Tracking Trump’s Trade Deals
The president has set out to rewrite the rules of trade, one deal at a time.
By experts and staff
- Published
Experts
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By Inu ManakSenior Fellow for International Trade- By Allison J. SmithAssociate Director, Geoeconomics
Introduction
In his second term, President Donald Trump has set out to fundamentally restructure U.S. trade policy. On April 2, 2025, he announced sweeping tariffs on nearly all U.S. trading partners in what he branded Liberation Day. When markets reacted negatively, he backtracked on implementing those tariffs, and instead threatened to reimpose tariffs on countries that failed to secure a trade deal with the United States within ninety days. The move kicked off a scramble among U.S. trading partners to negotiate deals. Even though only two preliminary deals were reached by the ninety-day deadline, Trump did not ratchet up tariffs. Instead, he modified many of the Liberation Day tariffs to lower rates on July 31, 2025, noting progress in trade negotiations. Many of those modified rates were enshrined in subsequent deals.
Although Trump may have hoped to rewrite U.S. trade policy with a single executive order, the reality has been much more complicated. In fact, even though a higher overall baseline tariff is in place, the specifics of trade relations with the rest of the world are slowly being adjusted, one deal at a time. To push those deals along, Trump created additional exemptions in September 2025, Potential Tariff Adjustments for Aligned Partners, which cover items such as aircraft and aircraft parts, generic pharmaceuticals and ingredients, natural resources unavailable in the United States, and some agricultural products. On November 14, 2025, Trump took further action to exempt certain agricultural products from reciprocal tariffs due to growing concerns over affordability. Therefore, despite high average tariff rates, the actual rate that is applied is much lower, and varies considerably by country.
This tracker breaks down the content of the deals to date. We include only those deals that have a written text to analyze. Most are so-called framework agreements that outline areas for future negotiation, while implementing a temporary tariff truce. Those agreements are eventually expected to become finalized reciprocal trade deals, which more closely resemble traditional U.S. trade agreements. Unlike those traditional agreements, Trump’s reciprocal trade deals exclude any role for Congress. Furthermore, all agreements include language that suggests room for constant modification and quick termination. The message is clear: a trade agreement no longer guarantees predictability in trade relations with the United States. The frameworks and agreements mix both traditional features of U.S. trade policy and novel elements. The table below summarizes some of their main features.
The most novel aspect of these new deals is their strong focus on economic security, a term that—though regularly invoked—remains largely undefined in U.S. policy circles. Provisions on economic security cover everything from mirroring U.S. trade actions toward third countries (such as through tariffs or export controls), establishing investment-screening mechanisms, excluding certain countries from government procurement contracts, and committing to cooperation on supply chain resilience. The table below details where those commitments appear in the deals.
U.S. trade policy is likely to evolve further over the next few years. The status of ongoing negotiations will be regularly updated in this tracker.
United Kingdom
The U.S.-UK Economic Prosperity Deal [PDF] was announced on May 8, 2025, and its text was concluded that same day. It is the first deal that the Trump administration secured. Its stated objective is “to grow the quality and volume” of trade, create “high-paying jobs and growth,” reduce trade barriers to businesses and increase investments, and “to ensure that the Special Relationship is rooted in an enduring economic partnership that is fair, reciprocal, future-facing, and built on a shared vision of the challenges that face our economies.” Importantly, the text states that it “does not constitute a legally binding agreement,” and can be terminated at any time by either party, with written notice.
This deal set the basic parameters for the framework agreements that followed. These are the highlights:
- It sets a new tariff baseline, maintaining the Liberation Day 10 percent rate. The only additional market access provided to the UK is an increase in the import quota for beef, which the UK reciprocated.
- The deal modifies the application of Section 232 sectoral tariffs, providing the UK with a quota for vehicle imports at a 10 percent rate to match its new baseline tariff, as opposed to the higher 25 percent rate that Trump announced on March 26, 2025. It also leaves room to negotiate down rates for additional sectoral tariffs, such as those on aluminum, pharmaceutical products, and steel.
- Both parties have committed to continue addressing nontariff barriers (NTBs) to trade, such as health and safety regulations, interoperability of standards and regulations through mutual recognition agreements, and cooperation on the development of international standards. Those are long-held objectives of U.S. trade policy and are integrated in past U.S. trade agreements.
- It includes provisions on negotiating ambitious digital trade commitments, which will likely involve support for the U.S. position on digital trade discussions at the World Trade Organization (WTO).
- It includes a range of commitments in the catchall category of economic security, such as addressing “nonmarket policies of third countries,” investment screening, government procurement, and cooperation on duty evasion and transshipment.
What the Parties Are Saying
President Trump said the deal was “turning out to be, really, a great deal for both countries.”
British Member of Parliament for the Labour Party Liam Byrne stated, “Sir Keir Starmer deserves credit for securing the Economic Prosperity Deal. But we can’t escape the truth that Britain now trades with its biggest partner on terms that are worse than the past, the EU has in places secured a better edge, and key sectors of our economy still face the peril of new tariffs. That means jobs hang in the balance and investment waits on certainty.”
Expert Take
Inu Manak, CFR senior fellow for international trade: “The U.S.-UK Economic Prosperity Deal isn’t what most trade experts would call a trade agreement,” but “a framework for future talks …. For U.S. trade policy writ large, this means a new approach whereby no deal is ever really done, as each one is subject to constant modification and threats of withdrawal.”
On June 3, 2025, the United States held the UK steel and aluminum tariffs at 25 percent, while increasing those 232 duties for other countries to 50 percent. On June 16, 2025, the White House issued Executive Order 14309, implementing parts of the Economic Prosperity Deal, including a 100,000-vehicle quota at a 10 percent tariff rate for UK automotive imports, a 10 percent tariff on automotive parts, and an exemption for UK aerospace products that fall under the WTO Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft. The UK Department for Business and Trade introduced a preferential duty‑free quota for U.S. beef and ethanol that went into effect on June 30, 2025.
On September 18, 2025, a memorandum of understanding on a Technology and Prosperity Deal was announced. That deal was suspended on December 15, 2025. On December 1, 2025, an Agreement in Principle on Pharmaceutical Pricing was announced, exempting certain UK-origin medical technology and pharmaceutical goods and ingredients from Section 232 tariffs and any future 301 tariffs, if applied. On December 31, 2025, the United States implemented the agreed upon tariff-rate quota for beef.
On January 17, 2026, President Trump threatened a 25-percent tariff on all UK imports over a lack of support for the U.S. purchase of Greenland, but this threat was dropped on January 22, 2026.
Indonesia
The U.S.-Indonesia Agreement on Reciprocal Trade was announced on July 15, 2025, and the framework agreement’s text was concluded a week later. The stated objective is “to strengthen the bilateral economic relationship, which will provide both countries’ exporters unprecedented access to each other’s markets,” including through building on the 1996 U.S.-Indonesia Trade and Investment Framework Agreement.
The deal is a pared-down version of the UK framework, though it similarly commits the countries to continue negotiations on a range of issues at a future date. These are the highlights:
- It sets a new tariff baseline, reducing the Liberation Day rate of 32 percent to 19 percent. Indonesia agreed to eliminate 99 percent of its tariff barriers on industrial and agricultural products. The United States provided no additional concessions. Indonesia did not receive modifications to 232 sectoral tariffs.
- Both parties agreed to work on addressing nontariff barriers to trade, but, in contrast to the UK deal, which frames this as a cooperative effort, the burden is on Indonesia to adjust. For example, Indonesia agreed to exempt U.S. companies and goods from its local content requirements, accepted U.S. motor vehicle and emissions standards, and made similar exemptions for U.S. agricultural products. This asymmetrical approach to regulatory cooperation is not typical of past U.S. trade agreements.
- The agreement commits Indonesia to addressing barriers to digital trade, including support for a permanent moratorium on customs duties for electronic transmissions at the WTO, which Indonesia has long opposed. Indonesia also committed to implementing the WTO Agreement on Services Domestic Regulation, which reduces regulatory barriers to trade in the services sector.
- To support U.S. economic security goals, Indonesia agreed to remove restrictions on critical minerals exports, to work with the United States on supply chain resilience efforts, and to join discussions at the Global Forum on Steel Excess Capacity.
- This is the first deal that includes a commitment to purchase U.S. products, such as aircraft, energy, and agricultural products.
- Indonesia agreed to prohibit the import of goods produced by forced labor, and to maintain high environmental standards, including through the implementation of the WTO Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies and by combatting illegal logging.
According to the White House, many U.S. industry leaders support the deal, including American Soybean Association President Caleb Ragland, who said, “We appreciate President Trump and his administration’s efforts in maintaining market access for U.S. soybeans into Indonesia, and the commitment from USTR [the office of the U.S. Trade Representative] to address nontariff barriers in that market.”
Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto said, “Although the negotiation was quite tough, we understood the interests of the United States, and they also understood our interests ... the most important thing is that our workers are safe.”
Joshua Kurlantzick, CFR senior fellow for Southeast Asia and South Asia: “The Indonesia deal commits Jakarta to roll back a number of significant nontariff barriers in a move that defies its traditionally protectionist approach … while Jakarta, Manila, and Tokyo have taken home what they portray as tariff ‘wins,’ their deals are massively unpopular with their respective publics.”
On July 31, 2025, the White House modified Indonesia’s reciprocal tariff rate to 19 percent. The United States and Indonesia continue to negotiate details of the agreement.
Japan
The U.S.-Japan Strategic Trade and Investment Agreement was announced on July 22, 2025, and the framework agreement’s text was released as a fact sheet the next day, with additional details released on October 25, 2025. A framework for cooperation on critical minerals was released two days later.
Similar to the UK deal, this agreement sets out various areas for future activities, but places significantly more emphasis on supporting American industry through investment. These are the highlights:
- It sets a new tariff baseline, reducing the Liberation Day rate of 24 percent to 15 percent. Japan agreed to improve market access for cars and trucks, energy, rice, and other unspecified consumer and industrial goods. In return, Japan received exemptions from reciprocal tariffs on select products that are unavailable in the United States and pharmaceutical products. It also received a similar exemption to the UK with regard to the WTO Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft.
- The deal modifies the application of Section 232 sectoral tariffs on automobiles and parts, providing Japan with a 15 percent rate to match its new baseline tariff, as opposed to the higher 25 percent rate that Trump announced in March 2025. Modifications to other sectoral tariffs are subject to future negotiations.
- Japan agreed to a broad set of economic security commitments, such as investment screening, coordinated action against sanctions-evading shadow fleets, and diversified critical minerals supply chains.
- Similar to Indonesia, Japan agreed to purchase commitments on agricultural goods, aircraft, and defense equipment.
- Japan’s deal stands out for emphasis placed on investments aimed at “restoring American industrial power,” with a commitment for Japan to invest $550 billion in “core American industries.” In a separate memorandum of understanding (MOU) [PDF], Japan agreed to invest in projects selected by the U.S. president based on recommendations from an investment committee chaired by the U.S. secretary of commerce. If selected projects are not funded as requested, the president may reimpose tariffs. Distributions from those investments will be split fifty-fifty until a certain amount has been reached, after which the allocation will be ninety-ten to the United States and Japan, respectively. Investments will focus on critical industries, such as commercial and defense shipbuilding, critical minerals, energy, pharmaceuticals, and semiconductors. Japan also entered into a critical minerals framework for cooperation on securing supply chains, investing in mining and processing, addressing unfair competition, establishing pricing mechanisms, and other issues.
President Trump said this deal “reflects the strength of the U.S.-Japan relationship and Japan’s recognition of the United States as the most attractive and secure destination for strategic investment in the world.”
When asked about renegotiating the $550 billion investment commitment, Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae said, “I think the situation for each country is different, so it’s not appropriate to make blanket comparisons … . I believe that intergovernmental agreements should not be altered. What’s important is that this agreement promotes mutual benefits between Japan and the U.S., and contributes to economic and security assurance.”
Sheila A. Smith, CFR John E. Merow senior fellow for Asia-Pacific studies: “How [Japan’s investment commitment] will be directed, and by whom, remains unclear. President Trump has maintained that he will control how Japan’s investment is spent, adding another layer of complexity to how Japanese companies view their prospects in the U.S. economy.”
On July 31, 2025, the White House modified Japan’s reciprocal tariff rate to 15 percent. On September 4, 2025, the White House issued Executive Order 14345, implementing the framework agreement. Although the United States and Japan have started reviewing potential investment projects in energy, nothing has been finalized or announced as of December 2025.
The U.S.-EU Framework on an Agreement on Reciprocal, Fair, and Balanced Trade was announced on July 27, 2025 and the framework agreement’s text was concluded on August 21, 2025. The stated objective is to “put our trade and investment relationship—one of the largest in the world—on a solid footing and … reinvigorate our economies’ reindustrialization.”
The EU framework deal broadly mirrors the Japan deal. These are the highlights:
- It sets a new tariff baseline, reducing the Liberation Day rate of 20 percent to 15 percent. The United States agreed to exempt some products from the reciprocal rate, such as aircraft and aircraft parts, natural resources unavailable in the United States, and pharmaceutical products. Others could be added to that list in the future.
- The U.S. agreed to match Section 232 sectoral tariffs to the EU’s new baseline rate of 15 percent. That rate is capped, meaning that in instances where the most favored nation (MFN) rate is below 15 percent, the 232 tariff will not adjust the rate beyond 15 percent. In cases where the MFN rate is higher, additional 232 tariffs will not be added. The deal with South Korea has a similar provision.
- Similar to the UK deal, both parties committed to continue addressing nontariff barriers to trade, improving interoperability of standards and regulations, and cooperating on the development of international standards. Both parties agreed to accept one another’s standards for cars. Importantly, the EU agreed to provide flexibility to the United States in the application of its Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism.
- The EU agreed to address “unjustified digital trade barriers,” and to support efforts at the WTO on ecommerce negotiations.
- The EU also agreed to cooperate on a broad set of economic security priorities, such as critical minerals, export controls, and supply chain resilience.
- Like other deals, the EU made purchase commitments on energy and artificial intelligence (AI) chips.
- The EU agreed to a significant investment commitment of $600 billion through 2028 in unspecific strategic sectors. This is the largest investment commitment of all the deals and would require EU firms to nearly double their existing investments annually. Unlike Japan and South Korea, the EU did not enter into a memorandum of understanding regarding the terms of the investment commitment.
Trump said, “We’ve had a very good relationship over the years, but it’s been a very one-sided transaction, very unfair to the United States. And I think both sides want to see fairness.”
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said, “Today’s deal creates certainty in uncertain times. It delivers stability and predictability, for citizens and businesses on both sides of the Atlantic.” EU Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič explained that the deal was “the best we could get under very difficult circumstances.” French Prime Minister François Bayrou struck a different note, however, writing, “It is a dark day when an alliance of free peoples, brought together to affirm their common values and to defend their common interests, resigns itself to submission.”
Matthias Matthijs, CFR senior fellow for Europe: “In the short term... [the EU framework deal] entrenches Europe’s dependence on the United States—especially in energy and defense.” However, it “could catalyze a more autonomous and balanced transatlantic relationship over the next decade.”
On July 31, 2025, the White House modified the European Union’s reciprocal tariff rate to 15 percent. On August 27, 2025, the European Commission introduced two proposals to eliminate tariffs on U.S. industrial goods, provide preferential treatment for U.S. seafood and agricultural products, and extend tariff-free treatment of lobsters. On September 25, 2025, the United States implemented the framework agreement. On January 17, 2026, Trump threatened to impose a 25 percent tariff on European countries over a lack of support for the U.S. purchase of Greenland. In response, the European Parliament paused action to approve the framework deal.
The U.S.-Vietnam Agreement on Reciprocal, Fair, and Balanced Trade was announced on July 2, 2025, and the framework agreement’s text was released in a joint statement on October 26, 2025. The stated objective is to “strengthen our bilateral economic relationship, which will provide both countries’ exporters unprecedented access to each other’s markets.”
The U.S.-Vietnam deal is one of the shortest framework agreements, though its provisions are similar to those in the Indonesia deal. These are the highlights:
- It sets a new tariff baseline, reducing the Liberation Day rate from 46 percent to 20 percent. The United States agreed to exempt some yet-to-be identified products from the reciprocal tariff, in accordance with Executive Order 14346. Vietnam did not receive modifications to 232 sectoral tariffs.
- Vietnam agreed to work with the United States to address nontariff barriers, but similar to Indonesia, the burden is on Vietnam. For example, Vietnam agreed to make regulatory adjustments to accept U.S. motor vehicle safety and emissions standards, facilitate import licenses for U.S. medical devices, and reduce barriers to pharmaceutical products. The agreement also contains standard language on trade facilitation and good regulatory practices.
- Vietnam agreed to “finalize commitments on digital trade, and services and investment,” which echoes references across other agreements to ongoing WTO negotiations on ecommerce and the implementation of existing commitments for domestic services regulation.
- There are some economic security commitments dealing with supply chain resilience, export controls, and duty evasion.
- Vietnam agreed to purchase commitments, such as for aircraft and agricultural products.
Trump said, “Vietnam will… give the United States of America total access to their markets for trade.”
However, Vietnam’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said it would be committed to “providing preferential market access for U.S. goods, including large-engine automobiles.”
Joshua Kurlantzick, CFR senior fellow for Southeast Asia and South Asia: “Vietnam was—and is—probably the single middle-income economy most endangered by the Trump administration’s tariff policies.” The country runs ”the third-largest trade surplus with the United States... and has been assembling items made of Chinese components and then selling them to other markets.”
On July 31, 2025, the White House modified Vietnam’s reciprocal tariff rate to 20 percent. The United States and Vietnam continue to negotiate the details of the agreement.
The U.S.-Cambodia Agreement on Reciprocal Trade was announced on October 26, 2025, and the text was released the same day. The stated objective is to “enhance reciprocity in their bilateral trade relationship by addressing tariff and nontariff barriers,” and to “strengthen their commercial relationship through increased alignment on national and regional economic security matters.” This is the only agreement that acknowledges the U.S. trading partner’s development status; in this case, as a least developed country, a designation maintained by the United Nations.
This agreement, along with the Malaysia agreement, most closely resembles a traditional trade agreement, but remain substantially pared down and highly asymmetrical. It has clearly delineated areas of commitments and future activities. These are the highlights:
- It sets a new tariff baseline, reducing the Liberation Day rate of 49 percent to 19 percent. Cambodia agreed to eliminate tariffs on U.S. industrial goods and agricultural products. In turn, the United States agreed to exempt certain products from the reciprocal tariff. The list of exemptions is nearly identical to the list in Annex III of Executive Order 14346, providing a full exemption on a range of agricultural and food products, raw materials and minerals, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, aircraft and parts, electronics and computing, industrial machinery and equipment, electrical equipment, wood products, textiles and fibers, precision instruments, and some metal products.
- Consideration will be given to exemptions from 232 tariffs, but none were outlined in the main text of the agreement.
- Cambodia agreed to work with the United States to address nontariff barriers, but like other deals, the burden is on Cambodia. This includes requiring Cambodia to remove “unjustified” sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) barriers, and barring Cambodia from entering an agreement with a third-party that includes SPS measures “that are incompatible with U.S. or international standards.” There is also standard language on trade facilitation and good regulatory practices.
- The agreement commits Cambodia to address barriers to digital services trade, including refraining from digital services taxes, facilitating cross-border data flows, and supporting a permanent moratorium on customs duties for electronic transmissions at the WTO. A novel provision requires consultations with the United States before Cambodia enters a digital trade agreement “with another country that jeopardizes essential U.S. interests.”
- Cambodia agreed to a broad set of economic security commitments similar to those other agreements, and, like South Korea, includes a commitment to take “complementary actions to address unfair and nonmarket policies and practices.” Notably, it states that Cambodia should take similar security measures to the United States “in a manner that does not infringe on Cambodia’s sovereign interests.” This is the first instance that such language appears. In addition, the United States withholds the right to terminate the agreement “if Cambodia enters into a new bilateral free trade agreement or preferential economic agreement that the United States considers undermines this Agreement or otherwise poses a material threat to economic or national security.”
- Cambodia committed to exercise “ownership or control rights over its State-Owned or -Controlled Enterprises (SOEs)” and to refrain from providing subsidies to SOEs that produce goods. There are additional reporting and investigation requirements if the United States alleges that a subsidy is being provided to a domestic manufacturing enterprise in Cambodia’s territory.
- Article 4.1 of Annex III states that “Cambodia confirms that Air Cambodia has agreed to finalize the purchase of ten, with the purchase right for an additional ten, Boeing 737 MAX 8 aircraft no later than October 31, 2025.”
- Cambodia agreed to facilitate U.S. investments in mining and critical minerals, and the United States agreed to consider providing support for critical sectors in Cambodia with help from the Export-Import Bank and the Development Finance Corporation. Cambodia also agreed to “facilitate job-creating, greenfield investment in the US,” though that is unlikely due to its limited capacity to do so.
- Cambodia agreed to prohibit the import of goods produced by forced labor, and to maintain high environmental standards, including through the implementation of the WTO Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies.
U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer said, “These landmark deals demonstrate that America can maintain tariffs to shrink the goods trade deficit while opening new markets … I thank my counterpart[s]… for their collaboration and commitment in achieving a more balanced trade relationship with the United States.”
Cambodian Deputy Prime Minister Sun Chanthol said, “Cambodia was the first country worldwide to sign a reciprocal trade agreement with the US…This agreement has provided clarity and strong confidence for investors exporting to the vast US market.”
Joshua Kurlantzick, CFR senior fellow for Southeast Asia and South Asia: “With many of the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) members, who are major exporters, the United States has significant leverage because they are highly dependent on the U.S. market.”
On July 31, 2025, the White House modified Cambodia’s reciprocal tariff rate to 19 percent.
Cambodia implemented its tariff commitments on August 1, 2025.
The U.S.-Malaysia Agreement on Reciprocal Trade was announced on October 26, 2025, and the text was released the same day. The stated objective is to “enhance reciprocity in their bilateral trade relationship by addressing tariff and nontariff barriers,” and “strengthen their commercial relationship through increased alignment on national and regional economic security matters.”
This agreement, along with the Cambodia agreement, most closely resembles a traditional trade agreement, but remains substantially pared down and highly asymmetrical. It has clearly delineated areas of commitments and future activities. These are the highlights:
- It sets a new tariff baseline, reducing the Liberation Day rate of 24 percent to 19 percent. Malaysia agreed to eliminate tariffs on U.S. industrial goods and agricultural products, and the United States offered nearly identical reciprocal tariff exemptions to the Cambodia deal, detailed in an annex to the agreement. Notably, the Malaysia agreement fails to mention Section 232.
- Malaysia agreed to work with the United States to address nontariff barriers, similar to Cambodia. One distinction is that Malaysia agreed not to accept any pre-determined list of geographical indications for protection.
- Uniquely, Malaysia agreed to extend commitments made in any third-party agreement on services to the United States as well, excluding any commitments made under ASEAN.
- The digital trade provisions are identical to Cambodia’s, including a consultation requirement in the event that Malaysia negotiates a digital trade agreement with a third country.
- Malaysia agreed to a broad set of economic security commitments, similar to others, including a commitment to take “complementary actions to address unfair and nonmarket policies and practices.” In contrast to Cambodia, Malaysia’s commitment is stronger, obligating it to “adopt or maintain a measure with equivalent restrictive effect as the measure adopted by the United States or agree to a timeline for implementation.” Similarly, although Cambodia agreed to align with “relevant” U.S. export controls, Malaysia agreed to align with all unilateral U.S. export controls. In addition, the United States holds the right to terminate the agreement “if Malaysia enters into a new bilateral free trade agreement or preferential economic agreement that the United States considers undermines this Agreement or otherwise poses a material threat to economic or national security.”
- Malaysia agreed to “address unfair practices of companies owned or controlled by third countries operating in Malaysia’s jurisdiction,” but there are no other commitments on SOEs.
- In Annex IV, Malaysia agreed to purchase $150 billion in goods related to semiconductors, aerospace, and data centers over the next five years.
- Malaysia agreed to facilitate U.S. investments in unspecified critical sectors, and “to the extent practicable,” invest $70 billion in the United States over the next ten years. There is also a provision that commits Malaysia to develop its critical minerals sector in partnership with U.S. companies.
USTR Ambassador Greer stated, “Malaysia, for its part, will modify its tariffs and nontariff barriers, and we intend to have a lot more trade in ag, industry, and technology and services.”
Malaysian Minister of Investment, Trade, and Industry Datuk Seri Johari Abdul Ghani said, “We cannot backtrack on what we have already agreed upon, but we want to review any clauses that we see as unfair, so we can renegotiate them.”
Michael Froman, president, Council on Foreign Relations: “The [Trump] administration, for its part, appears to see the Malaysia framework as a template to patch holes in unilateral implementation of U.S. export controls and tariffs by enlisting willing partners as co-custodians of a common set of national-security trade tools,”
On July 31, 2025, the White House modified Malaysia’s reciprocal tariff rate to 19 percent.
The U.S.-Thailand Agreement on Reciprocal Trade was announced October 26, 2025, and the framework agreement’s text was released in a joint statement the same day. The stated objective of the agreement is to “strengthen our bilateral economic relationship, which will provide both countries’ exporters unprecedented access to each other’s markets.” A separate memorandum of understanding on critical minerals was also released.
The U.S.-Thailand framework is also short but includes elements from the Indonesia and Japan deals. These are the highlights:
- It sets a new tariff baseline, reducing the Liberation Day rate of 32 percent to 19 percent. The United States agreed to exempt some yet-to-be identified products from the reciprocal tariff, in accordance with Executive Order 14346. Thailand did not receive modifications to 232 sectoral tariffs.
- Thailand agreed to work with the United States to address nontariff barriers, but similar to Indonesia and Vietnam, the burden is on Thailand. For example, Thailand agreed to make regulatory adjustments to accept U.S. motor vehicle safety and emissions standards, pharmaceutical products, and import permits for ethanol for fuel. There is also standard language on trade facilitation and good regulatory practices. Thailand also agreed to address barriers to U.S. food and agricultural products.
- Thailand agreed to finalize international labor commitments, and to maintain high environmental standards, including through the implementation of the WTO Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies.
- The agreement commits Thailand to addressing barriers to digital trade, including support for a permanent moratorium on customs duties for electronic transmissions at the WTO.
- There are some economic security commitmentsorganized around addressing third party unfair trade practices, supply chain resilience, export controls, investment screening, and duty evasion.
- Thailand agreed to purchase commitments, such as for aircraft and energy products. The MOU on critical-mineral cooperation outlines ways in which trade and investment in critical minerals between the two countries could be strengthened. It also provides each party “the first opportunity to invest… in critical minerals assets that may be sold in Thailand or by a company headquartered or incorporated in Thailand.”
The Office of the USTR said, “The U.S.-Thailand Agreement will lower non-tariff barriers facing American businesses and industries, from issuing import permits for U.S. ethanol for fuel to accepting U.S. certificates for medical devices and pharmaceuticals.”
Thailand’s Commerce Minister Suphajee Suthumpun said, “We are still negotiating and everything is smooth. Up to now, there has been no pressure signal from the US—no warnings or negative stance.”
Joshua Kurlantzick, CFR senior fellow for Southeast Asia and South Asia: “President Donald Trump’s tariffs and broader U.S. policy could exacerbate several of Thailand’s economic challenges and accelerate the kingdom’s strategic realignment toward China.”
On July 31, 2025, the White House modified Thailand’s reciprocal tariff rate to 19 percent. The United States and Thailand continue to negotiate the details of the agreement.
The U.S.-Korea Strategic Trade and Investment Deal was announced on July 30, 2025, and the framework agreement’s text was released as a fact sheet on November 13, 2025. The stated objective is to “increase mutually beneficial trade and investment.” An MOU on strategic investments [PDF] was also announced that day. The United States and South Korea already have a free trade agreement (KORUS), which was modified by the Obama administration in 2011 before congressional approval and entry into force in 2012. It was later modified [PDF] by the first Trump administration in 2018.
Similar to the UK deal, this agreement sets out various areas for future activities, but places significantly more emphasis on supporting American industry through investment, and thus closely resembles the Japan deal. These are the highlights:
- It sets a new tariff baseline, reducing the Liberation Day rate of 25 percent to 15 percent. The parties also agreed to expanded market access for U.S. automotive exports, including accepting U.S. standards. South Korea received exemptions from reciprocal tariffs on select products that are unavailable in the United States, such as natural resources and pharmaceutical products, as well as certain aircraft and parts.
- The deal modifies the application of Section 232 sectoral tariffs on autos, auto parts, lumber, pharmaceuticals, timber, and wood derivatives, providing South Korea with no greater than 15 percent rate to match its new baseline tariff. Importantly, where KORUS or MFN rates are below 15 percent, the difference between the baseline will be added. In cases where the MFN or KORUS rate is above 15 percent no additional 232 rates will be applied. This is similar to the EU 232 modification. Additional consideration will be given to future 232 tariffs on semiconductors.
- The agreement commits South Korea to addressing barriers to digital services trade and supporting a permanent moratorium on customs duties for electronic transmissions at the WTO.
- South Korea agreed to a broad set of economic security commitments. This was the first framework agreement to include a commitment to take “complementary actions to address unfair and nonmarket policies and practices,” which is also included in the Cambodia and Malaysia agreements.
- Similar to Indonesia and Japan, South Korea agreed to purchase $3.6 billion in Boeing aircraft.
- South Korea’s deal stands out for emphasis placed on investments for “critical industries,” though the commitment is not a lump sum like Japan’s. Instead, South Korea agreed to invest a total of $350 billion, including $150 billion in the shipbuilding sector, throughout the duration of Trump’s term with no more than $20 billion in a given calendar year. South Korea has a MOU similar to Japan regarding the terms of the investment.
- South Korea agreed to prohibit the import of goods produced by forced labor, and to maintain high environmental standards, including through the implementation of the WTO Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies.
- South Korea has two unique components in its framework, including a foreign exchange stability mechanism as well as significant defense and nuclear cooperation.
Trump said, “the deal is that South Korea will give to the United States $350 Billion dollars for investments owned and controlled by the United States, and selected by myself, as president.”
Amid disputes over implementation, South Korean President Lee Jae Myung said, “Without a currency swap, if we were to withdraw $350 billion in the manner that the U.S. is demanding… South Korea would face a situation as it had in the 1997 financial crisis.”
Inu Manak, CFR senior fellow for international trade: “South Korea’s deal shows that the Trump administration does not feel bound by past U.S. trade agreements, even ones that Trump renegotiated in his first term. In the end, South Korea is worse off than where it began in 2025.”
On July 31, 2025, the White House modified South Korea’s reciprocal tariff rate to 15 percent. On November 26, 2025, the agreement was submitted to South Korea’s National Assembly for approval. The Democratic Party of Korea (DPK) submitted a bill to establish a state-run investment corporation and fund to manage its investment in the United States.
On December 4, 2025, the United States implemented the framework agreement’s tariff commitments. On December 12, 2025, South Korean Finance Minister Koo Yun-cheol announced a joint committee for the South Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA) to implement the terms of the deal. On December 15, 2025, Korea Zinc announced a $7.4 billion smelter project in Tennessee. In January 2026, Korean firm SK Hynix announced a $10 billion AI investment, in part, to align with incentives to avoid 232 tariffs on semiconductors.
On January 26, 2026, President Trump accused South Korea’s legislature of “not living up to its Deal with the United States,” and raised tariffs on imports of autos, lumber, pharmaceuticals, as well as “all other reciprocal tariffs” to 25 percent. Following the threat, the DPK announced that it would pass the bill by the end of February. Trump subsequently withdrew his tariff threat.
The U.S.-Argentina Agreement on Reciprocal Trade and Investment was announced November 13, 2025, and the framework agreement’s text was released as a joint statement the same day. The stated objective is to “drive long-term growth, expand opportunity, and create a transparent and rules-based environment for commerce and innovation.” This objective mirrors those included in the frameworks of other regional partners, which also focus on advancing shared democratic values, free enterprise, and long-term economic growth.
Similar to other frameworks, this agreement sets out various areas for future activities. These are the highlights:
- Similar to the UK, it sets a new tariff baseline, maintaining the Liberation Day rate of 10 percent. Argentina agreed to provide the United States with preferential market access on certain agricultural products, medicines, and motor vehicles. In turn, the United States agreed to grant tariff exemptions for certain natural resources that are unavailable in the United States and pharmaceutical products.
- Consideration can be given to exemptions from 232 tariffs, but none were outlined in the main text of the agreement.
- Argentina agreed to work with the United States to address nontariff barriers, but similar to Indonesia and Vietnam, the burden is on Argentina. For example, Argentina agreed to accept U.S. vehicle and emission standards, as well as standards for pharmaceuticals and medical devices.
- Argentina agreed to take action to facilitate digital trade.
- Argentina also agreed to cooperate on a broad set of economic security priorities, such as export controls, duty evasion, and investment screening, in addition to cooperation on critical minerals and stabilizing the global soybean trade.
- Argentina agreed to prohibit the import of goods produced by forced labor, and to maintain high environmental standards, including through the implementation of the WTO Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies and combatting illegal logging.
A White House fact sheet said, “The Framework reflects the countries’ shared ambition and values, and builds on actions Argentina has already taken to modernize its trade and investment regime and foster reciprocal conditions.”
Argentine President Javier Milei described the agreement as “tremendous news,” and stated that his frequent visits to the United States “were paying off a little.”
Will Freeman, CFR fellow for Latin America studies: “This trade deal, accelerated by Milei’s public flattery of Trump, is likely to boost U.S. exports of chemicals, some medicines, IT (information technology) products, cars, agricultural goods, and Argentine exports of beef and certain minerals. But it also comes with challenges: it’s not clear what the overall economic benefit to Argentina will be and the economic security provisions may complicate Milei’s relationship with his biggest trade partner, China. For the United States, Trump risks increasing frustration with farmers and ranchers.”
The United States and Argentina continue to negotiate the details of the framework agreement.
The U.S.-Ecuador Agreement on Reciprocal Trade and Investment was announced on November 13, 2025, and the framework agreement’s text was released as a joint statement the same day. The stated objective is to “provide access to each other’s markets and increase alignment on economic and national security matters.”
The framework agreement with Ecuador is a pared-down version of the Argentina deal. These are the highlights:
- The framework agreement does not specify any modifications to Ecuador’s reciprocal tariff rate, which was 10 percent on Liberation Day and modified to 15 percent on July 31, 2025. Ecuador agreed to eliminate tariffs on certain agricultural products, chemicals, health products, information and communications technology (ICT) goods, machinery, and motor vehicles. In turn, the United States agreed to tariff exemptions for items that “cannot be grown, mined, or naturally produced in the United States in sufficient quantities.” There is no mention of Section 232 tariff modifications.
- Ecuador agreed to work with the United States to address nontariff barriers, but similar to Argentina, Indonesia, and Vietnam, the burden is on Ecuador.
- Ecuador agreed to not impose digital service taxes, and to support the adoption of a permanent moratorium on customs duties for electronic transmissions at the WTO.
- Ecuador also agreed to cooperate on a broad set of economic security priorities, such as export controls, duty evasion, and investment screening, in addition totaking complementary actions to address nonmarket practices, similar to those in the South Korea agreement.
- Ecuador agreed to prohibit the import of goods produced by forced labor, and to maintain high environmental standards, including through the implementation of the WTO Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies and combatting illegal logging.
Argentine Minister of Production, Foreign Trade and Investments Luis Alberto Jaramillo said, “It represents a very important milestone, great opportunities, and hope for the entire country, after an arduous process of intense negotiations that began in May . … Of course, we had the toughest part, but it has been a very interesting experience.”
Will Freeman, CFR fellow for Latin America studies: “Ecuador has long wanted a trade deal with the United States. This one will boost flows of Ecuadorean bananas, cocoa, and coffee to the United States, and eliminate or reduce barriers to U.S. machinery, health products, ICT goods, chemicals, and more. The deal may complicate Ecuador’s relations with China, its biggest trade partner, but the Noboa government has already been diversifying its ties with Europe and Asia.”
On July 31, 2025, the White House modified Ecuador’s reciprocal tariff rate to a higher 15 percent rate, up from the April 2 rate of 10 percent. The United States and Ecuador continue to negotiate the details of the framework agreement.
The U.S.-El Salvador Agreement on Reciprocal Trade and Investment was announced November 13, 2025, and the framework agreement’s text was released as a joint statement the same day. The objective is to “further strengthen and build upon our longstanding economic relationship, including the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR),” which entered into force in 2006.
The framework agreement with El Salvador is a pared-down version of the Ecuador deal, likely because of the existing free trade agreement that eliminates most trade barriers. These are the highlights:
- The framework does not specify the new tariff baseline, though the Liberation Day rate was 10 percent. The United States agreed to tariff exemptions for items that “cannot be grown, mined, or naturally produced in the United States in sufficient quantities, as well as certain products, such as textiles and apparel products, originating in CAFTA-DR.” This is an important preservation of an existing trade agreement.
- Consideration will be given to exemptions from 232 tariffs, but none were outlined in the main text of the agreement.
- El Salvador agreed to address several nontariff barriers, but similar to some frameworks, the burden is on El Salvador, such as through acceptance of U.S. standards on autos and expedited product registration for U.S. exports. There is also standard language on trade facilitation and good regulatory practices.
- El Salvador agreed to not impose digital service taxes, and to support the adoption of a permanent moratorium on customs duties for electronic transmissions at the WTO.
- El Salvador also agreed to cooperate on a broad set of economic security priorities, such as export controls, duty evasion, and investment screening, in addition totaking complementary actions to address nonmarket practices.
USTR Greer said, “The signing today of the first Reciprocal Trade Agreement in the Western Hemisphere will further strengthen markets for U.S. exports and reduce trade barriers faced by American workers and producers.”
Salvadoran Economy Minister Maria Luisa Hayem said, “El Salvador signs a trade agreement with the United States that eliminates the 10 percent tariff on Salvadoran exports, consolidating the strong relationship between both nations.”
Will Freeman, CFR fellow for Latin America studies: “El Salvador will likely benefit less from its deal than Argentina or Ecuador will from theirs. It stands to boost U.S. exports to El Salvador without doing much to increase Salvadoran exports to the United States, which face competition from Guatemala, which also just signed a reciprocal trade deal. The agreement may, however, weaken CAFTA-DR, pushing more of its members to seek out bilateral trade deals with the Trump administration.”
On January 29, 2026, the U.S.-El Salvador Agreement on Reciprocal Trade [PDF] was signed. Importantly, the preamble states that this agreement is a “complement” to the rights and obligations under CAFTA-DR. The agreement secures a reciprocal tariff exemption for goods “that qualify as originating under the rules of origin” of the CAFTA-DR. This is the first agreement with an existing FTA partner that provides this exemption. (Notably, South Korea did not receive similar treatment. Canada and Mexico receive a similar exemption under the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement, but neither of those countries has a framework agreement or reciprocal trade agreement on top of their existing FTA as of January 2026). For products that do not meet CAFTA-DR rules of origin, a reciprocal rate of 10 percent will apply. However, agricultural products, as provided for in Executive Order 14360, are exempt. There is also a specific commitment for El Salvador to treat exports of worn clothing as originating under CAFTA-DR.
Notably, some commitments by El Salvador mirror U.S. trade policy. For example, El Salvador agreed to “cooperate with the United States through appropriate border measures,” if “the United States adopts a border measure to combat regulatory arbitrage that would disadvantage U.S. workers and businesses.” El Salvador also agreed to take measures of “equivalent restrictive effect” to measures the United States takes to further economic or national security objectives. This includes cooperation on investment screening, export controls, and other related measures.
Additional elements that build on the framework are investment commitments, with a commitment by El Salvador to facilitate “greenfield investment” in the United States. El Salvador agreed to facilitate U.S. investment in critical minerals, energy, and other important sectors. Distinct from other agreements, El Salvador is “encouraged” to increase its purchases of U.S. liquified natural gas. Also, El Salvador agreed to not purchase nuclear reactors, fuel rods, or enriched uranium from countries that “present national security concerns.”
The U.S.-Guatemala Agreement on Reciprocal Trade and Investment was announced November 13, 2025, and the framework agreement’s text was released as a joint statement the same day. Like El Salvador, the objective is to “further strengthen and build upon our longstanding economic relationship, including the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR),” which entered into force in 2006.
The framework agreement with Guatemala is highly similar to the El Salvador deal. These are the highlights:
- The framework does not specify the new tariff baseline, though the Liberation Day rate was 10 percent. The United States agreed to tariff exemptions for items that “cannot be grown, mined, or naturally produced in the United States in sufficient quantities, as well as certain products, such as textiles and apparel products, originating in CAFTA-DR.” This is an important preservation of an existing trade agreement. There is no mention of Section 232 tariffs.
- Guatemala agreed to address several nontariff barriers, but similar to some frameworks, the burden is on Guatemala to maintain science-based risk assessment and remove other regulatory barriers on U.S. goods. There is also standard language on trade facilitation and good regulatory practices.
- Guatemala agreed to not impose digital service taxes, and to support the adoption of a permanent moratorium on customs duties for electronic transmissions at the WTO.
- Guatemala also agreed to cooperate on a broad set of economic security priorities, such as export controls, duty evasion, and investment screening, in addition totaking complementary actions to address nonmarket practices.
- Guatemala agreed to prohibit the import of goods produced by forced labor, and to maintain high environmental standards, including through the implementation of the WTO Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies and combatting illegal logging.
- A novel feature of the Guatemala framework is a commitment to restrict government procurement to exclude non-FTA partners.
The Office of the USTR said, “The U.S.-Guatemala Framework builds upon our longstanding partnership, expanding business opportunities, addressing non-tariff barriers, and opening new markets for American industrial and agricultural exporters. The deal will also reward U.S. textile production and help strengthen our textile supply chain.”
Guatemalan President Bernardo Arevalo said, “I want to emphasize the significance of this achievement [the framework], which benefits the people of Guatemala, because it positions us as the United States’ main trading partner in the Central American region.”
Inu Manak, CFR senior fellow for international trade: “The agreement with Guatemala shows an evolving approach to existing U.S. FTA partners, layering disciplines on top of congressionally approved trade agreements. This is a striking contrast to the South Korea deal, which ignored the KORUS agreement entirely. It will be interesting to see what approach USTR takes with Canada and Mexico.”
On January 30, 2026, the U.S.-Guatemala Agreement on Reciprocal Trade [PDF] was signed. It is nearly identical to the El Salvador Agreement on Reciprocal Trade, including the preambular language, CAFTA-DR tariff exemptions, as well as exemptions for agricultural products.
Several items stand out, however. First, “if Guatemala enters into a new digital trade agreement with certain countries,” the United States can terminate the agreement or reimpose reciprocal tariffs. Which countries this would include are not defined. Second, Guatemala has stronger language on digital trade, instructing Guatemala to support a permanent moratorium on ecommerce duties at the WTO “immediately and without conditions.” Third, Guatemala is prohibited from procuring covered goods and services from “non-eligible third countries.” According to footnote five, a non-eligible third country means countries other than those party to the WTO Government Procurement Agreement, those in a trade agreement with Guatemala, beneficiaries of trade preference programs with Guatemala, and least developed countries. This is likely targeting China. Fourth, the agreement specifically asks Guatemala to address unfair practices of companies “owned or controlled by third countries,” which contrasts to El Salvador’s broader requirement to tackle “unfair trade practices of companies operating within its territory.”
Guatemala also agreed to specific provisions on ethanol, such as implementing “an E10 ethanol blend mandate for on-road ethanol use,” and endeavoring “to purchase at least 50 million gallons of ethanol from the United States annually.” Guatemala also agreed to take domestic actions to strengthen its labor laws, amending laws, for instance, that hinder union formation. Finally, Guatemala also agreed to take actions to address intellectual property concerns listed in the Special 301 report.
The Framework for a U.S.-Switzerland-Liechtenstein Agreement on Fair, Balanced, and Reciprocal Trade was announced on November 14, 2025 and the text was released in a joint statement the same day. The objective is to “create a dynamic and balanced trading relationship on a reciprocal and mutually advantageous basis, with a view toward creating good, high-paying jobs, and economic growth in their markets.” It sets a goal for significant progress, “and if possible conclude an Agreement, by the first quarter of 2026.”
The framework agreement with Switzerland and Liechtenstein most closely resembles the South Korea and UK deals. These are the highlights:
- It sets a new tariff baseline, reducing the Liberation Day rate of 39 percent to 15 percent. Switzerland and Liechtenstein agreed to zero duties on all U.S. industrial goods, seafood, and some agricultural products. The United States agreed to exempt some yet-to-be identified products from the reciprocal tariff, in accordance with Executive Order 14346.
- Consideration will be given to exemptions from 232 tariffs, but none were outlined in the main text of the agreement.
- Expanded market access for U.S. automotive exports, including accepting U.S. standards, was also agreed, in addition to commitments to address other nontariff barriers such as on agricultural products and medical devices. Switzerland and Liechtenstein also agreed to increase cooperation on labor issues, such as forced and child labor, as well as implementing high levels of environmental protection. There is also standard language on trade facilitation and good regulatory practices.
- The agreement commits Switzerland and Liechtenstein to addressing barriers to digital services trade, including refraining from digital services taxes, facilitating cross-border data flows, and supporting a permanent moratorium on customs duties for electronic transmissions at the WTO.
- The framework includes a broad set of economic security commitments, such as investment screening, supply chain resilience, export controls, and cooperation on nonmarket policies of third countries.
- Similar to South Korea’s agreement, this framework puts significant emphasis on investments and commercial considerations. It includes a commitment for $200 billion in investment from Switzerland “across all 50 states, over the next five years to create manufacturing and research and development jobs,” and a $300 million commitment and an “increase by 50 percent” in the number of jobs it creates through the private sector in the United States from Liechtenstein. Notably, this is the first framework that mentions the development of training and apprenticeship programs as part of the investment targets.
Trump said, “I want to thank my team for having worked out a very fair deal with Switzerland .... I appreciate the treatment we’ve been given, and we will always reciprocate.”
Swiss President Guy Parmelin, then serving as economy minister stated, “We haven’t sold our soul to the devil,” and was “satisfied” with the deal.
Inu Manak, CFR senior fellow for international trade: “It is without a doubt that Switzerland is breathing a sigh of relief, with a substantially lower tariff. I suppose the limited edition Swatch with the 3 and 9 dials swapped will become a fun collector’s item.”
On July 31, 2025, the White House maintained Switzerland’s reciprocal tariff rate at 39 percent, and modified Lichtenstein’s rate to 15 percent. On December 18, 2025, the United States implemented the framework agreement, modifying tariff rates.
The U.S.-Taiwan Agreement on Trade and Investment was announced January 15, 2026, with details released in a fact sheet by the Department of Commerce the same day. The White House did not release a fact sheet or joint statement of its own. The stated objective is to “strengthen U.S. domestic semiconductor supply chains and secure America’s technological and industrial leadership.” Notably, it makes no mention of the United States-Taiwan Initiative on 21st-Century Trade First Agreement, which was concluded by the Biden administration and approved by Congress on August 7, 2023.
The focus on semiconductors sets this framework apart from others. These are the highlights:
- It sets a new tariff baseline, reducing the Liberation Day rate of 32 percent to “no more than” 15 percent. This new language presumably leaves room for tariff treatment below 15 percent. The United States agreed to reduce tariffs to zero for aircraft components, generic pharmaceuticals and ingredients, and natural resources that are unavailable in the United States.
- Section 232 tariffs on auto parts, lumber, timber, and wood derivatives were modified to “no more than 15 percent.” Special consideration was given to Taiwanese firms investing in semiconductor production in the United States: firms building new capacity are exempt from 232 duties for imports up to 2.5 times the planned capacity, and firms that have already completed chip production can import 1.5 times their production duty free. A lower rate would still apply to above-quota limits.
- Taiwan agreed to significant investment commitments, with $250 billion in direct investments toward AI production, energy, and semiconductors, $250 billion in credit guarantees to support Taiwanese firms in their efforts to build the U.S. semiconductor supply chain, and collaboration on the creation of industrial parks. In turn, Taiwan agreed to facilitate U.S. investments in unspecified critical and emerging industries.
- This deal least resembles any kind of traditional trade agreement, but this could be because a framework for a trade agreement already exists. Though it remains underdeveloped, it includes important provisions for congressional oversight.
U.S. Secretary of Commerce Howard Lutnick said, “We’re going to have hundreds of companies coming here, we’re gonna build giant semiconductor industrial parks in America, and we are going to bring semiconductors home to America .… The objective is to bring 40 percent of Taiwan’s entire supply chain and production to America.”
Taiwanese Vice Premier Cheng Li-chiun stated, “This is not supply-chain relocation; rather, it is support for Taiwan’s high-tech industries to extend their strength abroad—through addition, and even multiplication—to expand a strong international footprint in the United States.”
David Sacks, CFR fellow for Asia studies: “Beneath the surface of Taiwan’s pledges to increase U.S. trade ties lies an apprehension about the United States’ ultimate objectives, and what a potential rebalancing of global supply chains would mean for the island’s security .… If the United States successfully on-shores chip production, it may no longer care about Taiwan’s security and, therefore, not defend it from Chinese aggression.”
On July 31, 2025, the White House modified Taiwan’s reciprocal tariff rate to 20 percent.