The Trump Administration’s Approach to the Middle East

Panelists discuss the Trump administration’s role in the Israel-Hamas peace negotiations, U.S. relations with other Middle East countries, and the administration’s priorities regarding U.S. involvement and stability in the region.

This meeting is part of CFR’s Transition 2025 series, which examines the major foreign policy issues confronting the Trump administration.

 

RYAN: All right. Welcome, everyone. Happy to see a big group here on a Friday. My name is Missy Ryan. I’m a national security reporter with the Washington Post. And I’m really thrilled to be here with a fantastic panel to have a very timely discussion about “The Trump Administration’s Approach to the Middle East.”

Just to briefly introduce my fellow panelists and to summarize their esteemed professional backgrounds, we have Elliott Abrams, senior fellow for Middle East studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, former U.S. representative for Iran, and many, many other government jobs. We have Bernard Haykel on Zoom, I think, professor of Near Eastern studies at Princeton. And Denise Natali, director of the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, and former senior State Department official at the Bureau for Conflict and Stabilization Operations.

So we are going to—this is—this meeting is part of CFR’s transition series, which is going to be examining major foreign policy issues confronting the Trump administration. We’re going to do thirty minutes of moderated Q&A with the panelists, and then we’re going to open it up for questions from the audience. So we’re not going to do opening statements. We have a lot to cover. So I think we’re just going to jump right in. The goal today, as I see it, is to help sort out these different strands of the Trump administration’s moves on the Middle East, and understand, number one, what the goals and strategies are on the most pressing issues for the region and, two, what are the chances of those strategies succeeding. And I’m also hoping we can help understand a little bit better how decisions are being made in the Trump administration and gain some insights on how the chief players and their worldviews are interacting as the administration attempts to manage a very complex moment in the region.

So we’re going to jump right in with Israel-Gaza. Trump seems to be making this hundred-day push not only on Israel-Gaza but also on Ukraine for a very ambitious peace deal that would bring lasting calm to Gaza and also lay the groundwork for normalization with Saudi Arabia, which we’ll talk about later. The latest, as I understand it, per Barack Ravid, who obviously has very good sources, is that the U.S. has put forward a renewed proposal for hostage release that would re-impose a ceasefire and jump start talks for a second phase. I’m going to start with you, Elliott. How do you see the administration’s strategy for achieving some sort of calm, lasting ceasefire, next phase for Gaza? And what are the chances of that succeeding in a way that—and reconciling the different tensions that has to deal with it from the different parties, in a way that the previous administration wasn’t able to get to in a lasting way?

ABRAMS: First, I’m happy to be here. I’m hungry, watching everybody eat, but I’ll get by it. (Laughter.)

I think the administration has a good shot at getting another temporary ceasefire. The Israelis are clearly putting a lot more military pressure on Hamas. And the administration is not objecting or obstructing that in any way. I think the Israeli view is at a certain point, Hamas will make a deal, a partial deal, that is five hostages, or ten hostages, in exchange for a ceasefire of a certain period—thirty days, sixty days. It’s hard for me to see that going all the way to the end because it’s hard for me to see Hamas giving up all the hostages. They’re so valuable to Hamas. But I think the idea that there could be another ceasefire is a pretty sensible one.

RYAN: But what—can you get to the next stage, which would be some sort of transition to governance, to, you know, the hoped-for day after?

ABRAMS: Yeah. Very hard, I think. People have put forward—well, for a couple of reasons. One, our participation seems to be dependent on Israel’s agreeing to a path to a sovereign Palestinian state, a time-bound path. And the Israelis, in my view, are not going to do that. Israeli public opinion doesn’t want to do that. It’s not just Netanyahu. I think that’s one problem. The other problem is nobody has a workable plan for Gaza. The administrative side of it, I think, is reasonable. One can envision a kind of administrative board headed by someone like Salam Fayyad, well-financed, that could do, you know, schools, hospitals, that kind of thing. But who provides law and order? Who provides security? That is the question that I think has really not at all been answered. The Israelis don’t want to do it. It doesn’t seem that—yet, anyway—it’s been possible to put together arrow commitments to do it.

RYAN: Well, that—and, actually, Denise and Bernard, I’m hoping you all can weigh in and tell us what you expect the Arab countries—how you expect Arab countries to be handling this moment, given the fact that they are now, as Elliott said, under greater pressure to use their influence on Hamas to accept the deal, and given the fact that the Arab plan has not gained traction here in the United States. Denise, do you want to start?

NATALI: Sure, thanks. Thanks. And thanks to the Council. Just a note that I work for the Department of Defense, but these are my views. They don’t represent the government, DOD, or NDU.

I want to just start off with, when we talk about President Trump’s bid we should just remember what the premise is of this administration’s foreign policies—to put American interests first, to end wars, and to not be involved in regions that do not advance or serve U.S. interests. So I don’t see this as—or, this administration looking to have this lasting peace, where this going to be entirely peaceful and there’s not going to be any instability whatsoever. But it means thinking outside the box. So I don’t see any effort to revive a two-state solution, because it was a failure for decades. So thinking outside the box is going to do things in a way that perhaps, you know, would think be unthinkable at this moment. It’s going to mean coaxing those regional Arab states into taking responsibility. And that, of course, includes Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

And that means including this as part of other deals to be made. So any attempt to end the Israel-Hamas war, in addition to the hostages and all of these other issues, is what larger pictures—what larger package can this be part of, so that key strategic anchor points—such as Saudi Arabia—can take some form of responsibility for this? So to answer your question, Missy, yes, I do think that the Arab states—I don’t know how this is going to play out, exactly. But they’re going to be involved in some way because the United States, let’s be clear, is not going to be—and is clearly out, in this administration, of the nation-building business, of the institutional liberal interventionism, and all of the other failures that were part of that democracy promotion, all of that stuff. So we should just start off with we shouldn’t expect that in the first place, that this is going to be a security-focused endeavor.

RYAN: Bernard, I would love your thought on that. And also, if you could address the question of do you think that there is a danger that this effort—that the approach will backfire from the Trump administration by staking out a different position vis-à-vis the Palestinians, from what we can tell so far. That maybe that’ll actually make it more difficult to reach a lasting calm in the region, when you’re working with Hamas, obviously, and then other players like Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia?

HAYKEL: First, thank you for inviting me.

I think that the Saudis are really not that committed or deeply invested in, you know, solving the Palestinian issue in the way that was just described. Meaning, you know, putting a lot of money and even military effort in bringing an end to Hamas. They would love to see the end of Hamas, for sure. But their priorities are very much Saudi first. They want—they’re very worried about Iran, and an attack on Iran leading to an attack on Saudi oil and desalination facilities. I don’t—you know, they make a lot of noise about the importance of a two-state solution, and I don’t think they’re willing to be pushed into thinking out of the box because it’s just not a priority for them, frankly. The priority for them is much more—it’s much closer to home. And it’s much more the threat that Iranian missiles, Houthi missiles and drones, the civil war in Sudan—those are really much more immediate to them.

And I also would add one other thing. And, you know, this comes from Palestinians that I know, including, you know, my colleague here at Princeton, Salam Fayyad. I don’t think that the Egyptians and the Jordanians are really interested either in thinking out of the box and finding a solution. They happen to kind of benefit greatly from the chaos and the attention that the Palestinian cause and the wars between Israel and the Palestinians present for them. And, you know, we can get into detail. Like, for example, you know, Sisi and his government have made a fortune off of Palestinian refugees coming out of Gaza.

RYAN: I’m going to try to pepper in some questions—process questions, or questions about the structure that the administration is using to tackle these problems throughout the conversation. And so right now, I’m going to ask: Do you all—and jump in anyone who wants to respond—do you—how much of a bandwidth problem do you see in the sort of structure that the administration is using so far to approach the Israel-Gaza question? Because, you know, you have Witkoff not only being the envoy for the Middle East but also dedicating a lot of time to Russia. You have an unclear role for the State Department in addressing these questions. You have—you know, the NSC has a certain structure, but not really at the sort of active negotiation level. Elliott, do you have thoughts on that?

ABRAMS: Well, you don’t have an assistant secretary of state for the Near East yet. You have a nominee, I guess, Joel Rayburn. But, you know, it’ll be a few months before Rubio has his team of undersecretaries and assistant secretaries in place. I do think there’s a bandwidth problem, in the sense that if Mr. Witkoff is in charge of the Gaza and Gulf negotiations, and he’s in charge of the Iran negotiations, and he’s in charge of the Ukraine negotiations, he’s going to be a busy guy. And I think that’s a very large charge to put on any one person, particularly if they get going. I mean, you know, we’re not negotiating with Iran, but we might be.

RYAN: But maybe this creates a sort of competition situation where you have an ecosystem where the best ideas rise to the top. Do you think that’s possible? Or is it more just a bottleneck?

ABRAMS? I think it’s a bottleneck.

RYAN: (Laughs.) OK. Yeah, Denise, yeah, please. Jump in.

NATALI: So, I have a different view. First, there have been special envoys—this has always been an issue with special envoys, right? You have the assistant secretaries. You have the ambassadors. And presidents, no matter what administration create, special envoys.

ABRAMS: I was one.

NATALI: OK. And they don’t have, you know, their own budget, really. So they’re in—and it’s an issue. It’s an issue with the assistant secretary and figuring that out. So, one, this is not really anything new. But I do think that Special Envoy Witkoff is extremely effective. He’s not working alone. He’s working, obviously, in concert, with Secretary of State Rubio and all of these other important and effective people. He has a direct air and very close relationship with President Trump. So he has been effective. I do not see the Trump—this administration giving such important dossiers to someone if they didn’t have the bandwidth or they couldn’t handle it. So probably he is the face forward. But, no, I don’t see that—you know, if it’s leading to something that they can’t handle, but I don’t see that there’s a bandwidth issue at this time—

ABRAMS: Can I just jump and say I think one point you made is really critical. The best negotiator is somebody who has a relationship with the president.

NATALI: Close like this.

ABRAMS: Yeah. And that’s—that is what foreigners want to know, much more than your title. They do want to know, do you really speak to the president?

NATALI: I mean, people know that Mr. Witkoff and Mr. Trump have a very strong relationship. When you’re speaking to Mr. Witkoff, you’re almost speaking to Mr. Trump—President Trump.

RYAN: But he does have, as I understand it, a very tiny, almost nonexistent staff. You know, and then obviously some ambiguity with—

NATALI: So then I’ll say, all the power to him. Because if he’s doing all of this such little stuff, he deserves even greater kudos than I’d like to give him right now. That’s my response.

RYAN: Yeah. And in any—any insights that you, Denise or Elliott, can share from having worked in the first Trump administration would be great. So I want to move, though, to normalization with Saudi Arabia, which seems like—to be the administration’s other chief goal in the region, in addition to some sort of calm—lasting calm in Israel-Gaza. How can this administration—and, Bernard, maybe you want to jump in here—how can they square the circle of securing adequate progress for the Palestinians that would be acceptable to Saudi Arabia and coming up with something that is acceptable to Israel. Elliott, as you mentioned, the public opinion in Israel has really shifted on this. Bernard, you want to jump in?

HAYKEL: Yeah. So, first, let me just back up and just explain that the normalization with Israel, as far as Saudi Arabia is concerned, really has to do with five separate agreements that they negotiated with the Biden administration. They involve a mutual defense treaty, a nuclear agreement, a free trade agreement, a speedy process for purchasing weapons from the United States, and finally an artificial intelligence agreement. So their interest in in Israel really has to do with obtaining these things from the United States. And now, after the October 7 events they’ve become very hard on Israel in demanding that they want a viable state with a specific timeline for the Palestinians. And even as recently as a day or two ago, on, on Saudi national television, they put out a news report about—comparing Prime Minister Netanyahu to Hitler.

So they’re extremely aggressive when it comes to the Israelis and demanding this state. Now, I’m trying to understand why the Saudis are being so aggressive on this issue when it wasn’t really that important before October 7, 2023. I think, in fact, they see an opportunity here to displace Iran on this issue of Palestine, because it has huge currency and salience in the Arab and the Islamic world. And they want to capture that card, and then use it. Whether they really want a full blown, you know, acceptance of a Palestinian state is not clear to me. But at the moment, that’s where they stand. And I don’t see a way of squaring the demands of the Saudis on a valuable Palestinian state with what Elliott correctly pointed out, which is that the Israeli public has zero interest in that at the moment. And I’m not sure the Trump administration can do much about that.

RYAN: And it would—Elliott, I just—you know, given your focus on Israel in the past, do you think that Netanyahu is capable or willing to fall on his sword and sacrifice his government and maybe his future to clinch that kind of deal? Because that seems like what would be required on the Israeli side.

ABRAMS: No. I don’t think he’s going to go against Israeli public opinion on—it’s not just—it’s both public opinion and his own base that are opposed to this. Just to comment on what Bernie said, it’s very interesting. It doesn’t seem to me to be—let me put it this way. If the Saudis do that, they’re going to damage their relationship with the United States. That is, if they try to replace Iran as a power that is—that is blaring its hostility to Israel, you know, we—Congress is going to see that and we’re going to be hearing people. And, you know, the first people to take advantage of it will be the Qataris who will say, well, we’re not saying all that terrible stuff—though they are, by the way, in Al Jazeera—and the Emiratis, to some extent. So that seems to me to be really kind of dangerous in terms of U.S.-Saudi relations.

RYAN: Again—yeah, please. And, Denise, also I would love to get your thoughts on how immutable or lasting do you think that sort of higher bar that the Saudis have placed for, you know, Palestinian statehood or process is?

NATALI: Sure. Thank you. And I do—I want to follow up with what Elliott said too. I agree. I mean, the United States is coming into this—the Middle East, with the Saudis, with a very different relationship than the previous administration had, right? Whereas the previous administration referred—you know, saw the Saudis as pariahs and eventually tried to make up, the very strong relationship between the Trump administration, some of the Trump family, and the Saudis. So that relationship I do not see being replaced. On the contrary, I see that being enhanced. Now there are—as you said, Bernard, and I agree, there are some really important priorities for the Saudis and the Israelis that are not there right now.

With that said, having spent so much time in the region, I think a lot of these are mutable. I don’t think—right now. It depends. It depends on what is going to be the end state, or how is this going to play out with the Israel-Hamas war. But I think that the Saudis do have other interests, higher level interests, business—very important business and energy deals that also need to be made to reach some of these, you know, larger strategic priorities. So I’m not dismissing the importance of these domestic issues, but I don’t think that they’re immutable, to answer your question.

RYAN: So you think that the Saudis might agree to some sort of notional progress, or fig leaf for state—

NATALI: I don’t know. What did they—there’s not—the state—the two-state solution bit is just so off the table, on both sides. We shouldn’t even be having that conversation. But what happens when the Saudis ask for some kind of special security arrangement? I don’t know. I’m not speaking for anybody. But there’s certain things that the Saudis do want. And, again, the United States position is not going to be the security guarantor. We are not the security guarantor anymore. And so how can we, you know, use, work with our regional strategic anchor points to assume some of that? So I’m just putting some things out there, again, indicating that they could be mutable.

RYAN: OK. I’m just realizing we only have ten minutes left. We have a lot to get through. So I just wanted to ask another sort of cross-cutting question in terms of the different philosophical camps within the administration, and how that’s playing out on key Middle East issues. One of the really interesting things that. I think came out of the revealing moments in the Houthi Signalgate chats was you had Vice President Vance really playing this role internally, as we’ve seen him externally, staking out a more isolationist position, and skeptical about American military activity, and skeptical about Europe. Whereas, you know, Waltz and Rubio, as I think most of us would probably assume, appear to not share that view to that extent. And then the president is maybe unknown. How do you guys see these camps playing out on the Middle East? How would you define them?

ABRAMS: Well, I agree with you that that was the most interesting thing about those exchanges. I thought it really was extraordinary that Vance was, in a sense, trying to use this moment to push his own, if you will, isolationist view. And the president had said, we’re going to keep the sea lanes open. And you have Vance really saying, what do we have to keep the sea lanes open for? For the lousy Europeans? Push back from Hegseth also, which was—which was interesting. He seemed to be—Vance seemed to be a bit isolated in that conversation. And then you get what one of the papers called the commissar, Stephen Miller, coming in to end the conversation saying: Hey, why are we talking about this? The president made a decision. We’re doing this.

So I thought the whole conversation was really quite fascinating. Thing is, as we know from Trump one, every Cabinet member is expendable. It is not at all clear that two years from now any of those people on that call will be there, except Vance. He’s the one constitutional officer who’s going to be there in two years. So his influence may grow over time. I do ask myself the question whether, if President Trump reads that full exchange, he is annoyed at the vice president apparently undermining a decision he’s already made.

RYAN: Or, at least, questioning whether he is making an informed decision, at a minimum.

ABRAMS: Yeah.

RYAN: Denise or Bernard, do you want to—

NATALI: I’ll just jump in quickly. So, yes, we’ve seen these different views. And I agree, there’s just different—as you said, the different perspectives. If anybody hasn’t read, Hal brands did a pretty good piece on the five factions in the Trump foreign policy. I don’t know if you’ve read it, but it gives you an idea of where some of the nuances are. But I think at the end of the day, despite—everybody has different views. You can sit the bunch of people in a room who are part of the Trump administration, and they can be a bit by here. But at the end of the day—at the end of the day, what matters is that they are all following what President Trump’s priorities are.

So if you have to say which one is going to win out, it’s the base. It’s the base that matters. President Trump was very clear when he came in what his priorities are. So you’re not going to go this far away, because the base will say, you’re not delivering on what you promised. There’s midterms in 2026. There’s an election in 2028. So you have to just always go back to how is the base going to react to this? Not these other people who are unelected officials, because we didn’t elect them anyway. So I that’s where I think—well, the different views will matter, but are they deviating that much? And therefore, Stephen Miller, that’s exactly right, got to be this is what matters. What matters is what President Trump’s priorities are. So that’s my thoughts on it.

RYAN: Bernard, do you want to add anything?

HAYKEL: I mean, I think it’s actually very good that there are these different factions around President Trump with different—you know, some more isolationists, some more internationalists. And I think that’s a healthy—it’s a healthy thing. And I think his base, by the way, is composed of these different factions as well. So in that sense, you know, it reflects the voters. I think also when it comes to the Houthis, the president must be aware that the Chinese cut a separate deal with them, and therefore Chinese shipping can still go through whereas American shipping cannot. And that’s something that must irritate him to no end. So, you know, that’s another dimension of this—of this fight. And I think it’s an important one.

RYAN: And Russia, reportedly, has been flirting with supporting them as well. Yeah, please.

ABRAMS: Let me just say, I think the point about the base, though, is a good one. If the president announced, I don’t know, on June 1, last night I ordered the destruction of the Iranian nuclear program. I have said for years—I said in my first term, they are never getting a nuclear weapon. They were moving toward it. We’ve taken it out. I think his base would be very supportive of that.

RYAN: Well, that’s—

ABRAMS: So, I mean, the base, as Bernie says—I mean, the base, as in that discussion on Signal, has various parts too, and I think can be very influenced by the president’s argument to them. Here’s what I did and here’s why I did it.

RYAN: Yeah, go ahead.

NATALI: And as long as we are not getting involved in another war, right? So I did it. You never said to the base that we’re not going to take out these terrorist organizations. But we’re not going to be back on the ground, right, engaging in regime change. We’re not starting another war. And we’re not getting involved in the long-term bit. So that is—that’s where I think the red line is with the base.

RYAN: Well, I want to come back to that on Iran. And actually, that’s a perfect segue because my next question—I just want to get in a couple more before we open it up. On Iran, how do you all see this approach of return to maximum pressure paired with this very interesting outreach that President Trump is making to Tehran for potential negotiations? How’s that strategy looking to you guys?

HAYKEL: Yeah, I mean, I think it’s a—I support it. I think the Iran regime is more vulnerable now than it’s ever been, you know, probably since the end of the war against Iraq. And this is the time to put pressure on them, and to offer, you know, an olive branch at the same time. But, you know, this is a regime that has to understand, as Henry Kissinger once said, that it needs to decide whether it’s a nation or a cause. And it has to stop being a revolutionary cause, sowing mayhem and chaos all over the world—including, by the way, threatening President Trump’s life and a number of other American officials. And that’s just not acceptable. And I think that has to be made very clear to them.

RYAN: But then there’s an argument that the negotiations can’t happen because of Trump’s decision to withdraw from the JCPOA. They can’t return while the supreme leader is still alive. And so maybe that will lead to a war if the United States does decide to bomb the nuclear program. You know, what would happen after that?

ABRAMS: War is the wrong word. I think, actually, this is going to be the debate within the administration, if we come to it. That is, if there isn’t a negotiation, and if they’re clearly moving to a bomb, some people—presumably the vice president, are going to say: You were elected to not do this kind of stuff. You were elected to put an end to it. Don’t get involved in another Middle Eastern war. It’ll be the end of your presidency. And the other side, presumably people like Rubio and Waltz, are going to say, this isn’t a war. This is more like Soleimani. This is a strike. This happened once. It’s one day or two days, and then it’s over. And you promised. You said you wouldn’t let them do this. I think that’s kind of the way the debate will go. And then we’ll see what—take a guess at what the president decides.

HAYKEL: Can I just add one—

NATALI: If I can just jump in too. Yeah, it goes back to the—you talk about the maximum pressure. I would call this the ultimate maximum pressure campaign, right? So this is going after, in all of the ways that you can, enforcing the sanctions, many of which were not properly enforced last time. The Trump administration, during its first term, the Iranian oil was down to 300,000 barrels a day. Last year, you had up to—in 2024 it was 1.7 million barrels a day. So getting the Iranian oil exports tightly sanctioned, going after Chinese boats that we never were doing and those imports, there’s a very strong and active way to reduce that revenue. You have an Axis of Resistance that has virtually collapsed.

So I agree with Bernard. Iran is in a very weak state right now. But you really—going after those revenues by Iran in a very, very forceful and aggressive way matters. And in terms of President Trump’s priorities, Iran will not have a bomb. So I don’t think there’s a contradiction. Either they can have a negotiation because they’re in a very poor position and they will continue to be in one, or they risk having some type of—whether it’s the United States, whether it’s Israel—we don’t know who’s going to do it. But Iran will not have a nuclear bomb. So these are the types of, you know, deterrence threats, or whatever you want to say. That’s where the administration stands, in my personal view.

RYAN: OK. I’m going to try to get in one last question before we open it up, which is: How are things that are statements or ideas, things that the administration is doing not related to the Middle East, affecting the interactions with the Middle East? And I’m specifically thinking the administration’s position vis-à-vis Russia-Ukraine, the rapprochement with—apparent rapprochement with Russia, comments regarding Greenland and Panama, the attempts to dismantle the administrative state, and challenges to the judiciary, for example. How are those—it’s obviously very disruptive. How is that playing out, you think, in how the region is responding to the Trump administration and the chances for success on the things it’s tried to do there?

ABRAMS: I don’t think the domestic issues affect the way friends or enemies in the region look at this very much. I think there are two things. One, Russia-China, which are helping Iran and helping the Houthis. And I hope that in the negotiations with Russia and China, some of which have started, the administration takes a much harder line in demanding that those relationships diminish or stop. I mean, the Russians are helping the Houthis in what they’re doing to international shipping. The other question is whether people are going to think—people in the region are going to think that we’re pulling out. And I was worried about that, frankly. But, you know, when you see the president sending a second carrier task force to the Middle East, that’s not pivoting to Asia. Rightly or wrongly, for good or for bad, that is not pivoting to Asia.

RYAN: Right. Denise.

NATALI: Yeah, sure. So I agree with Elliott. I don’t think any of the domestic—what’s going on domestically is in the calculus of our regional partners. They will look at what—the way that the United States approaches its allies and partners, which is not isolationism but it’s exactly what President Trump said he was going to do. Our allies and partners are going to have to assure their own security, engage in more burden sharing. And what we’re doing with the Europeans no should be of no surprise. So others—those actions will only reinforce to what, in my view, the Middle East leaders would say, yes, this is not a surprise. President Trump is delivering. Anything that we’re going to be engaged in is going to be America first, but also ensuring that our allies and partners are ensuring their own security.

So none of this, I don’t think, is affect—you know, you can say, well, what happened in Greenland. One other way of looking at it is that kind of rhetoric actually was the impetus to increase security spending by the Danes. So, you know, it depends on which way you look at it, but I don’t necessarily think that the way that President Trump is engaging in Europe is going to negatively affect our relationships with our Middle Eastern allies and partners.

RYAN: OK. We’re going to open it up to Q&A. Just a reminder that the meeting is on the record. If you can raise your hand—

ABRAMS: Oops. Wait a minute.

RYAN: Oh, yes. (Laughs.)

ABRAMS: I take it all back.

RYAN: Too late for that, sorry. (Laughs.) We’re going to open it up. Please introduce yourself. You can raise your hand to get a question. I think there’s a hand right there in the back.

Q: Thank you very much. Thank you for this outstanding program. Tom Kahn from American University.

I’m curious, in the context of a much more transactional Trump administration than Biden, our allies are no longer quite our allies or partners. And now with this America first, how durable over the long term is the U.S.-Israel alliance and the amount of U.S. support, financially, for—military support for Israel?

RYAN: Who wants to take that?

ABRAMS: I’ll take it. I think it’s a good question. There is today very strong support for Israel in Congress. Yes, there are a few outliers, but there aren’t many. I think it’s really, in the long run, a public opinion question, because some of the people who are the strongest supporters—you know, it was Nancy Pelosi and Steny Hoyer. Well, you know, they’re moved aside. How will American public opinion evolve? And I think from the Israeli point of view there is a lot to worry about there, because if you look at the support it diminishes with age. That is, twenty-year-olds less supportive than fifty- or seventy-year-olds. I do think, though, that, you know, there’s a base of support here of about 100 million Evangelicals that the Israelis can look to for quite a long time.

RYAN: Yeah, please, go ahead.

NATALI: Yeah, also—I agree. Our support to Israel, in my view, is unwavering, particularly this administration—unwavering. We just, you know, in the Biden administration my understanding had some of that military support on hold. And that was just released. So you can understand where we’re going. And it goes back to the way that we look at our security partnerships and what the United States will do and what our partners should be doing. Second part, transactional? I use the word—this is a realist approach to foreign policy, right? And you can use the word “transactional,” if you will, but this is realism, pure and simple. It is not—there’s not an ideologically driven nature to this. So, you know, the kinds of deal makings or agreements will be—will continue in this manner. But I don’t see the Israel component changing anytime soon.

RYAN: But it has become a more partisan issue. If you look at the rhetoric from Democrats over the course of the Gaza conflict, it was much—became much more critical of Israel.

NATALI: So that’s the—you’re talking about the Americans are—

RYAN: Yeah, the Americans.

NATALI: Yeah. I’m looking at the way that our international partners are looking at this. This just a realist perspective, regardless of the partisanship that’s going on in the United States right now.

HAYKEL: I think there’s—

RYAN: Next question, please.

HAYKEL: Sorry, can I just—

RYAN: Oh, please, go ahead.

HAYKEL: There’s one other issue that I think has to be—the thing that distinguishes Israel from other states in the Middle East is that it does its own fighting. And it also, when it does fight, like what it did to Hezbollah, what it did to Iran, or what it did to the militias in Syria and Iraq—I mean, it’s incredible. I mean, these are spectacular successes. So, I mean, looking at Israel from an American point of view, this is, you know, someone that actually carries their own water, unlike, say, some of the Gulf countries, who would be unable to defend themselves.

RYAN: All right. We have a question over here.

Q: Chris Isham from CT Group.

I wanted to pursue the Iranian question a little bit. As you mentioned, the administration has kind of a bifurcated policy of maximum pressure plus the outreach. The Iranians recently are indicating that they might be open—after first rejecting it—that they might be open to some indirect negotiations. Where do you think those negotiations would go? What do you think the objective would be on the U.S. side? What do you think we would hope to achieve? Would it be some JCPOA 2.0? Would it be giving up all the enrichment facilities, as some people have suggested? Where do we go on that?

ABRAMS: Well, I think that the president genuinely wants to negotiate. He did in the first term. Remember, the purpose of maximum pressure is not to overthrow the regime. It was to get a negotiation going. I think the question is what will the president accept as a success in the negotiations? And that, I think, is what worries the Israelis. That is, the demand, in my opinion, ought to be not—I mean, the criticism of the JCPOA was that it was timebound and it was nukes only. Didn’t affect missiles. Didn’t affect, you know, support for proxies. If the president accepts a deal, if you allow me to put it this way, as bad as the JCPOA, he can probably sell that politically in the United States. He’ll say, this is a great deal. Democrats may not be so supportive. They’ll be split on it probably, because many will want a deal. What will he view as a success, knowing that if you say those terms are not good enough then you may be putting yourself in the position where you’ve got to strike. So I think that’s the question, What will he view as enough?

RYAN: And is there any reason to think that Iran would be more willing to include proxy—and proxy issues and the missile program in a negotiation than it has been in the past?

ABRAMS: Only—I would say only one thing, which is, you know, the ayatollah’s eight-six. He may not outlast President Trump. If his policy is I just got to live through Trump, we’ve just got to get the regime through Trump, then he may be willing to do some kind of deal. They can always break it later.

NATALI: Yeah. I also see the Iranians doing something like this: OK, we’ll do this for six months. And then, you know, it’s more of a—this happens here, and then we’ll—you know, they’re saying now no ballistic missiles, but you don’t know what other types of things will come up. And then we’ll have this three months, and we’ll—you know, we’ll hang on to this. As far as their proxies too, I understand, you know, this has always been an issue in the Iran’s Iranian proxy network. But that is really—a lot of this has been dismembered. You even got, you know, the Iranians more dependent on the—on the monies coming from these other places than their proxies relying on Iran at this moment. So I would just say that I wouldn’t look to are the Iranians going to create a deal that’s going to last for two years, because that’s not the way that they’re thinking about it. They’re thinking about it in chunks of time.

RYAN: OK. Next question. Here in the front.

Q: Hi. Paul Jones. Squire, Patton, Boggs, and former diplomat.

Thank you so much for this wonderful conversation. I wonder if you could factor in Lebanon and Syria. What are the early signs of the policy from this administration? What direction you think it will go, given the tremendous internal changes in both countries that offer, you know, opportunities and risks. Thank you.

ABRAMS: Bernie?

NATALI: I can jump in.

HAYKEL: So, on Syria, I think the big question is whether the new government there and its leader are still jihadists or, you know, have decided to become nationalists. And I think the jury’s still out on that. From the latest events that have taken place there with massacres against Alawites and, to some extent, Christians, we’re still seeing a lot of jihadists there. And so there are countries that do not want to deal with the Syrian government. And I think Israel is taking the decision that they want a weak central government. They want a kind of more federalized system in Syria. And there’s a real clash also between Turkey. And Turkey backs the HTS, the people who are in charge now in Damascus, and the Israelis. And to some extent, also the UAE is on that same side. So Syria is a potential clash point. And it’s far from—I tend to see the leadership there as jihadists and not having abandoned this ideology.

On Lebanon, you know, you have a situation where basically the government—it’s still not clear whether Hezbollah is entirely weakened and defeated. And the government needs a lot of support and help, financial and political, to rebuild the country, with an existing feudal setup with, you know, different warlords, or ex-warlords, who are still around and extremely corrupt. So Lebanon is far from being—you know, becoming a kind of stable and eventually prosperous place. And the administration doesn’t seem to have—other than to deal with the Israelis and deconfliction with the Israelis—doesn’t seem to have a concrete policy either towards Lebanon or Syria, for that matter, in terms of—

NATALI: Can I jump in?

RYAN: Yeah, please.

NATALI: Just want to add to—I agree with Bernie. Both of these places are, you know, obviously unstable. But the approach to Syria. We’ve had, as you know, about 2,000 U.S. forces there as part of the ISIS coalition—to ensure the enduring defeat of ISIS. There is discussions now. The United States was instrumental in brokering that agreement between the Kurdish SDF—Kurdish-led SDF and the Syrian government. There is still sanctions in place, but I think there’s some kind of interest. There is an interest to deal with this government and potentially lift these sanctions. Not in the immediate future, but give this administration—this new Syrian transitional government a chance. So there’s that component of it.

Now, remember, and there’s the military SDF component of it. What else is going on is that you have regional states—Turkey, Iraq, Jordan, others, Qatar—very involved in either reconstruction or trying to take off some of those responsibilities that the U.S. supported SDF is doing. For example, the Iraqis and the Turks are working to how do you get rid of these prisoners in the al-Hol camp? How do you—Turkey is going to—let’s say Turkey has a military base in Syria. So if some of those security elements of what the United States is involved in as taken care of—you could think of, when does the United States—if and when—leave Syria with these troops? And that is something to think about because Syria is not a vital U.S. national interest. And much of that humanitarian assistance has been removed from Syria. And that’s not going to go back on our part.

In terms of Lebanon, the United States, you know, continues to take—let’s see if we can take advantage of the weakening of the Axis of Resistance, providing the Lebanese Armed Forces with about 95—just recently approved, I think, the State Department released about $95 million—or, billion in support for Lebanese armed forces to enhance the sovereignty of the Lebanese state. So there are some continued partnerships and responsibilities and security cooperation that we will continue with so that these nonstate armed groups don’t continue to capture the state.

RYAN: Just to ask a follow-up question, how do you guys see the—how do you all see the different factions or forces or players around Trump playing out on Syria? Because I think that’s kind of illustrative, perhaps, as we try to understand how things are going to operate in the future. You have Trump, who has wanted to pull U.S. troops from Syria for a long time. Waltz has at least suggested that maybe there would be reason to have them stay. You have, you know, notionally, maybe you could say Trump would be open to embracing someone like Ahmed al-Sharaa, because who cares if he used to be a jihadist? You know, we can make a deal with him. How do you guys see that playing out?

ABRAMS: Well, I think the critical decision that sort of points—that will show the policy is, do we keep those troops there or do we pull them out? Or when do we pull them out? There was a report I saw this morning of some movement at our camp there that suggests beginning of preparations for withdrawal. No date set. But in my own view, it would be extremely dangerous and destabilizing to do it now. I don’t think this is a big subject of debate within the administration. I think there’s pretty good consensus. Morgan Ortagus, Witkoff’s deputy, is working very hard on Lebanon. I think everybody wants the same thing in Lebanon, which is we want—you know, as Denise said, we want the state to demand that it has full sovereignty over the whole country. We want the Lebanese Armed Forces to—as they promised—to take over the south. That has not happened yet. But we’re not giving up.

RYAN: Right.

NATALI: I agree with that. And just to talk about Syria, I agree. I don’t think that this is—the debate is here. It’s about here, and about when, right? But what is important, and I think this administration would not withdraw, it’s a security issue. We’re not going to withdraw in a haphazard way. There’s not going to be another Afghanistan. So those security measures would have to be in place so that this is not a vacuum where there’s this rupture. And so those are the types of measures when I said before, what are the regional actors doing? And I think the administration, in my personal view would be more than glad to say, are the conditions right for us to then leave?

But they’re not—we shouldn’t expect this, let’s see if the next Syrian government is going to be democratic. I mean, yes, it should be inclusive. But I don’t think that’s going to be the barometer of whether we—let’s stay in Syria forever, in the region, until we see a democratic regime. Or is this good enough? Or are regional actors—regional partners and allies capable of assuming some of these security responsibilities, and then—but then you also have to look at Iraq. And that’s a whole ’nother thing we can talk about.

RYAN: OK. Other questions? Right here, the black turtleneck.

Q: Hi. Kate Winston from S&P Global.

What more can be done to enforce maximum pressure on Iran? There’s been some sanctions on a teapot refinery, an oil storage facility in China. Do you expect this administration to go after ports? Or could the military be involved in addressing the shadow fleet?

ABRAMS: You know we were very successful—or, I should say, the president was very successful in his first term at doing this. And, as Denise said, their oil exports were way down, about 300,000 barrels a day. And their reachable foreign currency reserves were $4 billion, which for a country of seventy-five million people or something, you know, that’s nothing. And they built them up. I think it’s a matter of enforcement. I don’t think we need new legislation at all. It’s a little bit—if I can draw an odd analogy—it’s like the border. We have no new legislation, but there aren’t many people coming across the border now. I think the—you’re already beginning to see, I think, pressure on Iranian oil exports.

We’ve got to go—my predecessor on the Iran post, Brian Hook, used to, you know, call—literally call insurance companies and say, why do you want to ensure that ship? You’re going to be blackballed. You’re going to be out of business in the United States. Ship captain, ship owners, to say, you know, what are you doing? We are going to go after you for one lousy cargo of Iranian oil. And it worked. And that’s the kind of enforcement I think is necessary. You know, the hard part is China.

Now you’ve got to go after those refineries. You also got to do something that I would say we didn’t do successfully last time. Malaysia. Because what’s happening particularly in Malaysia is that these ships from Iran go to the coast, there’s then a transfer to another ship in Malaysian waters, and then the oil is delivered as if it were not Iranian oil. You know, we had a good relationship, we still do, with Malaysia. But we’ve got to put some pressure on Southeast Asia to prevent Iran from playing those tricks.

NATALI: I agree with Elliott. And I would just add, some of the things that are different this time is, for example, alternative areas where Iran can get revenue. Let’s take Iraq. This Trump administration has not renewed the waiver that the previous administration gave to Iraq to purchase—for direct electricity purchases from Iran. So going after other areas in which Iran can get its revenues is also another measure, in addition to very aggressive—I agree with Elliott, it’s about enforcement. Very aggressive ways to go after not just the Iranian part, but the China part too. And I think this administration is doing a very good job, as they did the first administration, in bringing those oil export revenues down. Let’s get it down to zero, if we can.

RYAN: That actually brings up a question that I didn’t—we didn’t have time to get to, which was the Houthis. And there’s some idea that people have floated that the Houthis could be—Iran’s support for the Houthis could be a bargaining chip in some sort of eventual negotiation—U.S. negotiation with Iran, to try to cut that off. Do you guys see this emerging campaign—there have been airstrikes that started on March 15 and then it’s been going almost every day, as I understand it, since then. Is this something that has the likelihood of succeeding in a way that it didn’t succeed under the Biden administration in getting the Houthis to stop what they’re doing? They have seemed remarkably resilient. And they have a lot of indigenous manufacturing capability—weapons manufacturing capability. And they really have taken on this mantle of the leaders of the Axis of Resistance—of Iranian-linked groups, now that the others—Hezbollah, et cetera—have been diminished.

Bernard, do you have any thoughts on that the—

HAYKEL: Yeah. I don’t think there’s any way you can get the Iranians to stop backing the Houthis, because the Houthis also represent a very important strategic factor, namely, that Iran takes pride in that they can block the Hormuz—the Straits of Hormuz. And the Houthis can disrupt shipping through Bab al-Mandab. So that’s a really important point that the Iranians have taken great pride in. The other is that, you know, the Iranians, of course, do this surreptitiously, but mostly it’s done through Oman. And it’s the Omanis that you have to put pressure on to stop the shipments from Iran to the Houthis. And that can—I think, can be done much more effectively than having to deal with the Iranians on this issue, because they won’t give up the Houthis.

The last thing—

RYAN: My understanding is the Iranians will say—oh, yeah. Go ahead.

HAYKEL: The one last thing I would say is that the intelligence on the Houthi leadership has gotten much better with, you know, human assets on the ground of, you know, Israeli, American, and Saudi. And so being able to take out the, say, top twenty leaders in the Houthi movement would, I think, incapacitate this movement. And this is what we’re seeing—which is different now from what we what was happening before. The Biden people never went after the Houthi leaders.

RYAN: There is some question, though, I think, of whether or not—how capable Oman is of interdicting supplies, and whether it’s a question of capability or will. I don’t know if you guys have a view—have views on that.

ABRAMS: Well, these are land transfers, largely, through Oman. And I think they’ve got the capability. The problem is they would have to confront Iran to do it. So I’m with Bernie, that we need to put more pressure on. I mean, you want to change the incentive structure and make it one in which the Omani government, the sultan, basically, says, OK, that’s got to stop, or it’s got to be very greatly diminished. On the Houthi capabilities, I mean, it’s true that the Emiratis and the Saudis thought they’d be able to defeat them. And they were not able to defeat them. But they’re not us. And I think if this campaign continues—it’s only been a few days—if it goes on and on, this may be one of the explanations for why there is a second carrier task force. And it’s not just a carrier. It’s a large task force. But if we’re going to pound away at the Houthis like that. And, as Bernie suggests, including decapitation, that’s different.

RYAN: And just to note that we did put B-2s and bombers in Diego Garcia just recently. And just to note that I think this week was the ten-year anniversary of the beginning of the Saudi-led campaign against the Houthis. So I think, you know, this campaign will also provide indications as it continues—this American campaign—of how the Trump administration is going to handle issues of civilian harm, because that was a big problem under the Saudis.

NATALI: Well—

RYAN: Yeah, go ahead, please.

NATALI: Yeah. I don’t—right now this is about, though—and I would agree with Bernie as well—going after—we never really had a concerted effort to go after the leadership of the Houthis. It was just going to let the Middle East go away and won’t even deal with it. This is not about interventionism, but it’s going out and weakening the command and control aspects of this movement, the way that the Israelis very, very successfully did with Hezbollah. And so that type of effort, I think, is what—you know, is the way that we’ve seen so far in this administration moving forward, is go after the leadership and weaken them to the extent to which they may exist.

And there’s another point, though, I’d just like to make. Even if—and this is—this will always be an area of disagreement. Let’s just say the Iranians say we’re not going to—OK, part of an agreement with the administration is I’m not going to—I’m going to leave the Houthis alone a bit. You know, the degree of autonomy that some of these groups have from Iran as well should not be understated. That is to say, they are going to be part of the landscape. There’s tens and tens and thousands of them, and all of these failed states—Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Lebanon. They’re not going away. They’re going to be there benefiting from these weak and failed states. So we have to understand too that they’re going to be there. But getting rid of their command and control centers, or decapitating them at least, is a, you know, more realistic way.

ABRAMS: Just one more point on this. Because I think it’s interesting that the president doesn’t want wars, right? But there we go with the Houthis. I mean, there we are with a campaign that the Biden administration did not do and would not do. And it seems like it’s growing, with the addition of another carrier task force. And it seems completely open-ended. So maybe we need to constrain this and say that the president doesn’t want ground wars. He doesn’t want, as he said, another Iraq, another Afghanistan. But he is certainly willing to use force when he thinks there’s a reason for doing it.

NATALI: But that’s not a war. That’s, you know, we’re going to go after these really bad terrorists.

ABRAMS: No, I agree.

NATALI: Qasem Soleimani is one of them. We’re going to knock them out.

ABRAMS: But Soleimani was an overnight strike. This is—there’s no end in sight. Yet, the president’s willing to do it.

RYAN: And you would have more limited exposure for American personnel unless you’re texting your war plans to adversaries.

NATALI: It’s also a very important message—but it’s also a very important message to send to the region. It’s the same kind of message that you’re going to send, that the Israelis are going to send. No, we’re not going to allow you bombing these ships, American assets, American people, obstructing the navigation routes. So, yes, this administration needs to go after these people to send a very clear message to the region.

RYAN: I think we have time for one more question, if there’s a question out there. And if not, I will take the prerogative—use the moderator’s prerogative to ask one more. We didn’t get to Turkey at all. Would love quick thoughts. Maybe Bernard, I’ll ask you to weigh in on how the Trump-Erdoğan relationship, which has been always very hard to predict, will evolve in the next—in the period ahead. And how, you know, this—the recent moves against the mayor that was arrested—you know, do you think there is any relationship to what Erdoğan has seen happening in the United States?

HAYKEL: No. I think, the—you know, the idea that somehow, you know, they think that the U.S. is going autocratic and so therefore we can be autocratic, I don’t think that’s true. First of all, I don’t think we are becoming more autocratic in the United States. I think that’s just propaganda. And I think when, you know, all politics are local, and what Turkey does is because of local dynamics. It has nothing to do with the United States. I think what Erdoğan, though, and others in the Middle East, are seeing is a United States that places interests first and foremost, and doesn’t talk about values. It’s like, we’re not spreading freedom. We’re not spreading democracy. And they love that, because it’s much more transparent, it’s much more transactional, and it’s a language they understand. And that, I think, is the single-most important message you’re getting out of the Trump administration today with the America first policy.

RYAN: Yeah, please.

NATALI: A couple of days ago Turkish foreign minister Hakan Fidan was in town. And he met with Secretary of State Rubio. I wasn’t at that meeting, but there were meetings later. And this relationship between the United States and Turkey, this very important strategic partnership, in my view will continue. There are obviously differences when it comes to Israel, but Turkey plays a very important role in stabilizing Syria. There are conversations about developing—or, the F-35 sales. There are conversations about improving business relationships and the defense industrial base. Turkey has built a nuclear reactor but needs LNG and needs cheap energy. And perhaps the United States is a way to go. So again, some of those ideologically driven ideas that this one’s a bad one, and this one’s—you know, should be really put aside to the very important security and business relationships that could be fostered, or are being—or there’s an effort to be fostered between this very important NATO ally, Turkey, and its geographic position—

RYAN: Want to have the last word?

ABRAMS: Yeah. I just want to say, I think that something is really changing in Turkey. It was what you might call a contested autocracy with real politics. And it looks as if it’s turning into a total dictatorship, where the lead candidate for the opposition is jailed for no reason, with no justification except he’s a threat to the power of Erdoğan. So that’s a different Turkey that’s being—that’s coming into being, I think.

NATALI: But I don’t think that that—I mean, whatever is going on in Turkey internally, if we’re looking at what the president or what the United States relationship will be with Turkey, that issue is, I don’t—I don’t—I think that’s not going to be determinative. It’s what types of security relationships. We are not going to be involved in Syria securing the region, but can Turkey do that? Or what part of it can it do? Can Turkey help energy and oil exports out of Iraq, particularly with the Kurds, get through? There’s only one geographic area it can get through. And that’s Turkey. So there’s some of these very important geostrategic, and economic, and energy issues that will tie, in my view, Turkey and the United States even further together over the next couple years.

RYAN: All right. I want to respect everyone’s time. We have to end it here. I want to thank the panelists for their insights and thank the audience for coming today. And please note that the video and transcript will be posted on the CFR website. Thank you. (Applause.)

(END)

This is an uncorrected transcript.