Preparing for the Day After in Europe

Paul B. Stares is the General John W. Vessey senior fellow for conflict prevention and the director of the Wachenheim Center for Peace and Security at the Council on Foreign Relations.

This Ukraine Policy Brief is part of the Council Special Initiative on Securing Ukraine’s Future and the Wachenheim Center for Peace and Security.

Executive Summary

Even as peace in Ukraine remains uncertain, U.S. and European policymakers should begin preparing for the postwar challenges a settlement will likely bring. Most analysts agree that any agreement will not diminish Russia’s threat to the continent—Moscow will continue testing European and transatlantic cohesion through hybrid attacks and possible military incursions, deepening preexisting divisions. To promote greater alliance cohesion and reduce the risk of renewed conflict, NATO, the European Union, and the Group of Seven should launch comprehensive reviews of their long-term strategies toward Russia to bolster deterrence and restore stability to Europe. It is better to plan for most likely postwar challenges now than to hope for the best when the moment arrives.

Introduction

As the war in Ukraine grinds into its fifth year, the prospects for peace remain bleak. To its credit, the Trump administration’s efforts to broker a deal over the past twelve months have yielded considerable progress in some areas, but serious obstacles still need to be overcome in others. Despite the long odds, a sudden breakthrough should not be ruled out entirely. Events that seem implausible today could unfold in ways to bring a ceasefire—if not a comprehensive peace settlement—suddenly within reach. Thinking about what could come next and planning accordingly is therefore prudent and necessary.

When it comes to the proverbial day after in Ukraine, much planning is already underway; the ongoing peace negotiations, after all, largely revolve around what Ukraine can do (alone and with the help of others) to defend itself following a ceasefire, as well as who pays for the massive reconstruction costs and how normal politics return to the country after years of martial law. In contrast, much less thought has been given to what a ceasefire in Ukraine would mean for Europe generally. Though the day after for Europe—much like for Ukraine—depends to a large extent on what happens the day before (in other words, how the war ends), the likely challenges are already coming into focus. Unpacking those challenges should stimulate more debate and, hopefully, preparation. To say the least, much is at stake in how they are managed and, better still, resolved. Better to do this sooner rather than later.

Imagining Post-War Europe

Excluding the possibility that either Russia or Ukraine prevail and achieve their maximal war aims—outcomes that are not viewed as likely in the short-to-medium term—the general expectation is that the fighting will eventually come to a halt through a negotiated armistice that leaves Ukraine divided with some parts under Russian control. Such an ending will not constitute an amicable settlement by any stretch of the imagination and, much like the present situation on the Korean peninsula, both sides will almost certainly view each other as bitter adversaries for the foreseeable future. This enmity could conceivably soften over time, especially if political change comes to Moscow and Russia makes full restitution for what it has done to Ukraine. However, given the history of post–WWII Europe—not to mention more recent conflicts elsewhere—it is unlikely that this will occur before a substantial passage of time.

Similar thinking shapes current expectations about Europe’s future relationship with Russia. NATO and EU officials share the belief that Russia will pose the predominant security threat to Europe for years to come—certainly for as long as Russian President Vladimir Putin remains in power. Having conducted a massive war of aggression and engaged in other hostile actions against European states, Russia simply cannot be viewed as anything other than a serious long-term security risk. Indeed, to some observers, the threat posed by Russia is anticipated to grow more, not less, menacing in the wake of a peace deal in Ukraine. Putin is widely expected to use the respite from the fighting in Ukraine to rebuild Russia’s military strength to not just strike Ukraine again—taking advantage of potential internal unrest and division in the aftermath of a ceasefire—but to test NATO and EU resolve through continued hybrid gray zone attacks and possibly even limited military incursions. The current confrontation with Russia will likely continue to harden in ways that resemble the Cold War.

Europe’s continued cohesion in the aftermath of a peace deal could be severely tested and strained due to growing transatlantic tensions, barely suppressed schisms within Europe, and the risks associated with continued confrontation with Russia.

Potential Transatlantic Friction

Several sources of tension in U.S.-European relations could fester in the aftermath of peace in Ukraine. Some are obvious, such as provisioning further military and economic support for Ukraine to deter Russian recidivism. Aside from critical intelligence and targeting support, the Trump administration has already ceased most of the United States’ direct military assistance to Ukraine. European states provide the bulk of materiel support for Ukraine (albeit in many cases by buying U.S. equipment and supplies). Whether they continue to buy from the United States rather than European firms is likely to become an increasingly contentious issue as Europe seeks to build up its own defense industrial base in order to become less dependent on American suppliers. .

This source of friction, however, could pale in comparison to diverging U.S. and European approaches to sanctions relief and the reestablishment of commercial relations with Russia. Press reports suggest that the Trump administration is already preparing to rapidly normalize economic relations with Russia once the war ends, and has even discussed major investment and trade deals with the Kremlin, all of which will be a source of great consternation to many in Europe. Fears that this will undercut continued European sanctions and ultimately disadvantage them commercially will only increase. And then there are potential future U.S. troop withdrawals from Europe as the United States’ priorities shift to other theaters, notably the Indo-Pacific. How to avoid undermining Europe’s defenses or causing some to seek a nuclear deterrent, given continued uncertainties over Russia, will be another major challenge requiring careful attention.

Emergent Intra-European Disputes

Although European states have demonstrated remarkable solidarity supporting Ukraine’s wartime needs and adjusting to the sudden and very costly unwinding of trade relations with Russia (particularly in the energy sector), intra-European friction has emerged. The various agreements and side deals that have maintained a semblance of unity could start to unravel once the fighting ends in Ukraine. Similar grievances are likely to grow more prominent over the disproportionate burden that northern and especially frontline European states have carried in supporting Ukraine. This situation has undoubtedly strained unanimity within NATO and the European Union. Peace will only magnify those rifts, especially if southern states feel that their security priorities continue to be subordinated to the task of deterring Russia. Some NATO frontline states will likely be concerned that efforts by the “Coalition of the Willing” to reassure Ukraine with enhanced military support in the aftermath of a ceasefire could detract from their collective defense commitments elsewhere.

Risks of Confrontation

The new NATO-Russia line of contact that will stretch from the Barents Sea in the far north to the Black Sea in the southeast is unlikely to resemble the heavily fortified intra-German border of the Cold War years, in which opposing forces were kept in high states of readiness for war. Nevertheless, the risk that the present confrontation with Russia could suddenly erupt into armed conflict—whether deliberately or unintentionally—will remain significant. Russia has already manifested a willingness to engage in provocative gray zone activities along its border with NATO, which can be expected to continue regardless of the outcome in Ukraine. The goal will be to foment further divisions among European states and between Europe and the United States over how best to respond. The possibility that Russia miscalculates NATO’s likely response, or individual NATO forces overreact to exacerbate a crisis, is real. And the frequency of military exercises by both NATO and Russia, as well as the number of close interactions between their forces, will grow in the coming years. That will only heighten the chances of accidents and potential misunderstandings, possibly triggering dangerous, unintended sequences of events.

It is not too early to think about those concerns before peace comes to Ukraine, as it surely will at some point.

Recommendations

With those challenges in mind, the following proposals should be considered:

Conclusion

Although an end to the war in Ukraine currently looks unrealistic, it is essential that the United States and Europe prepare for the aftermath. Many issues are likely to come to the fore should an agreement be reached, and it is better to anticipate them today and lay the groundwork for how best to manage them than hope for the best when the moment arrives.

This work represents the views and opinions solely of the author. The Council on Foreign Relations is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher, and takes no institutional positions on matters of policy.