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China Uses Exports as a Weapon. A Buyers’ Club Could Blunt It

<p>A man works on the assembly line manufacturing heavy duty trucks at a factory of Shaanxi Heavy Duty Automobile Co in Xian, Shaanxi province, China, March 26, 2019.</p>
A man works on the assembly line manufacturing heavy duty trucks at a factory of Shaanxi Heavy Duty Automobile Co in Xian, Shaanxi province, China, March 26, 2019. Reuters/Stringer

By experts and staff

Published
  • Senior Vice President of Studies and Maurice R. Greenberg Chair

China is weaponizing control over a host of vital materials, inputs, technologies, and goods, bending other nations to its will. While Western market-based economies can’t match Beijing’s hold on supply, they can compete on demand. But this lever will only work by bringing the world’s consumers together. To parry China’s commercial strikes, the US needs allies.

China is becoming more adept and assertive in leveraging its control over production for foreign policy ends. It fired a warning shot in 2010 against Japan, after the Japanese Coast Guard arrested a Chinese sea captain, by curtailing the exports of the rare earths that underpin the nation’s vast industrial base. After the US raised tariffs last year, it reran and expanded this playbook, disrupting global car, semiconductor, and other industrial manufacturing by constricting the export of rare earths and permanent magnets, getting the Trump administration to back down. It has taken to punishing European and US companies when their countries trample on China’s perceived interests, for instance by blacklisting precision manufacturing, electric motor, aerospace, and defense businesses on “dual use” grounds. And it looks to expand its arsenal of coercive tools, proposing new licensing regimes and export controls on solar, artificial intelligence, mineral refining technologies, and other products.

The US has tried to play this game, too. Since 2019, it has restricted exports of American software and chips to companies on its Entity List, including Chinese telecom giant Huawei Technologies Co. In 2022, it stopped the export of leading-edge semiconductors and their manufacturing equipment to China more broadly. But it is outmatched by the breadth of manufacturing chokepoints China holds. And prohibiting its private companies from selling abroad sits uneasily with America’s market-based fundamentals.

The US has also tried to leverage its buying power. It barred Chinese telecom gear from US networks, shut out Chinese-made connected vehicles, and leveled broad-based tariffs to keep Chinese goods out. But these unilateral measures haven’t stopped Huawei from becoming the world’s largest manufacturer of telecom equipment, BYD Co. the biggest EV car maker, and China’s global exports from rising to record levels.

The challenge is that US acquisitive power, as great as it is, amounts to only one-third of all global purchases. That’s not enough to unilaterally change China’s economic direction or behavior. Chinese companies can, and have, redirected their products to other markets. And while these countries have at times pushed back as well, for instance the European Union tariffing car imports or limiting Chinese made goods in public projects, the disjointed approach limits the effectiveness of demand-side leverage.

Market-based economies need to scale to flex their consumption power. If the US joined with Europe, Japan, South Korea, Canada and Australia, together they would wield more than half of global consumption. Add Brazil, Mexico, India, the UK and Argentina, and the group would top two-thirds of all global consumer spending.

Such a buyers’ club would give less running room to China’s unprofitable firms exporting goods at fire-sale prices, closing the door to the current workaround for the Chinese export juggernaut. This bigger network would help to offset the inflationary effects of substituting cheap Chinese goods by maintaining economies of scale and specialization with rerouted international supply chains. And it would afford nations safety in numbers against potential Chinese retaliation.

The challenge is that US acquisitive power, as great as it is, amounts to only one-third of all global purchases. That’s not enough to unilaterally change China’s economic direction or behavior.

This is a moment to mobilize as China’s manufacturing overbuild swamps the global economy. A diplomatically entrepreneurial US could make the most of open economies’ frustrations and in particular the EU’s increasing assertiveness. But to rally other countries, the US needs to give them a reason to join. Tariffing Seoul, Tokyo and Brussels alongside Beijing makes commercial camaraderie all the harder. And Washington needs to pick its economic battles as blanket levies and prohibitions dull the benefits and raise the costs of collaboration.

A nascent structure emerged in a framework signed on Sept. 30 in Milwaukee by the US, EU, Japan, South Korea and two dozen other nations on the sidelines of the G20 trade ministers’ meeting, where they agreed to investigate global steel overcapacity (China produces roughly half of all steel and its capacity is projected to grow). It was quickly followed up by a separate statement from a narrower coalition — including India, Mexico, and the EU — targeting cars, batteries, chemicals, legacy semiconductors and solar panels.

These initial voluntary agreements lack teeth. But countries could add binding enforcement mechanisms, including coordinated tariffs, quotas, or import bans. They could facilitate investment between members and match subsidies. Such a club of consumers would become a potent and asymmetric tool that China couldn’t match. Indeed, China’s willingness to make a deal with Europe on car imports reflects its desire to ward off a more coordinated and cascading pushback (and it was a good deal for China, the cap being higher than last year’s overall imports).

In the weaponizing of production, the US today can’t beat Shenzhen. But working together, the world’s market-based economies could blunt it.