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Democrats Should Repurpose, Not Retire, the China Select Committee

The new House majority will decide in January whether to renew the Select Committee on China. Democrats should keep the committee and give it a new mandate: domestic renewal, defense against a second China Shock, human rights, allied scale, and a workable path to cooperation.

A U.S. flag flutters as members of the honour guard carry Chinese flags ahead of a state arrival ceremony for Chinese President Xi Jinping on the South Lawn of the White House in Washington, D.C., on September 24, 2026. 
A U.S. flag flutters as members of the honour guard carry Chinese flags ahead of a state arrival ceremony for Chinese President Xi Jinping on the South Lawn of the White House in Washington, D.C., on September 24, 2026. Evan Vucci / Reuters

By experts and staff

Published
  • Rush DoshiCFR Expert
    C.V. Starr Senior Fellow for Asia Studies and Director of the China Strategy Initiative
  • Michael Wessel
    President, The Wessel Group

Rush Doshi is the C.V. Starr senior fellow for Asia studies and director of the China Strategy Initiative at the Council on Foreign Relations and an assistant professor in Georgetown’s School of Foreign Service. Michael Wessel is the is president of The Wessel Group, a public affairs consulting firm and was an original member of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. 

Democrats won a stunning victory in the midterm elections. The question they now face is what to do with it, including on one of the consequential issues policymakers must address: U.S. policy towards China.

When the 120th Congress convenes in January, the incoming House majority will decide whether to renew the Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party. It should be reauthorized.

The committee was created in 2023 under Speaker Kevin McCarthy. While it has no formal jurisdiction, and while it has done some important bipartisan work, it has generally reflected the priorities and preferences of the majority that built it. A new majority has every right to set new priorities that reflect their prerogatives. A wide range of Democratic foreign policy groups, some of whom previously opposed the Committee’s formation, now support retaining and repurposing it. For House leadership, the question should be less whether to keep a China committee and more what Democrats believe the China Select Committee’s focus should be.

Democrats should offer their own answer for the Committee’s future direction, and that vision should rest on five pillars, each of which fills a gap the current approach has left open. These pillars are:

  1. American domestic renewal. The Committee has previously studied what China does far more closely than what America must do to strengthen itself.
  2. Avoiding a second China Shock. The continuing wave of subsidized Chinese exports bearing down on U.S. workers and industries alike.
  3. Restoring human rights as a policy priority. This has risen in importance in the Democratic party precisely as it has fallen off the agenda in executive branch China policy. The topic matters for practical policy decisions on a range of issues, including trade, technology, and investment.
  4. Restoring American alliances. U.S. relationships have come under strain in the Trump administration, but they remain critical to the United States in balancing China’s scale and renewing American strength.
  5. Forging a realistic approach to cooperation with China. The Committee has historically treated Beijing as suspect, but the hardest problems—such as artificial intelligence, climate change, and global health—cannot be solved without China.

C.V. Starr & Co. Annual Lecture on China with Dan Wang | CFR Senior Fellow Rush Doshi Presides

Taken together, these pillars offer a new approach for the Select Committee, one that aligns with a Democratic vision that can advance these priorities in a way that avoids demagoguery and anti-Asian racism (it can start by adjusting the committee’s name and rhetoric).

The overall objective should be cleareyed: neither to wish away competition with China, which is naïve given growing risks to U.S. interests, nor to make it an end in itself, which is dangerously self-defeating and escalatory. A Democratic committee should seek to manage inevitable differences while securing U.S. interests, making the United States more competitive, and finding a realistic pathway for cooperation where possible.

The case for keeping the Select Committee

Skeptics of the Committee have a fair critique. It has no jurisdiction, it overlaps with standing committees like Foreign Affairs and Armed Services, and it sits alongside the Congressional-Executive Commission on China and the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission.

But the China Select Committee is distinct in ways that matter. It is the only China institution in the legislative branch that is made up entirely of members of Congress and can directly respond to the actions of the Executive Branch. Relative to the existing Congressional committees, which see only parts of China policy through the lens of their own jurisdictions, the Select Committee can consider it in its entirety.

Freed from jurisdiction and markups, the Committee has given others in Congress a jump start through its work on outbound-investment rules, de minimis reform, and the BIOSECURE Act. Its bipartisan investigations have exposed forced labor in supply chains, threats to U.S. industrial capacity, compromised critical infrastructure, continuing risks in the technology arena, and Wall Street’s financing of companies tied to China’s military.

China policy cuts across trade, technology, defense, finance, human rights, and more, exceeding the range of any one committee. It will shape the United States’ future more than almost any other question Congress faces. Without a dedicated committee and staff to connect the dots, Congress has no answer to the executive branch’s dominance of China policy.

Centering American renewal and domestic policy

The Select Committee in the new Congress should convene on how to build the domestic foundations of American prosperity, competitiveness, and technological leadership that the China challenge has exposed as weakened and that decades of failed policy have exposed. Renewal is the foundation for everything else the Committee does.

Previously, the Committee spent much of its energy on what China does—espionage, influence operations, and subsidies, among other items—and less on what the United States must do to renew its own strength. And yet the competition will be decided by what the United States rebuilds at home. Whether the United States trains scientists, funds universities, rebuilds infrastructure, welcomes talent, and invests in its own future matters as much as any purely competitive policy.

All of these priorities have been tested by the Trump administration. But they were weakened even before the president returned to office. Federal research funding as a share of GDP is at some of its lowest levels ever, the country now graduates fewer STEM doctorates than China, U.S. immigration policy has turned away foreign-born talent, and U.S. infrastructure from power transmission to transportation is far behind China’s. None of this is the fault of China. And resolving it is central to maintaining U.S. prosperity, innovation, and technological leadership relative to China and other countries.

A Democratic-led Committee should make this connection explicit and hold hearings on how to achieve domestic renewal and restore U.S. competitiveness. Congressional committees will lead in many of these areas, but what the Select Committee can do is shine a light on how these efforts add up into a broader agenda at all levels of government.

Avoiding the second China Shock

In addition to building an affirmative agenda for U.S. renewal, the Select Committee should also consider a defensive one that can protect U.S. jobs, industrial capacity, and supply chains from the dire threat of China’s flood of subsidized exports. The public already understands that economics is a priority. A 2026 NPR/Chicago Council/Ipsos public opinion survey indicated that 56 percent of Americans believe the threat posed by China is chiefly economic, while only 29 percent believe it is the country’s growing military power. This matches most polling over the past decade.

The first China Shock, which followed Beijing’s accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001, cost the United States roughly two million jobs and some 60,000 factories per one leading study. This effect was concentrated in communities that have not recovered in the two decades since. The second may prove worse, hitting the high-value industries that survived, from automotives and biotechnology to aviation and pharma. At stake is the future of the U.S. economy and the livelihoods of tens of millions of Americans.

The policy debate has not caught up to China’s industrial challenge to American workers. Already, China manufactures twice what the United States does, more than the next eight to nine countries combined, and runs a global surplus in manufactured goods approaching $2 trillion. All of that is backstopped by $700 billion in annual industrial policy support, or about 5 percent of China’s GDP, according to CSIS: an amount no other country comes close to matching. These exports are devastating manufacturing in the United States, Europe, and even Japan and Korea. The result is that Americans lose critical industries and the jobs they produce while China becomes the monopoly provider of essential goods from the rare earth minerals manufacturers require to the essential medicines Americans take daily.

A Democratic-led Committee should make this challenge its first major target of inquiry. It should identify the industries and regions most exposed, examine how allied governments can coordinate to build scale together, and assess what combination of trade remedies, import controls, industrial policy, regulatory fixes, and domestic investment can avoid disaster. It should also consider how to raise labor standards to avoid race-to-the-bottom dynamics. Washington was unprepared for the first shock in part because its scale was not appreciated by Americans until the damage was done.

This time should be different. The Committee’s contribution would be to ensure that Congress acts on that foresight rather than reconstructing the consequences afterward.

Restoring human rights

The war in Gaza has restored human rights to the center of the U.S. foreign policy debate, in Congress, in the Democratic Party, and among the public, with an intensity not seen in a generation.

And yet paradoxically, on China, human rights have receded from the policy conversation. Congressional focus sometimes remains, but within the executive branch and policy community, human rights is an afterthought. The public has historically cared about this issue, and it is one where a Democratic-led Committee could find success. Asked by the Pew Research Center in 2021 to choose between promoting human rights in China and strengthening economic ties, seven in ten Americans chose human rights, even at a cost to the U.S.-China economic relationship. Pew’s 2023 poll found roughly half of Americans call China’s human rights policies a very serious problem for the United States. And younger Americans go further: in Pew’s 2024 survey of foreign policy priorities, adults under 30 ranked promoting human rights abroad higher than any older age group did.

Some believe that the United States may lack the power and the tools to directly change the human rights situation in China, but that does not mean human rights have no role in U.S.-China policy, and a critical question is how to relate to a country that engages in widespread human rights abuses. A Democratic-led Committee is precisely positioned to consider that question, elevate human rights on the policy agenda and integrate it across trade, investment, and security policies.

The Select Committee should consider whether China’s labor repression should shape trade policy, whether American bans on goods produced with forced labor is adequately enforced; whether the lapsed sanctions on those who eviscerated Hong Kong’s freedoms will be restored; whether export controls can be tightened to ensure technology and capital does not power China’s surveillance state; and whether American pension funds should hold the companies involved in repression within China and abroad. The key is to connect the decisions of the moment to the human rights considerations that successive administrations have often overlooked.

Members of the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party watch an introduction video about Chinese leadership during a hearing entitled "The Chinese Communist Party's Threat to America," in Washington, on February 28, 2023. 
Members of the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party watch an introduction video about Chinese leadership during a hearing entitled “The Chinese Communist Party’s Threat to America,” in Washington, on February 28, 2023. Nathan Howard / Reuters

Building allied scale

The Select Committee has historically focused more on China policy then on the mechanics of allied and partner cooperation that are central to it. At a time when U.S. alliances are essential for American renewal, but are under new stress from the Trump administration’s tariff actions and military threats, the Select Committee should make them a central focus of their work.

China’s advantage is scale. Its population is four times the United States’, its industrial base is twice as large, and its navy is the world’s largest. No country can balance China’s scale alone, but the United States can together with its allies and partners. That group – the United States and Canada, Mexico, the European Union, the UK, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Australia, New Zealand, and India – would account for three times China’s economic output, twice its defense spending, three times its top-cited scientific publications and active patents, and 50 percent more than its share of global manufacturing. This kind of “allied scale” is the one asset Beijing cannot replicate.

That scale is theoretical, and determining how to make it real is a task that exceeds any one committee’s reach and the executive branch’s capability. U.S. alliances and partnerships will have to evolve from being security arrangements to platforms for pooling industrial, technological, scientific, financial, and other capacity to match China. It has to be coordinated through arrangements that offer better terms to allies than to China so allied firms have paths to scale. Without such arrangements, China’s sheer mass will ensure it dominates the markets and technologies of the future. The Select Committee is the only body in Congress positioned to ask how allies and partners can look across multiple policy domains, and whether the allied sum adds up to a coalition that can actually balance out China.

The United States, of course, cannot always wait for its allies and partners to act before addressing the real and growing challenges posed by China’s power, policies, and increasingly provocative actions. In many cases, it will have to be an anchor for collective action, moving first and bringing others along in time. But the critical point is that coordination must be a higher priority if we are to be truly successful in the face of China’s unparalleled scale. 

Forging a realistic approach to cooperation

The Select Committee has not historically focused on diplomacy with China. In the past, it often attacked the Biden administration’s efforts to manage competition with China or to unlock cooperation on artificial intelligence as “zombie diplomacy.” But a Democratic-led Select Committee has an opportunity to change that. Instead of treating distance from China as a virtue, a Democratic-led Select Committee would ideally inform responsible great power management.

This next Select Committee could begin with the understanding that China is not going anywhere, and the United States and China must work to coexist. The two largest economies in the world will have to contend with macroeconomic challenges, a shared climate, breakthroughs in artificial intelligence, and promote strategic stability in the cyber and nuclear domains. At the same time, the United States cannot and should not let China demand bilateral concessions as a precondition for multilateral cooperation, and it must remain wary of Beijing’s tendency to let dialogue stand in for progress.

A Committee that only studies competition will never find out where cooperation is most feasible, what it should reasonably advance, how compliance might be verified, or how to make it durable. These are the kinds of questions that are increasingly urgent, particularly on artificial intelligence, where polls show the public wants Washington and Beijing to work together. Those questions are as deserving of rigorous examination as any other on the Committee’s docket.

A committee that meets the moment

Allowing the Select Committee’s authorization to lapse is not the answer. It deprives Congress of an institution that can consider China policy in its entirety at precisely a moment when the White House’s approach needs to be balanced and the policy stakes are rising. The scope of the issue requires concerted attention and action that only a dedicated committee can provide, and it would not be at odds with standing committees like Foreign Affairs and Armed Services, the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, or the Congressional-Executive Commission on China.

The better course is to renew and then repurpose the committee with a mandate equal to the moment: one focused on renewing the United States, safeguarding Americans from unfair competition, standing up for the persecuted, bringing together U.S. allies and partners, and considering a workplan for cooperation with Beijing on the issues that matter most.

And while the Select Committee has the potential to offer a Democratic conception of China policy, this does not have to be a polarizing effort. If Republicans are prepared to join this agenda, it could lead to a broader bipartisan agenda that meets the challenge and opportunities posed by China.

In the midterm elections, Democrats earned the right to offer their own vision of China policy in this Congress. By retaining the Select Committee, they have the best possible chance to ensure that vision shapes how the United States approaches the most important foreign policy issue of the twenty-first century.

This work represents the views solely of the author(s). The Council on Foreign Relations is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher, and takes no institutional positions on matters of policy.