Trump Is a Lame Duck. But He’s Still in Charge of U.S. Statecraft.
Democrats won big, but Congress has little power to check a president who has sidestepped it at nearly every turn. A wounded Trump could make America First statecraft sharper, not softer.
Charles Kupchan is a professor of international affairs at Georgetown University. He previously served as special assistant to the president and senior director for European affairs on the staff of the National Security Council during the Obama administration. He is the author of the recent book Bringing Order to Anarchy: Governing the World to Come.
Despite the Democratic landslide in the midterm election, the Trump era is far from over—especially when it comes to foreign policy. President Donald Trump has generally ignored Congress’s sporadic efforts to check his role as diplomat and commander in chief, and he has proved quite adept at routing around the constraints that both the legislative and judicial branches have sought to impose on his presidency. Not only is America First statecraft likely to continue during the rest of Trump’s tenure, but it may come with even sharper edges. Democratic control of Congress is likely to have limited effect on U.S. foreign policy.
To be sure, the midterms brought plenty of good news for the many Americans and others around the world displeased with Trump’s presidency. The United States just carried out free and fair elections, providing reassurance at home and abroad about the health of U.S. democracy. The electorate held accountable and punished a president many Americans believed was failing to deliver—representative government worked as it is supposed to. Republicans outspent Democrats by a wide margin, but a flawed campaign finance system that funded countless campaign ads proved no match for popular will. In short, U.S. democracy is alive and well, which is no small accomplishment considering that representative government in many countries across the world is decaying in the hands of illiberal populists.
Yet even with a sizable Democratic majority in both chambers, Congress has little leverage over Trump’s foreign policy. The Constitution does grant the legislative branch exclusive power to declare war, but since World War II, and especially after 9/11, Congress has gradually ceded control over armed conflict to the “imperial presidency.” Congress continues to wield the power of the purse, however, and the Democrats will no doubt flex their right to exercise legislative oversight, holding hearings and launching investigations. The Senate can also hold up the confirmation of Trump’s nominees for high-level posts.
But Trump has shown how little these tools constrain him. He sidestepped a war powers resolution on Iran passed by both chambers. He has bobbed and weaved on the statutory authorities used to impose tariffs. He has found ways to work around legal constraints on his mass deportation program. Congressional hearings with cabinet members have regularly descended into shouting matches and provided little in the way of meaningful oversight. The White House has already sent a threatening letter to the incoming chairman of the House Oversight Committee, Robert Garcia, warning that aggressive investigations “may cross the line into blatant criminality.”
The Democrats will certainly try to use their legislative majority to force Trump’s hand, but he made clear even before the midterms that he would become “Mr. Veto” were he to lose control of Congress. The Democratic majority may be large, but it is not big enough to override a presidential veto without significant Republican help. Similarly, Democrats do not have the supermajority they need to overcome the filibuster in the Senate. Given that the midterms have sullied Trump’s brand, peeling off enough Republican senators to advance legislation may be doable, but the Democrats certainly cannot count on that option.
The recent fate of the Lindsey Graham sanctions act may offer a harbinger of what’s in store. The legislation, which enjoyed broad bipartisan support, instructed the president to impose new sanctions on Russia as well as high tariffs on countries that purchase Russian energy products. Trump not only waived the bill’s provisions, but he also struck a deal with Moscow to get more Russian diesel into global markets and talked up the potential for new business deals with Russia. After Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy criticized these moves, Trump asserted that “it’s time for Ukraine to get a new president.” So much for Congress’s ability to compel Trump to get behind Ukraine’s struggle for survival.
Where Trump will take his America First brand of foreign policy remains unclear. The outcome of the midterms clearly revealed broad popular discontent with his policies, and Trump might therefore orchestrate a course correction to win back public support. But in the wake of the midterm rebuke, a vulnerable and wounded Trump could be a dangerous Trump. He may well double down on, not moderate, the unilateralist, neo-imperial, protectionist, and anti-immigrant impulses that have shaped his policies, an outcome more likely after the appointment of Stephen Miller as his new chief of staff. Miller is an ideological hard-liner and a proponent of untrammeled executive authority.
Trump’s next steps in the war with Iran should offer at least some initial insight into his post-midterm trajectory. On one hand, Trump’s errant war of choice and its effect on energy prices were the principal cause of the midterm rout of the Republicans. Indeed, Vice President JD Vance admitted as much: “The reason we lost is the war.” Accordingly, Trump has every reason to seek a diplomatic off-ramp instead of again starting up a full-scale military campaign.
On the other hand, Trump is not known for acknowledging mistakes and changing course as needed. Instead of negotiating an endgame with Tehran, he may decide that he wants to prove his critics wrong by trying again to topple the Islamic Republic or at least bombing it into submission. That effort would entail a major military campaign, risking Iranian retaliation throughout the region and further disruption to the flow of oil—precisely why Trump may decide against going down that dangerous road.
Even if Trump chooses the path of de-escalation with Iran, he is likely to keep looking for a major foreign policy win to burnish his legacy. Given Trump’s ill-fated intervention in the Persian Gulf and his desire to offload security burdens in Europe and East Asia, he may focus on matters closer to home. With his effort to annex Greenland seemingly off the table, Cuba may be the next target in Trump’s sights. Especially because the Islamic Republic is likely to be still standing when he leaves office, Trump could well seek to ensure that Cuba’s regime is not.
The Democrats should by no means give up on using their legislative majority to hem Trump in, but they should do so with appropriate sobriety; Trump is notoriously difficult to constrain. So too should the Democrats choose their fights carefully in exercising their oversight authority. Investigating corruption and deals enriching the Trump family and their associates, questionably legal boat strikes in the Caribbean and Pacific, and the excesses of anti-immigrant and mass deportation policies are good places to start.
But the Democrats should be careful not to overreach and appear to be out solely for political vengeance. Instead, they should focus on trying to pass legislation aimed at improving the lives of working Americans. Most of the public wants economic progress at home, not more legislative gridlock and political bickering. Focusing on bread-and-butter issues would put Democrats in a good position to win the 2028 presidential election. Only then will they have a real chance to right the ship of state left behind by Trump’s errant presidency.
This work represents the views solely of the author(s). The Council on Foreign Relations is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher, and takes no institutional positions on matters of policy.