimate, Russia is still seen as a—as a country implacably opposed to the Western order, and the American built-order in Europe. And I think seeing that clearly is important.

FIX: Mmm hmm. Thank you.

Charlie, let me turn to you. Do you think that if this NATO summit—let’s assume it’s successful, everything is business as usual. Are you concerned that European allies will say, oh, look, nothing has really changed. The U.S. is not becoming isolationist. Things just continue as they are. We are in a safe spot, a little bit like during Trump’s first term? And linked to that, if you think about the European publics that have to cope with a 5 percent defense spending goal, and not all European publics are fiscally so flexible as Germany is, do you have concerns about what this means domestically?

KUPCHAN: No. I would say the opposite. I think that there is a five-alarm fire in Europe about the future of the relationship with the United States, and that even if this summit goes well there is going to be a debate ongoing for the rest of the Trump presidency, probably, over, you know, is our relationship—our strategic partnership with the United States intact? Will this summit and the G-7 summit today shift things one way or the other? Yes. But, you know, I think the—you know, the two—the two kind of must-haves are, will there be any blow up either in Canada or in The Hague, in which, you know, Trump sort of shouts down other leaders or says, I’m going to withdraw from NATO? And my guess is the answer is no. He’s going to be on best behavior.

And that’s because there isn’t the same geopolitical slack today that there was during his first term, because of the war in Ukraine, because of what’s happening in the Middle East. I’m not expecting some kind of black swan event. And I’m guessing that you’ll get some aspirational language about defense spending, and everybody will say this was a success, and go home. But I think that the backdrop to the summit will be all about Ukraine. And in many respects, NATO’s future rises and falls on what happens in Ukraine. And I give Trump credit for opening a dialog with Putin. It’s a conversation that needs to happen. I wish it had happened when Biden was still president because I think it may have been handled a little better. But, listen, this is not a war that Ukraine is going to win. And, as a consequence, we need to figure out how to bring this to an end at the negotiating table. And that entails a U.S.-Russia dialog, as well as with the Europeans and the Ukrainians.

I think that the key question in my mind, and I think in the minds of many Europeans, is, will Trump introduce greater coercive leverage against Putin to go with the diplomatic opening? And my guess is that he will. Will he do it by the time that we get to The Hague? I don’t know. I’m guessing that’s being discussed in Canada. But my gut tells me he’s going to increase the coercive leverage, not necessarily sanctions but approving more weapons, for three reasons. One, it’s cheaper. And that’s because the Ukrainians are now using mainly drones. They’re not burning through American materiel in the same way they used to. Second, I think Trump is pissed off at Putin. He’s being played by Putin, and he knows it. And I think that’ll make him more ready to approve, or at least ask Congress for more money. And the third thing is the minerals deal, where he can say, we’re going to ask $10 billion more in appropriations, but we’re going to get paid back because this is an investment in the minerals deal.

Final comment. I’m guessing that on NATO membership for Ukraine, everybody’s going to duck. I don’t expect there to be language similar to the last summit, where they talked about the irreversible membership of Ukraine. And maybe there’ll be some statement about the door is still open. But I think there’ll be less forward leaning. And I do think—I would like to see Trump himself come out, either at the summit or sometime soon, and take it off the table, because I think for three reasons it’s important to clarify the American stance on this.

Number one, because I think the war will be easier to end if Putin thinks that NATO is not moving in as soon as a ceasefire is declared. I understand why Russia objects to NATO membership for Ukraine. I don’t understand why one American decisionmaker after another has said: NATO is a defensive alliance, and it poses no threat to Ukraine. Of course it does. No country wants the greatest military alliance in history to move in next door. Number two, I think it’s a mistake to keep leading the Ukrainians on. We keep saying, come to mama, come this way, and they come this way, and they get to the doorstep, and we say, hold on. Not yet. And in many respects, I feel we should be more honest to Ukraine because they’re probably never going to get into NATO. So it’s important for them to make other plans.

And the final argument I’d offer here is, you know, a half-a-million Ukrainians have either been killed or wounded in this war. No U.S. troops, no German troops, no Polish troops, not a single NATO soldier. That says to me that NATO is making a decision that it is unprepared to go to war with Russia to defend Ukraine. If that’s the case, then why should NATO extend an Article Five guarantee to a country that would obligate it to go to war to defend it?

FIX: Thank you, Charlie. I know there might be, perhaps, some divergent views on Ukraine and NATO on the panel. We’ll come back to that. But I want to give one more opportunity to speak to Ambassador Hutchison, because I know you have to leave a little bit early, before we jump into Q&A.

First of all, I would love to know how you see the role of Ukraine in its relationship with NATO in the future, especially have we learned enough from Ukraine? Julie, Ambassador Smith, has already talked about European defense industry. Shouldn’t we use Ukraine more to prepare Europeans for a potential future ahead? And then if I may also ask you, so according to press reports China will not play a major role at this NATO summit. Is that something that concerns you, the lack of pressure on China for its support of Russia’s war? Would you like to see more in that direction coming up at the NATO summit?

HUTCHISON: Well, I’d like to make a couple of points. First of all, I do think that at some point down the road Ukraine will be a member of NATO. They’re not ready now. They know they’re not ready now. They’re going to have to go back and form their government, solidify their democracy, make sure the corruption is gone. But I do believe they will be a member of NATO. And I think it is important that Russia know they have no veto power whatsoever ever on NATO alliance. And Putin knows that NATO is a defensive alliance. He knows that. He doesn’t think that we’re going to go over the border and try to conquer Russia. So I think that we will do that. It may be after we’re all gone, but I think at some point it will happen, when Ukraine shows it’s ready and resilient.

Secondly, I want to make sure that people understand—and in this summit that they understand—how much Congress, on a bipartisan basis, is supportive of Ukraine and supportive of NATO. The president has reemphasized that he is not going to try to leave NATO. And his ambassador there who replaced Doug, and Julianne, and I, has said in his hearing: We are pro-NATO, and we certainly are pro-European alliance. Now, we all can talk about the way this goes forward, the way it’s being handled. And that’s a legitimate discussion. But we are going to stay in NATO. And there’s no danger. And the allies know that.

Having said that, I think it is important for our allies to know that eighty-two senators, Republican and Democrat together, have signed a bill calling for secondary sanctions against Russia, meaning China, as well as others that have helped Russia in this effort. And I think that shows the commitment of Congress to this alliance, to NATO and to Ukraine.

And onto your point about China, I think China is all over this Ukraine situation because we know China is seeing what we will do with Ukraine and Russia, and if we will stick. Because if we don’t, I think then China is emboldened. And I think secondary sanctions would be a very important signal to China that we are—we’re watching you. And you can’t help Russia conquer Ukraine and that go unnoticed. So I think China is very much in the wings of the summit, and of the whole Ukraine-Russia-NATO-Western situation.

FIX: Thank you very much. And obviously that’s something that Europeans are also hoping for and trying to push the White House, picking up that bill from Congress and pushing it through. Peter sounds like he wants to say something about it, and I’ll give you the opportunity. (Laughs.) But let me first open this up for your questions from the audience. We have now discussed half an hour on this stage. Let me take a couple of questions. We can also take some virtual questions. Please introduce yourself when you ask a question, ideally direct it to whom on the stage you want to answer this question. Otherwise, I’m going to distribute those. OK, the gentleman here.

Q: Hi. Dov Zakheim. I’ve enjoyed the comments.

I’ve got a question about how NATO is going to—or, how the summit will talk about the current war between Israel and Iran. They can’t ignore it. So what are they going to say?

FIX: Julie, do you want, perhaps, to come in? Or Charlie, otherwise?

SIMTH: Yeah, I—because they’re not issuing any communique of any kind, this is, like, at best, a one-page document, I think, that they’re putting out. And the sole focus will be defense spending. I don’t see Ukraine mentioned at all, even though there are rumors Zelensky will join the dinner the first night. And I don’t even expect China’s support for Russia and Ukraine to be mentioned, even though, actually, one of the good bipartisan stories in the alliance is the good work that Kay did in the first Trump administration with the allies on China. We took the baton and ran with it, and really deepened our relationship with the Indo-Pacific partners.

I mean, they may be there, the Indo-Pacific partners, I’ve heard they’re coming as well, but not for a substantive discussion. So we’re losing that focus, and certainly because none of that will be mentioned despite all the good work we’ve done inside the alliance. I do not expect any mention of what’s happening between Israel and Iran. I really don’t. It certainly will come up in press conferences, press engagements, to the extent that the president speaks at the podium, no doubt journalists will be preparing him with questions. But I would be shocked if it were on a piece of paper coming out of the summit.

FIX: Any divergent views on that on the panel?

ROUGH: Can I just supplement Julie’s point?

FIX: Please.

ROUGH: By saying, I think Iran, much like the China question which was just raised, is an opportunity for the administration. Because, to the extent that they’re being urged by Europeans to push secondary sanctions against Russia, I think it can turn around and ask the Europeans, if you are so offended by Chinese, North Korean—DPRK—support for Russia, and if this war is so important and existential for the European order, then you too should be prepared to take tougher steps when it comes to greenfield investments, foreign direct investments, when it comes to Chinese control of port terminals in Europe, and on and on and on, in the critical infrastructure sphere. And I think that is—that is certainly something that that could be up for consideration.

I also don’t think it’s time—to go back to the previous question—to necessarily go at one of the foundational principles of the alliance, Article 10, and the open door policy. I don’t think we’re at that point yet in Ukraine. The Ukrainian defense industrial base is at a far different place than it was a year ago. European production in certain systems is coming online. And I think a better use of our time at this summit, or in the conversations around it, would be to talk about how, as the American supplemental funding runs dry over the next few months for certain classes of systems, we can think about direct military sales, perhaps to European allies to backfill systems they’re sending the Ukrainians, perhaps even to Ukraine directly. The president can say he sold this stuff, the previous administration granted it away, and he can celebrate that.

And then I think we actually have a sustainable way forward for Ukraine that doesn’t require the types of upfront concessions that I don’t think are necessary. But again, as Julie mentioned, this is going to be a very sharp, tight, and well-choreographed twenty-four hours. And so I don’t know if all of that complexity will make its way into it.

FIX: And, Doug, two-fingers on that?

LUTE: So if it were to come up, I wish it would come up in the following way: Painting a contrast between the blending of diplomacy and hard power against Iran, right, arguably, with the Trump administration taking advantage of Israel’s hard power, right, in trying to pursue, still, a diplomatic solution—the contrast between that model and the model we see with Russia and Ukraine, which is rather feeble, disjointed diplomacy, not backed up by hard power. And if you painted that contrast, I think we may see a shift in the administration towards the sort of support that that Charlie suggested.

KUPCHAN: Yeah, I would just add, in response to Peter, I worry about that scenario because I think if this funding stream runs out and we’re done, it sends a signal to the Europeans that they’re—that they’re basically on their own. And it sends a signal to Putin to wait us out.

FIX: Next question from the audience? Over here.

Q: Mark Kennedy from the Wahba Institute.

I would like to ask about, you know, the European Union passed a bill on their industrial base. When we talk about the fragmentation of Europe, that was a kind of protectionist bill. Can we count on the European Union to really eliminate this fragmentation? Or do we have to work that through NATO? How much of a partner can European Union be in this?

FIX: Since you raised that before, Julie, do you want to take this on?

SMITH: Sure. Well, there’s a couple different issues here. I mean, there’s the—what the European Union is trying to do through its new defense industrial strategy. And that is to push the Europeans to invest in their own industrial, defense-industrial base. And I appreciate that. And I applaud those efforts. And I want to see more done on the European continent. But there are some things that Europeans simply can’t produce on their own. They have to cooperate with the United States. And by putting this percentage cap on it to say, I can’t remember if it’s 60 percent or what the number—yeah, 65 (percent)—must be produced—of everything that they produce must be produced in Europe, it shuts out the opportunity not just only, you know, to work with the United States and our best-in-class companies that produce kit that the allies have used for years and years and years, but it, in theory, puts the South Koreans out of the picture, the Turks, the U.K. I mean, Norway has kind of a special arrangement there.

But that’s one piece of the puzzle. And, again, I understand and appreciate the instinct, but I like examples where we see countries coming together to work with an American company. I often point to Spain, Romania, Germany, and the Netherlands joining forces with Raytheon to produce GEM-T missiles for Patriots. That is a brilliant idea. We’ll produce upwards of 1,000 GEM-T missiles. That’s needed in Europe, but it’s leaning on the technology and know-how from the United States, and allows us to remain interoperable and focus on that one system.

There’s another set of issues, which is, you know, more broadly whether or not the EU or NATO can get at the fragmentation, the fact that Europe still builds twelve separate tanks, and should limit that down significantly. But who’s going to do the hard work? Who’s going to go to country X and say, I’m sorry, we want you to produce less of X and more of Y? And who’s going to take orders from the European Union, from NATO, or from a group of countries, to kind of serve as the conductor of the orchestra? I don’t see that work happening. And, again, that’s why I raised it at the top. If Europe can’t get at that fragmentation, this money will just continue to flow into all of those siloed efforts. They’ll still have twelve different tanks, and it would be much better for the Europeans to pare that list down and get groups—small groups of countries investing in certain types of air defense, or armor, or artillery. And that is the work that I don’t see either institution in Brussels taking on right now.

FIX: And Charlie, you wanted to come in?

KUPCHAN: Yeah, I just want to—I want to reinforce Julie’s point, because I think it’s really important. And that is that the—there are two contradictory trends. One is, growing political willingness to spend more on defense, which is good. The other is decreasing political willingness to pool sovereignty on defense. And that’s simply because both center left and center right parties that have generally been pro-EU throughout their history are losing market share, mainly to the far-right, but also to the far-left. And both of them are not very interested in deepening integration.

And so I would say that the trendlines, politically speaking, are away from the kinds of deeper cooperation on procurement and policy that Julie’s talking about. And in some ways, that’s more important than whether you’re spending 2 percent, or 2.5 percent, or 3 percent. And it also, quite honestly, is, I think, the elephant in the room. I can assure you that this issue is not going to get one second of discussion at the NATO summit, but, you know, what is in my mind the greatest threat to NATO? Us. It’s what’s happening to liberal democracy on both sides of the Atlantic. It’s the hollowing out of the political center and the rising threat of populist nationalism. Is that going to be discussed at all? No.

FIX: But it is a challenge to European governments at home, right? I mean explaining to your public that 5 percent is the goal, in governments that don’t have fixed fiscal flexibility, that would mean tradeoffs with social security and social welfare. So how do you get out of a dilemma that if you don’t go for 5 percent you might end up with limited security, because that’s a scenario that Europeans are preparing for, right, that the United States might, in a disruptive way, withdraw. But on the other hand, domestically, you don’t have a public that is willing to accept social welfare—massive social welfare cuts for defense spending.

ROUGH: But, I mean, to its credit, I think part of the European ReArm plan is meant to address this. And that the allowance for countries and member states of the EU twenty-seven to trigger their national escape clause from this—from the Stability and Growth Pact means that—for 1.5 percent of GDP—means that they’re not immediately going to be subject to Maastricht-level proceedings. And then, secondly, the 500—or 150 billion euro credit facility is backed by the multiannual framework, which is a(n) AAA-rated funding vehicle. So if countries want to access it, it’s voluntary, those countries that have less fiscal space, that have lower credit ratings, have a long, I think, ten-year principal repayment horizon. They can raise money at cheaper rates and try to hit those percentages.

I agree with Julie entirely that there are issues with the design authority of the EU plan. But at the very least, it is an attempt, I think, by the commission, to its credit, to give some fiscal space to countries that don’t have it. And secondly, I’d add that in addition to the EU twenty-seven, the EFTA, Norway, Switzerland, Iceland, and—I’m forgetting one state—Lichtenstein, are eligible, but also Ukraine. So those 150 billion (euros) are joint procurements, by requirement, can also go to Ukrainian industry. And I think some of that could be—could be helpful. But, you know, the rubber will hit the road when actually countries have to access these.

FIX: Quickly, Doug, and then we’ll—

LUTE: So, this conversation edges on a very important distinction between inputs and outputs, right? So since the Wales pledge in 2014, right, we’ve been focused for ten years on 2 percent as a critical measure. I mean, the secretary general measures this down to two decimal points every January and issues his annual report, right? But what’s really important is this conversation, because it’s the outputs that really matter, right? And NATO has become—and our publics have become—fixated on the inputs. And we’re still sort of shy about what do we actually buy? Now, NATO knows what it needs, right? NATO has regional defense plans, north, center, and south. It has gone through the military math of assigning capabilities for each of those three contingencies to allies.

Allies know, at least the militaries in the thirty—among the thirty-two allies know what they’re on the hook for to provide to NATO. But we hide behind the classification system. And this is the conversation that ought to be had at The Hague among heads of state, so that we’re much more transparent with who’s delivering 2 percent, 5 percent, 3 (percent)—who’s delivering the capabilities that you’re on the hook for, and who’s not? And if we had that conversation, it might be a much more compelling argument to congresses and parliaments and bundestags and so forth that some are carrying their weight and some are not. But this artificial notion and the artificial fixation on inputs, I think, is not helpful.

FIX: I think that’s an excellent point.

We have one virtual question.

OPERATOR: We’ll take the next question from Gideon Rose.

Q: Hi, there. Gideon Rose, Council of Foreign Relations.

I’m kind of shocked by the complacency of this discussion about the U.S. side of it. As Charlie said, the reason this is happening is because the Europeans—that the defense spending is happening—is because the Europeans see themselves in a two-front war. They’re being—they have an aggressor, a great-power aggressor to the east, and they have a great power abandonment to the west. And they’re realizing for the very first time in seventy-five years, holy shit, we may actually have to be responsible—they’re wondering whether they will have to be responsible. And so what I hear from this discussion is everybody is going, OK, the TACO trade isn’t just about tariffs. It’s also true for security for Europe. And Trump is just bluffing. And all the things he said and all the things he’s done in this spring don’t really mean anything, and we can all confidently assume that NATO will go forward as a joint alliance with the same enemies and the same members.

And I think that maybe—I hope that’s the case. And I think that’s the best-case scenario. And I still think it’s probably largely correct. But I’m amazed that you guys aren’t as—you know, a couple of—I spent all spring in Europe. And people were tearing their hair out about the U.S. actually abandoning Europe. And I think there are many people in this administration, from the top to perhaps several layers down, who would actually like that. So I’m curious, is the TACO trade applicable to security too? Will all the Trump threats to aggress or abandon be essentially chickened out, and will accept a new defense spending, and everything will be OK?

FIX: Thank you, Gideon. You can always rely on your colleagues to ask the tough questions. Otherwise, I would have had to ask this myself in our conversation. (Laughs.) But let me give this, perhaps, first, the opportunity to Ambassador Hutchison to answer that question. Are we all just, you know, too optimistic and, at the same time, too naive about the U.S. role here?

HUTCHISON: Well, I think that—I think in many ways, the president has come around to realizing—because of several things that have happened—that NATO is important. He’s committed to staying involved, staying with NATO. He has shot down some of the kind of rumor mill that we weren’t going to be the SACEUR. We are. And I think the congressional support, which is so essential, has shown that they’re willing to stand up for those principles. I am optimistic.

Now, is he going to change his tone? You know, I think the European allies now are seeing how the president operates. And they are dealing with it professionally, coming to have the meetings, maybe disagree, maybe agree, but go out as an alliance that may have some differences but knows that together is where we need to be. You know, I keep saying, if we think that China is the strategic adversary of the future, which we’ve all agreed it is, then do we want to face China alone or with forty-two of the largest economies of the world, and I think that it’s clear that we want to be with our allies as we are looking at China. And I believe that how we handle Ukraine and NATO is an important signal about China. So I don’t see us being—in the panel, I don’t see us being overly optimistic, or pie in the sky, or rose-colored glasses. I think everyone has clear views about this. And it’s not the kind of president that is going to be openly soft and cuddly. But I think the president sees that what he’s done has had results and that he is looking at the big picture.

That, you know, his whole principle has been that the Europeans haven’t done enough. Well, all of us who’ve been NATO ambassadors know that the Europeans know they haven’t done as much as they should. And I think they are coming around. I hope the president will give them credit for coming around. I don’t know if he will. I don’t know if that’s his style, but they should get credit for what they have done in the last fifteen years. They’re starting to come around. So I don’t think we’re being naive or in any way not clear-eyed about this. You know, people have come to know how this president operates. And the bottom line is that we’re going to be in NATO and the leader of NATO. And it’s important.

I do want to reemphasize some of the points, Julie, that you made. And that is the next step is going to be that, yes, Europe wants to provide their own equipment. And you’re so right that they should be honing in on one design of a certain kind of tank and one design of certain missiles. Yes. But the important thing is that we stay interoperable. And this effort of Europe to go it alone, which some in Europe want to do, is not going to make us an interoperable alliance for our overall security. It’s important that the Europeans work with us. Most of them want us as an ally when they are making their contributions to the defense spending. They want consortia with America in. And I think it’s important that they continue that. Even if some of the Europeans would like to go it alone, most of the Europeans do not want that. They want a transatlantic alliance. And that’s what I think we’re going to give them, with all of the different personalities of our presidents. (Laughs.) They’ve all had flaws, but they’ve all had an enduring commitment to Europe, to our allies. And I think that will continue.

KUPCHAN: Can I just offer—

FIX: Yeah, let me—I’ll give this back to the panel, because I think it’s an important question. I mean, from a European perspective they have to invest into defense anyway, right, regardless of the scenario that will play out. (Laughs.) But do you think there should be more investments from the European side in contingency plannings, in plan Bs, and so on? Peter has grabbed my attention first, and then over to you, Charlie.

ROUGH: Well, I’ll just start by saying I think Trump’s sort of attitude towards Europe is to expose our allies to just enough hostile power to engender burden sharing, but not so much to the risk a security crisis on the continent. And that’s a tightrope balance for sure but, I think he would argue, he’s had results thus far. The Germans announced up to a trillion euros in infrastructure and defense spending in this new government. The budgets are still to follow, but the intent is clearly there. And there really are only three or four powers in the world that can talk about those amounts of monies—the Japanese, the Chinese, the Americans, and the Germans. That’s probably the club.

And so when Friedrich Merz came to Washington, lo and behold, he had a good meeting with President Trump. I don’t think it’s that complex. If he thinks he’s getting returns on investments, if he thinks he’s getting results, then in the end I think he’s prepared to have a positive and solid relationship. So I don’t want to be Pollyannaish about this, but there is sort of a—kind of a Domino’s Pizza slogan, a five for five deal here. Five percent of defense and you get an ironclad Article Five announcement by the president in The Hague. And I suspect that’s kind of what the Europeans are going to ask for. And I think that’s probably what they’re going to get.

And, by the way, Ambassador Whitaker and others have talked now for months about the importance of Article Five. Vice President Vance has said, we’re not going to leave NATO. It doesn’t mean that the transatlantic compact isn’t being renegotiated. There is going to be a pullback of American forces from Europe, for sure. But there again, to cite Ambassador Whitaker, he has said that there aren’t going to be security gaps, and we have to take a step-stair approach to this. It’s not going to happen in ten years. It isn’t going to be quick. But it’s going to be in a close consultation process with our allies. Maybe I’m too sanguine, but that’s kind of how I read things.

FIX: Mmm hmm. Charlie, did you believe in the five for five deal? (Laughs.)

KUPCHAN: Yeah, I mean, I think, Gideon, you’re not being unjustified in saying that, that we’re not being sufficiently honest about the downside risks. Because I do think that, everything else being equal, Trump would love to get out of NATO. And I think he’d love to withdraw from Japan, and South Korea, and everywhere else, because I believe that he has this instinct, this impulse that alliances are encumbrances and wouldn’t it be nice to just go back to a world in which we could focus on Greenland, and Canada, and the Panama Canal, and the Western Hemisphere? After all, that’s what most American presidents did from 1789 to 1941, right? They’d focused on areas close to home. And so that—I do think that there’s an impulse that gives our alliance partners good reason to stay up late at night and to think about getting nuclear weapons. I would be thinking about the same thing if I were Germany or South Korea.

But the saving grace for them may be that I don’t think Trump is a terribly ideological person. I think in the end, he’s much more transactional than he is ideological. Which puts me in more or less the same space that Peter’s in. Which is that, you know, there’s bad stuff happening. The Russians are bombing the hell out of Ukraine. There’s a war going on in the Middle East. The Europeans are spending more. He would like to go back to the nineteenth century and pull out, but he can’t. And it doesn’t make sense. And in that respect, yeah, you know, I think he is someone who is more open to ideas, and outside pressure, and negative feedback, than many people in his administration who I think are quite ideological MAGA rank and file.

FIX: Let me also ask you, Julie, for your opinion. Because one answer to that question could be that we just got accustomed to the shocks, right, because the first two shocks—Hegseth’s speech, J.D. Vance at Munich—you know, triggered much of the talk in European capitals, which now, you know, Greenland is not mentioned anymore, and so on, which has sort of calmed down. Is it just us getting used to a constantly existential crisis mode? How do you see it?

SMITH: No. I mean, my sense is that the Europeans are very worried. And while everyone, I think, on both sides of the Atlantic, we all seem to believe that next week is going to be a smooth, positive summit, and there’ll be champagne toasts and we’ll all celebrate an increase in defense spending, which is real. But that is not the end of the story. There’s a tremendous amount of uncertainty about the future of this relationship. The president has promised allies and Mark Rutte that he will not surprise them with posture changes. Will that happen? I’m not so sure. We hear that the U.S. is going to continue to pursue peace in Ukraine one way or another. Will that happen? And what happens if the lines start to shift, or collapse, or move westward? Will the U.S. come in and save the day, and at least back up Europeans who may take action? It’s unclear. Where’s the tariffs? What chapter of this tariff scenario, or war, where is that taking us?

So there are all sorts of open-ended questions. And then what will Putin choose to do? He can see very clearly that the allies are not 100 percent unified right now. He’s no doubt celebrating the fact that they cannot agree on a Russia strategy. And as Peter noted, they need more work. The allies have to do more work on these gray zone hybrid tactics that the Russians like to use so much. And because of that, maybe Putin opts to test the alliance in a way we’re not even imagining, right? And so if there is a crisis, or even just a U.S. troop withdrawal with very little notice or no consultation with European allies, where does that take us? I mean, the worst-case scenario is that the Europeans say, well, we got to 5 percent, he should be happy, and we’re good for the next three and a half years. That would be a huge mistake. My sense is not many of them are reaching that conclusion, but I think we cannot allow ourselves to assume that if next week is smooth and the president is smiling and he says something about Article Five, that we’re good for the remaining years of his administration.

FIX: Mmm hmm. Doug, I also want to—I always want to add additional questions to you. (Laughs.) But I want to take this one step further. If you were to advise Europeans, with your experience, on what should be their plan B, plan C, plan D planning for any such scenarios, what would you say? I mean, they’re different ideas in Europe—regional alliances, EU-led, you know, U.K., France. How would you advise Europeans to prepare for the alternative scenario?

LUTE: So I think the bridge between the Europe we have, which we’re not quite satisfied with, right, and the Europe that Europe needs, and the Europe we need, is American hardware, American capabilities. I mean, the reality is that consortia and, you know, increased defense spending—so, right now, the European defense industry is ten to fifteen years behind ours. So if they’re going to do a transaction, buy American, OK? Now, you know, that’s kind of—it sounds relatively familiar. We’re, what, two blocks from the White House, right? So, I mean, in some ways maybe production can be on license for American things, like the Patriot missile. But in other cases look what Olaf Scholz did with the 100 billion euro Zeitenwende fund. The first two big pronouncements he made was the F-35 fighter, U.S., and the CH-47 helicopter, U.S. Why? Because alternatives—European alternatives did not exist. And they won’t exist for some period of time. So during this period where we’re bridging from where we are to where we want to be, I think the natural thing, and the thing that will appeal to this administration, is buy American.

FIX: Mmm hmm. And what—I mean, there’s also worst-case thinking—just to push this further—that if you buy American, then that is weaponized against you. I mean, that’s the scenario that Europeans have been thinking about—Ukraine, HIMARS, U.S. software, is that something you know, too far-fetched?

LUTE: Well, I wouldn’t put anything off limits these days. But I think that defense cooperation—once capabilities are acquired, you know, there’s a certain ownership in those capabilities. And I think we know how to deal with those sensitive matters of technology transfers and so forth. And it’s not as easy to sort of turn the switch on and off as maybe some of these recent comments have suggested.

FIX: And HIMARS in Ukraine is different than—yeah.

Q: Julian Barnes, New York Times.

I wanted to ask you, Doug, Julie, a little bit on the buy American question. You know, part of the reason defense spending works in the United States is that and—why it’s bipartisan—has bipartisan support—is that it creates manufacturing jobs to—you know, every defense dollar is a boost to the economy. And in Europe, if you want them to spend more, they—and you’re saying spend on American—they’re not going to get that economic boost. And we have this moment after the Ukraine war where we see a new wave of weaponry being needed. Perhaps the age of the tank is going away and we—it’s all—or much more drones. And there’s room for all kinds of investment. Are we hurting ourselves by pushing for buy American? Should we try to get—if we really want Europe to be more self-sufficient, shouldn’t they do the American thing, which is mean every defense dollar is good for your economy?

LUTE: I mean, absolutely. That’s why I described it as only a bridge. I don’t see this as eternal and everlasting, right? But in order to get some capabilities in the short term, really, there aren’t that many choices. There’s no other Patriot missile system out there, and so forth. Software, ISR, space-based ISR, I mean, these are not capabilities you can build in a couple of years, so.

SMITH: But you do bring up a really good point, in that for a leader in Europe right now to go out and say to his or her public, we’re going to 5 percent, and we’re going to spend a big chunk of that on American kit, that is a losing strategy as a politician in Europe right now. There’s just no denying it. And I think it will take some leadership to find a way to make investment in indigenous capabilities, but to do so in a way that’s thoughtful and doesn’t end up producing lots of similar systems that actually aren’t interoperable. But it will also take leadership to say, look, we will take that 60-65 percent and invest it in our own European defense industrial base. But in certain circumstances, we don’t—as Doug said, we don’t have certain sets of capabilities that are required.

And it’s no secret that air defense is needed not only in Ukraine, but in Europe, because of the generous contributions that many European countries have made to Ukraine. I mean, look at a country like Romania. They’ve given most of their air defense to Ukraine. We’re all very generous and—grateful for that. We’re grateful for their generosity. But at the same time, they’re feeling a bit exposed. So they quickly have to fill that gap. And I appreciate how hard it’s going to be to go out and talk about buying American systems in this climate, while we’re slapping tariffs on each other. So you raise a very good point. But, as Doug said, in certain circumstances there’s no way around it. And I think those joint ventures that I cited, where Americans can bring the technology and the know-how, but we can produce and help them build capacity in Europe, might be the best halfway house on that.

LUTE: I think co-production is the path.

SMITH: Yeah.

FIX: Mmm hmm. Especially if Europe’s economy is squeezed not only from the side of the United States, but also from the side of China, right?

Let me take one more virtual question.

OPERATOR: We’ll take the next question from Phyllis Berry.

Q: Hi. This is Phyllis Berry.

I have a question to get back to Ukraine. On Ukraine, again, it won’t be discussed at the summit, but as we’re going towards the fall Ukraine is running through U.S. kit. And, as you say, Europe can’t substitute for everything. I mean, they’re ramping up and they’re looking for production with Ukraine. But, really, what happens—where do you get those discussions to get to something like what—Charlie, I’d love to believe you that this is what’s going to happen—but where we get to a decision in which we at least let Europe pay for the necessary materiel for Ukraine. But what happens in the fall when Ukraine starts really needing things that they can only get from the United States? Because I personally don’t—I don’t see any action going on in Congress or the U.S. to prepare for that next—you know, that next wave of supply that’s going to be necessary.

And if we don’t respond, what does that do to European views of the United States? Because, yes, all of these visits have been very nice. The Merz visit, they’ve all been very successful. But if you listen to what the leaders say, and it’s the same thing with the Norwegian prime minister, they find the one thing they can agree with the president. Which is usually, we all agree the killing has to stop. And then they say what they’re going to do to support Ukraine. But if the U.S. really doesn’t do anything more to support Ukraine on an extended basis, I mean, doesn’t that—isn’t that the biggest challenge to the transatlantic relationship?

FIX: Excellent question, Phyllis. Let me give this first to Peter, because you raised it at the beginning, and then Charlie probably will also want to say.

ROUGH: Well, I’d start by saying that I think intel sharing is hugely important. And I do think that, albeit brief, cut off in intel sharing rattled some of our partners and allies in Europe. And I think it’s important that there is a seamless continuity in intel sharing, and that the U.S. continues to do things like ISR, helps with Starlink, et cetera. And that can be paid for, I think, by the Europeans. As to the midterm horizon on some of these other systems, like air defense, maybe Charlie’s right but I detect no appetite in Congress for another supplemental. I don’t think there’s ever been a supplemental in American history that’s organically arisen out of the Congress.

It has to be asked for by the administration. It’s very much so a presidential ask, an Article Two kind of adjacent area. And I don’t think the White House is going to ask for a Ukraine supplemental. I don’t think it would ask for a munition supplemental to try to increase our defense industrial base. We basically now have the big, beautiful bill. There’s the budgeting process. And after that, it might be that the Congress turns back to something like this. But I would be very surprised, borderline shocked, if there’s another Ukraine supplemental. Which leaves us with direct military sales. And there, I do think the president’s open to greenlighting sales to European partners, either backfilling or directly to Ukraine, potentially.

FIX: Charlie.

KUPCHAN: Yeah. I mean—you know, I think Peter’s scenario is completely conceivable, if not likely. I do think that the Ukrainians can do much more on their own than they used to, right? Zelensky said, I think it was about a week ago, that Ukraine now produces roughly 40 percent of what it needs domestically. And there is a conversation in Europe now, which Liana and I heard we were there a few weeks ago, of active consideration by Europeans to buy American kit to send to Ukraine. So if there isn’t another supplemental, do I think that it’s game over for Ukraine? No. I think they can probably hang on. Probably not end the war on terms that are—that are favorable to Ukraine, but hang on.

The reason that I think that Trump may, in the end of the day, come around, is that I think that he does not want to be seen as the president who loses Ukraine. And he’s got three and a half more years to go. If he can’t convince Putin to stop, I do think that it’s not inconceivable that Ukraine will either turn into a failed state or can keep losing more and more ground. And if only for reasons of ego, my gut tells me that he is, at some point, going to ask for more money for Ukraine. But that’s just a guess. Peter knows the Republicans better than I do. So we’ll have to see how this plays out.

ROUGH: But it’s really not up to the Republicans. If President Trump asks for a supplemental, he will get a supplemental.

KUPCHAN: Right, he will get it.

ROUGH: Which would have been different if, say, President Harris was in office. But I guess we’re just trying to read the mind of Donald Trump.

KUPCHAN: Yes.

FIX: Great. I have time for one more quick question here from the audience, if there’s one. Otherwise, we’ll take one more from the virtual audience.

OPERATOR: We’ll take the last question from James Siebens.

Q: Thank you very much for an excellent discussion. James Siebens from the Stimson Center.

You talked about the difficulty of making a political case for buying American kit for European leaders. I wonder how the panel would think that European leaders should present the case for increasing contributions to Ukraine’s defense, especially if that means real tradeoffs in terms of budget—national budgets. So what would be the case for either a clear and present threat from Russia or other arguments, like the necessity of keeping the alliance strong, and so forth? How would you make that case for European voters?

FIX: And let me add, wouldn’t an easier way out of that dilemma be the Russian frozen assets, where we haven’t seen any further progress?

SMITH: The what?

FIX: The Russian frozen assets, we haven’t seen any further progress.

SMITH: Oh, right. Yeah.

FIX: Julie, do you want to give it a first cut?

SMITH: Yeah. I mean, I think European leaders aren’t really struggling to make the case for Ukraine. I mean, I think they’re feeling the threat of a failed Ukraine much more than we do on this side of the Atlantic. It is top of mind. You’re now hearing from—just about every defense minister across Europe is talking about Russia possibly being in a position and having an interest in targeting NATO territory, one way or another, within the next five years. This is just—at every conference you go to, somebody stands up and talks about the latest intelligence that shows the Russian threat. So the Russian threat, whether you’re in Madrid, or Poland, or Oslo, I mean, or in Greece, I mean, it is now—folks are consumed with it. There are shades of gray, obviously. The Balts feel it much more than the southern members of the alliance.

But in terms of purchasing American kit, I mean, I think they know, most European leaders, that they have to do two things. They have to address the fact that they’re now—their capability gaps are acute, again, thanks to the contributions they’ve made to Ukraine. But the cupboards are bare and they’ve got to get more for their own defense and to meet the regional plans that the alliance rolled out a couple of years ago. But they also have to buy American kit to get it in Ukrainian hands as soon as possible, especially if the United States is not going to be providing any additional intelligence sharing or any capabilities on our own, or offering any U.S. capabilities. So it seems to be, I don’t know, I think, a debate right now that is more or less, depending on where you’re sitting in Europe, in the right place.

Again, I recently was in Spain and traveled through Italy. I mean, it does have a different feel than the debates in the Baltic states. But where we were five years ago, it’s night and day. The whole continent is talking about Russia, the Russian threat, and the need to continue supporting Ukraine. So that feels very real to me.

FIX: Yeah. Doug. The last word.

LUTE: I do think the ticket here, the burst of additional funding that we need, has to take us back to the 300 billion euros of central bank—frozen central bank assets, because that political argument makes sense here, across party lines, and in Europe. So I hope that the G-7 will—they won’t say anything about this, but I hope they’re talking about this in Canada this week. Because that seems to me to be, again, another bridging mechanism that would be very useful.

FIX: Especially with a new German government.

LUTE: Right.

FIX: Wonderful. Please join me in thanking our fantastic panel for this discussion. (Applause.) I think by now you should know—and thank you for the viewers of C-SPAN who might have joined us. But I think by now you should all know everything you should know about next week’s NATO summit. And please follow us on our work on that. Thank you.

(END)

This is an uncorrected transcript.