China, Russia, and Ukraine: December 2024
from China Strategy Initiative
from China Strategy Initiative

China, Russia, and Ukraine: December 2024

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping attend the gala event celebrating 75th anniversary of China-Russia relations in Beijing, China May 16, 2024.
Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping attend the gala event celebrating 75th anniversary of China-Russia relations in Beijing, China May 16, 2024. Sputnik/Alexander Ryumin/Pool via REUTERS

China and Russia are deepening energy ties, with natural gas exports exceeding contractual agreements. At the same time, in face of economic pressures, Russia is selling stakes in uranium deposits to Chinese companies, bolstering Beijing’s regional influence. Western nations have imposed more sanctions on Chinese companies aiding Russia’s military and are increasingly concerned by Chinese and Russian activity in the Arctic. 

January 2, 2025 12:31 pm (EST)

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping attend the gala event celebrating 75th anniversary of China-Russia relations in Beijing, China May 16, 2024.
Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping attend the gala event celebrating 75th anniversary of China-Russia relations in Beijing, China May 16, 2024. Sputnik/Alexander Ryumin/Pool via REUTERS
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Current political and economic issues succinctly explained.

Trade Developments: On December 20, Gazprom announced that Russia’s daily provision of natural gas—traveling through the Power of Siberia pipeline to China—set a new record. The amount exceeds the contractual requirements previously established with the China National Petroleum Corporation. Additionally, Russia has increased its gas delivery to an annual supply volume of thirty-eight billion cubic meters. That flow of natural gas should, reports Bloomberg, “slightly exceed its pipeline flows to Europe.”  

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However, Russia has faced challenges using its highly developed rail network for trade with China, and Russian Railways JSC is cutting its investment program by 30 percent. Bloomberg writes that “an increase in war-related cargoes is also compounding existing bottlenecks, while sanctions weigh on cross-border payments.” As a result, Russia has been increasingly using the Eastern Polygon rail network, though it too has been experiencing delays and infrastructural strain. 

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Russia’s State Atomic Energy Corporation Rosatom has held significant stakes in Kazakhstan’s Kazatomprom, including investments in uranium deposits. Now, it has begun to sell those stakes to Chinese companies. Recently, Rosatom’s Uranium One Group sold a 49.979 percent stake in the Zarechnoye mine to a company whose “ultimate beneficiary” is China’s State Nuclear Uranium Resources Development Company, says Kazatomprom. The Moscow Times reports that Uranium One Group also plans to sell 30 percent of Khorasan-U and Kyzylkum LLP to China Uranium Development Company Limited. Those sales benefit the Chinese government, increasing its influence in Central Asia, while intensifying Russia’s reliance on China. 

In November, Reuters reports, Chinese yuan-dominated exports decreased by double digits, a steep decline from October; yuan-based imports from Russia have fallen by 7.4 percent. The main issue, says Russian President Vladimir Putin, lies in mutual payment settlements, which both Chinese and Russian banks are actively working to improve.  

Over the past year, there has also been a significant decline in Chinese imports of Russian coal, dropping from $13.3 billion to $10.5 billion. Even so, Chinese imports account for 45 percent of Russia’s coal exports, says Vaibhav Raghunandan of the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air. Trade between the two countries continues to face persistent roadblocks, with progress in one area co-occurring with challenges in another. 

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Western Pushback: The United States is struggling to limit Chinese and Russian acquisition of advanced American computer chips, despite concerted efforts to enforce export controls. Russia has managed to acquire American chip components indirectly through front companies in places such Armenia, Georgia, and Hong Kong. Meanwhile, China has been acquiring American technology through the creation of extensive smuggling networks, according to a report by the Senate’s Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. The Donald Trump administration, which is expected to have a confrontational stance on China, could push for harsher enforcement of export controls alongside other stringent policies. 

On December 16, the European Union enacted its fifteenth round of sanctions on China. Those sanctions, reports Newsweek, included measures against Chinese companies that sell “dual-use products and technologies” to Russia and help it acquire “unmanned aerial vehicles.” One sanctioned company, Juhang Aviation Technology Shenzhen Co. Ltd., supplied Russia with materials that contributed to the production of long-range attack drones. Additional sanctions were introduced against shadow fleets, or vessels attempting to circumvent Western sanctions to transport goods like oil, weapons, and grains. A statement by Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lin Jian expressed strong opposition to these sanctions, arguing that the EU sets a double standard, as Western companies continue trading with Russia. 

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On December 4, the United States revealed its new space force unit in Japan, a response to growing threats from China, North Korea, and Russia. According to Newsweek’s Ryan Chan, the unit will enhance Japan’s “space surveillance and missile warning capabilities.” The increasing cooperation between the three U.S. adversaries is continually pushing the West to strengthen its alliances with countries in the region. 

Moscow and Beijing in the Arctic: The United States and NATO allies are increasingly concerned about the expanding presence of China and Russia in the Arctic. With melting ice creating greater access to the region, China and Russia have utilized it for activities such as “joint naval exercises, coast guard patrols, and strategic bomber air training,” writes Voice of America. Additionally, the two nations are building shipping routes through the Arctic which would help with the transport of Russian oil and gas. In July, the U.S. Department of Defense released a “2024 Arctic Strategy,” calling for a stronger response to their increased activity in the region. On December 6, the Canadian government announced plans to boost military spending by $8.1 billion over the next five years, which should help address growing security concerns including Chinese and Russian operations in the Arctic. 

Ukraine: China has started restricting the sale of components—including motors, batteries, and flight controllers—that could be used to construct unmanned aerial vehicles for Ukraine. Those restrictions are expected to intensify next year and could, according to Bloomberg News, involve requiring “license approvals based on the intended use of the components” and “softer requirements for Chinese companies to notify the government of their shipment plans.” 

On December 24, Ukrainian Minister of Agrarian Policy and Food Vitalii Koval announced potential plans to enhance agricultural cooperation with China. They include developing new export markets and increasing Chinese technology use. Koval highlighted that, over the past ten months, Ukraine exported $250 million worth of agricultural products to China while importing over $220 million worth of agricultural goods from China. 

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Artificial Intelligence (AI)

Sign up to receive CFR President Mike Froman’s analysis on the most important foreign policy story of the week, delivered to your inbox every Friday afternoon. Subscribe to The World This Week. In the Middle East, Israel and Iran are engaged in what could be the most consequential conflict in the region since the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. CFR’s experts continue to cover all aspects of the evolving conflict on CFR.org. While the situation evolves, including the potential for direct U.S. involvement, it is worth touching on another recent development in the region which could have far-reaching consequences: the diffusion of cutting-edge U.S. artificial intelligence (AI) technology to leading Gulf powers. The defining feature of President Donald Trump’s foreign policy is his willingness to question and, in many cases, reject the prevailing consensus on matters ranging from European security to trade. His approach to AI policy is no exception. Less than six months into his second term, Trump is set to fundamentally rewrite the United States’ international AI strategy in ways that could influence the balance of global power for decades to come. In February, at the Artificial Intelligence Action Summit in Paris, Vice President JD Vance delivered a rousing speech at the Grand Palais, and made it clear that the Trump administration planned to abandon the Biden administration’s safety-centric approach to AI governance in favor of a laissez-faire regulatory regime. “The AI future is not going to be won by hand-wringing about safety,” Vance said. “It will be won by building—from reliable power plants to the manufacturing facilities that can produce the chips of the future.” And as Trump’s AI czar David Sacks put it, “Washington wants to control things, the bureaucracy wants to control things. That’s not a winning formula for technology development. We’ve got to let the private sector cook.” The accelerationist thrust of Vance and Sacks’s remarks is manifesting on a global scale. Last month, during Trump’s tour of the Middle East, the United States announced a series of deals to permit the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia to import huge quantities (potentially over one million units) of advanced AI chips to be housed in massive new data centers that will serve U.S. and Gulf AI firms that are training and operating cutting-edge models. These imports were made possible by the Trump administration’s decision to scrap a Biden administration executive order that capped chip exports to geopolitical swing states in the Gulf and beyond, and which represents the most significant proliferation of AI capabilities outside the United States and China to date. The recipe for building and operating cutting-edge AI models has a few key raw ingredients: training data, algorithms (the governing logic of AI models like ChatGPT), advanced chips like Graphics Processing Units (GPUs) or Tensor Processing Units (TPUs)—and massive, power-hungry data centers filled with advanced chips.  Today, the United States maintains a monopoly of only one of these inputs: advanced semiconductors, and more specifically, the design of advanced semiconductors—a field in which U.S. tech giants like Nvidia and AMD, remain far ahead of their global competitors. To weaponize this chokepoint, the first Trump administration and the Biden administration placed a series of ever-stricter export controls on the sale of advanced U.S.-designed AI chips to countries of concern, including China.  The semiconductor export control regime culminated in the final days of the Biden administration with the rollout of the Framework for Artificial Intelligence Diffusion, more commonly known as the AI diffusion rule—a comprehensive global framework for limiting the proliferation of advanced semiconductors. The rule sorted the world into three camps. Tier 1 countries, including core U.S. allies such as Australia, Japan, and the United Kingdom, were exempt from restrictions, whereas tier 3 countries, such as Russia, China, and Iran, were subject to the extremely stringent controls. The core controversy of the diffusion rule stemmed from the tier 2 bucket, which included some 150 countries including India, Mexico, Israel, Switzerland, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Many tier 2 states, particularly Gulf powers with deep economic and military ties to the United States, were furious.  The rule wasn’t just a matter of how many chips could be imported and by whom. It refashioned how the United States could steer the distribution of computing resources, including the regulation and real-time monitoring of their deployment abroad and the terms by which the technologies can be shared with third parties. Proponents of the restrictions pointed to the need to limit geopolitical swing states’ access to leading AI capabilities and to prevent Chinese, Russian, and other adversarial actors from accessing powerful AI chips by contracting cloud service providers in these swing states.  However, critics of the rule, including leading AI model developers and cloud service providers, claimed that the constraints would stifle U.S. innovation and incentivize tier 2 countries to adopt Chinese AI infrastructure. Moreover, critics argued that with domestic capital expenditures on AI development and infrastructure running into the hundreds of billions of dollars in 2025 alone, fresh capital and scale-up opportunities in the Gulf and beyond represented the most viable option for expanding the U.S. AI ecosystem. This hypothesis is about to be tested in real time. In May, the Trump administration killed the diffusion rule, days before it would have been set into motion, in part to facilitate the export of these cutting-edge chips abroad to the Gulf powers. This represents a fundamental pivot for AI policy, but potentially also in the logic of U.S. grand strategy vis-à-vis China. The most recent era of great power competition, the Cold War, was fundamentally bipolar and the United States leaned heavily on the principle of non-proliferation, particularly in the nuclear domain, to limit the possibility of new entrants. We are now playing by a new set of rules where the diffusion of U.S. technology—and an effort to box out Chinese technology—is of paramount importance. Perhaps maintaining and expanding the United States’ global market share in key AI chokepoint technologies will deny China the scale it needs to outcompete the United States—but it also introduces the risk of U.S. chips falling into the wrong hands via transhipment, smuggling, and other means, or being co-opted by authoritarian regimes for malign purposes.  Such risks are not illusory: there is already ample evidence of Chinese firms using shell entities to access leading-edge U.S. chips through cloud service providers in Southeast Asia. And Chinese firms, including Huawei, were important vendors for leading Gulf AI firms, including the UAE’s G-42, until the U.S. government forced the firm to divest its Chinese hardware as a condition for receiving a strategic investment from Microsoft in 2024. In the United States, the ability to build new data centers is severely constrained by complex permitting processes and limited capacity to bring new power to the grid. What the Gulf countries lack in terms of semiconductor prowess and AI talent, they make up for with abundant capital, energy, and accommodating regulations. The Gulf countries are well-positioned for massive AI infrastructure buildouts. The question is simply, using whose technology—American or Chinese—and on what terms? In Saudi Arabia and the UAE, it will be American technology for now. The question remains whether the diffusion of the most powerful dual-use technologies of our day will bind foreign users to the United States and what impact it will have on the global balance of power.  We welcome your feedback on this column. Let me know what foreign policy issues you’d like me to address next by replying to [email protected].

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