How America Can Win in Space to Protect Taiwan and Beyond

If China were to move toward attacking Taiwan, the first blows might not come from the sea or the air, but rather from space. Chinese ground lasers could incapacitate U.S. satellites providing imagery of the areas around Taiwan and Taiwan itself. Meanwhile, Chinese satellites equipped for close-range maneuvers could disrupt or destroy U.S. satellites that support critical military operations around Taiwan, like the systems used for precise weapons targeting and secure communications between ships, aircraft, and ground forces. Those communications systems provide the United States and its allies with navigation and real-time intelligence. Without them, U.S. forces and their allies would struggle to coordinate or respond in the event of a Taiwan conflict, potentially fighting blind.   

Military experts have warned that losing access to these systems would severely hinder operations by the United States, Taiwan, and its partners if there were a conflict with China. Indeed, if this were to happen, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) could gain a major advantage in the Taiwan Strait. This could shape the outcome before it begins.

Today, the United States military relies on its space-based satellites for a wide range of missions. These include: taking detailed images of Earth (geospatial intelligence); guiding missiles to targets that are far beyond the line of sight; maintaining secure, reliable communications across a wide area on Earth; and much more. But this dominance of space may well prove to be the Achilles’ heel for the United States. If the U.S. military lost its space-based capabilities, it would struggle to track enemy ships, guide missiles, coordinate forces across vast distances, and lose critical communications, making defeat more likely.  

Winning in space, however, would give both the United States and Taiwan a fighting chance in a conflict with China. In April 2025, the U.S. Space Force released its warfighting doctrine for space. In 22 pages, the country’s newest military service, the Space Force, sets out an ambitious goal of maintaining “space superiority”: ensuring the full use of outer space for all branches of the U.S. armed forces, across all domains (e.g., sea, land, air, and space) while denying the same to an adversary. The doctrine sets forth how the U.S. military plans to maintain an advantage in space, including protecting its satellites, disrupting or defending against adversarial space systems, and keeping open the pathways satellites use to send data and relay signals.

The Space Force’s new doctrine lays out how the U.S. military plans to fight and win in space. That framework is essential, but it is only the military aspect. To stay ahead of China, the U.S. needs a long-term national strategy that guides investments, technology, and partnerships critical for defense. China is halfway through its five-year national strategy for outer space, but has already met many of its technological milestones. It has expanded its launch vehicle family, upgraded its satellite services, and built new commercial launch pads to support faster and more frequent missions into Earth orbits and beyond.

China’s space milestones, such as its Tiangong space station and experimental modules, as well as returning lunar samples from the far side of the Moon, may seem distant from today’s issues. However, they show China’s determination to master advanced space operations that could reshape the military balance of power on Earth. It proves China seeks to outperform and even surpass the United States in space superiority, giving it the technological “high ground” in everything from space-based sensors to guidance and navigation for warships.

The Space Force’s doctrine outlines how to achieve and defend space superiority in war. It is now up to the rest of the U.S. government to provide the blueprint for advancing space technology and sustaining investments needed to keep the United States and its allies ahead in the long run. A long-term U.S. national strategy to guide technical priorities, investments, and global partnerships is required. Here’s how:

First, expand the Artemis Accords to create an Artemis Alliance. The Artemis Accords are a set of agreements signed by 56 countries that commit to principles of peaceful and cooperative behavior in space. An Artemis Alliance would go further by adding a security dimension. This defense alliance would be dedicated to deterring aggression and upholding norms in orbit and would complement the Space Force’s International Partnership Strategy, which highlights that America cannot preserve space superiority on its own and must work closely with allies and partners. China is rapidly expanding its circle of partners in space, signing bilateral partnerships with emerging space powers and recruiting more countries to its joint lunar research base with Russia. An Artemis Alliance would support the collective power of its members, presenting a united front promoting stability in space.

Second, empower the National Space Council to drive U.S. space policy. The United States should make a clear and lasting commitment to empowering the National Space Council to drive its space policy. Earlier this year, reports suggested that the White House considered abolishing the Council entirely, only to later signal plans to revive it. The Council needs to be institutionally strengthened, though that may be difficult moving forward, given shifting priorities between future administrations. It also suffers from a perception problem, often viewed as a low priority within the executive branch.

Strengthening the Council would require more frequent vice-presidential meetings and the revival of Space Policy Directives: formal executive guidance that spells out clear goals, technical standards, and agency responsibilities across civil, commercial, and defense space sectors. On top of this, the administration should elevate the Council’s standing within the White House by giving it a stronger role in coordinating policy across the U.S. government. Without this kind of structure, U.S. space policy risks becoming disjointed and reactive. The Space Force’s doctrine offers military guidance for war. However, it does not set national goals, technical standards, or agency responsibilities across the broader civil and commercial space sectors—a gap the National Space Council is uniquely positioned to fill.

Under the first Trump administration, Vice President Mike Pence chaired eight public National Space Council meetings, culminating in seven Space Policy Directives that tackled issues like lunar exploration, space traffic management, cybersecurity, and the establishment of the Space Force. Once the Biden administration took office, Vice President Harris led three public Council meetings, a marked reduction in frequency and visibility. Under the second Trump administration, the Council remains dormant and without clear leadership.

Under the Biden administration, the Council shifted away from issuing Space Policy Directives and instead introduced a Space Priorities Framework in 2021 along with National Security Memoranda to guide space strategy. While these tools carry legal weight, they cover wide-ranging topics and do not spell out specific technical standards or agency responsibilities that Space Policy Directives once did. As a result, the Council’s role as the coordinator of U.S. space policy diminished.

Third, maintain U.S. dominance by leveraging the private sector. A thriving commercial space ecosystem has taken shape in sectors like remote sensing, launch, and advanced technologies. This commercial ecosystem is possible thanks to investments by NASA, the National Science Foundation, and other agencies in early-stage commercial research and development. The United States continues to outpace global competitors in government-funded defense-related space investments, spending $73 billion in 2024 on technology like new satellites for communication, navigation, and missile warning, as well as new launch systems. With $19.8 billion in government spending, China is closing the gap as the second-largest defense investor. China has made notable progress in technologies like laser communications, reusable launch systems, and satellite constellations. 

To maintain its lead, the United States must actively support the commercial space sector and preserve channels for public-private collaboration. The decision to disband the Advisory Committee on Excellence in Space (ACES) in early 2025 removed a key venue for industry input on regulation and innovation in an effort to reduce government spending. Without structured interactions with the private sector, the U.S. government risks slowing progress in advancing its space capabilities and losing influence over future space norms.

Congress has made clear its preference for continued investment in commercial space. It included $10 billion in supplemental funding for NASA in the recent reconciliation bill, including funding for upcoming Artemis missions and a commercial Mars telecommunications orbiter. Both chambers marked up bipartisan appropriations bills that include steady topline funding for NASA, including continued partnerships with industry. Reestablishing forums like ACES would help align federal policy with industry advances and Congressional intent, and help ensure U.S. leadership in space for many more years.

Fourth, do not cede the moon to China. Maintaining space superiority in the long run will require that the United States return to the lunar surface. An American presence on the moon is a stepping stone to Mars, with lunar resources potentially sustaining a human presence and supporting deep-space missions. The lunar poles, for example, may hold ice deposits that can be converted into water, oxygen, and even fuel. Moreover, the United States could also avert strategic surprise, allowing America to monitor Chinese activity on the lunar poles and the far side of the moon. Just as important, whoever establishes a lasting presence on the moon helps set the rules for how the area is used.

If China establishes a permanent presence on the moon first, it could shape norms that serve its own interests and limit U.S. and allied access in the future. The expense of lunar exploration may seem high, but history shows that investments in frontier space programs like Apollo and the ISS produce transformative technologies in areas like healthcare, defense, and communications. One example of many: NASA created water recycling and filtration systems to turn astronaut wastewater into safe drinking water on the Space Station. These technologies are now used in portable filters and clean water systems for disaster relief and remote communities. A successful lunar effort could likely deliver similar breakthroughs while ensuring the United States can monitor and counter adversarial activities.

Of course, the United States may not outpace China in every domain, but the moon is one of the decisive arenas where an early presence is essential. Ceding that ground would carry consequences beyond prestige and affect resources, access, and the norms that will govern space for decades. If China becomes the leader in space, the effects may undoubtedly impact Earth from the Taiwan Strait to America’s ability to defend itself and its allies. The choices the United States makes now could decide whether it retains the ability to shape space access and governance or relinquishes that role to its competitors.

Andrew Hanna is a former congressional staffer with the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee who worked on international space issues.

Kathleen Curlee is a research analyst at Georgetown University’s Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET).