U.S.-Saudi Relations, With Steven A. Cook

LINDSAY:
Welcome to The President's Inbox, a CFR podcast about the foreign policy challenges facing the United States. I'm Jim Lindsay, Director of Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. This week's topic is the future of U.S. relations with Saudi Arabia. With me to discuss U.S.-Saudi relations, the recent oil production cut, and Mohammed bin Salman is Steven A. Cook. Steven is the Eni Enrico Mattei senior fellow for Middle East and Africa Studies at the Council. He has written extensively on the Middle East. His most recent book is False Dawn: Protest, Democracy, and Violence in the New Middle East. This summer he co-wrote the Council's special report, "The case For a New U.S.-Saudi Strategic Compact." A condensed version of that report appeared in Foreign Affairs under the title, "Go Big in Saudi Arabia." Steven, always a pleasure to chat.

COOK:
It's great to be back with you, Jim.

LINDSAY:
Okay, let's talk about the current tensions, maybe even crisis in U.S.-Saudi relations. Earlier this month, Saudi Arabia acting in concert with Russia as part of OPEC+ cut oil productions. This has angered the by the administration, which thought it had a deal with Saudi Arabia to keep production of oil up. What happened?

COOK:
Well, the Saudis, in cooperation with the members of OPEC and OPEC+, the additional 10 members of the cartel who aren't officially part of OPEC, decided that it was time to cut production by 2 million barrels. The Saudis make the argument that their decision was purely based on market conditions, that there is likely to be a considerable slackening of demand globally for oil, and that as a result they want to keep the oil market in balance. And it was the collective wisdom of all of these oil producers that taking 2 million barrels off the market would be the best thing for everyone. The Biden administration cried foul.

They believed after President Biden's visit to Saudi Arabia in July that they had an understanding. No written agreement, but an understanding that as the fall proceeded, the Saudis would in fact put more oil on the market, continuing to moderate oil prices as well as the price of gasoline that American consumers pay at the pump. Based on the reaction to the OPEC+ production cut, it suggests that the White House was taken a bit by surprise by the decision. This is perhaps only the most recent problem in U.S.-Saudi relations, but of course there have been a number of problems that have led to this point.

LINDSAY:
Okay, before we go to the big picture, the context, all of the other dynamics influencing the current situation, Steven, I have to know, do you buy the Saudi explanation that this was purely a business decision, it had nothing to do with any animus the crown prince might have toward President Biden, who famously on the campaign trail called Saudi Arabia a pariah?

Steven Cook:
Well, here's my view of things, Jim. It's clear that the Saudis one, want to take advantage of shocks to the market and have things planned that are very, very expensive. And high oil prices make it easier for them to do the kinds of things they want to do, including building this city on Saudi Arabia's Red Sea coast called Neom that is planned to cost billions and billions and billions of dollars. It's also the case that there is a potential slackening in demand for oil, given the fact that China, a huge importer of oil from the region, continues to lock down huge numbers of people in its zero-Covid policy. So that looking out to the market, it could very well be that there is more oil on the market than not, and that a glut of oil is problematic for the Saudis, given the expensive things that they would like to do.

LINDSAY:
But given the potential an oil production cut will drive up prices, and the spike in prices has many people worried that it may produce the recession that the Saudis are worried about.

COOK:
Well, part of the point that I was just going to make was that higher oil prices actually will, as you point out, potentially destroy demand because the price is so high, that trips countries into recession and consumers stop spending, they stop driving, and then this will have a downward pressure on prices. But one of the other points that I was going to make was specific to your question, do we believe that this is strictly decisions based on the market or does it have something to do with MBS and his animus towards the Biden administration?
What we know about the Saudi Arabian crown prince would suggest that at least part of this decision has something, perhaps something significant, to do with the fact that President Biden vowed to make Saudi Arabia a pariah and in fact declared that there was no redeeming social value to the Saudi government. We know from past behavior that MBS holds a grudge. It's entirely possible that this was part of his thinking. There is some evidence to suggest that other members of OPEC fought the production cut for some of the very reasons that you point out, as well as geopolitical considerations. But nevertheless, here we are. And the Saudis insist purely market conditions, whereas the White House and its allies in Congress believe otherwise.

LINDSAY:
Well, certainly people in the Biden administration would say even if they were an economic rationale for a production cut, and even if it were the case that the crown prince decided he had to go back on the understanding he had with the Biden administration, he could easily have waited until after November 8th and the Congressional midterm elections. Moreover, doing this not only embarrasses President Biden, who again went to Saudi Arabia this summer over the advice of some of his advisors, engaged in that well photographed and circulated fist bump with the Crown Prince. So what should the Biden administration do now?

COOK:
Yeah, it's a very, very difficult question actually. It would seem like it's straightforward, if in fact you believe that the Crown Prince did this on purpose. And you make a good point, why couldn't they have waited until after midterms? It seems like it was timed precisely to harm the President and Democrats who are already facing economic headwinds as the midterm elections draw closer. I think it's also clear that over the last decade or so, the Saudis have signaled that they feel more comfortable with Republicans, particularly Republicans in the White House. There's just been a lot of mistrust that has built up. And they particularly blame Democrats, although Republicans have played a significant role in eroding the trust between the two countries. But what should we do? What should the United States do?

Members of Congress have floated any number of proposals including halting weapons sales to the Saudis, withdrawing American forces from Saudi Arabia have been two of the most prominent proposals. I think that there are things that the United States can do, but we also have to be careful that what the United States does in order to register its disapproval of Saudi Arabia does not come back to harm the United States. And this is the dilemma of the U.S.-Saudi relationship. We still look to Saudi Arabia as a critical player in balancing the global oil market, which is why throughout the last half of 2021 and up until the president went to Saudi Arabia, he dispatched emissaries to the royal court to cajole the Saudi leadership to pump more oil.

So it is important to the United States and we don't want to damage the relationship too much. One of the things that the United States can do, however, if it did want to register its disapproval, is to freeze service contracts for Patriot missile batteries for the Saudi Air Force, those kinds of things, which would I think signal to the Saudis how much they really do need the United States. Without Americans to service air defense systems and the air force, it leaves Saudi Arabia vulnerable to drone and missile attacks from Iran and its allies, something that obviously the Saudis are concerned about. Of course, the Saudis say that the United States has not been attentive enough to this threat and that there is a risk if we did end these contracts or at least threaten to end those contracts, it would reinforce the Saudi belief that the United States is feckless and can't be trusted.

LINDSAY:
So Steven, help me understand that because there are two elements of what you just said that I have a hard time putting together. One is the claim that the Saudis feel much more comfortable with Republicans. They don't trust Democrats. They in particularly don't trust President Biden. And there's been a lot of talk, speculation really, that the attitude and view in Riyadh is they want to wait the Biden administration out. They think that come 2025, Donald Trump or somebody like Donald Trump will come into the White House and they'll be able to get what they want, get a better deal from the United States. On the other hand, it famously was on Donald Trump's watch as president that the Iranian struck Saudi oil facilities, taking off a good portion of the production for a couple of days. And the Trump administration, as best I can tell, took certainly no overt steps to punish the Iranians for that attack. And my sense was that sent chills down the spines of many people in the Saudi leadership.

COOK:
You've hit the kind of contradiction at the heart of what it seems that the Saudis are up to. Now, there's been no public declaration on the part of the Saudis that, "Hey, we prefer Republicans to Democrats." But of course in the years since Jamal Khashoggi's murder and even before that, predominantly democratic members of Congress have sought to take punitive actions against Saudi Arabia, whether it's for its intervention in the Yemen Civil War, which compounded humanitarian problems in that country, or for the murder of Jamal Khashoggi in October, 2018. They do curiously kind of skirt over the fact that Donald Trump essentially broke 40 years of American declared policy, which was that the United States would defend the oil fields of the region from both internal and external powers. I think part of the problem that the Biden administration has is that the Saudis have come to the conclusion that it is an extension of the Obama administration.
And the Obama administration of course negotiated the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the Iran Nuclear Deal, which the Saudis had a visceral reaction to and sought in their own way to unravel and have been alarmed by what they perceived to be the Biden administration's at all cost desire to get back into the JCPOA. It's not just the prospect of a nuclear armed Iran that's the problem, it's the sanctions relief that the Saudis as well as other important actors in the Gulf like United Arab Emirates and the Bahrainis, believe that that sanctions relief will not be dedicated to economic development of Iran, but will be used for the purposes of funding and supporting Iran's proxies around the region. Hezbollah, the Houthis, Palestinian islamic jihad and others that cause mayhem around the region and served to extend Iran's influence around the region.

LINDSAY:
So if I understand you correctly, the Saudis are worried that Biden administration is going to succeed in resurrecting the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, they Iran Nuclear Deal, but all signs coming out of Tehran and coming out of the negotiations in Vienna is that that's not going to happen. So why are the Saudis still fixated on it?

COOK:
Well, I think they're fixated on it because they remain one, stumped that the United States would even attempt to get back into the JCPOA and they actually have a kind of long bill of particulars that they recite chapter and verse against the United States that they believe has advantaged Iran in the region. Add to this the fact that President Obama and then President Trump after him talked about leaving the region or retrenching from the region, pivoting to Asia, which from the Saudi perspective was turning their backs on Saudi Arabia. And now President Biden is talking about getting back into the JCPOA. And his administration has talked about deemphasizing the region. Again, it raises questions in Riyadh about the United States' commitment to the security and stability of the region on which they, despite their rhetoric about Saudi Arabia being central and important and everybody coming to Saudi Arabia, they really do rely on the United States for their security.
So they're deeply paranoid about what the United States is up to. They don't believe the United States when American officials say we remain committed to your security. And they also perceive that the problem with the JCPOA is in Tehran and that the United States would get back into it as soon as they got a signal from the Iranians that they were interested in getting back into the agreement.

LINDSAY:
So what is Riyadh's view, Steven, on what should be done to deal with Iran? The argument for getting back into the JCPOA is simply that without it, the Iranians could get very close to a nuclear capability or actually acquire it very quickly and that would be deeply damaging to Saudi Arabia's own national interest.

COOK:
Well, so here's the gap in the way the Saudis talk about the JCPOA as well as the gap in which they talk about U.S. security in the region. They themselves don't offer up a plan to deal with Iran's nuclear program. They don't have any real conception of what that would take. They just believe that the JCPOA is bad for them. I think what they would want is continued significant American presence in the region, a commitment from the United States in not just in word but in deed to protect their airspace. I think MBS made it clear ahead of President Biden's visit is that they were looking towards security guarantees from the United States. He went as far as suggesting something akin to Article Five that we have with NATO, which states an attack on one country is tantamount to an attack on all the countries.

That's not going to happen with Saudi Arabia, but they're looking for security guarantees, something that actually the United States is in negotiations with with the United Arab Emirates. But again, for all of the Saudi complaints about lack of American leadership, they themselves haven't put forward a detailed plan about what American-Saudi security cooperation looks like and how to deal with Iran's nuclear development.

LINDSAY:
Steven, you just mentioned the United Arab Emirates, which is part of OPEC+, which went along with this production cut. I haven't seen the same kind of animus coming from unnamed senior administration officials toward the UAE that I have heard towards Saudi Arabia. Why is that?

COOK:
I think there's really two things that are going on here. First, the United States, for all of its security cooperation with Saudi Arabia, it's security cooperation with the United Arab Emirates is far more advanced because actually the Emiratis have gone into battle with the United States in Afghanistan. They have been solid allies in the fight against the Islamic State. They have kept the Al-Qaeda of the Arabian Peninsula at bay. So there is very, very significant security cooperation. That's not to suggest that there aren't problems between the two countries. I also think the second reason why there hasn't been as much animus towards the Saudis, I think the Emiratis have done two things. One, I think they've quietly signaled that they opposed this cut, but because the Saudis are the big dog in OPEC, they have to go along with it. And they have recently committed a significant sum of money for humanitarian relief for Ukraine, which I think goes a long way these days in Washington.

LINDSAY:
Steven, thank you for making the Ukraine connection because obviously part of the Biden administration's anger toward the Saudis is predicated on the notion that this is seen as trying to endanger the Democratic case in the midterm congressional elections. And I think you are seeing a similar reaction on Capitol Hill among Democrats. But there's also great concern in the White House on geopolitical grounds, that effectively what Saudi Arabia has done has made it easier for the Russians to pursue their war in Ukraine, violating international law, seeking to crush an independent sovereign Ukraine. Why are those arguments not gaining any traction in Riyadh?

COOK:
Because there's been this certain amount of decoupling between the United States and Saudi Arabia. There was a time in the past when the Saudis have stepped up and pumped more oil in order to help the United States. Former King Abdullah is quoted as saying that, "You have to help your friends in times of trouble." And one would have expected if the relationship had been what it was, and it wasn't always a tight relationship, there had been periods of tension in relationship, but there have been moments when the Saudis have put more oil on the market to help the United States in 1976, which coming so shortly after the Arab oil embargo during the October 1973 war, sort of extraordinary to think about it. But the Saudis had done that. And I think that was part of the expectation that the Saudis would be helpful here given our commitment to them. But as I said before, the Saudis can recite things for twenty years that the United States has done that they believe has helped the Iranians in the region, beginning with the invasion of Iraq and the vassalization of Iraq to Iran.

LINDSAY:
Which was done by our Republican president, not-

COOK:
Which Was done by a Republican, absolutely. To President Obama's unwillingness to get directly involved in the conflict in Syria where the Iranians were supporting and continue to support Bashar al-Assad, the ambivalence towards their intervention in Yemen, which they believed they were fighting the Iranians and Iranian proxies in Yemen, to everything including what they believed was their fecklessness when it came to the Hosni Mubarak and the uprising in 2011, they believed it was an advantage to Iran because Egypt is their strategic depth, and Mubarak was a strong ally. And of course, as you mentioned before, the American non-reaction to Iran's attack on Saudi oil facilities during the summer of 2019. All of those things combined have convinced Saudis that the United States is not trustworthy and is seeking to pivot from the region, which from their perspective means turning their backs on Saudi Arabia.

And because oil is the strategic commodity for Saudi Arabia. Without oil, you'd have a bunch of pearl divers essentially, not to be too flippant about it. And this is strategic for the Saudis. And they feel that their decisions have to be based on the stability of the oil market. I don't know why that's the case now, and previously it hasn't been, but that's the argument that they make. And at the same time they make the argument that they haven't actually leaned towards the Russians, despite that these decisions well clearly benefit Moscow and its prosecution of its invasion of Ukraine.

LINDSAY:
So is it the case that the calculation, Steven, in Riyadh is that the United States really has no choice but to take this production cut? Or is it that we actually don't care at the end of the day because we don't believe that this relationship is salvageable? I mean, again, I take your point that there's a long bill of indictment, a long list of U.S. decisions that make the Saudis unhappy, but clearly from the vantage point of Saudi Arabia, there has to be a recognition that this is something that is going to further fray that relationship with the United States that they have traditionally relied upon.

COOK:
I think that that's the case, that it will undoubtedly fray that relationship. But at the same time, the Saudis seem to believe their own rhetoric about the centrality of Saudi Arabia, about the dynamism of Saudi Arabia. I think the crown prince has drawn the wrong lesson from the fact that in the last few years, world leaders who had shunned him over the brutal murder of Jamal Khashoggi in 2018 have begun to reach out to him and he's been brought in from the cold. And I think that there's a belief that United States needs Saudi Arabia more than Saudi Arabia needs the United States. And there's been a significant amount of hedging based on this mistrust that's built up over twenty years. I think it's a miscalculation on the part of the Saudis. And it's something that Martin Indyk, our colleague Martin Indyk, and I warned about in our Council special report about the U.S.-Saudi relationship and that if the countries continue to kind of miscalculate and continue on the path that they have been on, it is going to drive the countries further apart.

LINDSAY:
Let me draw you out on that, Steven, because another way to approach this is to say it's not a miscalculation on the crown prince's part, but a deliberate calculation, that this is a relationship that is not going to stand the test of time. And that Saudi Arabia needs to hedge, to borrow your phrase and has to look to build up ties relations with other major powers, Russia and China. I will note that as we're sitting down to have this conversation, Saudi Arabia is holding the Future Investment Initiative sometimes known as the "Davos in the desert." I will note that the theme for this year's meeting of Davos in the desert is "Enabling a New Global Order." And I think some people speculate that perhaps what we're seeing is the Saudis deciding it is time to find new friends, new partners. Anything to that?

COOK:
Look, you make a very good point about a Saudi calculation, but from where Americans sit, it is a miscalculation. The Russians have demonstrated in Ukraine that the legend of Russia's return as a military power, which was forged in Syria, was really just that, a legend. And that as attractive as the Chinese have been as an economic partner for countries in the region, and China is the single largest investor in the region, China has got its own problems that may militate against it playing the kind of role that the Saudis might think. But I think undoubtedly it's the case that the Saudis, the Emiratis, Egyptians, Turks, others are hedging and that we are on the cusp of a significant change in the global order.

What it looks like, no one knows. And I think that this is part of this preparation for it. My own view is, as you know in the book that I'm currently working on, is that over a longer period of time, the United States is going to care less about this relationship. There's already some indication that it does care less. All of the patter in Washington about pivoting from the region is an indication. The fact that the United States didn't respond to Iran's provocations during the summer of 2019 was not just some kind of indication of the unique presidency of Donald Trump, it was one moment in Washington where there was kind of broad bipartisan support for the president not to engage in a retaliation.

LINDSAY:
Is that just war weariness, this residue of Afghanistan, but even more so Iraq?

COOK:
I think there's certain war weariness that's going on, but I also think that there's, looking down the road, people believe that oil from Saudi Arabia is not going to be as important as it once was. And no one wants to potentially shed American blood on behalf of Mohammed bin Salman. That was what people were saying at the time. "We're not going to defend Mohammed bin Salman." It wasn't, "We're not going to defend the oil fields of the Gulf." So I do think that there's a significant change that is underway. And unless the United States and Saudi Arabia are careful about it, they can do more damage and that seems to be what has happened.

LINDSAY:
Well, I have to ask you, Steven, do you think this relationship, which dates back to the 1930s, is it worth salvaging?

COOK:
The world turns, as we all know. And people don't do things the same way that they did 10 years ago, 15 years ago, or almost a hundred years ago. There's technological, political, cultural changes that are making this relationship, which in many ways is an anachronism, is putting tension in the relationship. So as Martin and I laid out what we called a new strategic compact. But we were very, I think upfront about the fact that it was a tall order, that it was going to take a lot and it was going to take a lot of goodwill on the part of two governments to have that strategic compact. I think by now it should be clear that the Saudis may not necessarily be interested in that.

So I think the best we could probably hope for at this point is a realist rapproachement where those problems aren't resolved, but at least in the kind of short and medium term, which I know you hate those terms because there's no real way to define them, but in the next three to five, ten years, the Saudis are going to continue to be important in balancing a global oil market. And they're going to still want security provided with the help of the United States. So we'll have to figure out how to do that in a purely kind of transactional way if the Saudis are interested in reweaving the fabric of the relationship that we have had over, as you point out, since President Roosevelt met King Abdulaziz.

LINDSAY:
So Steven, let me come at this from an entirely different perspective and suggest that perhaps the United States should do the inverse of Mohammad bin Salmon and just write off this relationship. And I could imagine forging a policy in which you say on the one hand what we should do is to diminish our reliance on what you could call or have been called, petro tyrants, and we should go green as hard and as fast as we can so that we're not subject to leverage from Riyadh or from Russia and elsewhere. But also combine that in the near term with an argument that we should drill, baby, drill here in the United States, unlock all of our fossil fuels so that we have more of it. And again, part of the reason for the claim that Saudi Arabia matters less to the United States is that U.S. oil production has grown remarkably because of revolutions in technology, the shale revolution, tight oil, and the like.

Do you see any potential for that kind of coalition which could bring together Democrats and Republicans? Though of course, obviously I think both sides want what they could get out the bargain but don't want to give up what the other side might get.

COOK:
The polarization of our politics certainly complicates these things further. I think what you're suggesting is something that, you know, kind of in a perfect world, we could do those things. But of course there's a lot of friction in the world and of course there's a global oil market. We don't import so much oil from Saudi Arabia. But when there's less oil on the global market, it affects the price of oil globally, thus the price of gasoline and food and a variety of things that obviously make Americans very unhappy. And so I think to suggest that we could kind of flip this switch and go green and drill, baby drill and wash our hands of petro tyrants is unrealistic. But I think if you look further down the road, twenty-five, thirty, thirty-five years, we can do that if we're smart about it. If we do do these things, if we do drill, if we do conserve, if we do invest in the infrastructure that is required to have cleaner alternative energy.

We are never going to decarbonize. Our clothing has petroleum in it. Everything has petroleum. But there is a chance, and there's a reason why the U.S. intelligence community in its National Intelligence Estimate in October 2021 said it had medium confidence that there will be an energy transition. Except that it's going to take a long time. And in the interim, geopolitical shocks like Russia's invasion of Ukraine or a global pandemic, renders Saudi Arabia more important because those things in the phase of the pandemic that we were in 2021 where people were kind of coming out of it, the demand for oil and petroleum was something that wasn't forecast. It wasn't forecast that Russia was going to invade Ukraine and rock the energy markets. And that is what our colleague Megan O'Sullivan talks about when she talks about a jagged transition that countries that in the end may not be as important as they once were, will at these moments of crises become quite important. And that's what we're seeing with Saudi Arabia right now.

LINDSAY:
Steven, I have to ask you a quick question on this because it just dawned on me. It seemed like it was only a couple of years ago I was reading articles about the Saudis opening the oil spigots because they wanted to drive the price of oil down because they were hoping to put these new competitors in the United States using these new technologies to get oil and natural gas out of the ground, out of business. But now if you have a production cut that drives the price up, which means all of those, I call them frackers, who maybe were sitting on the sidelines when prices were lower, now look and say, "We should get back into business, drill more." Or is it the case that the Saudi assumption is that those American drillers are also worried about a recession and don't want to drill more because they're afraid they'll spend all the money and by the time they can get it out of the ground, prices will be too low, no return on investment.

COOK:
I think the expectation that there's going to be a global recession has frozen people where they are. It's certainly frozen me. I do think though that what the Saudis did in 2014, which was to harm American frackers as well as by the way harm the Iranians. And the fact that the cut that they've proposed and that OPEC will undertake, will benefit frackers, speaks to the larger point that this is truly a global market and that there's no way to insulate the United States from the changes in the market. And you can't say we're washing our hands of petro tyrants and then everything will be okay. We can become less complicit or codependent with petro tyrant if that's the term that people want to use by doing smart things with regard to energy. And that includes the range of things that you talked about, whether it's drill, baby drill, or investing in alternative energies.

The good news is that there's some evidence that we've begun to do it despite our culture wars over these things. Americans have purchased more electric vehicles than ever before in 2022. We're not going to drive our way out of the climate crisis. Driving electric vehicles isn't going to make Saudi Arabia go away or return Saudi Arabia to this kind of pre-petro state situation where they're a backwater to American foreign policy, but it does lessen our dependence over time. Those things as well as a whole range of other things can help. But we're never going to undermine the global connections here, but we can lessen our dependence or codependence on the Saudis.

LINDSAY:
Your point, Steven, about what happened back in 2014 when the Saudis tried to put American drillers out of business reminds me that while the Saudis may have a long list of things where they think the Americans have done them wrong, the United States can come up with a long list of significant events in which they would argue the Saudis have done the United States wrong. And obviously 9/11 comes top of the list.

COOK:
I mean, this goes without saying. And I remember at the time of Jamal Khashoggi's killing being in the region and meeting with Saudis who were kind of stunned at the outrage over Jamal Khashoggi's killing, is something they said they'd never seen anything like it. And I tried to explain to them that the murder of Khashoggi has given an opportunity for Americans to kind of relitigate the entire relationship. And that when you ask Americans, what do you think of when you think of Saudi Arabia, they think of 9/11. And there remains a whole host of unanswered questions about September 11th, 2001. Americans can think about other things.

Americans of a certain age do remember the deep and painful recession of '73 and '74. I was quite young, but I do remember sitting in the backseat of my father's Chevy for hours on end waiting for gas. These are things that people alive still really remember. And then of course the murder of Jamal Khashoggi, the kind of way in which the Saudis have acted, Americans do remember. I think Saudis have not really internalized that. When I went through that list, they were kind of shocked that Americans were so focused on these things.

LINDSAY:
On that note, I'll close up The President's Inbox for this week. My guess has been Steven A. Cook, the Eni Enrico Mattei Senior Fellow for Middle East and Africa Studies here at the Council. Steven, as always, thanks for joining me.

COOK:
Thanks for having me, Jim.

LINDSAY:
Please subscribe to The President's Inbox on Apple Podcasts, Google Podcasts, Spotify, or wherever you listen. And leave us a review, we love the feedback. You can find the books and articles mentioned in this episode as well as a transcript of our conversation on the podcast page for The President's Inbox on cfr.org. As always, opinions expressed on the President's Inbox are solely those of the host or a guest, not of CFR, which takes new institutional positions on matters of policy. Today's episode was produced by Ester Fang with senior podcast producer Gabrielle Sierra. Mormei Zanke was our recording engineer. Thank you, Mormei. Special thanks go to Michelle Kurilla for her research assistance. This is Jim Lindsay, thanks for listening.