Takaichi Walks A Tightrope

Takaichi Diplomacy

This will be the second meeting between Japan’s prime minister and President Trump. The first took place in Tokyo last fall as the president headed to the annual APEC gathering and his meeting with China’s President Xi Jinping. His stopover in Tokyo, just days after Takaichi became Japan’s 104^th but first female prime minister, produced very favorable optics for Takaichi. The agenda highlighted Trump’s relationship with Takaichi’s mentor, the late Prime Minister Abe Shinzō, including a gift from his widow of Abe’s favorite putter. But it also ended with an unprecedented Takaichi-Trump appearance on the deck of the USS George Washington, a somewhat celebratory demonstration of the power of their military alliance.

The U.S. and Japan moved the needle forward on several practical alliance goals, but it was the rhetorical conviction that Trump and Takaichi were of one mind in moving the alliance into its “Golden Era” that captured the headlines. At the table where American and Japanese officials gathered, Trump seemed entranced by Takaichi and urged her to call him anytime if she needed his help stating, “I want to just let you know, anytime you have any question, any doubt, anything you want, any favors you need, anything I can do to help Japan, we will be there.”

But when Takaichi found herself in the crosshairs of China not long thereafter, there was a conspicuous silence from Washington. In the Diet, at the end of opposition party’s questioning on how she might handle a cross-strait conflict, Takaichi answered by saying that if China were to initiate the use of force, specifically a blockade against Taiwan, Japan could find itself considering a military response alongside the United States. While this answer conforms to Japan’s 2015 security laws about the circumstances under which Japan might join combined operations with other nations, it was the first time Taiwan had been mentioned publicly as a possible scenario. The Chinese response was to impose economic sanctions on Japan including limiting tourism, the purchase of aquatic products, and the sale of rare earths. Diplomacy came to a standstill.

Since her early foray into major power competition, Takaichi has faced a decisive electoral test at home. She passed with flying colors by leading her Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to an unprecedented victory at the polls. Takaichi called for a snap election on February 8 to ask for the public’s approval of her policy agenda. And she got it. A two-thirds majority in Japan’s Lower House, the first ever won solely by the LDP, now gives her party a strong mandate for legislating policy change. High among her priorities is answering the voters’ calls for cost-of-living assistance and a longer-term economic strategy for Japan. But it is her longer-term strategic aims for Japan that may define her.

The Iran War and Japan’s Options

Two realities confront Takaichi as she arrives in Washington, D.C. this week. The first is the legal limits on mobilizing the Self-Defense Force. Changes made to the government’s interpretation of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution under Abe Shinzō created new options for the use of its military. New situations, including threats to the survival of Japan, allow for the use of the SDF in coalition with others, especially the forces of Japan’s ally, the United States. To date, these situations have been theoretical as her Diet comments on Taiwan suggest. But this week, President Trump called on Japan, along with Korea, China and other allies to escort oil tankers through the Strait of Hormuz. However, Takaichi has determined that the SDF cannot perform these convoy operations during war time.

Japan’s prime minister has pursued other goals since the Iran War started. First, the Japanese government has worked with partners in the region to help its citizens return home from the Middle East conflict. Many Japanese returned to Japan with aid from others. On March 15, Takaichi tweeted that a South Korean military transport carrying Japanese nationals departed Riyadh and she expressed her gratitude to Japan’s neighbor. Second, Takaichi also contributed to the International Energy Agency’s (IEA) effort to provide short-term supply of oil. Of the four hundred million barrels made available through the IEA, Japan provided eighty million from its national reserves. Finally, Foreign Minister Motegi Toshimitsu has initiated diplomatic consultations with the G7, the Gulf States, and other partners and has called for the cessation of hostilities and stabilization of the region.

Japan’s longstanding ties with Iran prompted some legislators to urge the prime minister to use that channel for pursuing Japanese interests. India, Pakistan, and Turkey received Iranian assurances that their ships would transit without incident. In an interview with the NHK, Hossein Kanani Moghaddam, former commander of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) stated that Japan too could have its tankers safely pass through the Strait of Hormuz if it did not support America’s war. Motegi also has held multiple calls with the Iranian foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, most recently on March 17, to discuss concerns over Japanese vessels detained in the Persian Gulf and to request Iran to take necessary measures to ensure the safety of all Japanese vessels.

Trump’s Test? Or Takaichi to the Rescue?

President Trump’s remarks to reporters in the Oval Office on March 16 created new worry about Takaichi’s visit to Washington. Japan, along with the Republic of Korea, China and the European allies, seemed the focus of his ire. The president berated them for never stepping up when the U.S. needed help, even though China is obviously not a U.S. ally. Takaichi will be the first allied leader to step into this latest effort to discredit the partnerships that have long been the mainstay of U.S. foreign policy.

So, what to expect from the Japanese prime minister’s visit? Three issues to keep an eye on. First, and expected even before the war with Iran began, will be a new round of commitments by Japan to enhance its investment in the U.S. economy. Alongside the negotiations on tariffs last year, the U.S. and Japan concluded an agreement that Japan would over time provide $550 billion in foreign direct investment in critical sectors of the U.S. economy. In mid-February, three projects were announced totaling $36 billion: critical minerals development in Georgia, LNG in Texas, and power generation in Ohio. This visit we are likely to see Takaichi and Trump focus on oil, especially the development of infrastructure to export Alaskan crude oil to Japan.

Second, Takaichi will likely address the president’s expectations for Japanese support in U.S. military operations. Traditionally, Tokyo has offered greater support for U.S. forces stationed in Japan or in the Indo-Pacific region when it cannot contribute forces to U.S. coalition operations. The five-year Host Nation Support (HNS) agreement between Japan and the United States is up for renegotiation. Some type of Japanese assistance in the Persian Gulf is not entirely out of the question, but this would have to be after the conflict is over.

Finally, Takaichi—like so many leaders around the globe—will want to see the war with Iran come to an end. The ripple effects of this war across the global economy are clear, and Japan is not immune from the economic strain of higher gas prices and other impacts from a restricted supply of oil and gas. Takaichi will also likely still have her eye on the biggest strategic challenge Japan faces, and that is China. Trump’s visit to Beijing has been postponed by one month and ensuring the interests of Tokyo and Washington remain aligned no matter what China does will be top of mind for Japan’s prime minister. So will the national strategic review, including defense enhancements, which Takaichi plans to complete this year.

Takaichi will arrive in Washington, D.C. in a far stronger political position at home than when she first met with President Trump. Yet the war on Iran is deeply unpopular in Japan, and Japan’s energy supply, while adequate for 248 days, will be sorely depleted if this war goes on much longer. Will the prime minister be able to convey her country’s desire for peace while demonstrating to a skeptical President Trump the value of the U.S.-Japan alliance? We shall see.