Lessons From Anniversaries: October 7, Three Years On

As we approach the third anniversary of the October 7, 2023, terrorist attacks in Israel, I find myself reflecting on the other profound and somber anniversary that the United States just marked: twenty-five years since the events of 9/11. Last month, I wrote that that anniversary presented an opportunity to “consider what became of us and the world—and the role of the U.S. in the world—in the two-and-a-half decades that followed.” The same is also true of next week’s anniversary.

The Israeli government, righteous in its fury and heartbroken by the depravity of the attacks, launched a war—or rather, a series of wars—that has reshaped the Middle East over the last three years. Whether the remade region will ultimately be more secure and conducive to Israel’s interests remains an open question.

The last three years of war and conflict in the Middle East have transformed a region that was covertly unstable into one that is now nakedly so. Proxy conflicts became direct conflicts; espionage and tradecraft have been exchanged for escalated air strikes and ground invasions. Having tolerated years, and in some cases decades, of low-intensity conflict punctuated by occasional outbursts of more destructive violence—think Lebanon in 2006 or Gaza in 2014—Israel decided that October 7 created a permission structure to address its regional adversaries more comprehensively and permanently.

In Gaza, the years-long staccato of episodic rocketfire from Hamas and bursts of retaliation finally snapped on October 7, 2023. Israel, seeking the return of the hostages, justice, and the complete destruction of Hamas, at least as a military entity, set off a grinding and intractable conflict in response.

After years of uncomfortable insecurity for citizens living in its north, Israel seized on Hezbollah’s decision to escalate its attacks in solidarity with Hamas as an opportunity to go into Lebanon, degrade Hezbollah’s capabilities, and finally break its stranglehold on the country. In doing so, Israel gave Lebanon a chance to restore a sense of sovereignty and self-rule.

And, of course, there was the Twelve Day War itself: the effort by Israel and the United States to destroy Iran’s nuclear capabilities, followed by the more recent U.S. “excursion” into the region—supported, if not encouraged, by the Israeli government.

So how does the ledger look?

Prior to October 7, Gaza was ruled by Hamas, which maintained an extensive terrorist infrastructure and regularly shot rockets into Israel. Lebanon was controlled largely by Hezbollah, which had 120,000 precision rockets capable of targeting critical infrastructure across Israel and regularly lobbed rockets into its northern towns. Syria was the home of Russian bases and deployments of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, a critical component of Iran’s supply chain to Hezbollah. And Iran had domestic nuclear infrastructure and proxies in Gaza, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen. Almost all of that has changed.

On one hand, Israel’s enemies—namely Iran and its proxies—have seen their military capabilities seriously degraded. Hamas and Hezbollah are a shadow of their former selves. Iran’s nuclear program lies under rubble and its navy lies, as U.S. President Donald Trump is fond of saying, at the bottom of the ocean. Meanwhile, Syria has a new government working closely with the United States and striving to achieve some sort of modus vivendi with Israel. Israel has maintained relations with all of the Abraham Accord countries and has improved its day-to-day relations with certain others in the region.

On the other hand, the loss of innocent human life in Gaza, the further erosion of the prospects for any long-term peace plan, and the undermining of Israel’s place on the world stage—including, increasingly, within the U.S. political system—have all played into the hands of Israel’s adversaries and those who would seek to isolate Israel.

Moreover, Iran has demonstrated the cruel reality of asymmetric war. Israel and the United States might well have succeeded in achieving their military objectives to degrade Iran’s capabilities to project power across the region, but Iran (and its proxies) have demonstrated that they don’t need many capabilities to wreak havoc and, therefore, gain leverage over the global economy.

If Israel could have learned anything from previous U.S. wars in the Middle East, which unfolded over two decades on their doorstep, it ought to have seen that the way a great power can be frustrated in its objectives is not by actually losing the war. It is by spending down international goodwill and geopolitical and strategic advantages in the region and around the world. Wars like this don’t tend to end at Versailles. They end with exhaustion and hopelessness. But neither the people of Israel nor the Palestinian territories can afford that outcome.

In recalling the events in the Middle East since October 7, and having so recently reflected on the United States’ own wars in the region, I cannot help but feel that this all sounds eerily familiar. A powerful country was brutally and barbarically attacked by terrorists who targeted and killed over one thousand civilians. Seeking justice for those attacks and safety for its people, the country went to war against the terrorist organization and the network that supported it. But soon after, a mix of hazy intelligence, the fog of war, and mission creep drew the country into a quagmire of conflict, with broad implications for its security, politics, and place in the world.

Just this week, the last U.S. troops left Iraq.

Israel has the opportunity to learn from U.S. experiences in the Middle East—and it doesn’t have to wait twenty-five years to do so. Anniversaries are opportunities to look forward, not just backward.

In that spirit, Israel and the United States have certainly reached a point where they need to begin a serious conversation about what Gaza’s long-term future looks like, what nation-building can achieve, and the pitfalls it must avoid. Two difficult experiences of reforming nations previously run by dictators and warlords ought to make the United States a valuable partner to the Israelis as they take on the task of rebuilding Gaza.

The Board of Peace, proposed by President Trump and endorsed by the UN Security Council, may be imperfect in many respects, but in the absence of credible alternatives, it could potentially present a rare opportunity to advance this work. Last week, it proposed $2.4 billion in projects, including efforts to winterize structures in Gaza to reduce human suffering. The proof of concept will be in its implementation, but we should all hope for its success. Neither Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank, nor Israelis in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, can endure (another) twenty-five years of this. By learning from friends before conflicts became quagmires, Israel has a chance to avoid the same outcome.

Let me know what you think about how the Middle East has changed and what this column should cover next by replying to [email protected].