Before the Midterms: What Americans Think About Trade and Tariffs

As Americans head to the polls in November, affordability concerns weigh heavily on their minds and will likely inform their ballot choices. The Trump administration’s high tariffs, trade war with Canada, and increased barriers to commerce in the name of national security all affect issues Americans care about and by extension will play a role in the outcome of the midterms.  The pending question is whether frustrations with President Donald Trump’s trade policy and tariffs will result in widespread losses for Republicans in the midterms and what this means for the future of trade policy.

The Council on Foreign Relations’ Greenberg Center for Geoeconomics initially conducted a nationwide survey at the beginning of 2026 to better understand Americans’ views on trade and tariffs. Results from January showed that Americans generally see trade as benefiting all, but political partisanship often shapes their views. The second wave of polling, conducted in August, similarly showed that party identification influences views on trade, but not always. Six themes capture the broad findings from the August data.

The second wave of the CFR-Morning Consult survey was conducted online between August 18 and 19, 2026, involving a sample of 2,200 nationally representative adults. The data was weighted to approximate a target sample of adults based on gender, age, race, educational attainment, gender by age, and race by educational attainment. Results from the full survey have a margin of error of plus or minus 2 percentage points.

A Pew Research poll conducted in July 2026 found that Americans are largely focused on economic issues ahead of the midterms, including the cost of living, taxes, the general economy, jobs, the deficit, and Social Security. One-in-three Americans want candidates to talk more about these topics—more than health care, immigration, and other issues.

But Americans are divided on the trajectory of the U.S. economy. When asked to assess its strength a year from now, there was an almost even split between adults who said it would be stronger and those who believed it would be weaker.

Party affiliation plays a significant role. Although 65 percent of Republicans think the economy will be stronger within a year, a similar percentage of Democrats (63 percent) say the opposite. Those results are consistent with studies that find partisanship can influence views on “societal-level questions,” such as the economy as a whole, more than questions about personal finances.

Closer to home, the cost of living continues to cause Americans anxiety. In January, most respondents said they were concerned about affordability and saw tariffs as driving price hikes. This time was no different.

According to the August survey, 75 percent of adults are concerned about being able to afford groceries and food products; 46 percent are very concerned. More than half of Americans are also worried about affording pharmaceuticals and medical supplies (68 percent), clothing and footwear (64 percent), and technology and electronics (61 percent).

Americans across party lines share affordability concerns on a range of goods, although Democrats are more likely to be very concerned. For example, 56 percent of Democrats are very concerned about being able to afford groceries, whereas only 37 percent of Republicans express that level of worry. For pharmaceuticals and medical supplies, nearly half of Democrats are very concerned compared to one-in-three Republicans.

Multiple factors are pushing prices higher for Americans, including the Iran war. Trade barriers and tariffs have certainly contributed. Yale Budget Lab estimates that the average U.S. tariff rate now sits at around 11 percent (as of August 24, 2026) and is costing American households around $1,100 annually. Americans have noticed the rising prices and are making the connection to tariffs.

Over 70 percent of those concerned about affordability believe tariffs increase the price they pay for a variety of goods and services. That includes services such as childcare and babysitting fees, entertainment and subscriptions, and education and tuition. These findings suggest that Americans see tariffs as by-and-large increasing prices, regardless of whether goods are physically traded.

Party affiliation also seems to color Americans’ views on the intensity of the connection between tariffs and rising prices. Although respondents from both parties tie tariffs to higher prices, Democrats who are concerned about affording groceries, clothing, technology, and pharmaceuticals are more likely than Republicans to say tariffs raise prices a lot.

President Trump has made tariffs a centerpiece of his trade policy. Not only have rates increased to recent highs, but the Trump administration has kept tariffs in the news with the highly publicized Liberation Day tariff rollout on April 2, 2025, the Supreme Court challenge on International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) tariffs, and a steady stream of tariff announcements under Sections 122, 232, 301, and 338.

In his State of the Union address in February 2026, Trump reiterated that tariffs are paid by foreign countries, portraying them as a means to replace the U.S. income tax. But a growing number of reports and studies, succinctly summed up by Kimberly Clausing and Maurice Obstfeld at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, found that as of mid-2026, the evidence clearly showed that Trump’s tariffs are a burden on U.S. consumers and contribute to affordability issues—a top voter concern.

The CFR-Morning Consult survey asked Americans to define tariffs and describe their effect. A plurality of Americans says tariffs raise prices, mirroring results from January. But views vary by party. More Democrats believe tariffs raise prices than do Republicans or Independents. Republicans are more inclined to see tariffs as protecting U.S. manufacturing jobs.

Age also shapes how respondents view the effects of tariffs. Around half of Americans sixty-five and older think tariffs raise prices, but only one-third of those between the ages of eighteen and thirty-four agree.

Respondents are split on whether a tariff is a tax paid by Americans or a fee paid by foreigners. Forty-one percent of adults understand tariffs to be a tax (compared to 45 percent in January) but 40 percent think they are a fee (compared to 38 percent in January). Nineteen percent do not know.

As in January, party affiliation influences those views. Around half of Democrats see tariffs as a tax that Americans pay. Conversely, around half of Republicans view tariffs as a fee foreigners pay. The distribution across 2024 voters is similar to partisan splits, with 56 percent of those who voted for Kamala Harris viewing tariffs as a tax, and 53 percent of Trump voters describing it as a fee. Undoubtedly, President Trump’s characterization of tariffs as a fee has been absorbed by some of his supporters.

Neither friend nor foe has been spared from President Trump’s tariffs. Trump’s Liberation Day tariffs—later struck down by the Supreme Court—strong-armed many traditional U.S. allies, including Japan, South Korea, and the European Union, to the negotiating table to accept deals with less-than-favorable terms.

Meanwhile, after trade negotiations deteriorated between the United States and Canada, the administration increased tariffs to 50 percent on $20 billion of Canadian exports to the United States. Canada shot back with a volley of tariffs ranging from 15 to 50 percent on around seven hundred U.S. goods with comparable value. 

The survey asked respondents to describe how they view certain countries—either as friends, allies, rivals, or enemies. Most respondents consider Canada, France, Germany, Japan, and Mexico as either friends or allies, but see China and Russia as rivals or enemies. Those findings are consistent with results from January and hold across party and 2024 voting lines.

However, older and younger Americans diverge in their views. Around half of Americans sixty-five and older say Germany and Japan are friends of the United States. Among Americans between the ages of eighteen and thirty-four, a quarter see Germany as a friend of the United States and about one-third say Japan is a friend. A much higher percentage of older Americans view China and Russia as enemies or rivals (77 percent and 81 percent, respectively). But less than half of younger Americans agree.

When President Trump announced tariffs in April 2025, one of his stated goals was to “adjust for the unfairness of ongoing international trade practices.” After levying 50 percent tariffs on Canada, Trump said Canada had been “ripping us off for decades,” and Vice President JD Vance explained that the administration’s stance on Canada was about “fairness.” The administration has made similar remarks about Japan, the European Union, and others. Although the word “fair” is used almost as much as tariffs, the debate about what this term means in practice continues.

The survey asked Americans to share what they think fair trade means. Two-in-five respondents say it means that all countries are bound by the same rules. A smaller portion (less than 20 percent) believes the rules vary depending on a country’s wealth or whether it is friend or a rival. Others say the United States is exempt from the rules.

There is variation in public views by age. Around half of adults aged sixty-five and over say fair trade means all countries are bound by the same rules, but only one-third of respondents between the ages of eighteen and thirty-four agree. One-fourth of Americans between the ages of eighteen and thirty-four say fair trade means the United States is exempt from the rules, and a similar percentage say the rules vary depending on a country’s wealth. Less than 5 percent of older Americans think fair trade means the United States is exempt while others are bound by the same rules.

The survey also asked Americans to identify which trading partners they think are fair or unfair. Around half of Americans think Canada, Japan, Mexico, and the EU are either very fair or somewhat fair. Fewer respondents think China is fair.

Similar percentages of Democrats and Republicans share views on fair trading partners. For instance, 61 percent of Democrats and 59 percent of Republicans view Canada as a fair trading partner. With regard to China, 40 percent of Democrats see the country as fair, and 35 percent of Republicans concur.

Even though almost half of Americans from both parties see Canada, Japan, Mexico, and the EU as fair trading partners, they are divided on what the next president should do with Trump’s tariffs on those countries.

Similar percentages of Americans think all tariffs should be removed across the list of countries or at least should be limited to national security issues. China is the exception with less support to remove all tariffs. Almost one-quarter of Americans do not know what should be done.

Party affiliation influences those views. Democrats are more likely than Independents and Republicans to support removing all tariffs. The gap narrows slightly for China, as fewer Democrats believe all tariffs on China should be removed.

Republicans are more likely to support keeping all of President Trump’s tariffs or using them as leverage. Around one-in-three Republicans believe that all tariffs should remain on Canada, China, Mexico, and the EU, and one-quarter say the same for duties on Japan.

Policymakers from both parties often cite national security for raising trade barriers in part due to concerns that trade counterparts could restrict access to critical goods. CFR Senior Fellow Benn Steil found that the use of Section 232—a part of the law that gives the president the authority to restrict imports or impose tariffs if a good threatens national security—has exploded in the last few years, and with it has come a proliferation of questions about what constitutes a national security risk in economics and trade.

When asked to identify what defines a good as being critical to national security, a plurality of respondents said the good has a military use or application or helps the United States compete economically in emerging and high-tech industries. Only three-in-ten Americans believe a good is defined as critical to national security if it supports U.S. manufacturing, notable because both the Biden and Trump administrations have argued that manufacturing is critical to national security.

Respondents were asked to identify goods they believe should be produced in the United States for national security reasons. Most Americans say energy and medicine must be made in the United States, but there is less support for steel and semiconductors. The results mirror those from January.

Fifty percent or more of Republicans think all of these listed goods should be made in the United States, with around 70 percent identifying medicine and energy specifically. Although a majority of Democrats (58 percent for each) believe those two goods should be made in the United States, fewer than 40 percent say semiconductors (39 percent), steel (38 percent), and computers (37 percent) should also be made domestically.

The CFR-Morning Consult survey also asked Americans to rate their comfort level with importing a good essential to national security from certain countries. A majority of Americans are okay with importing such goods from traditional U.S. allies, with noticeable support for such imports from Canada. Americans are divided on whether to import those goods from China: one-fifth of respondents saying that they would not be okay with importing those goods, and a similar percentage saying they would be.

Comparable percentages of Democrats and Republicans are okay with importing national security goods from Canada, France, Germany, and Japan, but there is less support among Independents (roughly 10 percentage points lower).

Views on importing critical goods from China and Mexico differ by party. Sixty-three percent of Democrats are okay with importing those goods from Mexico, but only around half of Republicans and Independents agree. Republicans’ views may in part reflect the president’s characterization of Mexico as an unstable, cartel-run country. Although about half of Democrats are okay with getting critical goods from China, around one-third of Republicans and Independents share this view.

When academics and policymakers talk about unfair trade and national security concerns, China is almost always mentioned. Unfair trade allegations against China usually highlight Chinese policies that subsidize or otherwise artificially support exports, which then flood markets with cheap goods that undercut competitors. National security concerns focus on China’s ability and willingness to weaponize dependencies—as it did with rare earths in 2025. Even with those concerns, U.S. businesses and consumers rely on cheap goods from China. Addressing national security concerns and unfair trade with China will inevitably affect Americans’ top midterm issue: affordability. 

A plurality of adults, 43 percent, says the current tariff rate on Chinese imports to the United States—23.2 percent as of June 2026—is too high, although around one-third think it is about right. When Americans were asked in January, the effective average rate on China was much higher (47.5 percent), and almost 50 percent of Americans thought tariffs on China were too high. 

But as with the first wave, opinions vary by party affiliation. One-in-six Democrats say tariffs are too high compared to one-in-four Independents and one-in-three Republicans. Forty-five percent of Republicans say tariffs on China are about right, but only 17 percent of Democrats agree.

When asked who would be helped or hurt by increased tariffs on China, many Americans say consumers, the economy as a whole, small businesses, farmers, household finances, the middle class, and manufacturing workers are hurt. They are more divided on the effect on big corporations, the government, and politicians.

There is nuanced partisan variation in views about the effects of increasing tariffs on China.  A high percentage of Democrats say such increases would hurt consumers (69 percent), the economy (69 percent), the middle class (68 percent), and household finances (68 percent). Fifty-two percent say those increases would hurt consumers a lot, and 51 percent say the same for the economy.

A smaller percentage of Republicans, on the other hand, see increased tariffs on China as hurting consumers (52 percent), the middle class (50 percent), their household finances (49 percent), small businesses (47 percent), and the economy as a whole (47 percent). Less than one-quarter of Republicans think increasing tariffs would hurt those groups a lot. Republicans are generally more likely than Democrats or Independents to believe that increased tariffs would help the government and manufacturing workers.

Overall, the Trump administration has described its trade policies as making the United States more secure and prosperous by protecting economic and national security and benefiting American workers. When asked to identify which of Trump’s trade policies have made the United States more secure, 35 percent of adults said none of the listed policies—from raising tariffs on China to lowering the trade deficit—have made the United States more secure. 

Answers vary across party affiliation. Almost half of Democrats and Independents do not see any of those policies as making the United States more secure, but only 14 percent of Republicans concur. One-third of Republicans say that requiring investment commitments from U.S. partners and allies makes the United States more secure. Republicans are less enthusiastic about other policies, such as giving China access to various computer chips, negotiating trade deals without Congress, and the United States taking equity stakes in private U.S. companies.

Similar breakdowns exist across responses based on how respondents voted in the 2024 presidential election. Half of Harris voters do not think any of the listed policies make the United States more secure, compared to around one-tenth of Trump voters who shared the same view.

Manufacturing jobs are often a focus for both parties, and the Trump administration is no exception. President Trump describes his trade policies as a way to boost U.S. manufacturing jobs that have been stolen by foreigners. Administration officials have referenced the China shock—a term from a widely cited 2016 study that found concentrated job losses in certain areas of the country due to trade with China—as evidence of how trade has “hollowed out” industries and cost the United States millions of manufacturing jobs.

But many academics, economists, and policymakers continue to challenge this narrative. Former Chairman of the White House Council of Economic Advisers Jason Furman says rising productivity and stable demand for physical goods are the main contributors to lost manufacturing jobs, with the China shock playing a much smaller role.

Americans see the top contributors to historical losses of manufacturing jobs as offshoring from the United States and corporate greed. Fewer adults blame imports from China for historical losses.

Those findings are consistent across parties with a few exceptions. A higher percentage of Independents say none of these things were a factor. More Democrats (25 percent) attribute historical manufacturing losses to corporate greed than do Republicans (12 percent). Twice as many Republicans as Democrats—13 percent versus 6 percent—fault imports from China.

The CFR-Morning Consult survey also asked respondents their views of what might be the largest contributing factor to future manufacturing job losses. Concern about automation or artificial intelligence (AI) doubled, topping the list, while corporate greed remained in second place.

Views on automation and outsourcing are similar across party affiliation, although a slightly higher percentage of Democrats (22 percent) view corporate greed as the largest potential contributor compared to Republicans (14 percent). The split between Democrats and Republicans on imports from China is similar to views on historical losses. 

Although much of the attention on U.S. trade policy has focused on President Trump’s actions, Congress still holds constitutional authority over trade policy. As with the first wave, the survey asked Americans to share their views on the president’s authority to impose tariffs. 

A plurality of Americans continues to believe that the president should not be allowed, for any reason, to impose tariffs without approval of Congress.

As found in the January survey, half of Americans sixty-five and older say the president should not have the ability to raise tariffs without approval from Congress; only around one-third of younger Americans agree. Another one-third of younger Americans say the president should have full authority to impose tariffs without approval from Congress. Seventeen percent of older Americans agree. The willingness of younger Americans to give more authority to the president tracks with findings from the Harvard Political Review, which speculates that may be the result of younger Americans growing up in a political period characterized by a more powerful executive branch.

Party differences also mirror January’s results. Democrats and Independents are more likely than Republicans to say the president should not be allowed to impose any tariffs without approval from Congress. Republicans are more supportive of the president imposing tariffs without Congress for any reason or at least for a limited period. Since January, the number of Republicans who say the president should be allowed to impose tariffs subject to a time limit has increased by 5 percentage points.

Similar to the first wave, responses differ based on respondents’ 2024 vote and age. Sixty-seven percent of those who voted for Harris in 2024 say the president should not impose tariffs without congressional approval. Trump voters are more supportive of the president imposing tariffs without any approval from Congress, at least for a limited period, at 35 percent and 32 percent, respectively.

To tease out party bias related to presidential authority, the survey asked respondents if they believed a president should have the ability to raise tariffs on a range of goods, including automobiles, consumer goods, lumber, pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, solar panels, and steel and aluminum. Respondents were asked the question with a randomized description of the president (Republican, Democrat, or one without affiliation).

Republicans were most supportive of a president (without a mentioned party affiliation) and a Republican president increasing tariffs. For Democrats, there was less support for raising tariffs on goods if the president was Republican or if no party affiliation was mentioned, with around one-quarter to one-third of Democrats supportive of increasing tariffs on the range of goods in those situations. However, when asked about action by a Democratic president, Democratic support rose by around 10 percentage points for most goods. In that scenario, Republican support for the hypothetical Democratic president’s ability to raise tariffs decreased for most goods by around 10 percentage points.

The CFR-Morning Consult survey asked Americans where they get their information and news about trade, recognizing that sources can often shape perceptions and views.

Almost half of Americans use social media or broadcast/TV news as media for trade news and information; around a quarter receive such information from national or local newspapers and websites or family, friends, or colleagues. That is consistent across party and region, but differences emerge with age and education. 

Most Americans between the ages of eighteen and thirty-four obtain their news about trade from social media. Conversely, a majority of Americans aged sixty-five and older get their information on this topic from broadcast/TV news. Those findings track with studies that show a shift in how younger Americans are getting their news—mainly through social media.

A similar percentage of respondents across education levels receive information and news on trade from social media, broadcast/TV news, and local newspapers. However, a considerably higher number of postgraduate degree holders use national newspapers (46 percent) compared to those with less than a college degree (16 percent).

Whatever happens in November, public views of U.S. commercial engagement with the world will play a role in the outcome. Americans’ frustrations over the costs tariffs are imposing on businesses and consumers will likely mean some electoral losses for those they deem responsible. Nonetheless, Americans are split on fundamental issues, including who pays tariffs and what the next president should do with Trump’s tariffs. Those and other questions will not be resolved in the midterms and will continue to play out in the years to come.

The author would like to thank Morning Consult for their support in designing and fielding this survey, and Bruce Stokes for his invaluable feedback and input. All errors remain my own.