A Conversation With Elbridge Colby

Under Secretary of War for Policy Elbridge Colby discusses the U.S. National Defense Strategy under the Trump administration.

FROMAN: Good afternoon, everybody. Thank you for joining us. In addition to this full house in the room, we have about 400 people online. So thank you for joining us. We’ll have thirty minutes of conversation here and thirty minutes of Q&A from all of you, and from the folks remotely.

We’re really pleased and honored to welcome back to the Council Undersecretary Elbridge—Bridge—Colby. He’s been here before. He’s a longtime member. He spoke here a little over a year ago, when we launched the China Strategy Initiative led by his friend and former colleague Rush Doshi. So thank you for coming back. You all know his background. He’s the principal advisor to the secretary on matters of defense and foreign policy. He oversaw the development of the National Defense Strategy, which we’re going to talk about today. And welcome back.

COLBY: Thank you very much, Michael. Great to be here.

FROMAN: Let’s start with the National Defense Strategy. By the way, he was up at the Senate yesterday, Senate Armed Services, being grilled by that committee. And I promised him this would be equally hard. (Laughter.) So—

COLBY: That’s not what he said. (Laughter.)

FROMAN: Great to have you. Look, the National Defense Strategy really, in my view, in reading it, makes a real effort to try and connect ends and means, to set some priorities, to recognize that we’ve got limited resources. Two interesting areas of focus, the Western Hemisphere, of course, and also our willingness to engage with all sorts of different countries, whether or not they share our particular form of government. With the Western Hemisphere identified as our highest priority, we’ve now seen action in Venezuela. More recently we’re working with Ecuador and hitting some boats there. What’s next for the Western Hemisphere? Is Cuba next? And—(laughter)—how do you see that—how do you see that playing out? And what would be the role of any military action with regards to Cuba?

COLBY: Well, thank you, Michael. And it’s great to be here. I see a lot of friends in the audience. So pleasure to be back at the Council.

I think you’re right that the Western Hemisphere is being put back in sort of pride of place. And I think this stems from that sort of America first, peace through strength, but also common sense. That’s the hack I often give to allies and others to understand what we’re trying to do under the president’s leadership in this administration. Which is to say, we are going to make sure that the defense strategy and policy of the United States serves the interests of the, you know, regular Americans. Which is, of course, what the president ran on. And, you know, the Western Hemisphere is our neighborhood. And, you know, there’s problems of illegal migration. There’s narcotics trafficking, which has killed hundreds of thousands of Americans, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera.

And so we—you know, what we’re doing on the defense side is signaling—and I should say that the 2018 National Defense Strategy also put the homeland as the priority. So it’s not that radical of a break in terms of the overall prioritization. But I think there is a change in tone and emphasis, mostly to say the military will play a role in making sure that Americans are protected and their interests are advanced in our hemisphere. And, you know, narcotics and our efforts against narco-terrorists are a perfect example, where it’s to say military forces are on the table because these are things that have contributed directly to the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Americans. And we’re going to do our part. Obviously, the great bulk, I would say, of the efforts on our own hemisphere are not necessarily going to be military. But it’s a signal that that is part of the—a critical part of the agenda.

I’d also say that, actually, you know, looking at, for instance, the Venezuela—very successful Venezuela operation, that has enlisted—and I think you’ve seen already the chairman of the Joint Chiefs had a conference, Secretary Hegseth is going to have a conference, leading up to presidential level, efforts to bring together and to catalyze efforts by regional partners. It’s not like all the region is saying, oh, what you’re doing is terrible. Actually, to the contrary. We’re seeing a lot of support.

You know, in terms of what we might or might not do, or the president might or might not do, I won’t tip our hand. That would be very inconsistent with his approach and our approach following it. So I won’t comment on that. But, you know, I mean, the president keeps everybody—you know, we’re not going to tell people exactly what our strategy is, but when people—or, our approach is going to be. But one thing that people should calculate on and should factor is that the president, and we under his direction, will not hesitate to put Americans’ interests first, and is not going to be bound by the sort of shibboleths of the past, if those are not consistent with Americans’ interests.

FROMAN: So the Indo-Pacific is not—certainly not ignored in the National Defense Strategy, but you get the feeling it’s somewhat less emphasized than it has been in the past. It reiterates the commitment to defend the first island chain. But China, when you look at the NDS and also the National Security Strategy, it plays a much less prominent or significant role in it. You talk about a decent peace, a balance of power. China wasn’t even mentioned in the State of the Union. I mean, this is an area where there’s a rare bipartisan consensus, or there was, in the city around being tough on China. Has the administration gone soft on China? Is China still the pacing threat for the U.S. military?

COLBY: Well, there’s a number of questions in there. I’d certainly reject the notion that the United States and under President Trump has gone soft on China. It hasn’t gone soft on anything. (Laughter.) And I would put it a bit differently. You know, both the National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy, and if you look at Secretary Hegseth’s speech at Shangri-La as well as out of the Reagan Forum, I think you were there in December, it’s very clear about the central military role, and specifically what’s it—so, I would say in the past there have been—for many years there have been grand gestures about the Asia-Pacific or the Indo-Pacific as it’s evolved. And I’ve seen a lot of them over the years and I’m sure many of you have as well.

This is, I would say, again, going back to the concept of flexible realism, which is underlined as the kind of core idea or heuristic in the National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy that followed from that, is to say: We’re going to figure out what the military needs to do as part of a broader administration strategy. I think there’s a clear sense of what that is. So whether something hard or soft or, you know, aggressive or defensive, et cetera, I think there’s a clear set of objectives which are very much in line with the American people’s interests, which is a decent peace. What is a decent peace? A decent peace, as Secretary Rubio has said, it’s this concept of strategic stability where we can trade and have respectful relations with the People’s Republic of China, which has, you know, risen to become a great nation in the community of nations. And we all respect that, from the president on down.

But at the same time, we are going to operate from position of strength. Obviously on the economic side, that you’re very familiar with, if you talk to Ambassador Greer or Secretary Bessent, et cetera. But also that there’s a critical military component of that, but that our objectives are carefully scoped. They’re limited. They’re reasonable. And they’re designed to, in a sense, nest with the interests of the countries of the region. And in fact, we see that not only from our traditional allies—although certainly from our traditional allies—but also from countries in ASEAN, and South Asia, and so forth. And so in that context, I would actually categorically reject that there’s been—we’ve taken our eye off the ball. To the contrary, there’s even more of a focus on meeting that standard, which is a standard that’s consistent with this peace through strength, strong and clear but quiet, decent peace kind of balance of power model.

And that’s, I think, the right—especially, you know, I think this administration, certainly at the Department of War, our focus is on delivering real combat capable combat credible forces in the right place at the right time, and less on grand rhetorical flourishes.

FROMAN: So this is a big year potentially for U.S.-China relations. There could be up to four summit meetings between President Trump and President Xi. What do you expect to come out of this year? And at the end of the year when you look back—if last year was a year of escalation and deescalation, creating some degree of stability in the relationship, what would be your objective for this year and these four summits? Is there likely to be a grand bargain of some sort? The Chinese are pushing for the U.S. to change its rhetoric on Taiwan, from not supporting independence to opposing independence. How do you see this playing out?

COLBY: Well, I mean, a lot of that is obviously kind of outside of the purview of the Department of War. So I defer to the White House, and the Department of State, and president, and Secretary Rubio. I would say we are certainly in support of the overall agenda, which is this strong and clear but quiet and a respectful approach towards China. I deal with my PRC counterparts. The secretary is engaged with his PRC counterparts in a spirit of respect and, you know, constructive engagement, but also in a position—from a position of clarity and ultimately strength, which is what we’re—you know, in particular from a military point of view, is the job of the Department of War.

So, I mean, I think the goal is, again, contributions towards a decent peace. That requires the right calibrated balance. But at the end of the day, what we’re focused on is making sure that the president of the United States has the capabilities to meet the objectives that he has set out. And, I mean, in terms of the issues that you talk about, it’s not our place, and we are certainly not trying to change our traditional policy on any of these sensitive issues. We’re making sure that the president has the ability to back up American policy.

FROMAN: And so that sounds like it’s continuity in terms of our China policy, in terms of being tough, supporting Taiwan with military sales.

COLBY: I would say—I mean, look, obviously, time evolves, the circumstances evolve. I don’t know if—I wouldn’t really characterize it as continuity. I mean, since you mentioned it, I mean, I think in the last administration you had a very vocal—from the president, who would, you know, make comments about the leadership of China, about very sensitive topics in a way that would catalyze a massive reaction, but without delivering the strength. And so I think our approach is really the exact opposite. Is to be calibrated and careful about what we say, but make sure that the president has the ability—absolute, unquestioned ability. And I’ll just say, I think I am—and I said this in response to a question from Senator Sullivan yesterday—I think we are absolutely focused on making sure the president has the capabilities to meet the standard set by the National Security Strategy, which is denying aggression along the first island chain.

FROMAN: All right. We can’t avoid Iran, given everything going on. We’ve had Operation Epic Fury. How does Iran fit into this National Defense Strategy? Because, as I said at the beginning, prioritize Western Hemisphere, talk about limited resources. We’ve now moved carrier strike groups from one region to another. It feels a little bit like no matter how much successive presidents try and pivot away from the Middle East, they get dragged back into it. So where does Iran fit into the prioritization set by the National Defense Strategy?

COLBY: Yeah. I mean a couple—a couple of things. First of all, the strategy very clearly lays out that Iran is a—the Islamic Republic is a threat to United States and our allies and partners in the gulf, Israel, in Europe, et cetera. Of course, especially the nuclear program—or, I should say, the nuclear ambitions of the Islamic Republic, as well as the conventional missile forces. And so that is clearly called out. And it’s really stressed in the strategy that that it’s incumbent upon and necessary for the department to provide the president with credible, rational military options to advance his objectives around the world, and especially the ability to use, you know, our aerospace and maritime forces, in particular, to be able to reach out and conduct decisive operations around the world. So that’s one thing.

A second thing is the strategy really emphasizes the importance of burden sharing and looking to model allies, like our ally Israel, but also South Korea, Poland, Germany now stepping up. But in the case of the Middle East, we see a lot happening as well. And I think, you know, generally speaking, a strategy is designed, I mean, basically, to enable the president to conduct such operations, but also to provide an overall sort of framework for the—you know, making sure the department over time is providing the options in the future that will be necessary, not only to conduct those operations but also to meet the priorities that we talked about. And I think, you know, just to kind of maybe anticipate a little bit, and I talked about this quite a bit yesterday, Operation Epic Fury is consistent with that approach, which is that the—you know, the president has directed the United States Armed Forces to conduct a military campaign with a focus on degrading and destroying the Islamic Republic of Iran’s ability to project military power in the region, and potentially beyond.

And that is specifically focused, in particular, on the missile and one-way attack drone capabilities and production of the Islamic Republic and the Navy, the naval forces. Obviously the Israelis, our close ally, are operating farther north with a somewhat, you know, kind of, overlapping set of objectives and goals. But, you know, at the end of this, this is a, I think, you know, reasonable and attainable scoped set of objectives that will leave the United States better off, under a range of outcomes. The president has indicated—or, more than indicated—he’s stated a fact, that this is an historic opportunity for the Iranian people to change this, you know, oppressive and opprobrious Islamic Republic. But that’s ultimately—you know, a lot of that’s going to going to rest on the shoulders of the Iranian people. But I think the military campaign is designed, and I think we have reason to believe, will leave us better off with respect to this, you know, very serious threat of the Islamic Republic.

FROMAN: So are you suggesting that U.S. and the Israeli objectives are not completely aligned?

COLBY: I would say—I mean, I think they’re very close and overlapping, et cetera. At the political level there’s a lot of discussion. The military campaigns of the two are, I would say, kind of overlapping. I can’t speak to the military objectives of the Israeli Defense Forces with any authority, but I can say, and Secretary Hegseth and the chairman referred to this again this morning, the objectives are, as I detailed, the power projection forces of the Islamic Republic.

FROMAN: So that goes to the nuclear, the missile, the drone capability, the navy—

COLBY: Obviously the nuclear program had been—had been decisively set back with Operation Midnight Hammer. So that, of course, remains one of the main underlying reasons, as Secretary Hegseth said the other day, a big part of the rationale, strategic rationale, for this operation is the fact that there was the potential for the Islamic Republic to be able to build up its conventional missile forces and other capabilities to shield the ability to resume, you know, a kind of pursuit of a nuclear weapon.

FROMAN: How much focus is there right now on the 450 kilograms of enriched uranium that are somewhere in Iran?

COLBY: Well, I mean, without getting into any specifics, obviously we’re always highly focused on that. I mean, I think the key thing—and as you probably heard from Admiral Cooper last night, our very capable CENTCOM commander, as well as the secretary and the chairman this morning, I think this is a dynamic situation. As Admiral Cooper says, you know, his assessment is we’re on plan. That’s our assessment. We’re making a lot of progress. We’re shifting from a campaign that, you know, initial phase is primarily focused on bringing down air defenses and other kinds of imminent—tactically imminent threats, to one where we can, as they say, kind of get on top of the target and be able to use, as the chairman said this morning, precision but gravity bombs and other kinds of comparable weapons that the president referred to in his Truth Social post the other night.

FROMAN: So, stepping back, one interpretation of what we’re doing in Iran is that there’s a grand strategy underneath. That by attacking Iran we are further cutting off oil supplies to China, that together with the Venezuela action. That we’re making it more difficult for Iran to support Russia’s war in Ukraine with the provision of drones and other materiel support. And that this is really sort of a bank shot to get a better situation in Ukraine and to gain leverage over China, heading into the summit meeting, Are you the father of this strategy, or?

COLBY: (Laughs.) I’m the father of—I’m the second cousin twice removed. No, the—I mean, I would not—I’m not the right person to be able to comment on what the overall plan might or might not be. What I can say is, to my knowledge and the way we’re looking at it certainly from the Department of War, is there is—maybe I’m too linear—is there is a direct, clear threat from the Islamic Republic in terms of, obviously, its nuclear ambitions, but also its military forces. And that is more than sufficient to have justified—obviously, substantially and materially degrading the military capabilities of the Islamic Republic will have a range of beneficial secondary and tertiary effects. But from my point of view, this is—this is, you know, pretty straightforward in the sense that that’s—there’s enough of a rationale right there.

FROMAN: One of the top priorities that you cited in the National Defense Strategy is supercharging the defense industrial base. And you’ve spoken before about your concern that we were depleting our stocks in our support of Ukraine. Now we have this action against Iran. How depleted are our stocks? How concerned are we about that? And why is it that we can’t build enough of our interceptor missiles or artillery to keep up with the demand here and around the world?

FROMAN: Well, I just say upfront that our armed forces have the necessary equipment to take on anyone and pursue the president’s goals and objectives. And nobody should have the impression that we’re somehow, you know, behind the curve. As I said yesterday at the Senate Armed Services Committee, that is something that everybody should understand, friend and potential foe, that, you know, we are on top of this problem. I think, as the president said the other day, that said, you know, there are certain areas where we are not where we need to be. That is something that we have anticipated, and many of us have been working very hard on. Special credit to Deputy Secretary of War Steve Feinberg, who’s really under the—under the direction of the president and secretary—is really leading that charge and making a tremendous amount of progress.

I would say a couple things. Overall, the strategy is designed to deal with this kind of situation. So I was just talking to some European counterparts right before I came over here. And said, NATO 3.0 is already actually taking this into account, that we need to all get ahead of the problem. And the strategy is designed to map to it. The strategy is designed to map to, you know, the United States is going to take, you know, military operations in various places. And there’s going to be demand. So we’re going to get ahead of that. So in addition, I would say—I would say this. I would say there’s at least three major prongs that the administration is undertaking to get after this problem, under the president’s leadership.

One, a $1.5 trillion defense budget. I mean, that is a huge signal from the president himself of the seriousness in which he takes making sure that the American people have the armed forces that are—that are, you know, more than equipped enough. And, secondly, that we’re able to provide for our allies and partners. Money is critical. It’s a critical predicate. But it’s insufficient on its own. So you need to have an industrial base that can produce at scale. And both the National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy call for a national mobilization. I mean, that’s a pretty extraordinary statement. I just want to stress that. That’s not, hey, we need to do better, we need to be more aligned, or integrated, whatever. That’s a national mobilization.

And following up on that, you can see it—I mean, it expresses the attitude of the president and the secretary and the deputy secretary, et cetera—which is really a different approach towards, and I believe there’s even—there’s been reporting of a meeting later this week, as well as a supplemental. So this is happening. But we need to see—everybody knows that. And also, with our allies and partners, we need to be able to scale production more broadly. And that’s the third part of this, which is a big part of the problem. Everybody loves to talk about how we have the wealthiest, greatest group of allies in our network, yada, yada, yada. Didn’t go through the formality of actually having serious militaries in many cases. Not in all cases. And I say that—a lot of that is our fault.

And one of the things I was talking to Senator Reed about yesterday in the hearing, he used the term partisan. I objected to that because I don’t think there’s a partisan tone in the National Defense Strategy. There is a pretty tough tone on what I would really frame as the post-Cold War foreign policy. I think it’s really important to distinguish the post-Cold War from the post war, because people often want to wrap themselves in the flag of the post-1945 world. But I think what we’re talking about is much more akin to level of kind of practical realism problem solving, and real kind of brass tacks conversations with allies that you saw in the Cold War.

And that’s that third part, which is getting allies to step up and commit to the new global standard, as referenced in the National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy. And here’s the thing, and this was a little bit of kind of what I was saying yesterday, this is happening. That debate, in a sense, is over. I mean, now the conversation with the Europeans, and that was kind of a lot of the theme of my remarks in the defense ministerial in Brussels last month as well as at the Munich security conference, is people are now bought into NATO 3.0, and similarly in the Indo-Pacific, model allies like South Korea. Now the question is, how do we get down to business together? The conversation I was having just before I came here with a major European ally is how do we think about syncing industrial production so that we can scale together and so you’re buying the right stuff that makes sense.

So I think together we’re already moving very much in the right direction, and we’ll put ourselves in a position where, obviously, the president of the United States is going to have the ability to conduct military operations around the world, but we’ll also be able to deal with the core problem, you know, addressed in the strategy, which is the potential for simultaneity. Which is maybe, kind of backing up for a second—and forgive me, if I can go on—I mean, the core military problem is the potential for possible foes to operate on simultaneous or roughly concurrent timelines. That’s the most stressing scenario. But because it’s the sort of best, quote/unquote, “approach” from potential opponents, that’s the one you need to be prepared for. In fact, I would say the administration’s diplomacy is designed precisely to avoid that.

And I would distinguish that from the last administration. And I think this is a substantive not a partisan point, Mr. Sullivan. Jake Sullivan, the former national security advisor, at the end of the last administration he said in Time magazine interviews, et cetera, that our adversaries were aligned to an unprecedented degree. Now, if you’d asked Henry Kissinger, that would have been, I think, the standard of an unsuccessful American diplomacy. So under our president, you have a president who is prepared to talk to potential opponents, whether that’s to—you know, for various reasons, but you also have a military that is prepared for that in a way that is realistic, and has our allies do their part. And people—it’s common sense. People get it.

And so I think together I actually think we really have a very, very positive future before us, where you’ve got a more well-equipped defense perimeter around our alliances, with a much healthier industrial base, not only here but in our allies’ countries as well. Obviously, we’re going to want our weapons to be sellable, et cetera, in their markets, but we also understand they’re going to indigenize a substantial portion of their defense purchases in terms of their own DIB. And then you’re going to have a diplomacy that is saying, hey, we’re going to talk—we’re going to be prepared to talk to China, to Russia. The president had been prepared to talk to the leadership of the Islamic Republic. The White House just indicated its receptivity to talking to North Korea without preconditions. So there’s an openness.

If you go back to the Cold War, under presidents of both Republican and Democratic, you know, parties, that was considered sort of common sense, normal. And that’s, I think, where we’re headed. And we’ll be in a good position for sustained and decent peace.

FROMAN: And as you talk about Europe stepping up and bearing more of the burden and doing the responsible—taking responsibility, how confident are you that they’re going to be able to make the tough political decisions that they need to face so that not every country has its own air defense system or its own tank? Are the countries spending the money on the right stuff?

COLBY: I think it’s happening. I mean, and I was there—I mean, I’ve been watching it, obviously, and I see Europeans all the time coming through here. But it was striking to be there. I mean, you know, the Federal Republic of Germany, which was traditionally considered kind of a laggard on these issues, I mean, they are spending, I think, 4 percent, or close to it, by well before the end of the decade. So they’re on track to exceed 3.5 (percent). They changed their constitution. And that’s under—and talk about bipartisanship. You have the Christian Democratic chancellor and the minister of defense there is a Social Democrat. I mean, that is happening, right? Finland, Sweden, Norway, the Netherlands. Secretary General Rutte, I was talking to him, he pointed out that the Netherlands is going to raise its retirement age to seventy. I mean, that’s serious. That’s a serious step.

FROMAN: Well, it’s one thing to spend more, and it’s another thing how you spend it.

COLBY: Totally. And that’s where—but that’s the NATO 3.0 conversation. That’s, hey, we’re not talking about NATO as a set of symbols, and did you say the right words to me? No. NATO is a real military alliance that’s designed to put combat credible forces in the field. You know, West Germany had twelve active divisions along the line in 1988. They can do this. That’s where the conversation is going now. And we’re working really close with them, as well as other Europeans. And I think you’re—actually what you’re seeing is a lifting effect. And even here. I think some of the momentum behind the $1.5 trillion, you know, proposal is that we’ve seen our allies do it. And you even see internal pressure. We’re not always the ones putting pressure on other countries to meet—because people will say, if I’m in Germany, well, wait, why are some of these other Western European countries matching, you know?

FROMAN: So you made a really important distinction in your speeches in Europe between Europe stepping up on conventional defense and the U.S. continuing to provide the nuclear umbrella. The Europeans, feeling somewhat distrustful of the United States right now, or not certain about the commitment of the United States to their security, are now talking about having their own, or a further, nuclear umbrella of their own. Either the British or the French cooperating or other Europeans cooperating and acquiring nuclear weapons. How do you assess that? And is that dangerous for us? Is it useful for us, for them to also invest in that capability?

COLBY: Well, so I think it’s important to get empirical here, because I have not heard credible reporting of European governments really thinking about independent acquisition, in violation of their nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty obligations. I see churn in the commentariat. Having been in the commentariat, no disrespect, but, like, I haven’t seen—

FROMAN: But didn’t Germany say they wanted to join Britain and France—

COLBY: So what Germany—what I understand the Federal Republic to be doing, and I’ve had conversations and this is something I, you know, spend a fair amount of time in, is bottom line up front what I would say is, I think it’s perfectly appropriate, and from our point of view at the Department of War reasonable, for there to be a greater European complexion to NATO nuclear deterrence. And it goes back to the Ottawa statement. And it’s been a summit statement that’s been repeated for, I think, fifty years now. Which is that the independent nuclear deterrence of the United Kingdom and France contribute to the deterrence and defense of the alliance. So that’s good. So there’s already a built-in validation of a European contribution to nuclear deterrence.

My understanding, and I haven’t—I was talking to the French, actually, recently. I haven’t read the president’s, you know, very important speech, I think it was Breast, yet. I’m looking forward to it. My understanding is what’s being discussed now is more of a your—you know, exactly how it folds into NATO planning, et cetera—these are kind of important, but can be worked out—is Europeans taking on more of a role? I know the United Kingdom has decided to contribute more to NATO nuclear deterrence. I think there’s other potential. I think in that spirit, that’s all to the good. And, by the way, the Europeans are usually saying to us, hey, we’re talking to the French, but we don’t want you—you know, don’t take it the wrong way. Like, we understand that this is not a substitute.

I mean, the reality is, candidly, I mean, we put ourselves in contortions for seventy-five years trying to figure out how to do extended deterrence. You know, the French nuclear deterrent is designed for the defense of France. And so, you know, it’s one thing to change declaratory policy. It’s another thing to have a credible nuclear deterrent that you can extend to countries that may be hundreds of miles away. I’m not pouring cold water on it, but I’m just saying I’m not that worried about this whole dynamic, because I think in the spirit of NATO 3.0 we can adapt the alliance. Obviously, we’re asking the Europeans to step up. We just need to be practical about it.

FROMAN: Let me ask one more question before we open it up, being on Ukraine. There’s reports that there’s been some progress in the negotiations on Ukraine, at least, between the United States and Ukraine, on what security guarantees might look like, various territorial concessions might look like. How confident are you that Putin wants an agreement? And wouldn’t peace through strength mean building up Ukraine’s capability to achieve peace?

COLBY: Well, on the first question about what’s in President Putin’s mind, you know, inquiring minds would like to know, obviously. You know, I think that’s a—obviously, a tough sort of topic to get—to get insight into. I mean, you know, I think we are all committed to advancing the president’s, I think, moral goal of bringing this tragic conflict to an end. I think we all have to be prepared. One of the points from the Department of War point of view, not being—obviously, we’re supporting. And I think a lot of the brush has been cleared. So if there is a political alignment or agreement, I think it could be done, you know, pretty expeditiously. But whether the war goes on—and I don’t want to sound like a broken record, but maybe a little bit—whether the war goes on or whether it ends, the implications are the same, which is a European buildup.

And to get to your point, Michael, about supporting Ukraine, and having—yes, it’s in our interest for Ukraine to be well defended. In fact, the president ordered, and we played a critical role in building this—the PURL system to be able to facilitate the sale of American weaponry to Europe, and then from there to Ukraine. I myself was involved when I was over in Brussels in some of these discussions about ensuring Ukraine has what it needs. And I heard from the new minister, Fedorov, about their plan and so forth. But it’s really got to be Europe stepping up, right? And this is, again, where I think the strategy was already anticipating this world that we’re in.

I think some of those—if I could be a little unkind—but some of the logic of the argument is, oh, hey, if we just, you know, went back to normal, or something like that, went back to the old ways, we could keep doing things the way we’re doing it. And it’s like, no, no, we got to lean forward into a world in which not only are we spending more and producing more, but Europeans, and Japanese, and Australians, and Koreans, and New Zealanders are all spending more, and Canadians for sure.

FROMAN: So what role do you see the U.S. playing in Ukraine’s future security? Is it intel and selling our weapons through Europe to them? Or is it a more active role?

COLBY: Well, I wouldn’t want to get ahead of the conclusion of negotiations, but I think there’s going to be a lasting—obviously, there’s an ongoing, you know, very strong U.S. role in Europe in general. And, I mean, the negotiations, I think we can all see there is an important U.S. role. What exactly that looks like, obviously, I can’t speak to. But, yeah.

FROMAN: All right. Let’s open it up. Demetri.

Q: Thank you. Demetri, Financial Times. Good morning, Bridge. I miss our breakfasts, by the way. (Laughs.)

A question about Japan. Prime Minister Takaichi is coming here in a couple weeks. One of the reasons she won a landslide is she’s promised to cut the consumption tax. That’s complicating things in terms of whether you can spend more on defense within the government in Tokyo. What do you think is a reasonable amount that Japan should be spending on defense? And what would you like to see her to announce when she comes here?

COLBY: Well, thanks. It’s not my place, I think, certainly, to talk about specific figures or put the government on the spot there. I think, though, what we all recognize, and I know Japan is going through this very important process of the strategy development over the course of 2026, and hopefully rapidly. I think if you listen to what the government of Japan has said, not only in the last few months but over the number of years, they are the ones who are saying there is an unprecedented security situation around the world, but even in their own neighborhood. And they know this better than anybody. And I think what we’re seeing around the world is, obviously, there’s this new global standard idea. You know, that’s a—that’s a that’s a standard. But I think we’re seeing everybody all around the world of our allies really step up.

And, you know, I mean, to be honest, Japan has for many years been a big advocate of the idea that all these theaters are interconnected. So, I mean, this is not about what the United States is insisting. This is about what, you know, very advanced, large, sophisticated countries, just what is in their interests. And I think that’s where I’d really go back to what Europe is doing, countries like Germany, like the Netherlands, like, you know, the Norwegians, Swedes, Finns, South Koreans. They are stepping up. And that’s—we all know. We all know what we need to do. It’s not our place to lay out any kind of—certainly not my place to lay out any demands. But I think we—one of the kind of key themes, and I think I’m sort of looking for in 2026, or I think we are looking at it in 2026, is—2025, in a sense, was about reframing and really credibly demonstrating that things needed to change.

I think there was—I mean, candidly, I know people talked about the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, everything’s changed. If I could be maybe a little bit ungenerous, you know, there was a discussion of a Zeitenwende. The Zeitenwende did not go through the formality of actually happening until Chancellor Merz and Minister Pistorius, to their great credit—I know, you know, this was a topic of political debate. I think people have now internalized that things have changed. And it’s not just about Americans, like me, badgering people. This is for your own reasons. And that’s the common sense. I mean, Minister of Defense Collins, from New Zealand, has a great point. You know, she said, after the end of the Cold War a lot of us, you know, basically took a, you know, huge reduction in defense. And we put it in—the Americans were paying more.

FROMAN: The peace dividend.

COLBY: The peace dividend. And, frankly, a lot of that is kind of our fault. You know, even here, if people forgive me, at the Council on Foreign Relations, because it was the elite of the United States—and, you know, I think we’re all probably guilty of that if we’re here—but, like, were the ones who kind of benefited. But that system just doesn’t work anymore. And it’s, like, we don’t need to sort of pin who’s at fault and who’s not, because it’s, like, it doesn’t matter anymore. Now it’s about everybody’s got to get on the new dispensation, and let’s get down to business.

FROMAN: Elise. I should say, please identify yourself. Make it a short question.

Q: Thank you so much for your remarks. Elise Labott. I’m a journalist. I write the Cosmopolitics Substack. And I was the previous Murrow press fellow here.

You said yesterday in the Senate testimony, and also a little bit today, that your objectives with Israel are overlapping but different. And Israel seems more focused on, you know, leadership change, while you have a limited military objective. And you’ve encouraged the Iranian people to—or the president has—to rise up. But does that kind of leave the U.S. on the hook for helping shape what happens after to make sure that it’s not more dangerous, not just for the Iranian people but for the region and U.S. interests? And, you know, given your own history in terms of restraint in military action, how do you personally feel about the fact that Israel’s objectives in terms of a broader change in the region may be a little bit different than the U.S.? Thank you.

COLBY: Sure. OK. Well, there’s a lot in there, and I—you know, I’m a government official. Obviously, I’m not a think tank, whatever, commentator anymore.

But just to be clear, I sometimes am described as a restrainer. I don’t see it in the mirror. I’ve never described myself that way. Flexible realist, actually. That’s about right, you know. So my view is, you know, we should never be totally a hawk or a dove, because it’s contextual. Depends on the situation. So, for instance, to go back to China, I don’t describe—I don’t think of myself as a hawk or a dove. I want—totally in line, as I understand it, the president’s goals—I want a respectful, peaceful situation in which our interests are respected. And part of that is having the power to ensure that you’re respected, and part of it is being willing to engage. And I’ve been, you know, for instance, personally, engaged with the Chinese over many years, from a sort of condition or position of respect.

So, you know, that’s—on the—on the second point, I mean, I think we’re all clear that, I mean, we regard the Israelis as a model ally, who are willing to go forward and not only spend a lot, but actually do a lot, and take a lot of risk, and deal with a lot of their own, you know, threats that they face, and oftentimes we also face in a very forward-leaning way. And I think part of that might get at your question. So, just to be clear, you’re talking about you—sorry, I don’t mean to be—but just, I’m, you know, speaking about the—well, no, sorry. What I mean is I’m speaking about the objectives of the military campaign that have been directed by the president of the United States.

Obviously, the president has and will continue to set the overall objectives, and the military objectives. But the military objectives that have been given, and if you look at what the chairman has said and if you look at Admiral Cooper’s updates, those are what we’re doing. That’s not at all inconsistent with, for instance, saying the Iranian people have an opportunity to take—you know, take the situation into their own hands. And, you know, whether others may be helping, and et cetera, that are outside of the purview of the military campaign, I’m not speaking on behalf of, you know, the entire United States government, or whatever. I’m talking about the military campaign and how that nests.

So that’s how I think. I mean, and then I think in terms of—you know, and this is—my friend Senator Warren gave me a lot of questions about that. (Laughs.) That was a joke. (Laughter.) Gave me a lot of questions about this. Well, how is this distinguished? Well I think, as the president gestured at with the Venezuela operation, we’re not going to be—he’s not going to be bound by the sort of conventional wisdom parameters of—I’m thinking of some individuals but I’m not going to say—(laughs)—but in terms of how we have to look at phase four, or something like that. The president is clearly going to lead us in a direction where this is going to be net beneficial to the American people. The military campaign is part of that.

Obviously, if there’s—we would all welcome a change in government—I think. I mean, it’s been pretty striking to see that—I mean the chancellor of Germany yesterday, you know? I mean, the president—look at the French actions over the last day or two. The prime minister of Australia, et cetera, et cetera. Lots of support for what we’re doing, and very, very little opposition—real, credible opposition. So I think those all nest very well. But it’s going to be on the terms that he sets and to make sure that we’re in a position where we’re left better off. And having reduced from a kind of military—what’s the job of the Department of War and the armed forces the United States leave us in a better position than when we started.

FROMAN: So just to be clear, the objective of the military campaign is not regime change?

COLBY: I mean, that’s a—the—when you’re—that’s making it seem like I’m saying that that would not be a desirable outcome.

FROMAN: It would be a desirable outcome, it would not be—

COLBY: The designated tasks to the United States armed forces are to destroy and degrade the power projection. Of course, if that contributes to regime—and there may be other countries, et cetera, that are—that are moving towards that goal. But the instructions given to the United States armed forces are to degrade the military threat posed by the Islamic Republic.

FROMAN: Let’s go somewhat closer. Bob Grady. Yeah.

Q: Thank you. Bob Grady. Summit Partners, and also vice chairman of the Hoover Institution at Stanford, and long ago deputy director of OMB.

On this issue of stocks and readiness and defense industrial base readiness, you talked about part of the answer being, like, the third leg of your stool, the contribution of our allies and partners. That’s clearly happening in Europe with the NATO 5 percent mandates. As you say, the debates over, and even one and a half percent of that could be used for infrastructure basis. How do you think about that exact set of problems—readiness, supply chain, even fuel, airfields, equipment—in the Indo-Pacific context, where in the event of a conflict you’d be facing—all the talk is about Europe contributing, but in that context you’d be facing an unprecedentedly long supply chain of, you know, 7,000 miles.

COLBY: Well, we’ve got—it’s an excellent question. A couple thoughts. So the Indo-Pacific problem, the first island chain problem, has been directed by the National Security Strategy, and it’s in the National Defense Strategy, that presents problems for us. Real challenges, like the ones, sir, that you refer to. It also presents opportunities. Fundamentally, and this gets back to the kind of flexible realism balance of power, the military strategy of the United States at this point is very tightly nested to a balance of power approach, because it’s fundamentally defensive. Which is part of the reason—at the strategic level. Obviously, operationally, tactically, you can use offense, et cetera. And that’s why it nests very well with our political strategy, which is designed, as we’ve said, you know, the secretary said, we’re not trying to strangle or humiliate China. To the contrary, we respect China and, you know, it’s extraordinary accomplishments over many decades and beyond. But it’s basically saying we are not going to allow military aggression along the first island chain.

The thing about that is it’s a—obviously, there’s a lot of land, needless to say—but it’s a maritime theater where you have to project and sustain power. And as we demonstrated with USS Charlotte last night—I don’t know what time it was there—it’s the first sinking of an enemy vessel by torpedo by a submarine since World War II. We are—and this gets to another point—we have a military of unparalleled prowess. And everybody really does know that. I mean, we can see that in the evidence. And so that’s one of the things. And that’s another area where our allies and partners—allies and partners are not just a kind of symbolic shibboleth with a little flag. No, no. Like, I mean, countries, like we mentioned, Japan, a very close relationship with the Philippines right now, of course, South Korea, as well as countries like Australia, and New Zealand.

Basically, what we’re asking them to do, as well as countries in ASEAN—and we’re totally flexible in the perspective the Department of War and I think throughout the administration—as to how we work with them. I always say to them, this is the opposite of John Foster Dulles at the Bandung Conference refusing to shake Zhou Enlai’s hand. This is saying, hey, we’re going to—I actually like to quote Deng Xiaoping. Whether the mouse is white or black doesn’t matter as long as it hunts mice. I see Mike Pillsbury must appreciate that. Is that—

Q: Say it in Chinese.

COLBY: Now, I can’t do that. But that’s the sort of the mentality is pragmatic. So we understand what we need to be able to do. And the military strategy is tightly connected. And then that tells us the kinds of capabilities we need, the kinds of capabilities we’re recommending our allies build. Getting back to, Demetri, to your question. It’s all—it’s all coherent and logical within that—within that structure. And then one of the reasons that I believe we have a right to be optimistic is because, you know, our defense perimeter has existed for a long time there. It’s well grooved politically. It’s something we understand militarily. And, you know, countries like the United States, obviously, but also Japan, Germany, South Korea, when we put our minds to it we can get after industrial production problems pretty well.

FROMAN: Let’s go to a question online.

OPERATOR: We’ll take our next question from Gideon Rose.

Q: Hi there, Mr. Secretary. Very impressive presentation. You would never know that you’re in Trump two rather than Trump one.

I find everything you’re saying, if this was all the administration was saying, quite plausible and sensible. I’m just curious how it squares with what the president actually says and does. And in particular, how does threatening to invade Greenland and fomenting separatism in Canada fulfill the kind of policies you’re talking about?

COLBY: Good to see you. Good to hear from you, Gideon. (Laughter.) Thanks. I think Trump one and Trump two are both very, very successful. Proud to have served in both, under the president’s leadership. I mean, we definitely work for the president. I’m very proud to work for the president. I think he’s the one who’s driven the change and the needed focus, and the needed ability to adapt. I mean, I think the president’s been clear, and we agree, that we need to have our key interests respected in places like Greenland. We need—and I think there’s a process that’s underway that appears to be addressing that, from what I can tell. That’s in other channels, but I think we have reason to be optimistic that that that will be a successful outcome.

And, I mean, I guess that would be sort of part of the answer to the question, Gideon, is—I mean, the proof is in the pudding, right? You had—how many times we’ve all heard, you know, Secretary Gates or Secretary Panetta going to whatever NATO confab and saying all these words about needing to rebalance, and nothing really happening. And then, because of President Trump’s leadership and, in fairness, the leadership people like Secretary General, Rutte, Chancellor Merz, you know, a number of other leaders, and populations, of course, around Europe, that is changing. And so I think that’s—the results are what we go by. And the president’s leadership is critical, the way he engages in negotiation is critical. So I obviously rebut the spirit of your question. And I think we’re—you know, the results are—what you can see is what matter.

FROMAN: Let’s go somewhere in the back there, young man there in the middle. Please identify yourself as well.

Q: Thank you. Kamin Gock with the Australian Broadcasting Corporation.

I was just curious what the findings from the Pentagon’s review into the AUKUS submarine agreement were, and what the, quote, “opportunities” were that it found to strengthen the deal.

COLBY: Thanks very much. I can’t get into the specifics, but what I will say is I think we took very much the president’s instructions that AUKUS is full speed ahead, and the review is fully consistent with that, and put it on an even firmer foundation. I think, you know, when we came in we found some things that, you know, it’s sort of a shakedown cruise, that was not going to put the AUKUS program on a lasting—a lastingly successful footing. And we went through the AUKUS review in close consultation with our allies from Australia and the United Kingdom. And I think we came out with a framework that basically is a pathway to do exactly what the president said, which is to put it on, you know, full steam ahead.

And, candidly, I heard from a senior—very senior official the other day who, almost unprompted, he said, you know, actually that AUKUS review, it’s really great that we all did that, because—this is from one of the allies—he said, because now it’s on much firmer footing. So I think, you know, everybody knows what we all need to do with greater clarity. I mean, at the end of the day, obviously, kind of, AUKUS started out as a lot of, you know, kind of fanfare, if you will. But at the end of the day, it has to do with real military deliverables. And we got to make sure those are on time. And that’s the spirit of this administration, certainly the Pentagon approach in general. You look at things like FMS. Everybody’s been wringing their hands about foreign military sales for years. You mentioned the Ukraine situation, but that happens all over the place. We are really getting after it under the president’s leadership, so that we can deliver—to get back to Gideon’s question—on the results.

FROMAN: Toby Gati.

Q: Thank you very much. I served in the NSC and State Department. So my condolences for your day-to-day workload.

My first question is—

FROMAN: Just one question, Toby. Why don’t you stand up?

Q: OK, fine. (Laughter.) We have one to two—we have one to two million Americans in the Middle East who are stranded there. And our ambassador to Israel has said basically, I can’t help you. How could we begin a war and not consider how to take care of these number of Americans? And what are they supposed to do? So if our interest is protecting America, how could we leave such a group stranded?

And my second would have been about North Korea, which basically—(laughter)—

COLBY: That’s clever.

FROMAN: All right. That’s very clever.

COLBY: That’s very good, wow. (Laughter.)

FROMAN: That’s a best practice over here.

Q: Which basically you have said nothing about. And they have sixty nuclear weapons.

COLBY: Well, we did—we did say something about North Korea. It is—we’re well aware of that. And that’s part of what we—our close—very close alliance with South Korea. And I mentioned that that’s actually a center-left progressive government there, but they’re really—they’ve agreed to the new global standard of 3.5 percent, and to take primary responsibility for their conventional defense on the peninsula. So they’re really, you know, extending the model from Europe, to their great credit. But, again, I think the overall approach is similar to the approach we’re taking elsewhere, which is, be strong but be open to dialogue and engagement.

And then I can say, from personal experience, that we’re absolutely not neglecting Americans in the region. I would defer to the State Department and others to give you any more detail on that. But I know—I know we’re paying a lot of attention to make sure we do what we have to do.

FROMAN: Let’s take another one from our online audience.

OPERATOR: We’ll take our next question from Rodolphe Costanzo.

Q: Yes. Hi. Thank you very much.

My question is regarding nuclear proliferation. So, just to be clear, if the German government, the Polish government, and/or Scandinavian countries were to come to you and say, we want to develop our own nuclear capabilities, would you try to talk them out of it, or would you try to encourage them? Thank you.

COLBY: Yeah. I think we’d more than try to talk them out of it, we’d, obviously, at a minimum strenuously oppose it. So I don’t—I don’t know exactly what that—it’s a hypothetical. But we’re against, you know, such a—such a(n) eventuality.

FROMAN: OK. In the—in the back again. Yeah. It’s—yeah.

Q: Thank you very much. My name is James Siebens. I’m a fellow with the Stimson Center.

My question is about prioritization. One of the commonsense concerns that has been raised consistently, especially by Republicans, about the amount of aid that’s been provided to Ukraine is just the depletion of our own long-range fires, and whether or not that would count against our ability to deter major actors in other theaters like Russia and China. So I wanted to ask for your assessment. After this conflict in Iran, or with Iran, do you feel that the United States will be better-equipped or less-equipped to deter China?

COLBY: Well, the thing—thank you for the question. I mean, as the president said, we have very plentiful munitions for a lot of—especially the things—the phases that we’re moving into. And as he gestured at, there are areas where we’re—where we’re going to focus on getting healthier. And that is why we are calling for and implementing a national mobilization of the defense industrial base; and the proposal for a $1.5 trillion budget; the, you know, overhaul and really kind of radical approach towards increasing productivity from that defense industrial base and the allies doing more.

So, honestly, I’d kind of volley back, you know. I mean, I think the administration is doing everything that we really can. This is where we need Congress. We need industry to really, you know—and I mean, the level of seriousness about making sure that our forces—and they do, but that they will always have the weapons that they need—and that we’ll be able to provide our allies and partners with weaponry, whether, you know, through sales or otherwise—is very much top of mind. But I think this is something where, you know, I got questions from the Senate Armed Services Committee yesterday, I know the appropriators. I think—I think the sky’s the limit in terms of what we can—what we can do to get after this problem.

FROMAN: I gather that over the last twenty-four hours or so Iran fired at Iraq—excuse me, at Turkey, and it was intercepted by NATO air defense. Is this an Article 5 issue? Can we see NATO being mobilized against Iran?

COLBY: I’m not sure of the exact specifics, so I don’t want to get ahead of the commentary. I think it’s a—you know, I mean, I think we clearly see that the Islamic Republic is willing to strike against a wide range of countries, not only in the Middle East but also potentially in NATO. And we’ve seen a strong move by a number of NATO countries to take action.

FROMAN: Individual NATO countries.

COLBY: And I think—I think there’s a real potential for an evolution towards, you know, some kind of, you know, grouping or whatever that is—that reflects the wide consensus that the Islamic Republic is a noxious threat. This is not, like, oh, this is the Americans making something up. It’s not a high bar to get—to get people to say this is something not only that’s a threat, but that people—that our countries are going to action to—action against. Look at the Gulf. I mean, OK, the Israelis are involved, but you know, the Gulf countries are also involved.

FROMAN: Right. OK. Yes, right here, the gentleman.

Q: Hi. Excuse me. Alberto Mora, former general counsel of the Navy.

You used the words “commonsense,” “ally,” “NATO,” and I hear Greenland and the threat of military force against Greenland to annex the territory and our—

FROMAN: Can you put the microphone a little closer?

Q: What deterred the United States from exercising that kind of threat? And how do you assess today the effects of that use of threat of force against our NATO allies? Is it something that’s still on the table? Is it something we would use again? Should NATO allies understand that the United States operates with them, and that our last contract in derogation of whatever treaty may exist—in fact, we violated four of the articles of the NATO Treaty when we issued the threat, of course. What is the net effects of Greenland today?

COLBY: Well, there’s a lot of questions in there. What I would say is I think there’s a process that’s being worked, but it’s—as the president has made clear and we support, it’s essential that, you know, our key interests be reflected with respect to Greenland. And I’m confident that the process that’s being worked through will result in a good outcome. So I think that’s the measure of, you know, the wisdom of the president’s course, which is to bring attention to issues that may not have been surface before and people didn’t think about, but that will leave us, I’m sure, in a better—and I think the NATO alliance is in—stronger than it’s—I really think it’s stronger than it’s been in, you know, a generation. So I reject the premise of your question, to be honest.

FROMAN: Yes, Jane Harman. Stand up.

Q: Yes, I’m standing up.

I recently chaired the Commission on National Defense Strategy, as you know, and served in Congress a long time. We recommended increased spending on defense. But my question is around what are we spending in this war. What have we spent to date? And is Congress properly in the loop here? You mentioned you talked to appropriators yesterday, but one of the problems with—

COLBY: With the authorizers, I said.

Q: Oh—fine.

COLBY: I will talk to the—

Q: Well, that’s the first step.

COLBY: Yeah. (Laughter.)

Q: But in hindsight, Iraq and Afghanistan cost us trillions and trillions of dollars. Are we headed there again in this war?

COLBY: Well, ma’am, on the last point I think absolutely not. We’ve learned the lessons, as Secretary Hegseth kind of eloquently put it I think this morning. We’re not going to make the same mistakes under President Trump’s leadership, and we’ve been—he’s been clear about that, and we’ve all been—vice president, secretary, et cetera.

On the cost, I couldn’t give you an answer. I do—I mean, I know Congress has been consulted a lot. Secretary Hegseth, the chairman, I think Secretary Rubio, maybe Director Ratcliffe were all on the Hill yesterday, I’m pretty sure, and then I think on Monday as well. So there’s been extensive consultations. So exactly how it’s unfolding I’m not in a position to say, but you know—and in terms of the cost, my understanding is that there’s—there may be additional requests or something like that.

But I think a lot of this is going to be this is an opportunity—and, ma’am, you served on that commission calling for, you know, greater defense spending. This is where, you know, the 1.5 trillion (dollars), but also an industrial base that can produce more quickly at scale at a reasonable cost is going to be vital.

FROMAN: Dov Zakheim.

Q: Hi, Bridge.

COLBY: Hey, Dov.

Q: The buildup—the NATO buildup you spoke about, it’s going to take them a few years before they’ve spent to the level you want. And once they spend it, it’s going to take a few years before they get anything in the field. We’re going to be building up, as you say, but will we be building up enough to backfill them in order to deter people like Putin?

COLBY: So I think timelines are an issue. I think you’re probably more pessimistic than you need to be because in a lot of areas—I mean, if we look at the—at the Russian military, and without kind of commenting on their political intent but just analytically, obviously, they have built up, including over the course of the war, but they are heavily engaged in Ukraine and they’ve suffered very substantial losses of both personnel and equipment. And Europe actually in a lot of ways is—already has a lot of the capabilities that it needs. For instance, like, tactical aviation, you know, there’s a lot of European countries buying and already fielding F-35. There’s a lot of ground troops. Often it has to do with probably more, you know, joint operations, training, what the Europeans call strategic enablers. So that’s what we’re trying to get down to, is I think it’s less of a binary kind of issue than a matter of degree, where we’re going to have to work. And that’s a lot of what the conversations that I have, say, with General Grynkewich, who I understand is very highly regarded by all of us both as EUCOM and as supreme allied commander; try to understand where—you know, where we focus efforts, where we may lean forward, thinking about, you know, how we—how we get across whatever humps there may be.

But in general, I think—I think it’s a manageable issue. And especially—because the Europeans, they actually are doing it. I mean, they’re ramping—certainly the Germans and the Poles, the Scandinavians. I mean, a country like Finland, you know, has sustained a large military for a long time. They’ve got F-35s. They’ve got a huge artillery force. They’ve got well-trained infantry, a conscription system. That’s a—you know, and I said Poland. So when you—when you kind of unpack it a bit, it’s actually more manageable than it might initially appear. Similarly in Korea, you know, you have I think eighteen-month baseline conscription, you have a very large defense industry. You know, we’ve been operating with them for generations. So these problems are less pointed than—I mean, I don’t want to underestimate them, but there’s more to work on in a more sort of progressive way than it might seem.

FROMAN: Should Europe build its own long-range precision-strike capability?

COLBY: So that’s a great—a great question. I think in general we want a Europe that is able to take, you know, primary responsibility for its own conventional defense. And of course, long-range conventional strike is a really important part of the battlefield. You see it in Ukraine.

There are, obviously, strategic stability issues that naturally arise, so I think those can generally be managed. And I don’t want to kind of sort of presume one way or the other. But—I mean, the Europeans already have long-range strike. There’s every reason to think that—and I know there’s a lot of interest in their developing more long-range strike. How you think about concepts of operations, deployment, et cetera—especially because we still are extending our nuclear deterrent. It’s not like we’re trying to slow their roll; to the contrary. But I think it’s just a—and I—those conversations are already happening. I’m confident those can be managed together.

FROMAN: Right.

Please join me. We’re so grateful to have Undersecretary Colby here again at the Council. (Applause.) We really appreciate the engagement of you, Bridge, with the Council, and look forward to continuing our dialogue. So thanks very much.

COLBY: Thanks, Michael. Thank you.

(END)

This is an uncorrected transcript.