The Saudi Nuclear Deal Would Set a Dangerous New Proliferation Precedent

Erin Dumbacher most recently served in the Department of Defense in the Office of the Under Secretary for Policy.

The Trump administration announced on July 22 a civil nuclear deal between the United States and Saudi Arabia that would allow for exports of U.S. nuclear technology to the kingdom. The deal, known as a 123 agreement, must be transmitted to Congress for review under U.S. law. Yet its short-term future appears in doubt due to President Donald Trump’s linkage of the deal to Saudi accession to the Abraham Accords, which would normalize the kingdom’s relations with Israel. Still, nonproliferation experts have flagged aspects of the deal that they say will weaken standard controls against converting the technology to military use. The U.S.-Saudi process also comes at a time when the foundations of the global nuclear order have begun to crack.

Why has the U.S.-Saudi deal stirred controversy?

The precedent that this deal establishes matters. It’s positive that the U.S. nuclear industry has an opportunity to export, and it’s in the U.S. national interest for American companies to provide much-needed, clean, constant, and reliable power around the world. But if Congress approves, this deal could deepen the cracks in the foundation of the U.S.-led global nuclear order. It takes a distinct approach from the stringent nonproliferation measures the United States has insisted on in the past when exporting nuclear energy. This deal is also not fully transparent yet, which always breeds suspicion.

In the past, U.S. civil nuclear cooperation agreements allowed for more peaceful use of nuclear technology for energy, medical, and research purposes without the facilities to enrich the nuclear material. Enrichment levels below roughly 5 percent are all that is required for energy generation; if enriched to high levels, weaponization seems likely. U.S. policy has historically been to curtail enrichment and ask countries with peaceful nuclear programs to sign on to an international monitoring and inspections regime.

For example, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) volunteered to adhere to the most stringent safeguards regime when crafting its agreement for a U.S. firm to supply a nuclear power plant in the Emirates in 2009. Today, 25 percent of the electricity in the UAE is now powered by nuclear energy. This deal with Saudi Arabia does not meet this standard and seems to preserve the option for enrichment of fissile material in the future.

It also doesn’t include the most rigorous safeguards—International Atomic Energy Agency inspections under the Additional Protocol—that would reassure the region and the world that the program remains peaceful. The agreement appears to set up bilateral rather than international safeguards, and it’s unclear how those would work or whether they would carry the same reassurance advantages as international inspections.

If the deal goes through, will there be congressional oversight?

The White House’s late linkage of the deal to Saudi normalization with Israel could disrupt its review on Capitol Hill, meaning it might be a poison pill. When the deal comes up for review, there’s a chance the next Congress—elected in the midterms in November—will weigh in. Once transmitted, Congress has ninety working days to consider it. It will take a veto-proof majority to halt.

When considering the deal, Congress needs to balance the country’s business interests and the modern design, safety, and security that U.S. suppliers bring against long-standing U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy. Industry estimates say the United States could gain 12,500 new jobs [PDF] for a 25-year period if the deal goes through. On the other hand, there are 144 states around the world that have signed the Additional Protocol—why should Saudi Arabia not be one of them? (Note: Iran signed the Additional Protocol but suspended implementation in early 2021.) And if Saudi Arabia gets this deal, might the Emiratis seek a similar relaxation? And what about the next country to which the United States seeks to export?

It becomes a slippery slope toward more countries having nuclear material without the measures that have kept the total number of countries with nuclear weapons to only nine. More nuclear material unchecked around the world could lead to accidents, security risks, and more proliferation.

How does Iran factor into this?

Saudi Arabia has made it clear their plans are related to the status of the nuclear issue in Iran. Saudi leaders have said they will pursue a weaponization path if the Iranians do. This deal may amount to the United States supporting a Saudi path-to-proliferation hedging strategy—but the details matter.

The contents of the full agreement, including any secret notes, will need to be reviewed. Critical areas for oversight should be the details of the bilateral inspection framework and the terms of potential enrichment pathways.

It is notable that before finalizing this deal with the United States, Saudi Arabia formalized a defense pact with Pakistan in 2025, which has at least 170 nuclear weapons and has not signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. That agreement leaves open the possibility that Pakistan could defend Saudi Arabia with its nuclear weapons, creating a potential bilateral nuclear umbrella. Saudi leaders are putting hedging strategies in place to counter threats in the region.

The global nuclear order that the United States has led for eighty years is fraying. If Congress approves this deal, it would accelerate a relaxation of the norms that have kept Americans and citizens around the world safe for the decades we have lived with atomic weapons. While the U.S. military attempts to stop Iranian nuclear proliferation, Congress need not approve the option for potential proliferation in Saudi Arabia.