Media Briefing: What Comes Next After Trump’s Deadline for Putin

CFR experts from the Council’s Special Initiative on Securing Ukraine’s Future will discuss potential U.S. actions if Russian President Vladimir Putin rejects U.S. President Donald Trump’s demands for a ceasefire deal and what options remain to end the war in Ukraine.

STARES: Good day, everyone. Welcome to this Council on Foreign Relations media briefing on what comes next after Trump’s deadline for Russia, which after yesterday’s announcement should perhaps now be just called what happens next week. Thank you for joining us today. 

My name is Paul Stares, as Lilly said. I’m a senior fellow here in conflict prevention, as well as coordinator of the Council’s Special Initiative on Securing Ukraine’s Future. 

So I think it’s fair to say that the timing of today’s briefing could not be better. Much has happened in the last twenty-four hours regarding the diplomacy surrounding the conflict in Ukraine. President Trump had set tomorrow as the deadline for Russia to demonstrate real progress in reaching a ceasefire with Ukraine or suffer additional sanctions and potentially punishing secondary tariffs on those who trade with Russia. But at the meeting yesterday in Moscow between White House envoy Steve Witkoff and President Putin, the Russians have proposed a bilateral summit between President Trump and Putin to be scheduled sometime next week at a location still to be revealed. As we’re still trying to ascertain whether this meeting will actually take place—there’s some speculation that it’s a conditional acceptance on the part of the U.S., and that it will only go ahead if there is a meeting that also involves President Zelensky of Ukraine—but we can talk about this as we get into the discussion. 

So we have much to discuss today. I’m joined by a stellar group of CFR scholars to try to make sense of what just happened and what it could presage next week. In the interests of time, I will not give detailed biographical information on my colleagues but just their title here. Tom Graham is distinguished fellow here focusing on Russia principally. Steve Sestanovich is the George F. Kennan senior fellow for Russian and Eurasian studies. Heidi Crebo-Rediker is senior fellow at the Center for Geoeconomic Studies. And, finally, Liana Fix is the fellow for Europe here too at the Council on Foreign Relations. 

As usual in these media briefings, I will engage in a conversation amongst the experts for about twenty, twenty-five minutes, and then we will open it up for Q&A. Just a reminder that we are on the record and the transcript of this meeting will be posted on CFR.org after the session has concluded. 

OK. Let’s get to it. Maybe we turn to you first, Tom. So what just happened? You know, this extraordinary turn of events, did anybody anticipate this? Do people just think this is simply a stalling tactic by Putin to put off the imposition of additional U.S. sanctions, as threatened by President Trump? Or should we be expecting a significant shift in Russia’s position on ceasefire negotiations, assuming, of course, this summit does go ahead? 

GRAHAM: Well, I would say the answer to that question, Paul, is none of the above. You know, we don’t know what Steve Witkoff brought to Moscow or what the Kremlin and Putin in particular is reacting to.  

If I were guessing I would say that what Witkoff brought was some outline of a negotiating position that dealt with what Putin has called repeatedly the root causes of the conflict: no NATO membership for Ukraine, Ukraine’s demilitarization, the recognition of the territories that Russia has already annexed and so on, and an indication that the United States is prepared to seriously negotiate those matters and also has some ideas on how you might bridge the gap between what the Russian positions are and what the clearly stated Ukrainian positions are. 

That, it would seem to me, would be sufficient for the Kremlin to say, well, you know, we need to have a further discussion and what the presidential meeting would be about in the next week or the coming weeks, if it indeed comes to fruition, is an agreement between the two presidents on what a roadmap going forward is that would lead to a negotiation of what you might call a framework agreement for this conflict but also agreement that at some point a ceasefire will take place. 

So that, I think, would be sufficient for the Kremlin. That’s not a change in Russia’s position. It’s not a change in Putin’s position, but it’s movement forward towards what the Kremlin has been looking for over the past seven months from the Trump administration.  

STARES: You’ve written about the need for this kind of framework agreement as a precondition. Maybe that’s not the right term for serious negotiations, and I think you’ve written about it. We can put your piece in the chat. Could you just say a little bit more about the parameters here that you think would be acceptable as a basis for further negotiations?  

GRAHAM: Right. I mean, the framework agreement is supposed to lay out a set of principles and parameters for a final settlement. It’s a type of agreement that’s used—has been used to resolve other types of conflicts in the past.  

The key point here is that the principles and parameters would have to be agreed by both sides. That means Russia and Ukraine, and so you would try to find some bridging language on—that would answer Russia’s concern about Ukrainian membership in NATO but at the same time also provide Ukraine the type of security guarantees that you’ll be looking for.  

You try to find a formula that in fact can lead to a ceasefire along the line of contact at this point with the understanding that Russia is not going to be driven from the territory that it occupies at this point, but nobody is going to recognize de jure Russia’s control of that territory. 

You have issues on nondiscrimination against Russians, which could be reciprocated by nondiscrimination against Ukrainians in Russia, for example, but some types of compromise formulas that bridge the gap.  

The most difficult one is going to be the question of Ukraine’s demilitarization. The fundamental, I think, difference between the United States and Russia, at least I hope between the United States and Russia, is what you might call the status of that part of Ukraine that’s not controlled by Russia physically at the end of this conflict. 

Russia, clearly, wants that Ukraine to be a satellite, something along the lines of what Belarus enjoys with Ukraine today. We should want a sovereign and independent Ukraine—that is, a Ukraine that has the right to decide its own geopolitical orientation and has the right to develop sufficient military forces to guarantee its own security.  

That, I think, is the fundamental gap. I don’t know how the two sides would bridge that but I would imagine that that is where the real crux of any negotiation would come into play and, obviously, that is not a matter simply for Moscow and Washington. That is clearly a matter where he has to be directly involved, and also our European allies.  

STARES: Just a final follow-up question for you, Tom. So, if this goes sideways—either because Steve Witkoff didn’t understand the conditions for Putin to sit down with President Trump and the meeting doesn’t take place, or the summit takes place but just doesn’t end well—what happens next, in your best estimate? You know, are we really kind of entering into a very different and dangerous phase in U.S.-Russia relations? You know, it was only a few days ago after all that President Trump was talking about repositioning U.S. nuclear submarines in response to very, you know, inflammatory comments by Mr. Medvedev. 

GRAHAM: Yeah, look—I mean obviously it would be a tremendous setback for the relationship at this point. I would feel quite confident saying there won’t be a meeting unless there’s something substantive to agree to at this point. Whether, you know, Witkoff conveyed properly to the Russian side what the conditions were for this meeting or not, we don’t know, in part because we don’t know what the conditions exactly were. 

But a failure at this point for the presidents to meet and agree on something substantive obviously will be a significant setback, and will probably I think put a lot of pressure on the White House to reconsider how it wants to move forward in the relationship with Russia.  

STARES: OK. 

Let me now turn to Steve Sestanovich to give us a better sense of Ukraine’s equities here and interests. You know, I think we’ve all been watching in horror what’s happening to Ukraine over the summer. It’s been frankly a punishing summer for them. They’ve lost ground in the east; their cities are being pounded relentlessly. A public opinion poll just recently released—I think today, in fact—shows that close to 70 percent now of Ukrainians favor a negotiated settlement of some kind to bring an end to the fighting or some kind of ceasefire. This is a bug change I think in Ukrainian public opinion over the last year. You know, we still don’t know, for he reasons we just talked about, whether there is going to be a three-way meeting involving President Zelensky as well as Putin and Trump.  

Can you give us a sense of how you think Ukraine is going to manage this situation? How best they should think about managing this situation? Because, you know, the stakes could not be higher for them.  

SESTANOVICH: Thanks, Paul. 

You’re right, the experience that the Ukrainians have had, particularly in dealing with the Trump administration this year, has been a kind of rollercoaster, and sometimes the ups and downs have occurred within a single day or week or month.  

It’s important I think to remember some of the positives for them, though. They have gained confidence that they can conduct an effective policy to sustain and expand U.S. support. That’s reflected in their deal on minerals, in personal meetings, in the readiness of the U.S. to sell weapons—paid for by Europeans.  

But at the same time, they’ve gotten more anxious about a number of trends that you mentioned—military setbacks, their own political divisions, these demonstrations about the anticorruption bureaus, societal exhaustion. 

By the way, on that poll, just as many people said that, while they were in favor of an end to the war—a negotiated end to the war, they didn’t think it was going to happen.  

STARES: Anytime soon, yeah. 

SESTANOVICH: And it’s not clear that they’re in favor of a particularly one-sided deal or one at any price.  

But there is a real societal exhaustion—anybody who visits there can tell you that—economic stringency, and maybe above all, continuing displays of erratic, unpredictable, chaotic American policymaking. And in the past week you’ve had all of these things together. You’ve had new Russian military advances; you’ve had new agreements in which European governments have promised to bankroll cooperation in the defense industry. And you know—and, of course—(laughs)—above all you’ve had the latest lurch in Russian-American negotiations, with the possibility of a new round of meetings, of summit-level meetings, and with the possibility that Ukraine will be left out, and European leaders too. 

So where does this leave the Ukrainian leadership? I’d say they have a, you know, four-point to-do list, really, to drive home their messages, which were right there on social media yesterday as Zelensky was reacting to these calls and announcements. You know, the message that they need an honest end to the war, a real ceasefire, and that—you know, and they’re not—(laughs)—confident that that’s what the U.S. and Russia have been talking about. 

So the first item on the to-do list is mobilize European leaders to toughen Trump’s thinking on the question. You’ve already had calls between Zelensky, and Macron, and Ursula von der Leyen. 

Second, they hope to—their friends in Congress can weigh in. Over the last couple of months there’s been a lot of attention to Senator Lindsey Graham and Richard Blumenthal’s bill on sanctions. The bill isn’t workable, but the—but the expression of congressional support is important to Ukraine. 

STARES: Right. 

SESTANOVICH: Third, they want to play on Trump’s fears that he’s being jerked around. He, obviously, has voiced that more of late. 

And they want to sustain domestic unity. 

They have—for all of these audiences, their message is—they want to argue that meetings make no sense unless they are—there are also actions taken by Ukraine and friendly governments to increase their leverage; that the leverage they have right now is not going to produce a good negotiated outcome and probably no negotiated outcome. 

And, secondly, they want to convey to all these audiences that if a meeting takes place that Putin emerges as the obstacle to peace. And that is—you know, that’s a—this is a tall order right now, but I think their experience over the past several months has given them some kind of confidence that they can deliver that message to audiences that are prepared to help them. 

STARES: And if there is no significant progress next week and maybe Trump is, you know, once again angered by what he sees as Putin procrastination or just dissembling on all kinds of issues, do you see the sentiment, particularly on the Hill, changing in favor of sort of turning back the spigot on, you know, major financial and military aid to Ukraine? Is that—do you think that’s likely, even if things really do go sideways next week? 

SESTANOVICH: You know, it’s a really interesting question, Paul, because the administration has signaled that it’s not willing to go to Congress to get more aid or even to use its drawdown authority—existing drawdown authority—to send more weapons. They’re prepared to sell weapons that Europeans paid for. But they’ve never really explained the reason for this. 

And I think one question that will arise if you have the spotlight on Putin as the obstacle to peace and an agreement that you need more leverage will—you know, the question in Congress will be, well, why aren’t we—why aren’t we pushing for more—for more assistance? 

STARES: Right. 

SESTANOVICH: But you can—there are other ways in which assistance can be accelerated. That is just—you know, if the Europeans are prepared to pay, as they say they are and as they’ve vividly demonstrated this week, you can accelerate deliveries. You can—you can move forward in a number of ways. 

But the—there are going to be plenty of other issues that arise quite apart from, you know, your formula about increasing aid and opening the spigot. You know, questions like: Do we have a change in our attitude toward seizing Russian assets? Does the U.S. join the G-7 consensus on lowering the price gap on Russian energy exports? There are a lot of different subjects that will come up for discussion once a Putin meeting—a Putin-Trump meeting has taken place. 

STARES: Right. Well, that’s a good segue to you, Heidi. Now, I’m assuming if there—if the summits don’t take place and that is attributed to Russian obstructionism, then we will see President Trump moving ahead with what he’s threatened to do: more sanctions, secondary tariffs on those who trade with Russia. He’s already put an extra 25 percent on top of a pretty punitive 25 percent that was set for India because of their purchase of Russian oil, which he sees as financing—I think term he used—the “Russian war machine.” 

So tell us, you know, if—give us kind of the two potential trajectories. If things do not work out, how will, you know—what impact will these sanctions have? A lot of people think Russia is very close to being at the limit of being able to sustain the war economically and financially. Others say, no, there’s still a lot of margin there. But also talk about the secondary tariffs and how realistic they truly are, given we’re talking about India and China here. So unpack it in the way I’ve laid out and we can discuss further. 

CREBO-REDIKER: (Off mic)—tariffs right now are primarily going after the export and export revenues that Russia benefits from in oil, gas, and petroleum products. It’s really the lifeblood of Russia’s economy, and it is fueling the war, and it’s fueling, therefore, the military-industrial complex and all of the ability to gear up additional military capacity against Ukraine. 

So just to unpack the sanctions versus the secondary tariffs, the secondary tariffs are really a new tool; we haven’t used them before. And we saw—we saw the first—the first line of attack against India yesterday announced. So the reciprocal tariffs, as you mentioned, the 25 percent kicked in against India, but President Trump also said in twenty-one days that an additional 25 percent would be—would be added because India is a significant if not the largest importer of Russian—of Russian oil. So the secondary tariffs, they are—in part because, you know, what President Trump said, India’s not only buying massive amounts of Russian oil—it went from being, really, a non-player in Russian imports pre-invasion of Ukraine—but they are—you know, they’re buying the oil, they’re refining it—so there are Indian refinery—a refinery—refining Russian product, and then they’re exporting it, as Trump said, on open markets. But it’s really—it’s really, you know, primarily, I think, to Europe, as well as to some—to some other countries. So you do have this profiteering off of the cheap, discounted Russian oil exports, and that is—that seemed to be one of the big triggers for Trump. 

I will say that the fact that he went after India and not China is really telling. China does have that trump card in the rare earth and rare earth magnets that it will continue to play, and they really do have a chokehold on the U.S. in really any kind of aggressive behavior that we take against China. So I do think that, you know, in the context of putting China in a separate bucket whereas they are one of the biggest buyers of Russian—(laughs)—of Russian crude as well is a—is a big question mark. You could add Turkey to that—to that equation as well. And then the Indians raised, of course, that the EU and, you know, particularly Hungary and Slovakia are also buyers of Russian petroleum. It’s a big—it’s a big deal. We’ll see how it impacts, importantly, the U.S. relationship with India, which also has a long standing relationship with Russia as previously not an energy importer but is a big importer of Russian arms previously.  

So as to the sanctions and to the Graham bill that you referenced, it’s really on hold. Congress is in recess right now. Everything is in Trump’s camp right now. If he wants to impose secondary tariffs or sanctions he will take that upon himself to do and so it’s kind of balancing how he wants to manage those relationships—India, China, Turkey, others in the secondary tariff dance that we have right now. I would say, you know, unfortunately, I think it’s really set back our strategic relationship with India quite a bit.  

STARES: Steve mentioned the frozen assets issue. And there’s—obviously, the largest pull is in European hands; Belgium, I think specifically. There’s also some held in the U.S. and some people actually think it’s much larger than the—I think the 5 billion (dollars) that has been made public.  

Where do things stand in terms of trying to repurpose those frozen assets, especially if the sentiment truly shifts decisively next week if there is no real progress? Can we expect that they’re going to be much more serious about unfreezing those assets and using them to help Ukraine down the road? 

CREBO-REDIKER: So legally the assets that are primarily, as you mentioned, held in the EU by Euroclear are—belong to Russia. And so while the G-7 froze and moved to—G-7+ froze about 300 billion (dollars) in Russian sovereign assets they immobilized them. They actually took it upon themselves to in mid-’24 back a 50 billion (dollars) loan to Ukraine using the extraordinary revenue.  

So the revenue that was being generated from those assets rather than the assets themselves, and the U.S. is contributing and contributed about 20 billion (dollars) to those and that was transferred through the World Bank.  

And so the interest and profits, again, from the frozen assets are being used to service and repay the loan. I think that, you know, the U.S.—so Congress has already given the authority to the president through something called the REPO Act in April of ’24. It gives the president authority to seize and transfer the assets.  

As far as I’m aware and the people that I’ve spoken with, the 5 billion (dollars) is a real number. It’s not a made up number. You can’t really inflate it a whole lot more credibly.  

But those assets have still not been activated or, you know, “seized,” quote/unquote, and I don’t believe that President Trump will take that action. President Biden didn’t. It was around the legal challenges around it.  

Congressman French Hill has been a big supporter of, you know, the Europeans going and seizing those assets and using them as he has in the U.S. and I think, you know, Chancellor Merz came out and said—and I’ll defer to Liana on the German perspective—but he said they will confiscate if it is legally possible, which was a bit of a bob and a weave because I think if it were legally possible we’d have done it a long time ago. 

STARES: Already. OK. 

Finally, to you, Liana. Steve referred to Ukraine feeling like they’ve been on a roller coaster and I think it’s fair to say the Europeans have, too. I think at the beginning of the Trump administration there were some serious fears that there would be some kind of U.S.-Russia rapprochement, which would come at theirs and Ukraine’s expense, and I think then the pendulum swung back to mixed metaphors, and once Trump started hardening his views on Putin and there was, I think, a general relief that, you know, a decisive turn had been made which would align more closely with Europe’s interest.  

But now we’ve seen this latest development and could you give us a sense of how the Europeans are looking on these latest developments? Do they fear that they could essentially be cut out of the end game if that does, indeed, happen, since there’s been no talk other than coordinating with them and consulting with them of involving them in any kind of ceasefire process? So give us a sense of what the Europeans are saying at the moment about recent developments.  

FIX: Yeah. So there’s definitely confusion among Europeans and we see that in some hectic phone diplomacy that was taking place among European leaders after their phone call with Donald Trump when he announced that he has made some progress and there would be a meeting.  

So there are two readings of the situations from a European side. The one reading says, well, this is Putin having the upper hand when he suggests a meeting with Donald Trump. This is a way of further delaying pressure on Russia. 

And there’s another reading that says, well, this is actually Trump having the other the upper hand. This meeting suggestion by Vladimir Putin is a way—is a concession by the Russian side, in a way, to avoid sanctions and to avoid further pressure. 

Anyway, the takeaway for Europeans from the last couple of meetings but also from meetings years ago is that if they are not in the room things usually go sideways and that applies both for Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin being alone in a meeting as well as Donald Trump and President Zelensky being alone in a meeting.  

So the concern of Europeans that they are not part of negotiations at the beginning, which was primarily driven by their own sense of pride being at the table, has really given way to some serious influence campaigns that the Europeans have tried to do to make sure that Donald Trump has a view on the Russian president, a view of the situation in Ukraine, that helps putting pressure on Russia.  

We see that—we will probably see this also in the run-up to a potential meeting that is taking place. So the first line of influence that Europeans will try is that they will reinforce the message that a meeting alone between Trump and Putin would not be sufficient, that it needs to be a trilateral meeting between Trump, Putin, and Zelensky or a meeting with Putin and Zelensky needs to be in the works.  

That’s something where they can tell Donald Trump very clearly if you don’t get Vladimir Putin to do that he is, again, just delaying and not following your lead.  

The other axis of influence that Europeans can take is they can try to shape the outcome of those negotiations and I think the most important talking point that they have used in the past, which was successful, is that a ceasefire has to be a real ceasefire—that it can’t be a temporary ceasefire or partial ceasefire that Russia would then, clearly, break again after some period of time, which would humiliate Donald Trump in return.  

And the third point that they will want to shape for the outcome of these discussions but also for the aftermath is that there’s no way that the outcome of these meetings can be that Ukraine doesn’t receive any weapons anymore from Europeans or from the U.S. side.  

So the demilitarization of Ukraine—the supply of weapons—is the most important part from a European perspective, perhaps even more important than keeping sanctions in place, because they perceive this as the only way how Ukraine and how Europe can prevent a renewed attack from Vladimir Putin.  

So what Europeans actually need to achieve is frame this meeting in a useful way. I have been joking that ideally they show up in the same city coincidentally as the meeting takes place, and even if they’re not in the room they could be in the same city to help shape some of the discussions, be the first to talk to Donald Trump after that meeting.  

But in the long term what the Europeans need is a long-term agreement with the United States that Europe can buy weapons for Ukraine not only now, not only ad hoc as with the five Patriots, but also in the long time. That’s the most important outcome that Europeans would like to see.  

STARES: So, you know, we talk about the Europeans as a kind of unified, coherent whole but as we all really know there’s big divisions amongst them about how to proceed. Is Europe going to maintain a common front here for long if things go off in a very different direction than we hope?  

FIX: So, surprisingly, there has been a common front, perhaps a stronger common front than expected the last couple of months, and the reason for that is that Europeans were not only concerned about Ukraine but also about their own security.  

So the reasoning is if Ukraine fails then we are next, and who knows if Donald Trump will come to our help if Ukraine is resolved in a positive way with Vladimir Putin. And we actually have seen even Viktor Orbán from Hungary complain that Donald Trump has not been strong enough with European leaders. He said the problem is not the Russians or the Ukrainians; it’s actually that Donald Trump has not been able to—what from his perspective is an anti-Russian stance by Europeans that want to continue supplying Ukraine with weapons. So we see that even those populists who are clearly siding with the Russian president have not seen the gains and are frustrated by a relatively common and joint positioning by the Europeans in these negotiations.  

STARES: Great. 

OK, why don’t we now turn to those on the call to ask the panelists questions. I think you all know the drill. Just raise your hand and we will call you in the order that they appear. Do you want to handle this, Lilly, or should I just call on people?  

OPERATOR: We will take our first question from Martin Burcharth. 

Q: Yes. Hi. Martin Burcharth, U.S. correspondent for Information, a Danish newspaper. 

I was reading the executive order yesterday about India, and I just noticed that of course the president has to take authority from the IEEPA from 1977 in which he states then that basically Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is a—what was it, a— 

CREBO-REDIKER: International economic emergency. 

Q: —an extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States.  

My question is this: Cannot that be used by the Europeans and by Ukraine to argue that United States need to get more involved in actually helping Ukraine with the weapons deliveries? I’ve never seen that stated before. I was very surprised that he would actually sign that.  

The second question, Tom, was this, that I suppose you’ve read Marco Rubio’s interview with Fox News yesterday. The text is there on the State Department website. And what’s surprising about that is that he says basically that Witkoff—he took notes of what Putin wants in order to have a summit with Trump, and it seems that it only regards Ukraine and not the European—a future European security architecture. And you, Tom, did not mention that, but that was part of the three proposals of 2022—the fall of 2022. So one wonders. 

STARES: OK.  

CREBO-REDIKER: Do you want me to take the IEEPA?  

STARES: Heidi, why don’t you address the first? And Tom, if you want to talk about the second part, that—go ahead. 

CREBO-REDIKER: So, I think that’s an interesting observation about the potential—even expanded use of IEEPA even more. I think one of the issues right now is that the president has invoked this International Economic Emergency Powers Act to take the ability to tariff—to use tariffs as and how he sees fit, for whatever purpose. So that has been used to justify raising tariffs against most or a good chunk of the world, but in particular against—I think against Canada is the most obvious, which I don’t think we really see an international economic emergency with Canada. 

Can he expand it further? I think it’s really—there are some court cases as to whether or not the tariff—using IEEPA for tariffs is actually—that it—whether it’s actually legal, and so we’ll see if that is—if that is in fact challenged with all of the use of tariffs that have been used to date. 

On whether or not—whether or not he could expand it, I think it’s really—you know, Europeans can certainly put it on the table. I think because it is a unique presidential authority that he’s expanded the use of, there’s always the potential he could expand it even more.  

STARES: Tom? 

GRAHAM: Yeah. On the second question, Martin, you are right that Russia has talked more exclusively about Russia-Ukraine and less about European security in recent months, despite the draft treatise of December 2021. I suspect part of that has to do with the fact that the Russians find Europe and Europe’s involvement to be unhelpful, and this is a way of sidelining the Europeans.  

You know, all that said, it’s clear that even if you focus narrowly on Ukraine, when the issue of NATO comes up, inevitably you touch upon European security. So at some point you’re going to have to deal with it. My guess is that the Russians would like to put that off until they have a greater confidence in the way things are trending at this point.  

STARES: OK. 

Next question? 

OPERATOR: We’ll take the next question from Jesus Garcia. 

Q: Hi. Thank you for doing this. My name is Jesus Garcia from El Diario New York.  

Do you have any opinion on how the U.S. wants to ease human rights criticisms of Russia, which is part of preparing the path for their negotiations? But what could the implications be of ignoring human rights violations in international contexts? Thank you. 

STARES: Any takers? Steve, you want to go for that one?  

SESTANOVICH: You know, you’re—maybe you’re referring to these leaked drafts of the State Department’s human rights reports, which have appeared in other newspapers and been interpreted as a—correctly, I think—as a sign that the Trump administration wants to downplay the criticisms that have for decades been included in these reports of both hostile and friendly governments.  

You know, the theme here is one that both the president and the vice president have enunciated relatively often, and that is that we don’t intend to criticize other governments for the way they treat their own people. As the president put it in Saudi Arabia, we won’t tell you how to live. Of course there are exceptions made there. They tell the Brazilians not to give Bolsonaro too hard a time, and they tell the Israelis not to give Netanyahu too hard a time, and they tell the Germans not to give the AfD too hard a time.  

But the broad tendency of the administration is to downplay human rights as a factor in American foreign policy. 

STARES: OK. Is there anybody else in the queue there? 

OPERATOR: We have no other hands up at this moment. 

STARES: OK. Well, I encourage folks to jump in. 

I wanted just to follow up on this question of Russia’s vulnerability to increased economic pressure. And I wasn’t sure you addressed that at the beginning of your remarks, Heidi. We lost the audio just briefly. But what’s your sense of, you know, how fearful Russia would be for the kind of economic pressure that President Trump is threatening to impose on Russia?  

CREBO-REDIKER: So, one of the—one of the potential tools in the sanctions bucket is ramping up the sanctioning of the shadow fleet, because you have hundreds of tankers that are out there right now. And that was something that under the Biden administration—once they realized that naming specific tankers, regardless of what flag or what registration—if you name specific tankers, you could actually really decrease the ability of Russia to actually transfer oil that could be traced back to Russia, whether, you know, in the middle of some sea or ocean somewhere to some other tanker, or at a port. And so if Trump really wanted to cut off the core funding mechanism—oil, gas, chemical, other petroleum products—going after the shadow fleets would make a big difference. 

The Europeans and the U.K. continue to move forward with sanctioning those individual tankers, and so whereas we sort of—we stopped just north of 200 tankers that we sanctioned, when Trump came in, he wanted to give some breathing space for negotiations. But the EU and the U.K. moved ahead, and so they now have named more than 400 shadow-fleet tankers that are carrying Russian products. And I think the ability for the U.S. to actually just jump in and join that effort would be very meaningful, and actually put a dent in some of the—in some of the illicit exports. Pushing the oil price cap price down would also be meaningful. 

STARES: OK. Terrific. Thank you. 

OK. 

SESTANOVICH: Paul, can I just add a word on that? 

STARES: Sure. 

SESTANOVICH: Because there are—at the same time that the Russian leadership emphasizes their success in withstanding the pressures of sanctions, there are also more indications of anxiety among economic policymakers, businesspeople, and so forth. You know, oil markets are definitely softer than they have been, and earnings are down—energy earnings are down. There are people in Russia talking about the need for the central bank to bail out banks that are in trouble, that are overextended through the extension of credits. The possibility of a recession is a real one, given that this first half of this year I think economic growth declined by about two-thirds. That’s a rough—a rough number. So there is some greater anxiety on the part of Russian officials about the way in which they’ll keep the war machine going moving forward without too much disruption to the rest of the economy. 

CREBO-REDIKER: Well, they had—they were dealt a blow by weaker oil prices and stronger ruble, and Gazprom has continuously suffered because their exports were so tied to Europe and the exports to Europe have now hit their lowest levels since the early 1970s. So they have—so Gazprom’s in trouble. 

GRAHAM: Yeah. One further point on this, Paul, if I may. You know, a lot of the Kremlin thinking has been predicated on the idea that Ukraine and the West will crack before Russia does. You know, they’re aware of the economic problems that they’re facing, but they’ve always sort of put it off—you know, it’s next year, or the year after next, but by that time Ukraine will have capitulated, the Europeans will have backed away from their support, the United States will have done the same. So anything that suggests that the United States, along with our European allies, is in this for the long haul and can sustain this over the longer haul I think changes the political calculations inside Russia. 

It's not only on the economic side; I think it’s also on the geopolitical side. If you look at Russia’s geopolitical situation as a consequence of this conflict, it’s hard to argue, even if Russia attains the goals that it’s laid out in Ukraine, where Russia’s in a better strategic position. It’s clearly in a worse position vis-à-vis China and the United States, but have managed to rally Europe in a way that has been a problem for Russia in the past. And oh, by the way, the Indians actually are doing much better than the Russians are technologically. So you play this out over several years and Russia turns out to be the weakest of the great powers. I think that is something that at least factors into the thinking of those that are focused on national security beside—you know, in addition to those who have concerns about the sustainability of the economy over the longer haul. 

CREBO-REDIKER: There’s one other thing— 

SESTANOVICH: If one looks for an example of this, Paul, that’s a very—it’s an issue that probably doesn’t rise to the level—the label “geopolitics,” but tomorrow the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan—or, prime minister of Armenia—will be meeting with President Trump, who is overseeing their political reconciliation at a time when the Russians have thought they were gaining influence—(laughs)—in arbitrating relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan. These are countries of the former Soviet Union. And suddenly—this has not happened before—the two of them are in the Oval Office with the president of the United States. 

STARES: Yeah. Yeah— 

FIX: And what Tom has said, I think the Europeans actually have leverage they already developed, and let me just mention one thing. The reason why Germany has ended its debt brake for defense spending has been—one of the reasons has been their considerations that it would send a signal to Moscow that this is an unlimited European engagement and support and rearmament for Ukraine, instead of putting a ceiling on debt-financed defense spending. And Germany is the most important country in Europe that has the fiscal flexibilities to support Ukraine for the long term. It has done the Patriots deal. It will have to do the kind of the checkbook diplomacy for Ukraine on behalf of all the Europeans. So that is one of the signals which would have to be sent to Moscow that this engagement for Ukraine is continuing. 

CREBO-REDIKER: One last point on the continuing engagement of the United States is—that we did not discuss is that there have been discussions about the U.S. buying—purchasing very large amounts over time of Ukrainian drones. And if that is indeed something that is a deal that is ready to be inked, that is a long-term commitment beyond the critical minerals deal to actually really join the economic and the defense security, and be—and look to Ukraine as an innovative provider of military arms, and drones, and electronic warfare, and counter—I mean, you know, go down the list. It’s actually—that is super meaningful. 

STARES: OK. We have a couple of folks— 

SESTANOVICH: He has called that a $30 billion deal. 

CREBO-REDIKER: Exactly. 

STARES: OK. We have a couple of folks waiting patiently in the queue. Will? 

OPERATOR: We’ll take the next question from Laura Rosen (sp). 

Q: Thank you so much for doing this. 

I got on a couple minutes late, so I apologize if someone already addressed this. But can you speak a little bit to the Kremlinology on the U.S. side? It seems like Trump has been more—has had a more realistic picture or a clearer picture of Russian intentions more recently, but then when Witkoff went to Moscow it seems like the outcome is a little bit muddled in terms of what the U.S. and Russia are expecting in terms of meetings next. Does anyone have a sense of that? 

STARES: Well, we touched on it a little bit. But, Tom, maybe you can give us the state of play from your perspective. 

GRAHAM: Yeah. Look, I mean, I don’t think it’s muddled. There’s certain expectations that were raised in the United States and more broadly in Europe about what Russia’s—or, what Trump’s recent statements meant, but you know, Trump still wants a ceasefire. He still wants a deal with the Russians. I don’t know what he offered, what Witkoff brought in particular to Moscow, but it was something that appears to at least have been acceptable to the Russians and could jumpstart a negotiation. So Trump is still interested in that. He hadn’t backed away from anything that would continue to put certain leverage or pressure on the Russians. He may not step it up, depending—you know, before he’s had the meeting with Putin, but I don’t see this as a radical change in strategy. I think it’s a continuation of what Trump has wanted to do, and he sees an opening now. We’ll find out next week or the week after whether it indeed was a real opening or not. 

FIX: Let me perhaps add to that that the Europeans have worked hard to make sure that Donald Trump actually does understand what would be a negative concession or what would be a positive concession, especially on the question of continuing to arm Ukraine. So I think that has been one achievement of the Europeans, that they have been able to convince Donald Trump that this is something that has to happen even if Europeans are buying those weapons, and that this is something which cannot be part of a negotiated agreement that Ukraine does not get any more Western support. And that, I think, is a shift which has been worked on quite diligently by Europeans by talking a lot with Trump, debriefing him in meetings, and so on. And I think the interesting outcome to observe from this meeting is if some of the redlines that the Europeans have tried and the Ukrainians have tried to communicate to Donald Trump will actually be respected from the U.S. side or whether they will not. And then the whole implementation of any agreement is, again, up in the air. 

SESTANOVICH: Yeah. You know, Laura (sp), I might disagree with Tom a little bit here. I think one of the interesting questions has been what Trump’s different tone toward Putin means. When he says he’s just “tapping me along,” is he expressing a kind of exasperation that will lead to more intense sanctions, more unity with Europeans, more support for Ukraine? And if Witkoff’s—I think this is probably what you meant by Kremlinology on the U.S. side—if Witkoff’s U.S. visit ends up suggesting that he didn’t get what Putin really meant, didn’t get—didn’t hear the message right, I think that will surely weaken him a little bit in American deliberations on steps forward. You know, I wouldn’t exclude the possibility that Secretary Rubio was rather kind of ironically pointing to the notes that Witkoff took in the meeting, maybe suggesting these notes weren’t complete, you know? (Laughs.) If Witkoff didn’t get everything, this is going to hurt him. It has to. 

STARES: Fascinating. 

OK. One last question, I think, we have. 

OPERATOR: We’ll take the last question from Bastian Brauns. 

Q: Hello. Thank you for doing this. Bastian Brauns. I’m the U.S. correspondent for T-Online, based in D.C. Hello, Liana. 

I don’t know if you can maybe take a little time to tell us what this is about the Indian sanctions, because there is, I think, some risk to it because geopolitically it could also lead to, yeah, some more close relationships between India and China. I think the Indian government just announced for the first time since seven years a state visit from the prime minister. So in—yeah, maybe you can tell us how the Trump administration or the U.S. administration in general is thinking about this risk. So how far-reaching are those sanctions if, yeah, it’s going to hurt the American economic interests or even the geopolitical interests? Thank you so much. 

STARES: Speculating on whether this administration thinks in those terms is always a fascinating exercise. Who wants to take this on? 

CREBO-REDIKER: I can start in. Just in terms of—in terms of the India watchers that I—that I talk to, it’s—I think this is—it’s put a tremendous amount of pressure on a key strategic ally in the Indo-Pacific. And the U.S. has worked on shoring up India as a counter to China as part of the Quad for a long time, and they—you know, we’ve made a huge amount of progress. So from a pure strategic standpoint, the question marks are out there as to whether or not this was taken into consideration. 

The flipside is, you know—is, you know, in doing this, is Trump just being purely mercantilistic in trying to gain the upper hand in the—in the trade negotiations with India? There’s sort of one strain of thought that is—that thinks that is the primary driver. And then there are others who truly—who don’t think that this is going to put India—push India closer to China necessarily, but may push India back closer to Russia. And I think that’s probably—you know, none of those land us in a good place. But in terms of actually, like, rattling the saber on enforcement of a secondary tariff on what is actually fueling the war, which are these purchases, there was no other country that was as vulnerable for Trump to go after, because China really is not as vulnerable as India to this kind of leverage. 

FIX: And perhaps just to add the point that Lindsey Graham has already written that as a follow up to that India tariffs the Europeans should also look closely into their own revenues from Russia, which still continue today. So that is definitely something for Europeans to take note of. 

STARES: OK. We are very close to wrapping up here. I’m going to put my colleagues on the spot with a lightning round asking them: Do you think the summit’s going to go ahead? And if so, will it move the needle in favor of advancing a ceasefire in Ukraine? So, Tom, you first. 

GRAHAM: Yes and yes.  

STARES: Yes and yes. OK. 

Stephen? 

SESTANOVICH: Yes and no. 

STARES: Yes and no.  

Heidi? 

CREBO-REDIKER: I’m yes and no. I’m pretty cynical about Trump being—having that—Putin having that sense of just how much he needs to say to string Trump along. 

STARES: And you, Liana? 

FIX: Well, I go with no and no. I think the Trump-Putin meeting will only take place if a Putin-Zelensky meeting is agreed and I don’t think that that will come about.  

STARES: And I’m more in, I think, the yes-and-no camp.  

So, with that, I want to thank my marvelous colleagues. They’re always so thoughtful and articulate on these issues. It’s just a delight to be with you. 

Again, for those who want to look into what we discussed today, this video and transcript will be posted on CFR.org afterwards for all to see in due course. 

Again, thank you, everybody, for joining us and we look forward to seeing you again on this and other topics in the near future. Thank you again.  

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