Misperceptions and Misplaced Perceptions: Time to Turn the Page on International Trade
from RealEcon and Greenberg Center for Geoeconomic Studies
from RealEcon and Greenberg Center for Geoeconomic Studies

Misperceptions and Misplaced Perceptions: Time to Turn the Page on International Trade

A tugboat passes shipping containers being unloaded and stacked on a pier at Port Newark, New Jersey, U.S., November 19, 2021.
A tugboat passes shipping containers being unloaded and stacked on a pier at Port Newark, New Jersey, U.S., November 19, 2021. REUTERS/Mike Segar/File Photo

Trade deserves a better reputation. Increasing supply would improve the economy’s performance and the public’s perception of trade’s benefits.

September 20, 2024 9:51 am (EST)

A tugboat passes shipping containers being unloaded and stacked on a pier at Port Newark, New Jersey, U.S., November 19, 2021.
A tugboat passes shipping containers being unloaded and stacked on a pier at Port Newark, New Jersey, U.S., November 19, 2021. REUTERS/Mike Segar/File Photo
Article
Current political and economic issues succinctly explained.

International trade has gotten a bum rap in recent years, despite accounting for 25 percent of U.S. economic activity and its significant contribution to raising productivity and real incomes. Middle-class Americans gain about a quarter of their purchasing power from trade, while nearly half of imports are inputs for U.S. businesses. Exporting firms also pay higher wages, and the United States is the global champion in services exports.

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Nonetheless, former President Donald Trump tapped into a growing popular resentment of trade and has continued with his hallmark assertion “that foreign countries . . . have been ripping us off for years” and they “come in and take advantage of our country.” The Joe Biden administration has continued in the same vein, claiming that trade has “contributed to the hollowing out of the American industrial base and vital U.S. jobs, and harmed many of our communities and working families, undermining support for democracy itself.” With such portrayals, it is hard to see how anyone would favor trade.

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In a speech at the Brookings Institution in April 2023, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan cited trade liberalization—together with markets allocating capital efficiently and productively and the notion that all growth is good growth—as assumptions whose limits were laid bare by the “the shocks of a global financial crisis and a global pandemic.” He proclaimed that a new consensus is needed to “build a fairer, more durable global economic order, for the benefit of ourselves and for people everywhere.”

Smart industrial policy to advance national security, address climate change, and promote innovation can have its place. But it is a mistake to give short shrift to markets, trade, and growth, as they are the very mechanisms that raise incomes, a necessary part of addressing the unfairness issues cited by the last two administrations. Two phenomena are at play: a misperception and a misplaced perception.

Misperception

The misperception is the apparent view of Biden administration officials that the usual levers of fiscal and monetary policy were not working properly. During the Great Recession, the prime age employment-population ratio—which tracks the proportion of all Americans between the ages of twenty-five and fifty-four who are employed—tumbled from 80 percent in January 2008 to 75 percent by October 2009 and took nearly a decade to recover. Journalist Matthew Yglesias has suggested than rather than admit the Barack Obama administration stimulus measures were inadequate, the notion took hold that the sluggish labor-market recovery was due to something more “profound and conceptual.” Perhaps this is why officials rolled out a “worker-oriented trade policy” that has maintained the Trump administration’s tariffs, eschewed new market-opening arrangements, promoted onshore production, and expanded Buy American provisions.

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But, in fact, the economic machinery of the United States works fine. As the COVID-19 pandemic dropped the prime age employment-population ratio down to 70 percent, the Biden administration’s massive stimulus package and a forward-looking Federal Reserve headed off another slow labor-market recovery. The prime age employment-population ratio popped back up to 80 percent within two years, faster than forecast. Whatever merits the worker-oriented trade measures could have had to create jobs, they are not appropriate in a relatively tight labor market with unemployment at 4.2 percent.

Misplaced Perception

The misplaced perception is that trade has few benefits when they are overwhelmed by other unfavorable economic conditions. Intuitively this makes sense. When Walmart shoppers’ savings on purchases of a tradable items—produced abroad or in the United States—are more than eaten up by rising rent and medical costs, awareness of any benefits from trade quickly evaporates like water on a hot rock.

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This dynamic was evident during the Great Recession. Those who believed trade was good for the country collapsed from 78 percent to 58 percent and never fully recovered. When the pandemic undercut the economy, the 79 percent who thought foreign trade presented an opportunity for growth in 2020 slipped to 61 percent, according to a Gallup poll

Even though more recent headline data suggest that the economy is doing well, a May 2024 Pew survey reported that only 23 percent of respondents believed that economic conditions in the country were excellent or good. It is no wonder that 59 percent of respondents believe that the United States has lost more than it has gained from increased trade with other nations, a 3 percent increase from 2021.

Pre-distribution

Rather than build policy on the misperception and misplaced perception described above, Washington policymakers should do more to help ordinary Americans by taking measures to increase the supply of goods and services that are currently constrained by regulation or market concentration and contribute to raising costs. Unlike distributional policies, where the government makes direct payments such as unemployment insurance to address unequal growth outcomes, in these so-called pre-distribution measures the government helps raise real incomes in the first instance by strengthening market forces that reduce costs, such as lowering the price of drugs.

The Biden administration deserves credit for seeking to lower costs in some pre-distribution areas such as housing and medical care and for creating the Competition Council to tackle exploitive practices such as junk fees and noncompete clauses. But more could be done. Journalist Derek Thompson has proposed an “abundance agenda” to reduce price pressures in areas of constrained supply by easing regulatory burdens. Vanderbilt University’s Accelerator Program has chipped in, listing forty new ideas to promote competition.

International trade policy also has a role to play to lower prices in pre-distribution areas. For example, under a process known as foreign peer approval, the Food and Drug Administration could address shortages of a drug it has already approved by allowing the importation of the same drug produced abroad and approved by a foreign drug agency. Other examples where trade policy could support pre-distributional policies are by lowering tariffs on housing construction goods; expanding visa extensions for qualified doctors, construction workers, and others; lifting the recent pause in processing new visa applications for international nurses; and signing on to the new Agreement on Climate Change, Trade, and Sustainability providing for duty-free treatment of environmental goods (excluding unfairly subsidized goods).

Dispelling the misperception that the machinery of the U.S. economy is defective would be the first step toward a discussion of more effective policies that embrace trade. Using trade measures to reduce pre-distribution costs would help lift real incomes and improve the economy’s overall performance. When paychecks go further to meet family needs, perhaps the population would have a rosier view of the economy and discard the misplaced perception that trade presents a threat. Politicians would have less of a foothold to exploit trade for populist purposes.

Time to turn the page on international trade.

James Wallar is a former U.S. Treasury official and advisor to the CFR RealEcon initiative.

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Artificial Intelligence (AI)

Sign up to receive CFR President Mike Froman’s analysis on the most important foreign policy story of the week, delivered to your inbox every Friday afternoon. Subscribe to The World This Week. In the Middle East, Israel and Iran are engaged in what could be the most consequential conflict in the region since the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. CFR’s experts continue to cover all aspects of the evolving conflict on CFR.org. While the situation evolves, including the potential for direct U.S. involvement, it is worth touching on another recent development in the region which could have far-reaching consequences: the diffusion of cutting-edge U.S. artificial intelligence (AI) technology to leading Gulf powers. The defining feature of President Donald Trump’s foreign policy is his willingness to question and, in many cases, reject the prevailing consensus on matters ranging from European security to trade. His approach to AI policy is no exception. Less than six months into his second term, Trump is set to fundamentally rewrite the United States’ international AI strategy in ways that could influence the balance of global power for decades to come. In February, at the Artificial Intelligence Action Summit in Paris, Vice President JD Vance delivered a rousing speech at the Grand Palais, and made it clear that the Trump administration planned to abandon the Biden administration’s safety-centric approach to AI governance in favor of a laissez-faire regulatory regime. “The AI future is not going to be won by hand-wringing about safety,” Vance said. “It will be won by building—from reliable power plants to the manufacturing facilities that can produce the chips of the future.” And as Trump’s AI czar David Sacks put it, “Washington wants to control things, the bureaucracy wants to control things. That’s not a winning formula for technology development. We’ve got to let the private sector cook.” The accelerationist thrust of Vance and Sacks’s remarks is manifesting on a global scale. Last month, during Trump’s tour of the Middle East, the United States announced a series of deals to permit the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia to import huge quantities (potentially over one million units) of advanced AI chips to be housed in massive new data centers that will serve U.S. and Gulf AI firms that are training and operating cutting-edge models. These imports were made possible by the Trump administration’s decision to scrap a Biden administration executive order that capped chip exports to geopolitical swing states in the Gulf and beyond, and which represents the most significant proliferation of AI capabilities outside the United States and China to date. The recipe for building and operating cutting-edge AI models has a few key raw ingredients: training data, algorithms (the governing logic of AI models like ChatGPT), advanced chips like Graphics Processing Units (GPUs) or Tensor Processing Units (TPUs)—and massive, power-hungry data centers filled with advanced chips.  Today, the United States maintains a monopoly of only one of these inputs: advanced semiconductors, and more specifically, the design of advanced semiconductors—a field in which U.S. tech giants like Nvidia and AMD, remain far ahead of their global competitors. To weaponize this chokepoint, the first Trump administration and the Biden administration placed a series of ever-stricter export controls on the sale of advanced U.S.-designed AI chips to countries of concern, including China.  The semiconductor export control regime culminated in the final days of the Biden administration with the rollout of the Framework for Artificial Intelligence Diffusion, more commonly known as the AI diffusion rule—a comprehensive global framework for limiting the proliferation of advanced semiconductors. The rule sorted the world into three camps. Tier 1 countries, including core U.S. allies such as Australia, Japan, and the United Kingdom, were exempt from restrictions, whereas tier 3 countries, such as Russia, China, and Iran, were subject to the extremely stringent controls. The core controversy of the diffusion rule stemmed from the tier 2 bucket, which included some 150 countries including India, Mexico, Israel, Switzerland, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Many tier 2 states, particularly Gulf powers with deep economic and military ties to the United States, were furious.  The rule wasn’t just a matter of how many chips could be imported and by whom. It refashioned how the United States could steer the distribution of computing resources, including the regulation and real-time monitoring of their deployment abroad and the terms by which the technologies can be shared with third parties. Proponents of the restrictions pointed to the need to limit geopolitical swing states’ access to leading AI capabilities and to prevent Chinese, Russian, and other adversarial actors from accessing powerful AI chips by contracting cloud service providers in these swing states.  However, critics of the rule, including leading AI model developers and cloud service providers, claimed that the constraints would stifle U.S. innovation and incentivize tier 2 countries to adopt Chinese AI infrastructure. Moreover, critics argued that with domestic capital expenditures on AI development and infrastructure running into the hundreds of billions of dollars in 2025 alone, fresh capital and scale-up opportunities in the Gulf and beyond represented the most viable option for expanding the U.S. AI ecosystem. This hypothesis is about to be tested in real time. In May, the Trump administration killed the diffusion rule, days before it would have been set into motion, in part to facilitate the export of these cutting-edge chips abroad to the Gulf powers. This represents a fundamental pivot for AI policy, but potentially also in the logic of U.S. grand strategy vis-à-vis China. The most recent era of great power competition, the Cold War, was fundamentally bipolar and the United States leaned heavily on the principle of non-proliferation, particularly in the nuclear domain, to limit the possibility of new entrants. We are now playing by a new set of rules where the diffusion of U.S. technology—and an effort to box out Chinese technology—is of paramount importance. Perhaps maintaining and expanding the United States’ global market share in key AI chokepoint technologies will deny China the scale it needs to outcompete the United States—but it also introduces the risk of U.S. chips falling into the wrong hands via transhipment, smuggling, and other means, or being co-opted by authoritarian regimes for malign purposes.  Such risks are not illusory: there is already ample evidence of Chinese firms using shell entities to access leading-edge U.S. chips through cloud service providers in Southeast Asia. And Chinese firms, including Huawei, were important vendors for leading Gulf AI firms, including the UAE’s G-42, until the U.S. government forced the firm to divest its Chinese hardware as a condition for receiving a strategic investment from Microsoft in 2024. In the United States, the ability to build new data centers is severely constrained by complex permitting processes and limited capacity to bring new power to the grid. What the Gulf countries lack in terms of semiconductor prowess and AI talent, they make up for with abundant capital, energy, and accommodating regulations. The Gulf countries are well-positioned for massive AI infrastructure buildouts. The question is simply, using whose technology—American or Chinese—and on what terms? In Saudi Arabia and the UAE, it will be American technology for now. The question remains whether the diffusion of the most powerful dual-use technologies of our day will bind foreign users to the United States and what impact it will have on the global balance of power.  We welcome your feedback on this column. Let me know what foreign policy issues you’d like me to address next by replying to [email protected].

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