Implications of the Russia-Ukraine War

Addressing the Hertog Forum in Tel Aviv on February 24, I summarized my view of the implications of the Russia-Ukraine war on a panel with Natan Sharansky (who addressed Israel's own role). Here is an edited version of my remarks:

This war has told us some important things about international politics, which I’ll cover first, and then turn to U.S. policy.

In Europe, the war has certainly concentrated people’s minds about defense—and as soon as that happened, NATO and the United States once again emerged as the providers of security for Europe. It’s not that the EU has been irrelevant; it has been useful in coordinating European reactions and providing funds to Ukraine. But as has happened repeatedly since 1945, we have seen that Western Europe cannot defend itself and turns to NATO and the Americans. France’s efforts to develop an independent European military capability have clearly failed and they have no prospect of success. It seemed briefly a few months ago that Germany would truly change its policy on defense, but the change has been at best partial and is very slow, as we saw when it refused to provide Leopard tanks or even to allow other nations to supply them until it could hide behind the American announcement about Abrams tanks. And even now no one can say when the German tanks will actually be given to Ukraine.

The Baltic nations and the East Europeans have turned to NATO and the United States because there is no alternative—and there isn’t going to be one. So this is the first point I would make: there is still something called “The West” and it is still led and defended by the United States and its military power. This is as true today as it was when Israel was created in 1948.

I think we can also say that while fear of Russia has risen because of Putin’s aggression, respect for Russia has declined.

No one thinks of Russia any more as a first-rate power, on the level of the United States or China. Putin has made it China’s junior partner, possessed of one great asset—nuclear weapons—that may not even be useful weapons. Putin’s brief nuclear threats have not much affected European, US, or Ukrainian conduct so far. Russia’s poor military performance has changed its position in the world; it is now dependent on Iranian and Chinese weaponry, and Chinese technology. And Putin has managed to devalue deeply what used to be Russia’s other great asset—energy. In just one year he has managed to lose Russia’s closest and best and richest customers for gas and oil, in Europe, as well as permanently damaging his own economy.

What about the Middle East? Here I would argue that there have been two significant effects of the Ukraine war.

First, because of Russia’s troubles in Ukraine there is a growing alliance between Russia and Iran. It started with the export of Iranian drones but may expand to include weapons production inside Russia and export of other munitions. That alliance is of great significance in the context of the Iranian nuclear weapons program. In the past there were moments of considerable unity among the US, China, and Russia and the EU-3 against Iran’s nuclear weapons program. This new Russia-Iran alliance has changed that; it is questionable now whether Russia really opposes the Iranian program and how it would react if the UK, France, or Germany tried to invoke snapback, for example.

Second, Russia’s debilitated position means that in the Middle East it is devalued as an ally. Is anyone wondering now whether Gen. Sisi will reorient Egypt away from the United States and to Russia? There can of course be cooperation with Russia on certain issues and Putin can send the Wagner group to fight in small wars, but Russia is no one’s idea now of a permanent and valuable ally and world power.

In Asia, one could say Ukraine is far away and the impact of the war is slight—but I think that would be inaccurate. Russia’s aggression, and the leadership of the United States to resist it, have added to the impact of China’s own aggressive stance under Xi Jinping and have pushed Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Australia closer to the United States. India too—a country that for decades was closer to Russia. We see a new choreography of coalitions such as the Quad—Australia, India, Japan and the United States—become even more significant.  Same for AUKUS, the US-UK-Australia security arrangement.

As for China, it has gained from having Russia more dependent on it for oil sales (at a big discount, one has to add) and for geopolitical support. But that alliance is now with a devalued Russia, a military ally that is still very important but today has the ability only to make trouble, not to shape the world of the coming decades.

And of course one has to wonder what Xi makes of the failures of the previously untested Russian military, and of US-EU solidarity in sanctioning Russia, as he himself contemplates military action against Taiwan.

Now let’s turn to the United States. In the United States, there has been considerable bipartisan support for this action to back Ukraine—but it is slipping. There is now a deep partisan division between Democratic and Republican voters on continuing aid to Ukraine at the current very high levels.  We can debate why, and I think myself that as time goes by this becomes (in many eyes) Biden’s war—and many Republicans become more skeptical about it for that reason alone. Much of the Senate Republican leadership, behind Sen. McConnell and Sen. Cotton, has been very staunch. Still, there is a clear lack of leadership. President Trump isn’t saying much—and that may be best because no one can really be sure what he would say. It will be interesting to see how Ukraine factors in the race for the 2024 Republican nomination.

The problem with U.S. policy is President Biden’s reluctance to give Ukraine the support it needs when it is needed—not six or twelve months later. There are no irresistible political pressures causing these delays; they are simply a Biden-Blinken-Sullivan policy choice, and a bad one. This policy not only prolongs the war, which means more destruction and death in Ukraine. It also risks sending a message of reluctance and fear to Putin. If the Russian effort in Ukraine stalls and Putin begins to look even more like a loser, we all run the risk that he will not pull back in a compromise settlement or be overthrown—but instead double down. That could mean other military moves, in Georgia or Moldova, or more fatefully a move to grab a small portion of Estonia or Latvia that is very heavily Russian. He would say he is defending Russians, and threaten military escalation if challenged. The best way to deter such a move is to reinforce our support of Ukraine—which is also the best way to deter China over Taiwan. The Biden administration gets a passing grade here, but does not get the A that we all need.

I’ll conclude: the main impacts of the Ukraine war has been to weaken Russia, to make Europe more or at least more visibly dependent on the United States, and to suggest quite clearly that only two countries really have the ability –the power—the shape world politics in the coming decades, and they are China and the United States. The war in Ukraine has reminded us that Europe and Russia are not truly world powers despite whatever influence, and real military or economic assets, they may have. In that sense, the Ukraine war has shown us that we are back, after 30 years, in a bipolar not multipolar global system.