Syria’s Surge in Violence Does Not Signal a New Civil War—for Now

Steven A. Cook is Eni Enrico Mattei senior fellow for Middle East and Africa studies and director of the International Affairs Fellowship for Tenured International Relations Scholars at the Council on Foreign Relations.

Syria’s worst violence since the December overthrow of the Assad regime has reportedly killed hundreds, including many civilians. What spurred this?

The violence that convulsed Syria recently was not unexpected. Although the family of ousted dictator Bashar al-Assad and others close to them escaped to Russia and the United Arab Emirates, a fair number of Assad loyalists, many of them well armed, remain in Syria. They are concentrated in the west, along the coast, and in the mountainous areas just inland from the port city of Latakia. Many of them are Alawites, the heterodox and minority sect, from which the Assads hail. Apparently, these loyalists staged an uprising against the new regime under Ahmed al-Sharaa and his Ha’yat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), an offshoot of al-Qaeda.

Some Syrian reports suggest that Iran, which lost its strategic position in Syria when Assad fled in early December, played a role in fomenting the violence. Whether or not that is accurate, al-Sharaa mobilized his security forces to put down the Assadists. At the same time, armed groups from other parts of Syria, including affiliates of the HTS and Syrian National Army, mobilized along with them. Apparently, both the security forces that were deployed to put down Assad’s loyalists and those who self-mobilized used a significant amount of violence, some of it indiscriminate, which reportedly killed hundreds of civilians.

There have been conflicting reports of ongoing massacres of Alawites and Christians, but these are extremely difficult to verify given a deluge of misinformation and disinformation around the series of attacks.

Does this threaten to engulf the country in a wider civil war?

So far, no. The Assad loyalists are very unpopular after the Assad regime's decades of abuses committed against many Syrians, including torture and the use of chemical weapons. At the same time, al-Sharaa and his ministers need to be careful that they do not overplay their hands. The uprising in the west had nothing to do with anything other than loyalists seeking vengeance after the toppling of the Assad regime. But, if al-Sharaa and HTS do not move quickly to improve the economy, which contracted 84 percent during the war; if they seek to impose Islamic law—not an unreasonable concern given HTS’s lineage as a an al-Qaeda offshoot—or aspects of it; and if they do not respect the rights and traditions of minorities, they could spur opponents to undermine the new order.

The good news is that al-Sharaa seems to understand this. He has sought sanctions relief and financial support from Syria’s neighbors to bolster an economy that was never a standout in the region to begin with and now reflects the devastation of almost fifteen years of war. He has said all the right things about respecting the rights of minorities and has not (yet) sought to impose HTS’s Islamist worldview on others. It remains unclear whether al-Sharaa’s call for a “Syria for all Syrians” is a tactical move to assuage the concerns of the West and some of Syria’s neighbors or whether it is the actual evolution of the new Syrian leader’s thinking. As unsatisfying as it is, there is no way of knowing for sure.

Is there a possibility of Syria’s sectarian violence drawing in outside actors?

As noted, there are reports of Iranian meddling in Syria, but there has been no credible reporting to confirm these allegations. The Russians would certainly like to see al-Sharaa fail. That would be a blow to Turkey, which has positioned itself as the powerbroker in Syria after the fall of Assad, who was a Russian as well as Iranian client. The Israelis have established a buffer zone in the south and are vowing to protect the Druze, a religious minority who live mostly in that area.  

The major Arab states—Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates—do not like the accumulation of Islamist power in Syria and are wary of Turkey’s patronage of al-Sharaa, but they do not seem interested in another proxy conflict in the region. While that could change, of course, the Arab states seem more focused either on internal development and/or the crisis in the Gaza Strip than on Syria.

Is there a role for the United States or outside powers in stabilizing Syria?

Even before he was inaugurated, U.S. President Donald Trump declared that Syria was not an American fight. So, while U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio made a strong statement about the killing of civilians—essentially laying blame on al-Sharaa—there is no indication that the Trump administration wants to play a role in Syria. 

That said, the authorities in Damascus this week did sign an agreement with the U.S.-backed, Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces aimed at integrating the group into Syria’s military and security forces. These negotiations, which occurred under American auspices, was a big step toward piecing Syria back together. Now, the parties need to fulfill their commitments to each other.

Turkey clearly wants to play a major role in Syria for geopolitical and economic reasons. A government in Damascus that is aligned with Ankara—whether it was Assad prior to the Syrian uprising or al-Sharaa and the HTS—has been an important goal for Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. A friendly Syria helps to mitigate the threat Turkey perceives from Kurdish nationalism. It also opens a bridge for trade between Turkey and the Gulf states, expands its geopolitical influence in the Levant, and advances Ankara’s effort to establish itself as a major power in the Middle East and Muslim world.

This work represents the views and opinions solely of the author. The Council on Foreign Relations is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher, and takes no institutional positions on matters of policy.