The Missing Consensus: U.S. Policy Specialist Views on Korea

Two Opposing Camps

At least as far back as 1994, two views of the North Korea problem have competed, sometimes heatedly, for policy preeminence. Ironically, each camp views the embrace by the Obama administration of the opponent’s policy prescription—bold engagement or enhanced sanctions and containment—as a sign that denuclearization has been abandoned in favor of counterproliferation. Early in the Bush administration, Secretary of State Colin Powell provoked this fear among some observers when he said, on a Sunday news show, that the number of nuclear weapons produced by the DPRK was less important than our commitment to contain them. The Obama administration’s recent support of Bill Clinton’s humanitarian mission to free two U.S. journalists provoked this response from The Heritage Foundation’s Bruce Klingner: “U.S. allies South Korea and Japan remain exceedingly nervous that Obama will eventually abandon the U.S. policy of denuclearizing North Korea and accept a lower standard of merely preventing future nuclear proliferation.” In the January-February edition of Arms Control Today, Joel Wit urges for bolder engagement, noting that although the political and bureaucratic difficulties of the current situation may argue for ”adopting a warmed-over Bush approach of seeking very small steps forward“ so as to limit exposure and risk, doing so ”runs the serious risk of allowing Pyongyang to think that its strategy of playing for time can succeed...It also encourages the dangerous misperception among U.S. allies that Washington will indeed be willing to live with a nuclear North Korea.”

Two views of the history of U.S.-North Korean negotiations continue to divide the U.S. policy community. One view holds that there are good reasons to expect the DPRK will sell off even its nascent nuclear threat if the United States makes a consistent and credible commitment to the North’s development, diplomatic engagement, and long-term security. The other view is that the evidence is now conclusive that the North Korean leadership cares more about its nuclear capability and isolation from foreign influence than about economic development or diplomacy-based security. This continues to be the majority view, as it has been for most of the past fifteen years.

A parallel debate involves the political cost of working for a comprehensive denuclearization deal as opposed to enhanced containment and more punishing sanctions. A divide among nonproliferation specialists has clearly emerged over the past four months, as tension and escalation have again defined the U.S.-DPRK relationship. Some favor a strong and multidimensional approach, while others are convinced North Korea will be a test case for containment in the next phase of nonproliferation strategy. The growing issue of containment versus disarmament will be a major factor influencing the future direction of U.S.policy toward North Korea in coming months as the Obama administration makes critical decisions on how to proceed.