Conflict and Cooperation in the Red Sea 

In Search of a Governance Mechanism

The Horn of Africa (HOA) has been understood within the context of the Red Sea as a place where Middle Eastern conflicts spill over and maritime rivalries are resolved, rather than as an entity with agency. The frameworks proposed for governing the Red Sea, such as the Council of Arab and African States Bordering the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, proposed in 2020, have treated African states as strategic buffers instead of principal stakeholders. This clientelist approach, characterized by financial bailouts by Middle Eastern countries to HOA states in exchange for military and naval real estate, has provided African elites in the HOA with the resources needed to consolidate their regimes.

The war in Iran has further amplified those dynamics and also reemphasized the importance of the Red Sea as a strategic waterway whose disruption threatens global economies—rather than as a governance space with its own political ecology. But the region is no longer merely a geopolitical pawn under Western control. It has become a bastion of autonomous actors with responsibilities and rivalries far beyond its shores.

Within this political ecosystem, some states, such as Egypt, Ethiopia, Israel, and Saudi Arabia, have become regional and even global powers, while the Red Sea zone as a whole sustains an environment for warlordism, migration, and instability. This context has not dampened investment initiatives by Middle Eastern states in agriculture, and port and logistics infrastructure. Instead, their competitive approach exacerbates tensions and often undermines existing collective security mechanisms in the HOA.

As a result, littoral states like Djibouti, Somalia, and, increasingly, Eritrea gain from this chaotic environment by leveraging slices of their sovereignty. Djibouti, for example, has monetized its geography by serving as a crowded hub for many external military bases—mostly from great powers—while refusing to host Russia. Meanwhile, the Sudanese Armed Forces have converted Port Sudan, their remaining and most important hub, into an asset for geopolitical and geoeconomic influence, as well as a tool for securing guardianship from Iran and Russia.  

Given the incredibly complex geopolitical environment of Red Sea states’ conflicts and alliances, a Red Sea compact between the Intergovernmental Authority on Development and the Gulf Cooperation Council that emphasises transparency, mutual recognition, mediation, and sea-access arrangements—rather than episodic dialogue—offers the best chance to restore stability. The recent appointment by the African Union of two former heads of state as special envoys for the HOA and the Red Sea underscores the urgency felt in Africa to treat the Red Sea space as an integrated peace and security environment.

Sources of Instability in the Red Sea: Beyond Maritime Security 

The Red Sea is no longer merely a maritime corridor through which trade, energy, and supply chains pass. It has become a strategic space where national security, economic transformation, communications security, digital sovereignty, and the protection of the marine environment intersect. Accordingly, sources of instability in the Red Sea should not be understood solely as attacks against ships or threats to freedom of navigation. Such occurrences represent only the visible manifestation of a deeper imbalance within the broader maritime security architecture. Instead, analysis should begin with a wider reading of the principal drivers of instability that make this region increasingly fragile and vulnerable to escalation. 

Drivers of Instability in the Red Sea  

First, the issue of unresolved conflict zones in the region drives instability. The ongoing armed conflict in Sudan, the political and security fragility in Yemen, and the prolonged tensions in the Horn of Africa all make the region highly susceptible to escalating crises. In such an environment, armed groups are able to utilize the maritime domain as a tool for political pressure and to increase the costs imposed on adversaries, rather than solely as an arena for direct military operations. 

Second is the gap between the priorities of major powers and the Red Sea littoral states. International powers view the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab primarily through the lens of securing trade and energy flows and protecting supply chains. However, littoral states adjacent to the Red Sea approach the space from a broader perspective linked to coastal security, port stability, development, combating smuggling and organized crime, protecting critical infrastructure, and preventing the spillover of crime and conflict from land into the maritime domain. Therefore, any approach will have limited effectiveness unless it is built upon clearer alignment between the strategic vision of international powers and the security and development needs of the coastal states. 

The third driver of instability in the region is economic, social, and environmental fragility. Rising poverty, increasing living costs, and marine environmental degradation in some littoral states weaken state capacity and create fertile environments for terrorism, smuggling, human and arms trafficking, and illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing. In addition, the rise of what is increasingly referred to as “blue crime,” or transnational organized crime at sea, further erodes maritime security, transforming the sea from a source of development and economic connectivity into a space for illicit activities and security pressure.

The View From the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 

From the perspective of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Red Sea coastal states, stability is not merely a matter of navigational security—it is directly connected to national, economic, and communications security, digital sovereignty, and trade resilience. 

The submarine cables crossing the Red Sea represent critical sovereign underwater infrastructure that is no less significant than oil and trade routes. Consequently, the most effective approach to securing the region must include the protection of those cables and other digital infrastructure alongside the protection of ports, in addition to enhancing maritime domain awareness, building the capacities of littoral states, and protecting the marine environment. Instability in the Red Sea does not stem from a single actor or a single crisis, but rather from the intersection of conflicts along the coasts and inland areas, economic and environmental fragility, weak governance, and competing international strategies. Addressing those challenges requires a regional framework that views the Red Sea as a shared strategic space, rather than merely a transit route for global trade.

Red Sea at Risk: Security, Trade, and the Stakes for Regional Order  

The Red Sea is a vital international maritime corridor connecting Asia, Africa, Europe, and the Middle East. It is central to shipping, energy flows, digital infrastructure, and geopolitical competition—a nexus where global trade, great power rivalry, and regional diplomacy converge. Roughly 15 to 17 percent of global maritime trade passes through the Red Sea, while the Suez Canal carries about 10 to 12 percent of world trade and a quarter of oil tanker traffic. Those waterways are logistical pillars of the global economy; any disruption to them raises transport costs, extends voyage times, and ripples across commodity and energy markets.

The Red Sea’s two major choke points are Bab al-Mandab in the south and the Suez Canal in the north. Disruption of either passage affects global shipping and fuels competition among the United States, China, Iran, Russia, and regional powers for control of critical chokepoints and alternative supporting infrastructure. This area is also a critical digital corridor for numerous submarine cables that pass through Bab al-Mandab and link Africa, Asia, and Europe. That concentration of infrastructure in a single corridor is a major strategic vulnerability at a time in which the physical underpinnings of digital progress matter more than ever.  

The principal risk to traffic through the Red Sea stems from Houthi instability and the erosion of governance across the basin. Since late 2023, Houthi missile and drone attacks have forced many companies to reroute around the Cape of Good Hope in South Africa. Yemen’s fragmentation, Sudan’s civil war, and fragile governance across the Horn of Africa compound the threat.  

A secondary risk is Iran’s expanding regional role. Through Houthi proxies and maritime intelligence, Iran projects influence across the region, turning the Red Sea into an arena of competition over freedom of navigation. 

However, the Red Sea should not be viewed only through a military lens. Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) share an interest in protecting freedom of navigation through its waters and containing Iranian influence there—even limited coordination among them could advance broader security cooperation and benefit the global community. This could look like intelligence sharing, joint search and rescue missions, and the financing of vessels that specialize in marine pollution cleanup or the repair of underwater infrastructure.  

Civilian cooperation is also important. The port of Eilat in Israel could serve as a regional logistics hub, and joint projects in undersea communications, search and rescue, and maritime assistance could deepen regional interdependence and build trust among Middle East actors.

For Israel, the Red Sea is both a strategic vulnerability and an opportunity. Maritime dependence makes freedom of navigation essential, and Eilat provides strategic depth and diplomatic potential. A comprehensive strategy needs to combine military preparedness, maritime diplomacy, infrastructure investment, and regional partnerships. Lasting stability demands an integrated framework linking security, economics, and cooperation.

Regional Powers Entrench Conflict in the Red Sea Region

Regional powers in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) are pursuing their own priorities in the Red Sea, regardless of the positioning of Washington or other capitals. This attitude is reflected in the growing prominence of strategic investments and market access in Africa. But the ways in which these economic movements are pursued rely on local partners in states often mired in conflict, thus exacerbating those conflicts through support of opposing warring parties and complicating broader partnerships.

To better understand the positioning of Red Sea states and the dynamics between the region and outside stakeholders, one should look at the broader context. 

Understanding the Regional Context  

War continues to rage in Sudan and a series of military coups across the Sahel have led to the ousting of civilian-led governments and the exit of French and U.S. forces. This absence has sparked competition for influence and access to strategic supply routes. Morocco has proposed creating the Atlantic Initiative, by which it would build partnerships with military juntas in the Sahel to connect that region to Morocco’s Atlantic coastline, mostly through the development of roads and public infrastructure passing through Mauritania. Meanwhile, Russia’s Africa Corps and Turkey’s armed forces are using their bases in Libya as a jumping off point to export influence across the Sahel to the Central African Republic and Niger.  

In the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea, competition for land access to Africa has long been underway. The United Arab Emirates has been pursuing the establishment of commercial shipping ports under the control of Dubai Ports World in Angola and Djibouti, and has established a military basing agreement in Somaliland. Saudi Arabia, too, has been pursuing basing access in Djibouti. 

A slogan of the Trump administration’s Africa policy has been one of “trade not aid.” U.S. policy toward the Red Sea region and Africa mirrors the policies of Turkey and the UAE, which have sought to align their political and security interests with their economic priorities. Nowhere is this more visible than in Libya, where in 2022 a UAE-brokered change in leadership at the Libyan National Oil Corporation created the opportunity for a Turkish firm to have an outsized role in Libya’s oil sector.  

Instability and the Red Sea 

Those emergent policies, often crafted by powerful regional players, create contradictions for MENA states and their supposed international partners that are hard to de-conflict when it comes to the Red Sea.  

For example, Egypt has become increasingly dependent on financial support from the UAE in recent years. But, in Sudan, Egypt has been supporting the Sudanese Armed Forces, who oppose the UAE-backed Rapid Support Forces. In another case, the UAE has effectively supported the development of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, which Egypt views as a severe threat to its water supply via the Nile.  

Those contradictions are compounded when Western states turn a blind eye to regional powers bolstering conflict due to commercial relationships. For example, the United Kingdom is seeking to advance peace talks in Sudan, yet it has been reluctant to focus on the UAE’s role in the conflict due to economic considerations between the countries and domestic pressure to secure economic growth.

The result of those contradictions: local actors in civil conflicts seeking international support to prosecute their wars and entrench their positions have been able to find willing partners. In other words, these conflicts resemble the current multipolarity of the international environment and present a significant multiplier of conflict dynamics in the Red Sea region.