Why Trump Should Reset Relations With Colombia, Not Abandon Them

When allies stop acting like allies, what should the United States do? That’s the challenge the Trump administration faces in Colombia. Long the United States’ closest regional ally, under President Gustavo Petro Colombia has pivoted toward China and seen coca growing zones increase by 70 percent. Ongoing cocaine and illegal gold mining booms are evaporating the hard-won security gains of the 2000s and 2010s—achieved with more than $10 billion in U.S. assistance—empowering gangs and cartels that threaten Colombia’s neighbors and the United States.

The Trump administration is right to aim for a reset, even before Colombians choose a new president in 2026. The question is how to do so effectively. The administration seems to favor blunt force: “decertifying” Colombia as a major drug war ally when it comes up for review in September. This would slash hundreds of millions in remaining foreign assistance, including ongoing support for the Colombian military and law enforcement.

This course of action will weaken the state and strengthen drug traffickers and armed groups. It will push Colombia’s military to search for new partners, costing the United States regional influence. It will worsen forced displacement by armed groups, possibly rekindling irregular U.S.-bound migration from Colombia, which was until recently one of the top sender countries globally. It is not clear it will weaken Petro or the left politically, if that is what the administration seeks. It may do the opposite.  

Another approach is possible: decertification accompanied by national interest waivers allowing certain types of assistance to continue. This is the way to reset relations with a historically strong U.S. ally without breaking them—and gambling on U.S. and regional security in the process.

Why A Reset is Necessary 

Each September, the White House publishes a list of major drug transit and major drug producing countries known as the “major’s list.” The list says whether countries have “failed demonstrably” in their bilateral and international counternarcotics commitments and are thus decertified, barring them from receiving U.S. aid or support for multilateral loans except on a case-by-case basis.

The United States hasn’t decertified Colombia since 1996—when President Ernesto Samper was credibly accused of financing his campaign with Cali Cartel drug money. But few doubt Trump is seriously considering the option, for several reasons.

First, coca cultivation and traffickers’ potential cocaine production have reached record highs under Petro, increasing by 10 percent and more than 50 percent, respectively, in 2023. Meanwhile, the number of coca hectares eradicated during Petro’s presidency has plummeted by nearly 80 percent. True, the Petro government has interdicted record amounts of processed cocaine, but given increased production, that’s just a fraction of the total. The lack of any effective strategy to suppress supply—almost 70 percent of coca is grown in Colombia—is empowering cartels, sowing instability exploited by adversaries, and fueling drug overdose deaths, exacting a heavy toll on the region and the United States.

Although decertification carries plenty of risks, it’s not unreasonable to ask whether U.S.-Colombia relations merits a reset—even a major one. Trump has considered decertification before. In 2017, as the coca boom gained force, he weighed the option but backed away because of the enduring and strong military-to-military ties and the fact that Colombia was approaching a presidential election.

Trump is more likely to decertify now, in part because Petro hasn’t done much to position himself as a U.S. ally. Petro has publicly opposed the United States on tariffs, migration, Venezuela’s Maduro regime, and extraditions. Recently he signed Colombia on to China’s Belt and Road Initiative and the BRICS-led New Development Bank (Republicans tried to dissuade him by leveraging decertification, but evidently this failed). Some in the administration may wish to punish Petro simply for being a leftist and for the recent bribery conviction of right-wing former President Álvaro Uribe, which Secretary of State Marco Rubio claimed was politicized. Petro seems to welcome the fight as a distraction from his inability to execute most of his domestic agenda, recently accusing the Trump administration of plotting to overthrow him, before walking the statement back.

Given all this, Trump might conclude the United States has little left to lose in Colombia. But that’s not the case. Fully cutting off the United States’ closest ally in Latin America—military, police, and prosecutors, included—is likely to make the continent more volatile and the United States less safe.

The Drawbacks of Full Decertification 

If Trump moves to decertify, he will have essentially two options: decertify completely, dramatically reducing U.S. assistance and cutting off multilateral lending support, or decertify with waivers that allow certain forms of assistance to continue.

The former option—a full cut-off—means ending hundreds of millions in assistance overnight in the midst of Colombia’s worst security crisis in over a decade. Forced confinement, extortion, and child recruitment into armed groups are all rising. The number of yearly ransom kidnappings and murder of members of the security forces have doubled and tripled, respectively, since last year. Membership in illegal armed groups and criminal organizations has increased 45 percent since Petro took office, reaching nearly 22,000 members.

Decertification without waivers will supercharge Colombia’s illegal armed groups and allow them to quickly expand control of territory.

Colombian security forces already face budgetary constraints that hinder their ability to effectively combat these groups. Termination of the assistance they receive from the U.S. State Department and Defense Department will further weaken them. Colombia’s fiscal deficit, which recently reached 6.7 percent of GDP, will also prevent the government from filling the security spending gaps left by the United States. 

Wholesale decertification will also deprive Colombia’s armed forces and police—including around 30 U.S.-vetted units—of vital intelligence and training as well as logistical and air support, disrupting currently routine joint operations against criminal groups. Recently appointed Defense Minister Pedro Sánchez—a retired general and pragmatist not from Petro’s inner circle—said that if Trump decertifies Colombia, it would not be able to contain its armed groups and U.S.-bound drug trafficking would surge. “The United States would not be stronger, more prosperous, or safer,” for it, he added—and he’s right.

Colombia is also the longtime hub for U.S. regional drug interdiction efforts, frequently coordinating and training its neighbors to stop U.S.-bound drug shipments. For instance, in July 2024, the Colombian Navy led Operation Orion, a 62-nation, 45-day operation that led to drug seizures totaling nearly $5 billon. According to the International Crisis Group’s Beth Dickinson, during the initial foreign assistance funding freezes earlier this year—a test run of what decertification could look like in practice—the sudden shutoff of State Department funding, a large percentage of which came from the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, meant the Colombian military learned of a large drug shipment headed through Costa Rica but was unable to coordinate its partners to stop it.

Wholesale decertification will mean more such coordination breakdowns, and the need to find a new regional hub for interdiction efforts. But it’s not clear what country could or would act as a substitute. In retaliation, Colombia might also comply with fewer U.S. extradition requests. Naturally, Petro and possibly his successor will look for other security partners. China has offered to sell Colombia military aircraft. Even if it’s not fully willing—and certainly not able—to provide the defense support currently provided by the United States, China or other countries that step up to provide hardware and training may gain leverage.

Decertification will also hurt the Colombian economy. According to Colombia Risk Analysis’ Sergio Guzmán, it may not cause a fire sale with many foreign investors prepared to wait and see on next year’s elections. But combined with recent decisions by Moody’s Ratings and S&P Global Ratings to downgrade the country’s credit score it is likely to sour the mood among investors—this at a time when foreign direct investment has declined for two years running and the International Monetary Fund has suspended access to an $8.1 billion credit line, a financial lifeline in the event of a crisis, increasing borrowing costs. A weaker Colombian economy could mean a rebound in irregular Colombian migration. U.S. Customs and Border Protection encountered Colombian migrants more than 430,000 times between FY2022 and FY2024. And if U.S. investors exit, it seems Colombia will inevitably join the rest of South America’s major economies in doing more of its trade with China.

Decertify, But Issue Waivers 

If the Trump administration moves to decertify, it should also issue either a national interest waiver or combination of waivers that allow continued funding for the Colombian military and law enforcement.

At the very least, the Trump administration should issue waivers that preserve assistance for intelligence collection and sharing, programs to enhance Colombian state presence in the countryside, implementation of the 2016 peace deal, prosecutor training, military and police training and salary support, and fuel supply and maintenance for Colombian aircraft. This is the bare minimum necessary to prevent a breakdown in order, and by no means an exhaustive list given the breadth and depth of the U.S.-Colombia security relationship at present. 

Assuming that a centrist or conservative pro-U.S. presidential candidate will win the 2026 election—allowing the Trump administration to immediately resume relations as normal afterwards—is a mistake. The presidential field is crowded and fragmented, with more than 60 candidates currently planning to compete. A July poll had Miguel Uribe Turbay, in critical condition after a June assassination attempt, leading the polls at just 13.7 percent. Petro’s base is still several times larger. The right or center may fail to unite, allowing Petro to rally his base behind a successor—especially if he can turn the vote into a referendum on Trump rather than his own presidency.

Full decertification is likely to strengthen Petro politically. Decertification with waivers, on the other hand, may motivate the government to get serious on the cocaine supply and security without creating a crisis that plays into Petro’s hands. 

The Trump administration should heed the lessons from the first time the United States decertified Colombia. The Clinton administration’s 1996 decertification of Colombia—at a time when narco-corruption was much more endemic, and decertification more merited—was a boon to the FARC. Coca production increased. The Colombian military and police were forced to buy certain maintenance parts commercially, some at a 150 percent markup over those previously sold to them by the U.S. government. In 1997, Clinton signed a waiver releasing $30 million in security aid. But by that point order had already substantially eroded. The United States would spend billions, in subsequent years, helping Colombia put it back together.

Trump risks repeating history. Fortunately, he can make a better choice.