China in Africa: January 2025
from China Strategy Initiative
from China Strategy Initiative

China in Africa: January 2025

Chad’s Foreign Minister Abderaman Koulamallah meets with China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in N’Djamena, Chad on January 8, 2025.
Chad’s Foreign Minister Abderaman Koulamallah meets with China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in N’Djamena, Chad on January 8, 2025. JORIS BOLOMEY/AFP via Getty Images

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi continued the tradition of visiting the continent at the beginning of each year.

February 13, 2025 2:40 pm (EST)

Chad’s Foreign Minister Abderaman Koulamallah meets with China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in N’Djamena, Chad on January 8, 2025.
Chad’s Foreign Minister Abderaman Koulamallah meets with China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in N’Djamena, Chad on January 8, 2025. JORIS BOLOMEY/AFP via Getty Images
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Current political and economic issues succinctly explained.

Soft Power: At the beginning of the month, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi toured Chad, Namibia, Nigeria, and Republic of Congo—the one hundred fortieth trip of top Chinese leadership to Africa since 2007. He kept with the thirty-five-year tradition of making the first overseas trip of the new year to a set of four to five African countries. While meeting with Chadian President Mahamat Idriss Deby in the capital N’Djamena on January 8, Wang expressed China’s interest in helping facilitate Chad’s “development and vitalization.” That commitment could be put to the test sooner than expected, according to some observers. Shortly after Wang’s departure from N’Djamena, gunmen stormed the presidential palace and killed twenty people, calling into question the speed at which China will mobilize its Global Security Initiative in Chad and throughout the Sahel to bolster regional peace and stability. 

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Chinese soft-power projection in January also materialized in sports diplomacy, archaeological excavation coordination, and a series of educational-exchange memorandums of understanding (MOUs). Supervised by the Kenyan Defence Forces, China Road and Bridge Corporation continues to construct the $350 million, sixty thousand–seat Talanta Sports Stadium in Nairobi, Kenya’s first international sports complex since the Moi International Sports Centre’s 1987 inauguration. Surpassing the original December 2025 completion target, the Talanta Sports Stadium will be completed by 2027, when Kenya, along with Tanzania and Uganda, will cohost the Africa Cup of Nations. In Egypt, representatives from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and the Egyptian Ministry of Antiquities are working to jointly unearth the Temple of Montu in Luxor’s Karnak Temple Complex. Confucius Institutes at universities in Botswana, Mozambique, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe signed MOUs with various secondary schools and companies to fully integrate Chinese language learning; establish academic scholarships in fields of strategic priority, such as environmental engineering, geology, and law; and provide scholarships for African cultural immersion in China. 

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Economic Exchange: Nigeria was central to several Chinese economic deals in January, both at the state and federal level. Nigeria’s Niger state government established a Special Agro Processing Zone with several Chinese partners, targeting an export projection of $1.5 billion. While announcing his plan to increasingly use the private sector’s power to drive agro processing, Niger state Governor Mohammed Umaru Bago said the Chinese Overseas Engineering Group and the China Railway Corporation have already partnered with Niger state. Meanwhile, at a high-level meeting with the Nigeria-China Strategic Partnership (NSCP) delegation in Beijing, China National Chemical Engineering International Co., Ltd., President Liy Zhenyi announced the company’s plan to invest in Nigeria’s $20 billion Ogidigben Gas Project in Delta state. Also in Beijing heading the delegation, NSCP Director General Joseph Tegbe discussed Nigeria’s active efforts to enhance its domestic drone technology capabilities, specifically through consultations with Loong UAV, a Chinese-origin leader in tactical drone solutions. According to Tegbe, “The cooperation with Loong UAV is expected to bolster Nigeria’s domestic capabilities in drone technology, facilitating access to essential services and commodities in remote or hard-to-reach regions.” 

Chinese global linen leader Kingdom Holdings outlined an expansion strategy in Egypt. Egyptian Minister of Investment and Foreign Trade Hassan El Khatib discussed building a linen manufacturing plant in Egypt with the company’s representatives, highlighting mutual benefits such as a more significant Egyptian presence in the global linen market.  

More Mining: Several forthcoming Chinese investments in Africa’s mining industry were announced, including in Egypt, Guinea, and Zimbabwe. In the first phase of an ongoing project, Asia Potash International Investment (Guangzhou) Co. Ltd. will invest $1.6 billion in southeastern Egypt to mine two million tons of phosphate annually for fertilizer production, including by building a large-scale in-country industrial complex. A total project investment estimate of $7 to $10 billion is expected to produce ten million tons of phosphate. In Guinea, China’s State Power Investment Co. is set to begin the construction of its alumina processing plant, which will allegedly produce 1.2 million tons of alumina per year by the end of 2027. Hoping that lithium prices will recover in 2025, Zimbabwe’s Kuvimba Mining House has decided to proceed with a $270 million deal with two Chinese companies, which will involve the construction of a lithium concentrator in Sandawana expected to output six hundred thousand tons per year. 

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Despite warnings from the Chinese Embassy in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to Chinese citizens and firms to halt mining ventures in eastern DRC amid worsening security, the risk-reward calculus continues to lead Chinese nationals there in search of large deposits of coltan, gold, tantalum, tin, and tungsten, among other minerals. One of the risks—prosecution—was realized when three Chinese nationals were arrested in possession of gold bars and $400,000 in cash. The three were sentenced to seven years in prison, charged $600,000 in fines, and permanently banned from DRC after serving their respective sentences. DRC has, in tandem, begun to court new mining investors from India, Saudi Arabia, and the European Union to curb its overreliance on China. Zimbabwean trade unions have also witnessed firsthand the nefarious behavior of Chinese nationals operating in its mining industry, where violent altercations between Chinese employers and Zimbabwean employees has brought to light the extent and gravity of China’s labor violations. 

Beyond the Norm: January saw a series of events that linked China to several of its African counterparts. One instance involved Canada, China, Libya—and a scheme orchestrated by a Montreal-based former UN official to deliver Chinese-origin armed drones to Libya under the guise of COVID-19 aid. As part of an ongoing investigation in Canada, Kuang Chi Wan, former deputy director at the International Civil Aviation Organization, was arrested by the FBI and charged with attempting to negotiate arms deals between China and Libya worth $1.1 billion—in breach of the U.S. Arms Export Control Act. According to FBI documentation, Wan attempted to contravene international arms and trade sanctions by crafting planned illegal arms and oil deals between China, Libyan warlords, and others. Emails from 2018 to 2021 revealed plans to use a network of shell companies in Egypt, Tunisia, and the United Kingdom for the transactions—which China could have approved to obscure its involvement. Wan is only one of seven thought to be involved in the scheme, another of which he claims was once “a special advisor to Chinese President Xi Jinping.” That open case is related to earlier charges the Royal Canadian Mounted Police leveled against two others who allegedly conspired to ship Libyan crude oil to China in exchange for ninety-two Chinese drones, the Toronto Star reported in April 2024. 

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According to a local representative of the police in Somalia’s Puntland region, a group of Somali pirates seized a Chinese fishing vessel in late November 2024, continuously moving the boat to avoid detection by the Somali Police Force Coast Guard. On January 13, the Chinese Embassy in Somalia issued a statement on X that following “the unremitting efforts of the Chinese government” to coordinate with the Somali Federal Government and the regional government of Puntland, the fishing vessel and its eighteen-member crew had been released. Whether the pirates’ original demand of a $10 million ransom was paid remains unclear. 

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