China and Nuclear Arms Control: Why a Trump-Xi Breakthrough at APEC Is Unlikely
China has historical and strategic reasons for its reluctance to engage on arms control. There are still areas that the U.S. should pursue.

By experts and staff
- Published
Eleanor AtkinsCFR ExpertStanton Nuclear Security Fellow
Gerald BrownCFR Expert2026–27 International Affairs Fellow
Eleanor Atkins’ research focuses on Chinese foreign policy, particularly the intersection of diplomatic statecraft and military power. Gerald C. Brown’s research focuses on Chinese military and security issues, including nuclear strategy.
The lead-up to U.S. President Donald Trump’s planned trilateral meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit this week has already been marked by some upbeat rhetoric, including on security. Trump has said he plans to discuss “a lot of things, including denuclearization.” While the Chinese Foreign Ministry has pushed back on the nuclear characterization of the talks, they have stated that the discussions, being held in Shenzhen, China, would cover “safeguarding world peace and promoting strategic stability.”
This is not the first time Trump has raised the prospect of trilateral denuclearization talks. In October, a few weeks after hosting Xi at the White House, Trump reported such talks were underway, though the administration has offered few details since. But while drawing China into nuclear arms control has been a goal of several U.S. administrations, including this one, expectations of a breakthrough on the issue should be tempered.
China has long cited the disparity in the size of its arsenal and that of the United States as a reason for refusing to participate in nuclear arms control talks. Asked in October to confirm the existence of such talks, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson pointed to the gap in the size of the arsenals and asserted that it was “neither fair, reasonable nor realistic” to ask China to participate.
This disparity is real. China has approximately 600 warheads in its stockpile, compared with 3,700 for the United States and 4,400 for Russia. But the conditions China has set for talks have also changed. In 1982, for example, China stated that the United States and the Soviet Union would need to cut their arsenals in half before it would consider joining talks. Yet even though the U.S. stockpile has declined by more than 80 percent since the fall of the Berlin Wall, Beijing still cites the need for further reductions. For example, a white paper released in 2025 calls for “drastic and substantive reductions” in existing arsenals. This is despite Pentagon estimates that China’s own stockpile has approximately tripled in size since 2020.
This continued reluctance to engage on the issue is fueled by several historical and strategic beliefs. One, born of experience, is that arms control is a tool used by powerful countries to constrain weaker ones. When the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union signed the Partial Test Ban Treaty in 1963, China had not yet tested a nuclear weapon. The treaty banned tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and underwater, but permitted them underground, which Beijing interpreted as allowing the nuclear powers to continue improving their arsenals while constraining states that had yet to build one. China’s premier, Zhou Enlai, called the treaty “a huge swindle.”
When China tested its first nuclear weapon the following year, the government said the treaty had been “an attempt to consolidate the nuclear monopoly of the three nuclear powers.” This view persists, and some leaders in Beijing see U.S. arms control proposals as an attempt to lock in an American advantage while China’s forces are comparatively small. For example, the head of the Foreign Ministry’s arms control department, Sun Xiaobo, recently accused the United States of being obsessed with “absolute strategic advantages.”
A second cause for China’s reluctance to engage on arms control is the belief that its nuclear deterrent depends on secrecy. Beijing’s no-first-use pledge means that its nuclear forces must survive a first strike and still be able to retaliate to act as an effective deterrent, a demanding standard for a relatively small arsenal. As Tsinghua University’s Wu Riqiang notes, uncertainty about how many weapons Beijing has and where they are is part of what makes its deterrent credible. Hui Zhang, a nuclear policy expert at Harvard’s Belfer Center, describes this as “quantitative ambiguity,” wherein an attacker that does not know the precise “numbers and locations” of Chinese warheads cannot be certain that a first strike would destroy them all. From Beijing’s perspective, excessive transparency could provide an adversary with information it could use to target those forces. Accordingly, China is unlikely to accept arms control measures that require intrusive verification.
A third belief concerns status. In 1988, Deng Xiaoping credited China’s nuclear arsenal and satellites for its “standing as a great, influential country.” Similarly, in 2016, Xi called the Rocket Force a “strategic buttress to the country’s position as a major power.” A 2023 study from the U.S. National Defense University found “strong evidence” that status concerns shape China’s nuclear expansion. Tong Zhao has also pointed out that Xi’s “demand for absolute loyalty” has led Chinese experts and opinion leaders to “carefully align themselves with Xi’s policy perspectives.” As a result, those within the system who disagree with the current hesitation toward arms control are unlikely to voice those opinions, given that, as Zhao writes, “dissent or even raising questions has high costs in such a power system.”
Another reason China is wary of constraints on its nuclear arsenal is that it seeks a nuclear force that enables it to secure its broader military strategic objectives, which since 1993 military guidelines have centered on a Taiwan conflict. As China’s military focuses increasingly on deterring intervention by a nuclear-armed United States in a Taiwan conflict, China seeks a credible nuclear force that can deter U.S. nuclear options during that conflict. Beijing would not agree to proposals that would weaken its ability to achieve this objective, and it has tied arms control policy to this goal. In 2023, U.S. and Chinese representatives met to discuss views on arms control, but these talks were abruptly discontinued the following year by the Chinese side following routine U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.
Despite these hesitations, China is not intrinsically opposed to arms control. Beijing has made clear what it would like to see out of arms control: a commitment from other nuclear powers to no-first-use and an end to global missile defense systems are high on its agenda. However, these concessions are unlikely to be ones Washington is willing to grant. The 2022 Nuclear Posture Review, for example, concluded that a no-first-use policy would “result in an unacceptable level of risk,” and Golden Dome—a planned next-generation missile defense shield—is a Trump administration priority.
Finding win-wins
Still, there are areas worth pursuing. Arms control should focus less on numerical disparities and more on identifying mutually beneficial pathways that reduce the incentives that may lead to conflict or the destructiveness of a conflict if one does occur. Arms control is not a tool that states will sign on to if it reduces their ability to accomplish their respective political and strategic objectives. The United States should instead focus talks on identifying areas of mutual concern that will not touch on core national priorities. Some examples worth exploring include ballistic missile launch notifications or tactical nuclear weapons deployments. Beijing warned Washington ahead of two recent intercontinental missile tests into the ocean, but in July this year it gave only a couple of hours’ notice, far short of international norms. Bilateral discussions on nuclear policy and strategic views would help build mutual understanding of risks and how signals may be perceived that could curb unintended escalation in a crisis.
Trilateral denuclearization talks will probably not produce the limits on China’s nuclear arsenal or increased transparency over its capabilities that Washington most wants. Nevertheless, efforts to bring Beijing into nuclear arms control are worth continuing. As China’s arsenal grows, so too does the risk that a crisis will escalate through misperception. Establishing regular channels for discussing these topics might not grab headlines this week, but doing so could help reduce the likelihood of dangerous misunderstandings.
This work represents the views solely of the author(s). The Council on Foreign Relations is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher, and takes no institutional positions on matters of policy.