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Testimony from Zongyuan Zoe Liu on China’s Role in the Fentanyl Crisis

Dr. Liu’s testimony to the House Foreign Affairs Committee argues that while China alone cannot be blamed for America’s fentanyl crisis, cooperation with China can be made meaningful to end the crisis.

By experts and staff

Published

Committee
House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on East Asia and the Pacific 

Hearing Title
Beijing’s Poison Pipeline: The CCP’s Role in the Fentanyl Crisis 

Date
June 4, 2026 

Dr. Liu’s testimony to the House Foreign Affairs Committee argues that while China alone cannot be blamed for America’s fentanyl crisis, cooperation with China can be made meaningful to end the crisis. After the Chinese government implemented controls on fentanyl-related substances in 2019, the risk shifted upstream to precursor and intermediate chemicals. Chinese industrial and financial networks have also helped create the conditions under which illicit fentanyl have gained traction. Dr. Liu argues that understanding China’s role as an upstream industrial and financial node can help inform policy to create measurable disruption of the networks that make illicit fentanyl scalable.

Her testimony highlights three levers that Congress can use to pursue enforcement and supply chain governance of fentanyl-related substances:

  1. Congress should require a regular interagency assessment of China-related fentanyl supply chain risk. The assessment should evaluate whether Chinese commitments and controls on chemicals are producing operational results. This interagency report should cover new controls on precursors and emerging synthetic opioids; evidence of inspections and penalties related to drug exports; the speed of Chinese regularity responses and progress disrupting payment channels linked to precursor procurement.  
  2. Congress should fund multilateral enforcement, not just bilateral pressure. Given the cross-border nature of supply market, a fully integrated U.S.-China-Mexico-Canada mechanism linking precursor control, customs enforcement, and financial intelligence will support China-related fentanyl cooperation and strengthen assessments of supply.  
  3. Congress should follow the money. Targeting chemicals alone will not be enough if payments, laundering, and trade-based financial channels remain intact. Recent financial trend reports disclose money laundering concerns in connection with illicit opioid trafficking, especially at the intersection of Chinese supply chains and Mexican financial channels. Anti-money-laundering enforcement should be central to fentanyl enforcement, especially where high-risk chemical suppliers, buyers, and payment channels intersect.