How the U.S. Can Alter Putin’s Calculus on Ukraine

A string of recent reports has again raised the question of whether Russian President Vladimir Putin can be persuaded to back down from his maximalist demands and make the tough compromises needed to end the war in Ukraine.

In August, The Washington Post reported that Russians had withdrawn the equivalent of billions of dollars in recent months over concerns about the security of their funds. The news came against the backdrop of a stalled economy, with the nonmilitary sector almost certainly already in recession, starved of investment because of high interest rates and facing labor shortages as workers are sent to the front lines or into war production. Budgetary shortfalls are mounting. Ukrainian strikes deep inside Russia have debilitated a large share of the country’s oil refineries, leading to gasoline shortages. And attacks on storage facilities that underpin Russia’s vast e-commerce retail market have also taken a heavy toll.

The Limits of Pressure

Despite the growing pressures, some commentators suggest that almost nothing will alter the Kremlin’s course. Putinism, they argue, has consolidated as a regime that can survive only on perpetual conflict with the West.

Certainly, Russia has shown unexpected resilience and resourcefulness in dealing with the socioeconomic challenges it has faced. Most importantly, Putin can still mobilize the resources needed to prosecute the war. Defense spending now accounts for around 6-8 percent of Russia’s GDP and consumes more than 40 percent of the federal budget. While high, these figures are significantly lower than during the Cold War. Polls indicate growing discontent—and there has been some sharp public criticism of the war effort—but nothing suggests that this discontent can be mobilized for political purposes. The Kremlin’s multilayered repressive apparatus has effectively paralyzed whatever elite opposition there might be.

Harsher Western sanctions are not likely to materially change this reality. Efforts to cut off revenues from Russian energy exports, a significant source of funding for the federal budget, are problematic at a time of a worsening global energy crisis. U.S. President Donald Trump’s call for Ukraine to desist from attacking Russian refineries because of the negative consequences for diesel prices in the United States speaks volumes. Levying secondary sanctions against actors that indirectly support Russia’s war effort could damage U.S. relations with India and complicate those with China, among other consequences. Washington will not likely risk those relations in an uncertain attempt to induce greater flexibility in Russia’s negotiating position on Ukraine.

Putin’s regime would thus appear politically unimpaired in its effort to continue the war and unlikely to change course, especially when Putin himself believes time is on his side. And he is not necessarily wrong. Ukraine’s socioeconomic conditions are more dire than Russia’s, particularly following Russia’s devastating aerial bombardment of cities and critical infrastructure, even as Ukraine’s stockpile of interceptor missiles dwindles.

Meanwhile, it is not hard to imagine Europe’s critical support for Ukraine cracking as populist forces opposed to aid gain ground. The recent decisive state election victory of the Alternative for Germany, a hard-right force with pro-Russia sympathies, could be a harbinger of things to come. Most worrisome for Ukraine’s supporters is the possible victory of the hard right in France’s presidential election next spring.

Under these circumstances, it will be difficult to persuade Putin to rethink his war aims. But it is not impossible, and one country in particular has the wherewithal to cause Putin to recalculate his goals in Ukraine: the United States. Doing so would require a coherent strategy, like the one employed by the United States to end the Cold War. Such a strategy means deploying the full range of foreign-policy instruments to resist Russian aggression in Ukraine, deter Russia from committing malevolent acts against Europe, and restore constructive relations with Russia on a wide range of geopolitical and transnational matters.

Washington’s task is to reconfigure the matrix confronting Putin so that he concludes that ending the war short of achieving his maximal goals is his best geopolitical option.

The key is to recognize that Putin is not indifferent to the balance of geopolitical risks and opportunities. Washington’s task is to reconfigure the matrix confronting Putin so that he concludes that ending the war short of achieving his maximal goals is his best geopolitical option. It can do that through a well-crafted strategy consisting of three principles: resistance, deterrence, and dialogue.

Resistance

Resistance requires ample support for Ukraine’s war effort. Stalling Russia’s progress on the battlefield and reducing the effectiveness of its air strikes are essential to bringing the Kremlin to the negotiating table in earnest. To that end, the United States should continue to provide Ukraine the weaponry it requires indirectly, through its European allies, as it has from the start of the second Trump administration. The United States should also enhance its intelligence support while ensuring Ukraine has continued access to Starlink (and Russia does not), which is critical to its success on the battlefield.

Deterrence

This includes a range of activities to demonstrate that the United States, along with its European allies, is prepared to defend every inch of NATO territory. Further fortifying the long frontier between Russia and Europe remains indispensable. Europe itself must do most of the heavy lifting in removing bureaucratic obstacles and national preferences so that it effectively and efficiently expands and modernizes its defense-industrial base, but Washington’s support can facilitate progress. The United States and Europe must demonstrate their determination to win the arms race that is underway.

European governments also need to continue to show unity of purpose in countering Moscow and build the public support needed to thwart Russia’s escalating hybrid war tactics. It would help tremendously if the Trump administration refrained from rhetoric and actions that erode NATO’s credibility. But even if it doesn’t, embedded alliance structures can help shape a common understanding of the threat and coordinate responses.

Dialogue

Contrary to the prevailing view in Europe, resistance and deterrence cannot shift Russia’s position on the war, absent dialogue. The United States, in particular, can use dialogue to make clear to the Kremlin its continuing support for Ukraine and its determination to help Europe bolster its deterrence posture. It can also leverage talks to quietly foreshadow the further steps it is prepared to take to squeeze Russia geopolitically in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and even the former Soviet space should Moscow refuse to show more flexibility on the war.

More important, Washington can underscore its desire to normalize relations. The benefits of normalization for Putin are not to be underestimated. Psychologically, dealing with the United States as a seeming equal validates Russia as a great power and Putin as a major global leader. That is not insignificant for a country and leader that, for all their boastfulness, harbor doubts about Russia’s global standing, especially given the great asymmetry in power that divides Russia and the United States (and China, for that matter). In addition, normalization would serve two major geopolitical purposes: it would enable the Kremlin to rebalance its relations with China and thereby bolster its strategic autonomy, and it would provide the Kremlin the security guarantee it seeks against what it perceives as threats from Europe.

Using normalization to advance a resolution of the Russia-Ukraine war requires a well-crafted approach. Washington must lay the basis for this approach by taking the first steps toward normalization to convince the Kremlin that it is serious. Distrust is too profound for the Kremlin to take Washington’s promises at face value. But Washington must withhold the full benefits until the Kremlin acts in good faith to resolve the Russia-Ukraine war. As an example, the United States could agree to launch strategic stability talks with the understanding that no agreements would be reached until an enduring ceasefire had been put in place.

Together, resistance, deterrence, and dialogue could shift the geopolitical calculation for Putin by underscoring both the rising costs of seeking to achieve his maximal goals in Ukraine and the tremendous benefits he could gain for Russia’s global standing from abandoning them for a settlement that he could still proclaim as a major victory. Much, of course, would depend on Putin’s response to this strategy. But it is a more promising—and realistic—option than assuming the United States has no choice but to prepare for perpetual war, or banking on a straightforward victory if only a little more pressure could be applied to Putin.