• International Law
    Three Challenging Policy Issues for the Prosecutor in the Israel-Hamas Situation
    The chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC),[1] Karim A. A. Khan,[2] faces several challenging policy issues in the months ahead regarding the Israel-Hamas situation.[3] In this comment I examine three of those issues. I. Role of the Prosecutor Prosecutor Khan made two particularly important public statements about the Israel-Hamas situation following October 7, 2023. The first was an address he delivered in Cairo on October 29, 2023, the text of which was published in The Guardian on November 10, 2023.[4] Khan’s address in Cairo immediately followed his visit to the Rafah crossing at the border between Gaza and Egypt. Khan was quite expansive in Cairo about the obligations of the contentious parties and how they can be held responsible under the Rome Statute. His remarks were aimed at both Israel and the State of Palestine (Palestine), including Hamas. Khan’s second statement occurred on November 17, 2023, in The Hague when he announced the referral by five ICC States Parties of the Israel-Hamas situation to the ICC.[5] These are the same countries (South Africa, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Comoros and Djibouti) that filed a case[6] under the Genocide Convention[7] before the International Court of Justice on December 29, 2023, seeking to hold Israel accountable under that Convention and requesting provisional measures against Israel. In his statement, Khan confirmed that he was extending his investigation (initially commenced on March 3, 2021 concerning “acts committed since June 13, 2014 in Gaza and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, which would constitute crimes under the Rome Statute.”) “to the escalation of hostilities and violence since the attacks of October 7, 2023. In accordance with the Rome Statute, my Office has jurisdiction over crimes committed on the territory of a State Party and by nationals of such a State.” He called “on all States Parties to the Rome Statute to provide us with the resources we need to enable us to effectively fulfill our mandate for all situations we examine.” In my view, Khan need not and should not say more publicly other than cryptic confirmations that his investigations continue. He needs to build trust among a wide range of governments, many of which are non-party States of the Rome Statute, such as Israel, the United States, Turkey, most Arab countries, and influential nations like China, Russia, India, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, and Indonesia. These countries need to understand that his office is investigating objectively, with no political agenda, and that those investigations will proceed under the auspices of a Court that they have not joined. That trust will be attained with communications in private and diplomatic channels. There will be more than enough to say publicly in the event the ICC issues arrest warrants in this situation. Further, Khan likely is reaching out to several non-party States, particularly the United States and Israel, for cooperation in the collection of evidence, including from intelligence sources. In his statement of November 17, 2023, he missed the opportunity to highlight the importance of cooperation from non-party States, particularly those with unique capabilities. He nonetheless should explore those opportunities quietly and diplomatically with such countries. Since the United States is cooperating with Khan on the provision of intelligence relating to the Russia-Ukraine war (fought between two non-party States of the Rome Statute), there will be protests of double standards unless Washington acts in a similar fashion regarding the Israel-Hamas war (fought between Hamas, part of one State Party, the State of Palestine, and one non-party State, Israel).[8] The best way for Khan to address that politically sensitive issue with the United States will be to do so discreetly and tactfully in the months ahead. II. Article 18 Notification Khan may have acted already in this respect, but just to check the box: Pursuant to Article 18 of the Rome Statute, the Prosecutor presumably has notified Israel, in particular, of the investigation now underway regarding the Israel-Hamas situation.[9] That is an important notification as it should incentivize Israel to demonstrate that it is investigating, for example, claims of war crimes allegedly committed by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and the Israeli political leadership as well as public statements by government and military officials allegedly inciting genocide. Khan should privately encourage Israeli officials to undertake a comprehensive domestic investigation of Israeli actions. Granted, this will be a difficult step for Israel whose population is traumatized by the October 7 intervention and atrocities by Hamas militants.[10] Most Israelis at this point will have little tolerance for self-reflection about the conduct of the IDF.[11] But everyone will need to recognize the important role for the rule of law being followed by all actors. While under Article 18(3) of the Rome Statute the Israeli investigation would be “open to review by the Prosecutor six months after the date of deferral,” if the Israeli investigation is being undertaken in good faith and diligently, then Khan should use his discretion under his own “review” to extend the period of time that Israel would continue to conduct its domestic investigation prior to continuing his own full-scale investigation. This would conform with principles of complementarity under the Rome Statute. Khan also presumably has delivered an Article 18 notification to the State of Palestine, whether that means to officials of the Palestinian Authority or the Palestine Liberation Organization. Such notification might prove pro forma as the judicial system in Palestine likely would struggle with any widescale investigation.[12] However implausible the procedure, nothing prevents officials of Palestine seeking foreign assistance, including even from Israel, to investigate the actions by Hamas on Israeli territory on October 7 and in the use of human shields during the combat in Gaza, the taking and holding of hostages in Gaza following the October 7 assault, and the commission of any other war crimes under the Rome Statute. All of these acts presumably will be under investigation by Khan, so Palestine has the choice whether or not to weigh in with its own investigations of Hamas’s conduct. Palestine should be as mindful of complementarity, and the risks of ignoring it, as any other State Party of the Rome Statute. III. Negotiated Settlement Khan and his staff should be strategizing how he will navigate any evolving diplomacy for a negotiated settlement among Israel and Palestinian representatives (however composed among the Palestinian Authority, Palestine Liberation Organization, and/or Hamas) and major foreign players such as the United States, key Arab states, the European Union, and the United Nations. Every party to those talks, other than probably Israel as long as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu remains in power,[13] will insist on the two-state solution[14] as a major objective. What will be the fate of international criminal justice in such talks? There might be strong pressures to keep justice issues completely separate from the diplomatic talks. Given the allegations and disinformation swirling around October 7 and the aftermath, it might prove very problematic how justice would even be discussed among the negotiators.[15] Isolating accountability for atrocity crimes from peace objectives would leave Khan free to pursue his investigation and uphold the prospect of ICC arrest warrants. Such segregation of justice from peace, however, may prove implausible, as the two goals of peace and justice seem destined to become intertwined given the way atrocity crimes presently dominate the situation both on the ground and in international courts, namely the ICC and the ICJ. But if the segregation of peace from justice is the chosen path, then Khan simply could plod his way through investigations and ultimately persuade the Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC to approve arrest warrants, and then let the chips fall where they may. The more likely prospect is that justice will be factored into negotiations that center on permanently ending hostilities and forging a two-state solution. The victim populations of atrocity crimes will expect justice to be addressed in the talks and doubtless will protest strongly the absence of accountability in the settlement. But the negotiations will compel tough decisions on modifying perfect justice with imperfect justice (or none at all) in order to reach the two-state solution. Khan may choose to engage with the negotiators in order to preserve the ICC’s equities. It would not be surprising if one or more of the following options arise during the talks: First, Israel and Palestine could agree, upon normalization of relations, to enter into a non-surrender agreement described by Article 98(2) of the Rome Statute whereby neither country would surrender an individual under an ICC arrest warrant to the ICC without gaining the consent of the “sending State” of that individual.[16] Such an agreement would not be so different from probable realities. As a non-party State, Israel would not want to surrender anyone, and particularly not an Israeli citizen, to the ICC. Palestine would want to avoid the surrender of any individual (most likely from Hamas) within Palestine to the control of the ICC. While such an agreement would impair the ICC’s power to prosecute alleged perpetrators of atrocity crimes in the Israel-Hamas situation, the Article 98(2) non-surrender agreement could become a compelling means in the negotiations to essentially take the ICC off the table and focus on the two-state solution. Nothing would prevent ultimately bringing Hamas leaders to justice in Israel if captured and brought to Israel to stand trial in Israeli courts. Israel, almost certainly, would never immunize them from possible prosecution, particularly for the atrocity crimes perpetrated by Hamas on October 7. In a conditional reciprocal fashion, future Palestinian courts might try to prosecute Israeli citizens for actions taken prior to the peace agreement unless explicitly deprived of that power in the peace agreement as a pre-condition to Israeli recognition of the State of Palestine. These would be difficult trade-offs to negotiate, but they need not necessarily implicate Khan and the ICC as these issues focus on justice rendered by national courts (Israel or Palestine) and not the ICC. But Khan should factor in any such developments in his review of complementarity efforts, if any, by prosecutors and courts in Israel and Palestine. Finally, the negotiations for the end of hostilities and implementation of the two-state solution could raise the prospect of the UN Security Council acting in a manner consistent with the objective set forth in Article 16 of the Statute, namely that: No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under this Statute for a period of twelve months after the Security Council, in a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, has requested the Court to that effect; that request may be renewed by the Council under the same conditions.[17] Israel and Palestine may find this option attractive during the negotiations so as to shelve the ICC for at least one year, perhaps more, if that would mean achieving a permanent end to hostilities and the co-existence of two nations—Israel and Palestine—engaged in normalized diplomatic relations. The prospect of constructive negotiations leading to promises of international financing to rebuild Gaza and to strengthen the economy of Palestine could be a tempting objective that negotiators would be willing to prioritize over speedily achieving criminal justice of leading individual perpetrators of atrocity crimes. In order to reach a final peace settlement enshrining the two-state solution, the five permanent members of the Security Council might find common cause in adopting a Chapter VII resolution (with sufficient non-permanent member votes) that prevents the ICC from continuing its investigation or prosecution of atrocity crimes in the Israel-Hamas situation under the terms of Article 16 of the Rome Statute. Russia and China might see political value in shielding Hamas officials from ICC scrutiny, and the United States, United Kingdom, and France might see equal political value in shielding Israeli officials from ICC investigation. Khan will need to keep a very keen eye on negotiations that may unfold in the coming months and weigh to what extent he should personally intervene at any point during those negotiations to respond to proposals pertaining to Article 16 or Article 98(2) or other provisions of the Rome Statute. This publication is part of the Diamonstein-Spielvogel Project on the Future of Democracy. Endnotes ^ “International Criminal Court,” International Criminal Court, accessed February 7, 2024, https://www.icc-cpi.int/.  ^ “Karim A. A. Khan KC,” International Criminal Court, accessed February 7, 2024, https://www.icc-cpi.int/about/otp/who-s-who/karim-khan.  ^ Vusi Madonsela, letter to International Criminal Court Prosecutor Karim A. A. Khan KC, November 17, 2023, https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/2023-11/ICC-Referral-Palestine-Final-17-November-2023.pdf.  ^ Karim A. A. Khan, “We Are Witnessing a Pandemic of Inhumanity: To Halt the Spread, We Must Cling To the Law,” The Guardian, November 10, 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/nov/10/law-israel-hamas-international-criminal-court-icc.  ^ “Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Karim A. A. Khan KC, on the Situation in the State of Palestine: Receipt of a Referral From Five States Parties,” International Criminal Court, November 17, 2023, https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/statement-prosecutor-international-criminal-court-karim-aa-khan-kc-situation-state-palestine.  ^ “The Republic of South Africa Institutes Proceedings Against the State of Israel and Requests the Court to Indicate Provisional Measures,” International Court of Justice, December 29, 2023, https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/192/192-20231229-pre-01-00-en.pdf. ^ “Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,” conclusion date: December 9, 1948, United Nations Treaty Series, registration no. I-1021, https://iccforum.com/genocide-convention.  ^ “The Republic of South Africa Institutes Proceedings,” International Court of Justice. ^ “Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,” opened for signature July 17, 1998, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9, Art. 18, https://iccforum.com/rome-statute. ^ Noa Limone, “‘A Multilayered Trauma Is Affecting Israelis in the Wake of October 7,’” Haaretz, December 2, 2023, https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2023-12-02/ty-article-magazine/.highlight/there-is-a-multilayered-trauma-taking-place-in-the-wake-of-october-7-its-infectious/0000018c-2774-d04a-af9f-f7f6ddf30000.  ^ “Widening Mideast Crisis: Blast That Killed About Twenty Soldiers Linked to Israeli Effort to Create Gaza Buffer Zone,” The New York Times, last updated January 24, 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/live/2024/01/23/world/israel-hamas-gaza-news.  ^ “Judicial Systems in Member States - Palestine,” Euro-Arab Judicial Training Network, accessed February 7, 2024, https://www.eajtn.com/judicial-systems/palestine/. ^ “Widening Mideast Crisis: U.S. Official Heads to Middle East for Talks on Hostages,” The New York Times, last updated February 6, 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/live/2024/01/21/world/israel-hamas-gaza-news-iraq#netanyahu-rebuffs-biden-again-on-the-idea-of-creating-a-palestinian-state. ^ “Israel-Palestinian Conflict: What Is the Two-State Solution and What Are the Obstacles?” Reuters, January 26, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/what-is-two-state-solution-israel-palestinian-conflict-2024-01-25/.  ^ Elizabeth Dwoskin, “Growing Oct. 7 ‘Truther’ Groups Say Hamas Massacre Was a False Flag,” The Washington Post, January 21, 2024, https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2024/01/21/hamas-attack-october-7-conspiracy-israel/.  ^ “Rome Statute,” Art. 98. ^ “Rome Statute,” Art. 16.
  • Ukraine
    Russia Must Be Held Accountable for Alleged Criminal Aggression in Ukraine: Two Paths to Justice
    The authors, including a former Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada, UN Undersecretary-General for Legal Affairs, Founding Chief Prosecutor of the UN Special Court for Sierra Leone, and the inaugural U.S. Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues, urge the imperative of prosecuting alleged Russian crimes of aggression in Ukraine, and present two practical options for doing so.
  • Human Rights
    Virtual Media Briefing: International Law and the Humanitarian Crisis in Gaza
    Play
    The Council on Foreign Relations hosts experts to discuss recent developments on the humanitarian crisis and to analyze the laws of war and human rights in Gaza. 
  • Russia
    Russia Tests New Missile and Seeks to Rejoin UN Human Rights Council, ICJ Takes On Syria, and More
    Podcast
    Recent satellite imagery indicates that Russia is preparing to test a new nuclear-powered missile; the UN Human Rights Council votes on new members, with Russia vying to rejoin after its April 2022 suspension; the International Court of Justice (ICJ) begins hearings on torture in Syria; and one hundred thousand ethnic Armenians flee as Azerbaijan asserts control over the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave.
  • Armenia
    Ethnic Cleansing Is Happening in Nagorno-Karabakh. How Can the World Respond?
    Azerbaijan’s push into the Armenian enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh is drawing comparisons to other episodes of ethnic cleansing. What can be done under international law?
  • Human Rights
    The Fate of Justice in Russia-Ukraine Peace Talks
    While the final chapter of the Russia-Ukraine war has yet to be written, the prospects of any negotiations to achieve a just and lasting peace remain distant. But it is not too soon to consider how accountability, particularly criminal accountability, would fare if any such talks were held between Russia and Ukraine. Russian negotiators will, of course, push back on any proposal for accountability. Ukrainian officials should anticipate a range of Russian positions that would prove incompatible with international justice. The Russians likely will table immunity defenses and counterproposals for amnesties of various types in order to shield their officials and personnel from any criminal prosecutions. Two strategies on the role of justice in the negotiations seem plausible. The first strategy would be to focus the negotiations only on peace objectives – ending the fighting, withdrawal of Russian troops, territorial integrity, reparations, return of Ukrainian children, exchanges of prisoners of war – and not seek any justice objectives. This would simplify the process but also leave accountability off the table to fend for itself. The second strategy would be to seek justice objectives – notably prosecutions of perpetrators of atrocity crimes – but perhaps leverage one or more elements to incentivize agreement on the peace objectives. The Role of Justice and Accountability in a Negotiated Peace   The Ukrainian people and their allies and friends across the globe are desperately seeking justice for the victims of atrocity crimes, namely genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and aggression on Ukrainian territory. The seventh point of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s 10-Point Peace Plan is “justice,” which includes establishing a Special Tribunal to prosecute the crime of aggression against Ukraine and creating an international compensation mechanism. Zelenskyy has staked out a firm position on holding all Russian perpetrators to account. During his address in Helsinki on June 2, 2023, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said that, “A just and lasting peace must address both accountability and reconciliation.” The issue of accountability has been a regular feature of various peace negotiations in recent decades. But no situation on the global landscape is identical to any other in the realm of peace and justice. The Russia-Ukraine war has characteristics that, when considered together, present an extraordinarily challenging scenario for negotiators to navigate: a blatantly unprovoked war of aggression launched and perpetuated by Russia, a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, against Ukraine without any prospect, yet, of Moscow reversing its illegal cross-border interventions; the infliction of widespread atrocity crimes of a character not seen in Europe since the Balkans war in the early 1990s; the emerging crime of ecocide (or war crimes or crimes against humanity constituting attacks on the environment) significantly amplified with the destruction of the Kakhovka dam on the Dnipro River in June 2023, which caused loss of life and enormous environmental and property damage and human dislocation, not to mention other devastating assaults on the Ukrainian environment during the war; the rapid and intensive investigation of atrocity crimes by a wide range of courts, inter-governmental bodies, and civil society groups – all building a large body of evidence and demanding prosecution; the International Criminal Court (ICC) central role in investigating senior perpetrators alongside the work of domestic Ukrainian criminal courts that face the Herculean task of potentially prosecuting more than 108,000 registered war crimes; while Russian troops who remain on Ukrainian territory and commit atrocity crimes will be exposed to the risk of arrest, a large number of suspects who may be charged with committing such crimes in Ukraine are or ultimately will be residing in Russia and for all practical purposes shielded from arrest and transfer to the custody of Ukrainian courts, the ICC, or any other court of non-Russian jurisdiction in the near term and possibly indefinitely; and the still undecided means of prosecuting the crime of aggression against the highest political and military leaders absent ICC jurisdiction over that crime in the Ukraine situation. Some might speculate that Russian President Vladimir Putin would be discouraged from negotiating since he already is targeted with an international ICC arrest warrant. Additional arrest warrants almost certainly will be issued against Putin in the future, including from other courts. Surely, he would refuse any responsibility for Russian commission of atrocity crimes and reject any means to establish criminal culpability in the peace agreement. Common sense informs such thinking, but so too does the reality that issues of justice are ever present in a world that is highly sensitized to atrocity crimes and to the growing realization – buttressed by three decades of tribunal-building – that such heinous crimes can no longer be planned and committed by political and military leaders with impunity and devoid of any prospect of accountability. Many such leaders have been brought to justice despite earlier common presumptions that they would escape the reach of international law for the commission of atrocity crimes while in office. Further, top political leaders, including former heads of State, have been charged in recent years for other types of crimes, demonstrating that the overall reach of criminal law has expanded significantly for those who hold power or have relinquished it. If the day arrives when Ukraine begins peace negotiations with Russia, accountability should be factored into the strategy that Ukrainian and international negotiators formulate before and during such talks. These considerations are practical necessities given Russia’s likely negotiating position and the demands of the Ukrainian people for justice. There are two over-arching strategies for the fate of justice in such negotiations.  First Strategy: Negotiate Only Peace The First Strategy would have a dual character: to end the armed conflict on largely favorable terms for Ukraine and to pursue accountability that stands separate from the peace negotiations (just as accountability is currently being pursued absent any negotiations for peace). This relatively simple formula for the peace negotiations would leave criminal accountability completely off the peace table. There would be no negotiated agreement to accelerate, slow down, strengthen, or weaken the pursuit of justice. The negotiators would be focused exclusively on the aims of peace rather than justice objectives. The two-track approach in the First Strategy would not assume any cooperation by Russian authorities with Ukrainian objectives for accountability under Ukrainian or international criminal law. There would be no leverage employed during the peace talks to compel the Russians to cooperate with atrocity crimes investigations, enforce arrest warrants, or hold any Russians accountable in Russian national courts. The pursuit of justice would rely solely on the jurisdiction exercised by non-Russian courts as well as the actions and cooperation of the Ukrainian government and many other governments, the United Nations, the European Union and other multilateral institutions, and civil society organizations committed to assisting with investigations and prosecutions of atrocity crimes committed in Ukraine. Thus, the First Strategy would remove the thorny issue of justice from peace negotiations, which could derail the talks because of the personal exposure of Russian leaders to legal jeopardy. Those leaders have a predictable interest in avoiding the legal risk or any acceptance of such criminal liability. The justice track would be pursued simultaneously under its own steady steam, with investigators, prosecutors, and judges seeking to achieve what they can in both the short term, facing Russian non-cooperation, and the long term, when Russian intransigence likely will continue unless Russia one day reforms politically in a manner where at least some cooperation on accountability might be plausible. For example, the latter could arise if Putin loses power and is succeeded by a leadership group that views his surrender or the surrender of any members of his leadership cohort to the ICC as politically useful. After all, former Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic faced exactly that fate in 2001. Once he lost power government authorities surrendered the indicted fugitive to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia to face justice in The Hague for atrocity crimes. Similarly, the Liberian government consented to the surrender of former President Charles Taylor to stand trial before the Special Court for Sierra Leone, where he was convicted in 2012 and is now serving a 50-year sentence in a British prison. Second Strategy: Leverage Justice for Peace Negotiators might follow a very different course and insist on the issue of accountability being addressed directly in the peace agreement, albeit in radically different ways. It will be difficult for the Ukrainian officials to dismiss accountability as they will be representing a victimized population determined to bring perpetrators of atrocity crimes to justice. But it will be equally difficult for the Russian negotiators to embrace any proposal of accountability for Russian actions which they might view as an admission of guilt, a dark prospect that many Russian citizens would likely resent and resist. The elements that follow explore how accountability strategies could be introduced into the negotiations between Ukraine and Russia. Political factors might, for now, eclipse immediate pursuit of some justice objectives and using justice as leverage would be at the discretion of Ukrainian negotiators during any talks. Each of the elements are designed with that flexibility in mind, employing one, two, or more of the elements depending on policy judgments. Comprehensive and credible justice, which will take years if not decades to achieve, may not rest on the same time schedule as achieving the end of the war and the benefits of peace, territorial integrity, and societal stability. Of course, delayed legal proceedings can undermine successful prosecutions as witnesses become unavailable or their memories fade, tangible evidence becomes increasingly difficult to collect, public interest and support shifts to other priorities, and indicted fugitives burrow ever deeper into safe havens to avoid arrest. The mantra of “justice delayed is justice denied” can ring very true, particularly when elderly defendants die before final verdicts are rendered. But the brutal Russia-Ukraine war demands a pragmatic realization of how to balance justice with peace by examining, in advance, options that could be plausibly raised at the negotiating table by either party. Element 1: Demand full accountability for Russian criminal conduct before criminal tribunals as well as State responsibility before the International Court of Justice under relevant treaties. Accountability essentially would become a peace objective in and of itself and a means for Russia to answer for its crimes. This would be the maximalist justice strategy, but one that would meet steep Russian disinterest and resistance. While full accountability could still be pursued under the First Strategy, its prospect under the Second Strategy and melding it to peace discussions is highly problematic. Element 2: Ask the U.N. Security Council to mandate deferral of certain ICC investigations or prosecutions for one year under Article 16 of the Rome Statute, which governs the ICC. The action would have to be an enforcement resolution under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter to maintain international peace and security and avoid a veto by any permanent member of the Council: China, France, Russia, the U.K., and the United States. This procedure was pressed by a number of African countries in the past to limit the ICC’s early focus on African situations of atrocity crimes, but the Security Council never acted under its Article 16 authority. The tactic could prove controversial both domestically in Ukraine and among ICC States Parties, including those sitting on the Security Council. The deferral, unless renewed with a veto-free vote in the Security Council, would end after one year with full resumption of any delayed ICC investigations and prosecutions. Element 3: Consult with the ICC prosecutor to take the interests of victims into account in arriving at decisions to prosecute. Article 53(2)(c) of the Rome Statute empowers the ICC prosecutor to decide that there is “not a sufficient basis for a prosecution because…[it] is not in the interests of justice, taking into account all of the circumstances…”  This provision does not prevent or derail investigations. Rather, it allows the prosecutor considerable discretion to take the interests of victims into account when weighing what strategy can best achieve not only justice, but also peace, security, safety, and economic recovery for the victims. While it may appear counter-intuitive to the aims of international criminal justice, under the Rome Statute the ICC prosecutor can elevate non-judicial interests of victims in determining the efficacy of a prosecution. Element 4: Require a temporal limitation (such as signing the peace agreement) on Ukraine’s Article 12(3) declarations under the Rome Statute that have granted jurisdiction to the ICC for atrocity crimes in Ukraine since late 2013. The Article 12(3) declaration is available to States that have not joined the ICC, like Ukraine, to request the Court’s jurisdiction over its own territory for designated atrocity crime situations. If, to advance the negotiations, the declarations are time-limited, the ICC’s jurisdiction could be reactivated with a fresh Article 12(3) declaration if there is Russian noncompliance with the peace objectives, particularly with the commission of new atrocity crimes. Element 5: Suspend efforts to create the Special Tribunal for Ukraine on the Crime of Aggression provided there is Russian compliance with the peace objectives. While the need to prosecute the crime of aggression against Ukraine before an international tribunal remains essential for both Ukraine and the deterrence of aggression globally, the fact that leadership suspects likely will avoid arrest by remaining on safe haven territory, such as Russia, gives Ukraine some flexibility to delay the creation or operational start date of the Special Tribunal in return for compliance with peace objectives at the negotiating table. Element 6: Drop or modify charges of war crimes against prisoners-of-war who would be exchanged between the two countries. Article 119 of the 1949 Geneva Convention III, which both Russia and Ukraine have ratified, posits this possibility with discretionary language: “Prisoners of war against whom criminal proceedings for an indictable offence are pending may be detained until the end of such proceedings, and, if necessary, until the completion of the punishment. The same shall apply to prisoners of war already convicted for an indictable offence.”  Applying leniency in some manner for charged or convicted prisoners of war, whose names must be shared and who include Ukrainian soldiers held in Russian detention, could be explored to facilitate their return home, particularly at the conclusion of the war as negotiated by the parties. Element 7: Drop or modify Ukrainian criminal charges against individuals responsible for illegal abductions and transfers of Ukrainian children into Russian custody provided the children are first returned to their Ukrainian parents and guardians. This may prove to be a difficult procedure under Ukrainian law, but, like prisoners-of-war, the return of Ukrainian children would be so central to any peace negotiations that there may need to be an incentive of this character to ensure that it can be accomplished. Element 8: Minimize Ukrainian legal penalties for some of the Ukrainians who collaborated with Russian occupying forces, but only if there is a Russian demand for this type of leniency. Ukraine could offer, for example, to grant such treatment to suspected collaborators who engaged in minor acts of humanitarian cooperation to ensure the survival of the residents in their communities Element 9: Create a new “Accountability Commission” that would digitally record the admissions of responsibility for atrocity crimes by low-ranking soldiers who enjoy safe haven on their national territory and have not surrendered to the custody of foreign courts, but who wish to confess or promote truth. The Accountability Commission would be created with expert international oversight and operated in the spirit of transitional justice to enable victims to reach at least some degree of closure on holding perpetrators responsible for their crimes. Russia would have to agree to cooperate with this mechanism, including a guarantee not to retaliate against those who share information with the Commission. Element 10: Lift certain economic sanctions and unblock at least some frozen assets upon Russian fulfillment of justice objectives. These tools undoubtedly will be used in the negotiations to achieve peace objectives, including the rebuilding of Ukraine. But an important issue will be to what extent they could be used to pursue justice objectives as well. For example, lifting some sanctions might be tied to surrender of designated indicted war criminals. Various sanctions were imposed against Serbia by the United States and the European Union until indicted fugitives of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, including former leaders Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, were arrested on Serbian territory and surrendered to the Tribunal. Also, the seizure of certain frozen Russian assets, particularly if facilitated with Moscow’s consent under the peace agreement, could be used to finance investigations and litigation before national and international courts for years to come. None of these strategies on justice (however configured) would be easy to implement. Each would be controversial. Funding any mechanism of justice would remain difficult. But the strategies should be considered while the pathway to peace negotiations is paved. This publication is part of the Diamonstein-Spielvogel Project on the Future of Democracy.
  • International Law
    Deterrence Lawfare to Save Taiwan
    A recent Council on Foreign Relations task force report about “U.S.-Taiwan Relations in a New Era” warns that “deterrence is steadily eroding in the Taiwan Strait and is at risk of failing, increasing the likelihood of Chinese aggression.” The report provides a pragmatic road map for managing this looming threat and counsels “that any future arrangement between China and Taiwan be arrived at peacefully and with the assent of the Taiwanese people.”   But diplomacy sometimes requires a hard counterpunch. If China invades Taiwan, the United States should recognize the Republic of China (Taiwan) as a sovereign state while maintaining its long-standing recognition of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and without severing diplomatic relations. The recognition card would be a powerful diplomatic weapon for Washington to deploy in the event Beijing abandons a peaceful means to resolve the governance of Taiwan.   There is no appetite for the United States to legally recognize Taiwan in the absence of aggression by China, and the Council report rightly criticizes any such move as “irresponsible and ill-advised.” As the U.S. executive branch has consistently held, such an extreme initiative would needlessly inflame tensions and accelerate the military conflagration diplomats have long prevented. But without changing this sensible policy, American officials nevertheless should make clear as a deterrent warning that the worst-case scenario—military aggression against Taiwan and its people—would eviscerate the “one China” policy that has stabilized China’s relations with the United States for decades. Recognition History in U.S.-Taiwan-PRC Relations To understand why this is the right policy today, we must look back to how we got here. There was a recognition black hole between the Communist government of mainland China and the United States for three decades after World War II while Washington recognized the anti-Communist Republic of China that actually governed only Taiwan after losing control of the mainland in the Chinese civil war. As a predicate to a future flip in recognition policy, the Shanghai Communique of 1972, during the Richard Nixon administration, stated that the United States  “acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves.”   No agreement, no affirmation, no endorsement of one China—just an acknowledgment of the views of others, namely “all Chinese,” that is explicitly left unchallenged by Washington. The American aim, though, is clearly stated: to peacefully resolve the Taiwan question. In conjunction with the determination of the Jimmy Carter administration in December 1978 to terminate America’s mutual defense treaty with Taiwan, de-recognize the Republic of China, and officially recognize the People’s Republic of China, a second communique reiterated the U.S. acknowledgement of “the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China.”  The third communique negotiated by the Ronald Reagan administration with China in 1982 expressed the U.S. intention to reduce its arms sales to Taiwan and stated for the first time that the United States “has no intention of…pursuing a policy of ‘two Chinas’ or ‘one China, one Taiwan.’”  But as the Council report notes, Reagan circulated an internal memorandum stating that “the U.S. willingness to reduce its arms sales to Taiwan is conditioned absolutely upon the continued commitment of China to the peaceful solution of the Taiwan-PRC differences. It should be clearly understood that the linkage between these two matters is a permanent imperative of U.S. foreign policy.”   Reagan coupled the 1982 communique with “Six Assurances” to the government in Taipei stating in part that the United States would not take any position regarding sovereignty over Taiwan and would not mediate between Taipei and Beijing or pressure Taipei to enter negotiations with the PRC. Meanwhile, back on Capitol Hill an angered Congress lodged several powerful kickers in the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, which remains in force. The law requires the provision of defensive arms to Taiwan and maintenance of the U.S. capacity “to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people of Taiwan.” It is these words that likely inspire President Joe Biden, who voted for the legislation as a senator, to state repeatedly that the United States would defend Taiwan if it were attacked (while reaffirming the one China policy under present circumstances).  Biden used the Presidential Drawdown Authority on July 28 to provide $345 million of military assistance to Taiwan, invoking that power for the first time for Taiwan following his frequent reliance on it for Ukraine. He also reportedly intends to fold more military funding for Taiwan into a supplemental budget request for Ukraine.  The Taiwan Relations Act echoes the Shanghai Communique by making “clear that the United States’ decision to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means.” If that future is not “determined by peaceful means” because China has invaded Taiwan, then there is nothing in America’s longstanding one China policy or the Taiwan Relations Act that would prevent United States recognition of the democratically elected Taiwan government, even if its officials must govern the more than 23 million inhabitants of Taiwan in exile.   Just as American intentions regarding arms sales to Taiwan are influenced by China’s conduct against Taiwan, so too should such conduct influence American intentions regarding its recognition policy. Chinese aggression against Taiwan would egregiously violate the entire premise of the one China policy—a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question—and no longer would that policy be entitled to American subservience.   How the Recognition Card Would Work Unlike the situation from the 1950s onward, in which the United States saw a choice between recognizing either the PRC or the government in Taiwan as representing the entire population on both sides of the strait, today the question is not one of governmental recognition, but of State recognition – i.e., whether to recognize Taiwan as a new, self-governing State (but not, as compared to the historical recognition issue, as the legitimate seat of government for the entirety of China).   That means the United States would not need to de-recognize the People’s Republic of China if Washington recognizes Taiwan as a State. Taiwan easily meets the international law test for statehood. The decision is strictly America’s choice to make, but the decision is both simple and imperative. Governmental recognition would not be at issue on the mainland. Clearly the United States must continue to recognize the government of the second most populous country in the world as a political, economic, and military power.  Despite the punitive sanctions that doubtless would be imposed by the United States and a good number of European and Indo-Pacific nations were China to attack Taiwan, Washington would need to maintain diplomatic relations with Beijing to deal with the existential challenges of our era, including climate change, clean energy, public health, and, yes, aggressive war.  Like Kosovo, which the United States and 100 other nations recognize as an independent State despite the fierce resistance of Serbia, Taiwan would not gain admission to the United Nations because China and Russia would prohibit that. Taiwan, like Kosovo, would continue to be locked out of many other international organizations. Those realities, though, are manageable.   An infuriated President Xi Jinping might retaliate and foolishly break diplomatic relations with the United States, but he would do so at China’s dire economic and political peril. If China seeks isolation from broad swaths of the globe, military aggression against Taiwan and a diplomatic break with the United States would achieve that self-destructive objective. Historians would ask, just as they do today of Russian President Vladimir Putin mired in his aggressive war against Ukraine, what was Xi thinking? Beijing’s smarter policy would refrain from aggression against its island neighbor and try to peacefully coax Taiwan into its sphere of influence. Meanwhile, Washington should employ now a powerful lawfare deterrent—the threat of recognizing the statehood of a vibrant democracy and its people if they fall under the heel of an invading authoritarian power. This publication is part of the Diamonstein-Spielvogel Project on the Future of Democracy.
  • International Law
    The United States Should Ratify the Rome Statute
    (Editor’s note: This article is part of a joint symposium hosted by Just Security and Articles of War. The symposium addresses topics discussed at a workshop held at The George Washington University Law School concerning U.S. cooperation with the International Criminal Court’s Ukraine investigation. Laura Dickinson’s introductory post is available here.) A quarter century ago today the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) was completed following years of negotiations. I led the U.S. delegation in those talks. The Clinton Administration decided not to support the final text of the treaty on July 17, 1998, but after two more years of talks on supplemental documents, I signed the treaty on behalf of the United States on December 31, 2000. Despite the fact that 123 nations, including almost every American ally, have joined the ICC, the United States has not yet ratified the Rome Statute and thus has not become party to the ICC. That fact need not be the final chapter. The time has finally arrived to acknowledge some evolutionary developments and move towards American ratification of the treaty. There is longstanding American policy that while the United States remains a non-party State to the Rome Statute, the ICC has no jurisdiction over U.S. nationals for actions undertaken even on the territory of a State Party of the Rome Statute. The same standard would apply to any other non-party State (like Russia) and its nationals acting on State Party territory (or territory of a non-party State—like Ukraine—that has fallen under the jurisdiction of the ICC voluntarily or because of a UN Security Council mandate). I term this the “immunity interpretation,” which makes it difficult for the United States to fully embrace the ICC’s investigations of Russian suspects for atrocity crimes (war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide) committed in Ukraine. The immunity interpretation reached its peak under the Trump Administration, with the threat and, in two cases, imposition of sanctions against key personnel of the ICC and foreigners.  President Joe Biden repealed the executive order authorizing such sanctions on April 2, 2021, though Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken stated, “We maintain our longstanding objection to the Court’s efforts to assert jurisdiction over personnel of non-States Parties such as the United States and Israel.” The immunity interpretation, however, is archaic, counter-productive, and largely rejected worldwide. I should know, as I presented the immunity interpretation before the 1999 annual meeting of the American Society of International Law. While the position articulated some logical premises, it also defied the core principle of criminal law, which is territorial jurisdiction. It ignored the decision-making authority of a sovereign government when entering a treaty regime, including to confer criminal jurisdiction to an international court. In December 2019, during a hearing on the Afghanistan situation before the ICC Appeals Chamber, I spoke as an amicus and publicly rejected the immunity interpretation, whatever its original merit, as an argument that has been overtaken by customary international law. I elaborated on the point in a May 2021 article. After three decades of rapid development in international criminal law and in tribunal-building and jurisprudence to enforce the law, it is implausible that a non-party State can invade a State Party, commit atrocity crimes that fall within the jurisdiction of the Rome Statute, and essentially enjoy immunity for doing so. To do so rewards the non-party State with impunity while rendering meaningless the State Party’s membership in the ICC. Professor Leila Sadat has persuasively countered the immunity interpretation by focusing on the conferral authority of governments in her forthcoming article in the Notre Dame Law Review. In Washington, D.C., I have attended meetings recently where retired senior officials of the U.S. Government, particularly having held legal positions, have reversed their own positions and believe the United States should abandon the archaic immunity interpretation. Granted, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has proven to be an inflection point on the issue. At some stage the hypocrisy of the matter must be acknowledged. It simply is implausible to keep arguing the immunity interpretation with a straight face when the criminal assault against Ukraine and its people is so blatant, so widespread, so deadly, so destructive, and so persistent and while the U.S. Congress and the Biden Administration have evolved to support efforts, such as the ICC investigations, to hold Russian officials accountable under international criminal law. The ICC cannot exercise jurisdiction over Ukraine for the crime of aggression because of the constraint built into Article 15bis(5) of the Rome Statute. This creature of the Kampala Amendments process in 2010, at the time strongly supported by the United States and some other major powers, reads, “In respect of a State that is not a party to this Statute, the Court shall not exercise its jurisdiction over the crime of aggression when committed by that State’s nationals or on its territory.” Consider for a moment how surreal that sounds, particularly if one recites it to the mother of a young girl who died from the impact of a Russian missile fired from across the border in Russia and hitting a civilian neighborhood in Ukraine. There is a solution to the particular problem of the crime of aggression.  Official U.S. statements condemning the Russian aggression against Ukraine ring rather hollow when the Biden Administration fails to support the creation, through a procedure involving a UN General Assembly resolution and a treaty between the United Nations and Ukraine, of an international Special Tribunal for Ukraine on the Crime of Aggression that can deny head of state immunity. Instead, the United States has opted for “an internationalized national court” in the Ukrainian legal system some day for the crime of aggression—a weak option that invites head of state immunity and hardly deters massive and continuous acts of aggression by Russia against Ukraine. Recently, I attended a closed-door meeting in Washington with a senior government lawyer and, when asked, that official simply could not answer the question of why the Biden Administration would continue to uphold the longstanding and awkwardly hypocritical immunity interpretation, particularly in light of both the Russian actions against Ukraine and the Administration’s support for new laws that enable U.S. cooperation with the ICC to investigate Russian conduct. It also proves difficult to explain the ICC’s investigation, without any noticeable U.S. objection, of Myanmar officials, whose country is a non-party State, for atrocity crimes against the Rohingya who were persecuted and forcibly deported onto the territory of neighboring Bangladesh, a State Party, beginning in 2017. I firmly believe that whatever the merits of the immunity interpretation 25 years ago, it has been overtaken by the march of customary international law combining both state practice and opinio juris, by judicial decisions, by persuasive scholarly work, by a renewed recognition of fundamental principles of criminal law and of sovereign decision-making, and frankly by common sense. Related to the immunity interpretation is the debate playing out in Washington over the implementation of ICC cooperation legislation that President Biden signed into law on December 29, 2022. Administration officials have delivered tortured testimony before Senate committees in recent months when confronted by Senators over the failure of the Administration to follow through on cooperation efforts with the ICC that are mandated by U.S. law regarding the Court’s investigation of Russian atrocity crimes in Ukraine. In a recent Senate Appropriations defense subcommittee hearing, Senators Lindsay Graham (R-SC) and Dick Durbin (D-IL) pressed Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin on the Pentagon’s resistance to the legal mandate. Austin said that he was concerned about the issue of reciprocity. Such views are old think and reflect the concern that someday the tables will be turned and the ICC will be investigating and prosecuting U.S. actions and that we would not want other governments to cooperate with the ICC in its investigative work. The cooperation train left the station decades ago. All of America’s allies, with the exception of Israel and Turkey, are States Parties to the Rome Statute and are obligated to cooperate with ICC investigations. But there is no comparison in modern times with what is transpiring in Ukraine. Ambassador-at-Large for Global Criminal Justice Beth Van Schaack answered Austin quite effectively when asked on the PBS NewsHour recently. She said, “I think there is virtually no equivalency or comparison to what Russia has done here to anything that might involve U.S. personnel or service members. We have a full-scale war of aggression being committed through the systematic and widespread commission of war crimes, crimes against humanity. There’s no comparison here. And so I do not see a concern that this would set any sort of a precedent that might redound badly to the United States.” Austin’s statement also reflects a presumption that should be challenged. During the Clinton Administration, my instructions as the U.S. chief negotiator of the Rome Statute were based on the intent of building an international criminal court which the United States one day would join. The instructions were not to negotiate for six years to build a court that the United States would never join. When I signed the Rome Statute, the intent was to signal that the United States would remain on deck with the treaty and work towards one day joining the Court, not to stand in permanent opposition to it. President Bill Clinton conceded in his signing statement that the treaty would not (during Clinton’s remaining three weeks in office) and should not be submitted by his successor to the Senate until “fundamental concerns are satisfied,” a primary one being to “observe and assess the functioning of the court.” That opportunity to “observe and assess” began on July 1, 2002, when the ICC became operational following ratification of the Rome Statute by 60 nations. We have had 21 years to “observe and assess” and while there are some imperfections in the workings of the ICC, as there are with every legal system, the ICC’s professionalism and track record merit Washington’s respect. In any event, U.S. policy towards the ICC today should not be premised on, structured, or implemented as if the United States intends to be a permanent non-party State. Such isolation was never the Clinton Administration’s position and never reflected my negotiating instructions. The immunity interpretation was not advanced by the United States in order to permanently keep the United States out of the ICC, but rather to explain its status and non-exposure to ICC jurisdiction until Washington ratified the treaty. Otherwise, why did we negotiate and sign the treaty? Rationalizations for permanent non-party status may attract the support of those seeking that outcome, but such thinking defies all that was negotiated into the Rome Statute and its supplemental documents to protect U.S. interests, including due process protections, complementarity, Security Council backstop under Article 16, precise definitions of the crimes, judicial oversight of the Prosecutor’s investigations, tough admissibility standards, high approval requirements for amendments, precise rules of procedure and evidence, comprehensive elements of crimes, and much more. If the United States were to become a State Party of the Rome Statute, the immunity interpretation would become irrelevant—a non-issue—for the United States even if Washington wished to argue its merits for Israel, Turkey, Pakistan, North Korea, China, Iran, Myanmar, Libya, Egypt, Russia, Belarus, India, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Cuba, and other non-party States. Those who express concerns about “reciprocity” unfortunately convey an intimidated attitude about the ICC. Rather than be on the defensive about the ICC, the U.S. Government and particularly the Pentagon should take the offensive and recognize how the ICC in fact advances critical U.S. values, particularly against an aggressor State like Russia. The United States can weigh in and influence gravity requirements at the ICC and how the Prosecutor can best utilize his discretion, not to mention placing an American judge on the bench and perhaps one day greeting an American chief prosecutor. Washington can use its diplomatic clout to advance ICC investigative and prosecutorial objectives globally and in ways that are compatible with U.S. foreign policy and global security needs. The ICC should become part of this nation’s lawfare strategy. In other words, Washington should weaponize the ICC for worthy objectives—such as justice in Ukraine and Darfur—that reflect critical American values rather than taking an anemic defensive posture towards the Court. The Pentagon should embrace the duty of the law and when necessary justify the conduct of warfare to Congress, to the public, and even to the courts during the adjudication of relevant cases. A skeptical fear of being accused of atrocity crimes is a long way from the reality of credibly being investigated or prosecuted for such international crimes. The world has changed, and any presumption of the right to commit atrocity crimes, or to be shielded from accountability, is quite antiquated. If the U.S. military dared to plan and implement genocide, crimes against humanity, or serious war crimes anywhere in the world, then such action would demand investigation and prosecution at home with enforcement of federal and military law. Article 18 of the Rome Statute, which as a negotiator I proposed and largely drafted, is intended to give a country like the United States the opportunity to seize the reins of justice and hold onto them without interference by the ICC. We should take that option seriously if the need arises, but which actually should not arise because U.S. armed forces and indeed our civilian leadership should never be engaged in the planning and commission of atrocity crimes and certainly not of the magnitude that could trigger ICC jurisdiction. One has to think counter-intuitively to enter the world of ICC paranoia, namely that the United States must never become a State Party because it should be at liberty to act with permanent impunity as a non-party State or that the United States should be free to plan and commit atrocity crimes without consequence even if it were to become a State Party, so the Rome Statute should somehow permit that outcome. What do we have to fear from the ICC? I would argue that scenarios of illegal American conduct overseas or at home should never come to pass, but if they did, then the response must be first and foremost the enforcement of U.S. law, be it federal criminal law or the Uniform Code of Military Justice, or both, and adherence to Congressional oversight. The United States could become a pillar of complementarity and leadership in the ICC if some in Washington were not so intimidated by fear of ICC scrutiny. Lawmakers still have work to do on complementarity. For many years, Senator Durbin has advanced legislation to fill the gaps in federal criminal law for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. If the gaps can be filled, then the United States can demonstrate its capacity to investigate and prosecute the atrocity crimes found in the Rome Statute and thus, if addressed properly, avoid ICC scrutiny. This is the same goal shared by our allies, which are almost all States Parties to the Rome Statute, and many have amended their criminal codes accordingly. Durbin has almost reached the finish line. Laws of essentially universal jurisdiction have been adopted for commission of genocide and war crimes. The next step should be the Crimes Against Humanity bill, which Durbin introduced on July 12 as an amendment to S. 2226 authorizing appropriations for fiscal year 2024 for the Department of Defense.  One should not expect a mirror image of Article 7 of the Rome Statute in the Durbin bill, but if adopted it will be the first opportunity to bring crimes against humanity into the federal criminal code. Administration and Congressional negotiators should be able to get it over the finish line this year given the impetus afforded by the Russia-Ukraine war, the recent enactment of the Justice for Victims of War Crimes Act, and the new legal authority for cooperation with ICC investigations in Ukraine. Senator Charles Grassley of Iowa (R-IA) stepped forward in 2022 to co-sponsor the Justice for Victims of War Crimes Act and thus build bi-partisan support for it. Even though at present the United States is not a State Party to the Rome Statute, the consequence of these legislative acts would be that any Russian soldier or government official involved in atrocity crimes in Ukraine and who steps foot in the United States, including Disney World with his family, would risk arrest and prosecution in federal criminal court for the crime of genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity. Even though President Vladimir Putin, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, if they dared to visit the United States, could claim head of state immunity as the most senior officials of the Russian Government and thus avoid sustained arrest, the fact that a federal criminal indictment and an arrest warrant could be issued would present legal jeopardy and public shaming none of them may wish to risk.  Of course, if the United States were a State Party to the Rome Statute, any ICC arrest warrant against such individuals should be honored if they were to visit this country. In so many discussions I have had about the ICC and U.S. policy over the years, particularly dialogues with foreign scholars, lawyers, think tankers, diplomats, and journalists, there arises the constant refrain that American invocations about international criminal justice fall on deaf ears overseas, particularly in the Global South, because of the foreign perception of double standards. The complaint centers on the United States negotiating treaties like the Rome Statute that it then does not ratify. In their view, the U.S. military sometimes acts illegally on a large-scale, such as the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the use of torture in Afghanistan, foreign black sites, and Guantanamo during the so-called war on terror. These are very deep scars. While I was negotiating the Rome Statute, other negotiators often would press me in sidebar discussions about perceived American hypocrisy and the peculiar American failure to commit. They would remind me that they re-opened the Convention on the Law of the Sea at President Ronald Reagan’s insistence to revise the deep sea mining provisions. But once they met U.S. demands and ratified the treaty amendments, the United States never followed through with ratification of that critical treaty. And yet today our government relies heavily on the rights protected by that treaty, albeit claiming they are customary international law, to ensure U.S. commercial and military access on the seas. Our foreign friends are not pacified and are quite cynical. There is deep resentment that the United States intensively negotiates international treaties, signs many of them, and then often fails to follow through with ratification. The United States would begin to overcome the double-standards perception, which cripples our influence on so many fronts, including international criminal justice, if the U.S. Senate were to follow through on major treaties that the United States took the lead in negotiating and then often signed. These include the Convention on the Law of the Sea, Additional Protocols I and II of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, and, yes, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. All but one of these treaties have been languishing for decades. For example, it has been 23 years since the United States signed the Rome Statute. Despite some flaws in its performance, the ICC has demonstrated its credibility, competence, fairness in protecting due process rights, reasoned jurisprudence, and a mixture of convictions and acquittals. It also is demonstrating every day its relevance in a highly dynamic and violent world. All of Europe and Latin America, most of Africa, the Caribbean and Central America, and a good number of Asian and Pacific nations are committed to a credible ICC. White House and Congressional support for ICC investigations in Ukraine is an encouraging signal of more open minds about the ICC in the Executive Branch and on Capitol Hill. The Biden Administration should take the following steps now to advance American engagement with the ICC and pave the way for U.S. ratification of the Rome Statute: The Crimes Against Humanity bill should be navigated towards adoption in the Senate and the House of Representatives as a bipartisan initiative to close an increasingly inexplicable gap in federal criminal law and better insulate the United States from ICC scrutiny. The White House should signal its intention to sign an acceptable bill into law. The Biden Administration should undertake a thorough review of the American Service Members Protection Act and determine what provisions, if any, should remain U.S. law as the government considers ratification of the Rome Statute. The Biden Administration should cease use of the immunity interpretation when discussing the Rome Statute, the ICC, and U.S. policy. There is no need to explicitly reject the immunity interpretation, but there is an imperative need now to stop defining U.S. policy as being anchored in it. A simple explanation would be that the immunity interpretation no longer guides U.S. policy. The State Department should send a letter to the United Nations, as depository of the Rome Statute, to withdraw the George W. Bush Administration’s letter of May 6, 2002, which states the intention of the United States not to become a party to the Rome Statute and to abandon any obligations as a signatory party. Those statements undermine U.S. foreign policy objectives and are embarrassing even to read in 2023. The letter remains a beacon of hopelessness for other countries seeking to understand the U.S. posture towards the ICC. Fortunately, the U.S. signature has never been removed from the Rome Statute but no longer should be soiled by such statements. A fresh State Department letter would send a powerful signal that the United States is shedding this symbol of weakness. The United States should take the lead in the U.N. Security Council to ensure that the fresh investigation by the ICC Prosecutor of the recent atrocity crimes in Darfur can be fully resourced and supported by the Council under the UN Charter Chapter VII enforcement authority of UN Security Council Resolution 1593 of March 31, 2005, which referred the Darfur situation of 18 years ago to the ICC and which the United States enabled at the time. This would demonstrate that the Biden Administration not only is interested in supporting ICC investigations of the atrocity crimes in Ukraine but also is backing other designated ICC investigations, notably in Darfur. Further, the State Department should indicate its clear support for the ICC investigation of atrocity crimes committed against the Rohingya and seek Congressional authorization for that assistance, similar to what has been obtained for investigation of the Ukraine situation. The National Security Council should chair an inter-agency task force to draft “declarations” to the Rome Statute that would address key U.S. interests, including adherence to the U.S. Constitution and to full complementarity within the U.S. judicial system. Senators undoubtedly would craft their own declarations, and those would be critical to consider, in part to ensure that none of them rise to the level of reservations, which are prohibited by the Rome Statute to all States Parties. But the initiative to draft declarations, which many nations have employed for the Rome Statute, would be a pragmatic and constructive means to mold acceptable terms for ratification of the Rome Statute. President Biden should use the occasion of his address before the UN General Assembly in September to express his intention to take the necessary steps with consultations and legislation on Capitol Hill so that the United States can ratify the Rome Statute with bipartisan support in the U.S. Senate. (He will need 67 out of 100 votes to achieve U.S. ratification.) Everyone knows this will take time (likely years) to achieve but the stated intention will boost American credibility and blunt the double standards criticism that constrains U.S. foreign policy aims. My hope is that it will not take another 25 years before the United States is part of the International Criminal Court. The fact that it took the United States 40 years to ratify the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide is a dishonorable precedent in American history and we should strive not to repeat it. Atrocity crimes are the scourge of our times and the United States should be proudly and confidently at the forefront of bringing the perpetrators of such heinous acts to justice. This publication is part of the Diamonstein-Spielvogel Project on the Future of Democracy.
  • Artificial Intelligence (AI)
    AI Meets World, Part Two
    Podcast
    The rapid emergence of artificial intelligence (AI) has brought lawmakers and industry leaders to the same conclusion: regulation is necessary to ensure the technology changes the world for the better. The similarities could end there, as governments and industry clash on what those laws should do, and different governments take increasingly divergent approaches. What are the stakes of the debate over AI regulation?
  • International Law
    Congress Should Close the ‘Crimes Against Humanity’ Loophole
    The last Congress delivered a big win for atrocity accountability by passing the Justice for Victims of War Crimes Act, which President Joe Biden signed into law in January of this year. The law closed several critical loopholes in U.S. law on atrocity crimes, adding jurisdiction over war crimes committed abroad when the perpetrator is present in the United States, regardless of the nationality of the perpetrator or victim, and eliminating the statute of limitations for most war crimes (a significant practical barrier to enforcement). These changes brought U.S. law far closer to its obligations under international law, including the Geneva Conventions. While there has not previously been a U.S. prosecution using the war crimes statute, the numerous examples of individuals accused of war crimes ending up in the United States suggest that with due attention and resources, these changes can bolster the United States’ ability to deliver some measure of justice to more victims of atrocities. But even with progress on war crimes, current U.S. law still severely limits the role U.S. courts can play in holding perpetrators of atrocity crimes accountable because of a significant gap in the legal framework for crimes against humanity (which often occur outside of any war context). Crimes against humanity involve a specific set of grave human rights violations committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population (more on that below). If the United States is serious about fighting impunity for the repeated patterns of atrocities committed in Ukraine and many other situations around the world, it should close the crimes against humanity loophole in U.S. law as soon as possible. Momentum for Atrocity Accountability The political will to finally reform U.S. law on war crimes stemmed in large part from bipartisan efforts in both Congress and the executive branch to ensure working paths exist to pursue accountability for atrocities committed in Ukraine. In a September Senate Judiciary Committee hearing, DOJ and DHS officials testified that addressing gaps in U.S. law would expand the tools available to U.S. authorities, and expand access to justice for victims of atrocities, without which the United States would effectively be a “safe haven” for certain types of human rights violators. The hearing raised several other shortcomings of U.S. law on atrocities (including clarifying the extraterritorial applicability of the Alien Tort Statute, the subject of another proposed bill last session that did not advance). Though the hearing again demonstrated bipartisan interest in expanding U.S. jurisdiction over war crimes and crimes against humanity, only the war crimes fixes were achieved during that session, leaving the void for crimes against humanity intact and U.S. agencies and courts without adequate options to provide justice for victims of those crimes. Several experts, civil society coalitions, professional associations, and human rights advocates have repeatedly raised the problem (including a Working Group on Crimes Against Humanity within the American Bar Association chaired by Ambassador Scheffer). An initial bill was introduced by Senator Dick Durbin and colleagues in 2010 (past hearings here, here, here). Since then, cases pursued in some of the many national jurisdictions that already have crimes against humanity laws have provided compelling evidence of their utility: there have been multiple prosecutions of ISIS members in Germany for crimes committed against the Yezidis, cases filed by victims’ advocates in Argentina for crimes committed against the Rohingya and Uyghurs, and criminal cases against Syrian regime officials, all for crimes against humanity. In fact, crimes against humanity was the most common charge (66) found in Trial International’s 2022 report on universal jurisdiction cases, compared to 34 war crimes and 25 genocide charges. Despite their frequency and despite consistent U.S. policy supporting atrocity accountability and prosecutions abroad, the U.S. government does not have its own legal authority to criminally prosecute perpetrators of crimes against humanity, even when alleged perpetrators are in the United States. This leaves a unique category of atrocities vulnerable to impunity. The Crimes Against Humanity Gap in U.S. Law A patchwork of U.S. law currently gives federal authorities the tools to prosecute perpetrators of war crimes (bolstered by the legislative updates described above), genocide, and the specific crimes of recruitment/use of child soldiers and torture, which now all include jurisdiction when the offender is present in the United States (among other jurisdictional bases, coverage of which remains inconsistent among the statutes). Of those statutory tools, only the torture statute has so far been used to pursue criminal accountability in the United States (Ross Roggio, Michael Sang Correa, Charles “Chuckie” Taylor,  Jr., the only conviction so far, and Sulejman Mujagic, who was charged but extradited). Additional existing federal laws punish isolated crimes (such as individual acts of murder) in limited circumstances, but these laws often do not cover crimes committed abroad, even when perpetrators are found in the United States. Because of these limitations, prosecutors often resort to using immigration violations such as fraud and false statements (the utility of which is also limited by statutes of limitation) to prosecute and/or remove suspected international criminals from the United States. In many of these cases, involvement in crimes against humanity form the basis of the fraud allegations and evidence outlined in court. As one example, Liberian warlord Mohammed Jabbateh was convicted of immigration fraud and perjury in 2018 rather than for the most serious crimes that victim testimony demonstrated he and his fighters committed against civilians (murder, enslavement and sexual enslavement, torture, conscription of child soldiers, persecution, and other inhumane acts—all amounting to crimes against humanity) during Liberia’s first civil war. These efforts can physically remove perpetrators from U.S. soil, but they often do not result in appropriate penalties fitting the scale and criminality of atrocities. Prosecuting the conduct that constitutes atrocities as “common” crimes or through immigration violations, as a sort of workaround, does not adequately recognize and respond to the unique social harm and extent of victimization inflicted on communities through widespread, systematic atrocities, and may not elicit the perpetrator’s full culpability. And although some alleged perpetrators have been prosecuted for crimes against humanity or other crimes in their home countries after being deported, others have not and thus may escape justice altogether. Lastly, as Ambassador Scheffer has previously noted, the lack of crimes against humanity provisions in the U.S. legal framework also means that if Americans are allegedly involved in crimes against humanity, either as perpetrators or as victims, the United States’ inability to investigate and prosecute those atrocities at the appropriate level of gravity could mean that there will either be no accountability for those crimes, or that prosecutions will be pursued in other legal venues, such as in the national courts of other countries or international tribunals with jurisdiction, rather than U.S. courts. Crimes Against Humanity Laws Respond to Atrocity Situations that War Crimes Laws and Genocide Do Not As defined in Article 7 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), crimes against humanity include certain acts (such as killing, extermination, torture, sexual violence, and persecution) when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against the civilian population. Crimes against humanity can include attacks against civilians during war (and therefore may overlap in part with war crimes), but they also cover a distinct set of crimes that occur in “peacetime,” leaving many cases unaddressed by war crimes laws (see USCIRF’s Legislation Factsheet). Crimes against humanity also uniquely recognize the use of a State or organizational policy to attack civilians, which Ambassador Beth Van Schaack noted in written testimony makes crimes against humanity laws “critical” for promoting accountability for senior leaders, who “are often instrumental in the design and execution of the state or organizational policy through which mass atrocities are committed.” And crimes against humanity include many atrocities that do not fit the limited technical legal definition of genocide. Research by Professor Leila Sadat has found that many modern atrocities are solely prosecuted as crimes against humanity — 30% of ICC cases have included only crimes against humanity charges. Because elements of crimes against humanity also often manifest as indicators and precursor acts for other atrocities, occurring before the onset of armed conflicts or more developed plans to destroy entire populations (what Sadat has called an “atrocity cascade”), crimes against humanity laws are also important tools for atrocity prevention. War Crimes War crimes, in contrast, are limited to serious violations of international humanitarian law occurring in the context of an armed conflict (drawn from various international legal sources including the Hague Conventions, Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols). Even with recent legislative changes, the provisions of the U.S. Code on war crimes do not include all war crimes under international law, and some were also decriminalized through the Military Commissions Act of 2006. Rome Statute Article 8 contains an extensive illustrative list of war crimes, but it also demonstrates key challenges in their prosecution, which first requires a determination that violence has risen to the level of an “armed conflict,” and then whether the armed conflict is “international” or “non-international” in order to determine which exact rules apply as well as a potential nexus of the relevant conduct to the conflict. What’s more, as Ambassador Stephen Rapp previously noted, courts may deem crimes committed far from the “battlefield” not to be “war crimes,” even when they occur during an armed conflict. Those same challenges do not arise for crimes against humanity. Crimes against humanity charges can also cover unique conduct of comparable gravity to war crimes. The crime of forced marriage, for example, which often occurs within the context of armed conflicts, but is not well captured by enumerated war crimes, has been successfully prosecuted in international courts as a crime against humanity (most recently in the Ongwen case at the ICC). Additional examples include post-election violence (e.g., ICC investigations in Kenya and Cote D’Ivoire); violence against peaceful protestors (e.g., 2009 stadium massacre in Guinea); and mass killings, enforced disappearance, torture, and deportation outside of armed conflicts (e.g., extra-judicial killings as part of the Philippines so-called “war on drugs,” or torture committed against perceived political opponents in Venezuela, or post-coup crimes in Myanmar). Genocide The challenges in prosecuting atrocities as genocide have been clearly articulated by experts (ex. here, here, here, here, here), and research on past U.S. atrocity determinations. Those challenges include the difficulty obtaining sufficient evidence of the highly specific “intent to destroy” a population as well as the limited protected groups covered by the Genocide Convention. Whether an atrocity qualifies as a genocide is often the subject of much public debate, government deliberation, and even judicial deliberation, with questions over classification sometimes clouding the atrocity response. Importantly, it is very likely that acts falling short of the threshold or specific circumstances recognized as genocide within international law would constitute crimes against humanity. The crime of persecution, for example, has existed in international criminal law since the Nuremberg trials, and as part of the law of subsequent international tribunals including the ICC. Like the crime of genocide, the crime against humanity of persecution focuses on acts committed against particular groups based on perceived identity, with discriminatory intent (a lower threshold than the “specific intent to destroy” required for genocide), yet covers more recognized grounds (political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender or other grounds that are “universally recognized as impermissible under international law”) than the crime of genocide. Numerous past cases have exemplified the utility of crimes against humanity at capturing atrocities that were difficult to include within the limited definition of genocide, such as atrocities by the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia against particular political or social groups (not protected groups under the Genocide Convention); and the ICTR Media Case, where charges of persecution as a crimes against humanity allowed prosecutors to include broadcasts by Hutu extremists that helped direct the killing of Hutus politically-aligned with Tutsis. Present day examples include mass violence against political, social, or other groups not covered by the Genocide Convention or where evidence of genocidal intent is difficult to obtain (e.g., extensive crimes against the Uyghurs, which a UN’s report suggested “may constitute international crimes, in particular crimes against humanity”) and gender-based persecution (e.g., escalating attacks on rights of women and girls in Afghanistan), among others. Impact on Accountability for Crimes Against Humanity in Ukraine and Beyond The crimes against humanity loophole in U.S. law leaves the United States unprepared to deal with the slate of potential atrocities occurring in Ukraine and other situations, leaving the United States a safe harbor for perpetrators who come into U.S. jurisdiction. As exemplified above, there are many atrocity crimes not covered by war crimes or genocide statutes, for which having a crimes against humanity statute would be necessary to secure criminal accountability. One does not need to look hard for examples of these crimes occurring in ongoing atrocity situations today. In Ukraine, for example, the OSCE mission of experts’ reports have already concluded that some patterns of violence committed in Ukraine (“targeted killing, rape, abductions, or massive deportations of civilians”) qualified as widespread or systematic attacks against a civilian population likely to constitute crimes against humanity. In 2020, before the invasion, the previous ICC Prosecutor had already found a reasonable basis to believe that war crimes and crimes against humanity had been committed in Ukraine as part of earlier situations, including alleged crimes such as persecution on political grounds and enforced disappearances occurring “in the context of the period leading up to and during the (ongoing) occupation of Crimea.” With the war ongoing, we cannot say for sure that all international crimes committed related to the conflict will be best captured by criminal laws on war crimes alone. Is the systematic targeting of certain groups of Ukrainian civilians, for example, better captured by crimes against humanity charges? Would attacks and violence against activists or dissidents critical of the war or against other persecuted groups within Russia, for which different officials might be highly responsible, rise to the level of crimes against humanity?  Could the “filtration system” and systematic deportation of Ukrainians to Russia, or crimes committed against Ukrainians after their deportation ,best be captured by crimes against humanity? Department of Justice Director of Human Rights Enforcement Strategy and Policy and Counselor for War Crimes Accountability Eli Rosenbaum raised this last concern during the September 2022 hearing (see recording at 1:27:50), noting the possibility that potential ambiguities in other areas of international law make this “another instance in which it would be very helpful to have crimes against humanity on American law books at long last.” Critically, we do not know which perpetrators or victims of atrocities may end up in the United States and fall under U.S. jurisdiction, when perpetrators already in the country will be recognized by law enforcement or even victim communities, or for which specific crimes U.S. law enforcement authorities will be able to obtain sufficient evidence. Having statutes on genocide and war crimes but not crimes against humanity unnecessarily ties the hands of U.S. investigators and prosecutors when opportunities arise. Closing loopholes in the legal framework is therefore one way that the United States can stand up for justice in Ukraine and beyond. Conclusion There is no hierarchy of atrocity crimes. Genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity all describe and capture different forms of criminal conduct the international community has deemed unacceptable under any circumstances.  Crimes against humanity focuses on heinous crimes systematically targeting civilians on a massive scale, through abuses of power by States or other organizations. Just as the crime of genocide is an important repudiation of attempts to destroy communities, crimes against humanity also has important expressive value: it elicits truth about the scale of planning and preparation, recognizes unique harm and the targeting of protected groups, and includes acts that fall outside the technical bounds of genocide or war crimes, yet are atrocities nonetheless. Closing the loophole on crimes against humanity in U.S. law would combat the perception that the same universal international legal obligations do not apply to all countries equally, or that victims of some crimes are more deserving of justice than others. And when human rights activists and experts in Ukraine are advocating for Ukraine to shore up their own domestic law on atrocities, correcting a critical flaw in U.S. law only strengthens U.S. credibility and ability to lead. Such a legislative reform would make good on expressed commitments to pursue justice, as updating the war crimes statute did, and help ensure that perpetrators of any atrocities cannot find a safe haven in the United States. It would also give U.S. government lawyers the tools they need to effectuate investigations and deliver justice for victims, including when the U.S. government  has special if not unique access to witnesses, evidence, or the perpetrators themselves. The United States was instrumental in drafting definitions of crimes against humanity as part of the post-WWII Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals, and as part of its leadership in negotiating the statutes of international ad hoc tribunals and the ICC Statute. During recent diplomatic discussions on a potential crimes against humanity treaty in 2021 and 2022, the United States delegation said the absence of a treaty addressing crimes against humanity was a “critical gap in the international legal framework” that the United States “strongly believe[d] should be addressed.” It is past time to live up to that commitment and fill the crimes against humanity gap in the United States’ own law. Disclaimer: The views expressed herein represent the opinions of the authors. They have not been reviewed or approved by the House of Delegates or the Board of Governors of the American Bar Association and, accordingly, should not be construed as representing the position of the Association or any of its entities.
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